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“‘The Negro had been run over long enough by white men, and it was time they defend 
themselves’: African-American Mutinies and the Long Emancipation, 1861-1974” 
 
Scott F. Thompson 
 
This dissertation analyzes racially motivated mutinies by black military servicemen from 
the Civil War to the Vietnam War. Resistance against white supremacy in the armed forces 
illustrates the commitment of generations of African Americans to a vision of freedom centered 
on bodily, familial, and socioeconomic autonomy. These mutinies thereby warrant the reframing 
of emancipation as a centuries’-long process rather than a single event confined to the 1860s. 
Subscribing to martial masculinity, black servicemen believed acting forcefully, and risking their 
lives or well-being as a result, offered the best path to earning their human rights. African-
American sailors enjoyed the opportunities offered by the integrated pre-1900 U.S. Navy to such 
an extent that no unequivocal racially-motivated black naval mutinies exist in the period’s 
historical record. Yet, once the Navy designated separate spaces and roles based on race during 
the Jim Crow years, ships and ports began producing their own black rebellions. Meanwhile, 
mutinies and race riots populate the history of African Americans in the U.S. Army. From the 
time black men started serving in uniform in a permanent capacity, such offenses as unequal 
compensation, controversial orders, and physical abuse inspired them to revolt. Though black 
soldiers accused of mutiny generally enjoyed unprecedented legal rights in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the Jim Crow era brought a sharp erosion in the government’s enforcement 
of due process rights in court-martial proceedings. Finally, despite civil rights gains during and 
after World War II, racial tensions remained acute enough to overwhelm the armed forces with 
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In the fall of 1898, while training at Camp Poland, Tennessee, to fight in the Spanish-
American War, men of the all-black Sixth Virginia Volunteers mutinied rather than allow the 
Army to compel them to serve under white officers. As blacks began receiving officer 
commissions in the late nineteenth-century, African-American soldiers cherished the right to 
have those of their own race finally command them. Such an arrangement fulfilled a main goal 
of African Americans who toppled slavery a generation prior: bodily autonomy from white 
overlords. Initially, black officers led the Sixth Virginia. However, white Colonel Richard 
Clayborne Croxton, the regiment’s commander, wanted to inspect the “fitness, qualification and 
conduct” of nine black officers on the suspicion that they were delaying the progress of the 
regiment’s training. These men resigned in protest. Among them was Major William H. Johnson, 
who explained their decision: “knowing that I have no redress from the decision of the (review) 
board as named; and being persuaded that this order for me means nothing more or less than an 
outing from the regiment as a Major, I hereby tender my resignation.” The high command 
replaced the departed with whites. Arguing that the Army had violated an essential term of their 
enlistment, and feeling insulted at enduring such treatment after they left their jobs and families 
to answer their country’s call to serve, eight hundred enlisted troops refused to drill. As one 
soldier told a black newspaper, “not a man would move” and they “hooted and hissed” at their 
new white superiors. The black Virginians added to their rebellious reputation by violating 
segregation ordnances when their unit subsequently moved to a camp in Georgia. As 
punishment, authorities disarmed and arrested the entire “Mutinous Sixth,” a nickname its troops 
2 
 
earned from their resistance to white supremacy. To neutralize this disciplinary problem, the 
Army simply mustered out the Sixth in January 1899.1  
When members of the “Mutinous Sixth” chose to defy their commanders and disrupted 
the regular order of military life, they did not merely express frustration with their superiors’ 
policies and actions in an antagonistic manner. Rather, they fought a single battle in a centuries’-
long conflict in which uniformed African-American men struggled to expand the degree to 
which they enjoyed bodily autonomy, family stability, and socioeconomic independence. This 
set of goals sat at the heart of what bondspeople envisioned when they dreamed of or 
experienced liberation. Emancipation unfolded as an extensive and convoluted process, with 
different individuals realizing this vision to varying degrees based on time, location, class, or 
mere luck. This aspect of emancipation necessitates us to view it as not a single event—the 
collapse of bondage’s final remnants during the Civil War and the social revolution it spawned—
but as a long-term process. It was in the implementation of this “long emancipation” that several 
generations of blacks serving in the U.S. armed forces—on land and water, stateside and 
overseas, in peace and war—rebelled against tyrannical white officers and racist white civilians.  
In framing emancipation in this manner, the dissertation joins a recent trend in the 
scholarship. The current author’s terminology draws from Ira Berlin’s 2015 work, The Long 
 
1 “Ham” to Richmond Planet, October 15, 1898, in “Smoked Yankees” and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from 
Negro Soldiers, 1898-1902, Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., ed. (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1987), 
126-127 (first quote on 126); “Ham” to Richmond Planet, November 5, 1898, in ibid., 131-134 (third quote on 131); 
“A Black Man” to Richmond Planet, December 10, 1898, in ibid., 140-144; “Ham” to Richmond Planet, December 
10, 1898, in ibid., 144-146; “A Black Man” to Richmond Planet, December 24, 1898, in ibid., 146-150; “Ham” to 
Richmond Planet, December 17, 1898, in ibid., 151-153; “Ham” to Richmond Planet, January 7, 1899, in ibid., 153-
154; Major Letter from William A. Johnson et. al., November ?, 1898, quoted in Sgt. 1st Class Terra C. Gatti, 
“Virginia’s African American Militiamen: Remembering the 6th Virginia Volunteers,” February 20, 2018, 
https://vaguard.dodlive.mil/2018/02/20/11058/ (second quote). Sixty years after his regiment’s mutiny, Sergeant 
John H. Allen considered himself “lucky” because the actions of him and his comrades neither brought a firing 
squad nor dishonorable discharges. Quoted in C. G. Krüger and S. Levsen, War Volunteering in Modern Times: 
From the French Revolution to the Second World War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 103.  
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Emancipation, which explores the eighty-year struggle to destroy bondage from the American 
Revolution to the Civil War. Similarly, this dissertation’s time period builds on the contributions 
of the 2016 anthology Rethinking American Emancipation. Beginning where Berlin left off, its 
authors examine the final abolition of slavery in the 1860s and then connect it to postbellum 
American society and politics. Racially-motivated mutinies by black servicemen offer a window 
into the military and social history of the long emancipation studied by the above volumes. Even 
if slavery as an institution died by 1865, the emancipation process continued as several 
generations of African Americans—the formerly enslaved and their descendants—revolted 
against real and perceived remnants of bondage in the armed forces and in civilian life.2   
This dissertation formulates a theoretical definition of what constitutes a mutiny and what 
it means for a particular socioeconomic, political, and/or cultural group to conduct one. Among 
the various forms of resistance oppressed peoples employ against the sources of their 
subordination, the mutinous type contains ambiguities, shares parallels with others, and generally 
lacks a consensus understanding. Historians and contemporaries have devised multiple meanings 
with varying degrees of utility. The main determiners in shaping how this work defines “mutiny” 
are how participants and witnesses understood confrontational behavior among servicemen, as 
well as the effects such conduct had on a military base and its surroundings. 
When a serviceman engaged in mutiny, it entailed an aggressive questioning of or refusal 
to recognize the authority of one’s superior officers in order to compel a revision in their unit’s 
 
2 Ira Berlin, The Long Emancipation: The Demise of Slavery in the United States (Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2015; William A. Link, “African Americans and the Long Emancipation,”167-186, Paul Ortiz, 
“Washington, Toussaint, and Bolivar, ‘The Glorious Advocates of Liberty’: Black Internationalism and 
Reimagining Emancipation,” 187-215, and Laura F. Edwards, “Epilogue: Emancipation and the Nation,” 252-269 
Rethinking American Emancipation: Legacies of Slavery and the Quest for Black Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). As Edwards accurately notes, wartime abolition was “one among many points in a much 
longer journey about what America would be without slavery,” 252. Also see Patrick Rael, Eighty-Eight Years: The 
Long Death of Slavery in the United States, 1777-1865 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015). 
4 
 
or military branch’s customs, policies, or command decisions. Mutineers belligerently denied the 
right of their superiors to give certain orders, to direct their men’s physical movement, and/or to 
punish the rank-and-file for crimes. A mutiny exceeded insubordination, disobedience of orders, 
or an absence without leave, even if many mutineers technically committed at least one of these 
lesser actions. Rather, a mutiny more deeply tried to subvert the military command structure. 
Most saw the use of hostile language by the perpetrator(s), including profanity and serious 
threats. Some mutineers attempted to correct injustices by applying force. Physical actions 
included freeing an imprisoned comrade or using a weapon on superiors. When in August 1865, 
enlisted men in the Twelfth U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery fixed bayonets and loaded muskets at 
their Kentucky fort, the incident, as officers later testified, “cannot be called anything else than a 
mutiny.” Even if a serviceman did not use hostile language or threaten to act violently, the action 
can still fall within the realm of mutiny if perpetrators disrupted the regular flow of military duty 
as a means of demanding an improvement in how commissioned officers treated enlisted men. A 
non-violent form of mutiny entailed soldiers, sailors, or airmen refusing to perform duties, 
neglecting to man stations, stacking their arms, or organizing unauthorized meetings with 
comrades. During an 1873 Buffalo Soldier episode in Texas, one participant denied that he was a 
mutineer because he had been unarmed. Yet, because enlisted men illegally organized and spoke 
with antagonistic words, white officers and black troops who refused to join the movement alike 
viewed it as a mutiny because of its levelling nature. Whatever action a mutineer committed, it 
had the effect of weakening discipline and eroding hierarchy, either concretely or symbolically. 
Mutinies could be spontaneous or premeditated and involve anywhere from a single individual to 
numerous personnel. For the sake of prose variety, and to compare mutinies to other types of 
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resistance, this dissertation uses the following synonyms: “revolt,” “rebellion,” “insurrection,” 
and “uprising.”3  
Racially-motivated mutinies by people of African descent warrant their own topic of 
analysis. To be sure, armed forces throughout world history have their own record of mutinying. 
Black mutinies, however, possessed an extra layer connected to the history of African-American 
resistance to white supremacy. This racial element resulted from most black combatants serving 
under prejudiced white commanders and living in an intolerant society. Black mutineers tended 
to view injustices as not just a superior’s abuse of power, but discrimination. Maltreatments that 
drove a serviceman to revolt against his commanders—inadequate compensation, physical abuse, 
unpopular orders, etc.—were that much more threatening to blacks than whites because they too 
closely resembled the oppression blacks had encountered elsewhere in everyday life. 
When they stood as defendants in a court-martial, mutineers were charged with a range of 
specific offenses. In addition to “mutiny,” their commanders could accuse them of disobeying 
orders, physically attacking a superior, “insubordinate conduct,” and “conduct to the prejudice of 
good order and military discipline.” Specifications for these lesser offenses could indicate that 
the defendant had engaged in “mutinous behavior” or “mutinous conduct,” had used “mutinous 
language,” incited mutiny, or had failed to suppress a mutiny. Even if the court never included 
the word “mutiny” or a derivative thereof, numerous cases document incidents similar in 
character to those in which court-martial judges and witnesses did speak of a “mutiny” or a 
“mutinous” affair.  
 
3 Proceedings of a GCM, Trial of Private James Thornton, et. al., August 24-September 17, 1865, RG 153, MM-
3004, NARA (quote); Nicholas Eskow, “Sympathy for the Loss of a Comrade: Black Citizenship and the 1873 Fort 
Stockton ‘Mutiny,’” UC Berkley, 2018, 28, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9nf8t9v5.   
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 Defining what constitutes a mutiny becomes a difficult task when one factors in the 
images people conjure up in their minds. As many still do today, Americans tended to define 
mutiny exclusively as the revolt of civilian or naval sailors against their captains. Thus, the most 
common image is the maritime setting. When civilians rebel, observers call the ones on the water 
“mutinies” while not designating identical land-based actions with the term. This form of mutiny 
permeates historical fiction.4 Yet, most black military mutinies occurred on land. 
During the nineteenth century, “mutiny” often meant something other than its literal 
definition. In their political rhetoric, Americans frequently invoked mutiny in metaphorical 
terms. People used the ship-based form of mutiny when commenting on intra-political party 
divisions and the secession crisis. In the summer of 1866, a court opinion reflected on the Civil 
War, a time when the “ship of state freighted with the hopes of human liberty” was “tossed about 
upon an angry ocean, its crew in mutiny, its sails gone, and itself a helpless wreck.” A “mutiny” 
could also refer to any popular movement against a government, like the Lincoln administration, 
or a social institution, like slavery. Also, observers referred to India’s 1857 revolt against British 
colonial rule as the “Indian Mutiny.” With Americans equating mutiny with political division 
and social unrest, we get a sense of why the choice to commit this crime was serious and risky.5   
 
4 In a case in point, when the current author informed a graduate student colleague of his dissertation topic in 2015, 
the latter assumed the former was studying maritime mutinies exclusively. For a literary example, see James 
Norman Hall and Charles Bernard Nordhoff, Mutiny on the Bounty (Boston, New York, and London: Little, Brown 
& Company, 1932). 
5 In the wake of the Democratic Party’s sectional splintering during the 1860 election campaign, John J. Crittenden 
noted at a convention of pro-Stephen Douglas delegates that they, “considered the Breckinridge men as mutineers in 
the ship of Democracy who should be thrown overboard.” In 1870, reflecting on the partisanship of the last decade, 
the Indianapolis Journal referred to the GOP strategy as throwing a “an unfaithful Jonah” overboard, and the 
Democracy’s plan as one in which the crewmen “get up a mutiny, cut each other’s throats, and sink the vessel and 
her cargo.” At least twice in the 1870s, Democratic newspapers described Republican infighting as mutinies. In 
February 1861, as hostilities approached, Democrats in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, held a convention at 
Harrisburg. As a tempest rocked the country’s “ship of state,” the convention’s speaker noted, “the crew, whose duty 
it was, to man the noble vessel, and to steer her clear of the dangers of the deep, has broken into open mutiny, and in 
their mad efforts to gain the mastery of the ship, have scuttled her and left her to drift at the mercy of the winds and 
waves.” See Staunton Spectator, Volume 37, Number 35, 21 August 1860, https://virginiachronicle.com/cgi-
bin/virginia?a=d&d=SS18600821.1.2.; Indianapolis Journal, December 2, 1870; “The First Funeral By Fire,” 
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For literal mutinies, the U.S. armed forces have struggled to settle on a consistent 
definition. When white Captain Joseph Smoot of the frigate United States faced accusations in 
1849 of failing to suppress a mutiny, other officers disagreed whether the incident—a work 
stoppage for an advance of wages—constituted a mutiny. Some noted that since naval 
regulations failed to provide a clear definition, captains had the discretion to decide for 
themselves when their men had crossed into mutinous territory. Others countered that the 
following definition from a federal court opinion regarding merchant ships applied to naval 
vessels: “not…simple disobedience of orders, nor…the mere exhibition of turbulence or 
violence, but…organized and concerted resistance to lawful authority, aiming at the 
subversion…of the power of those legally entitled to command.” Similar to this latter view, in 
1896, West Point law professor William Winthrop contended that mere insubordination fell short 
of a mutiny. To reach that level, belligerents needed to try to “usurp, subvert or override” their 
superiors’ authority as commanding officers. The Winthrop standard formed the basis of the 
crime’s definition in the U.S. Navy’s 1937 Naval Courts and Boards, Section 46. The current 
work finds “usurp, subvert or override” the most useful principle.6   
Whatever the specific definition, the military branches have always taken the crime of 
mutiny so seriously that they reserve the worst punishments for it, including death. As the cases 
 
Columbus Daily Enquirer, July 30, 1876; “The Man on Horseback,” Princeton Union Democrat, January 29, 1870; 
“Mutiny in the Republican Camp,” Jefferson City Peoples Tribune, July 26, 1876; “Letter from Ohio,” Aurora 
Dearborn Independent, October 30, 1873; Valley Spirit, February 20, 1861, 
http://valley.lib.virginia.edu/news/vs1861/pa.fr.vs.1861.02.20.xml#04; Valley Spirit, July 04, 1866, 
http://valley.lib.virginia.edu/news/vs1866/pa.fr.vs.1866.07.04.xml#01 (first quote); Staunton Spectator, September 
3, 1861, http://valley.lib.virginia.edu/news/ss1861/va.au.ss.1861.09.03.xml#01 (second quote); James Kennedy, The 
Great Indian Mutiny of 1857: Its Causes, Features, and Results (London: Ward and Co., 1858); “Additional from 
Europe the Mutiny in India Important Debates in Parliament the Anglo-African Slave Trade,” New York Herald, 
July 15, 1857, https://infoweb-newsbank-com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/apps/readex/; "Narrative of William W. 
Brown," The Liberator, July 30, 1847.  
6 James E. Valle, Rocks & Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861 (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1980), 120-121 (quote); Navy Department, Naval Courts and Boards: 1937: With Table of Corresponding 
Sections 1937 and 1923 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1944), 14. 
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featured in this dissertation reveal, if convicted mutineers avoided execution, they could expect a 
dishonorable discharge and a period of hard labor. The Army considered mutineers more 
deserving of capital punishment during times of war and insurrection. Since Florida officially 
remained in a state of rebellion despite the end of the Civil War several months prior, the Army’s 
justice system chose death for six mutinous USCTs in October 1865. Due to mutiny’s place in 
the range of unlawful behavior, some individual officers decided to quell them outside of the 
court-martial system, especially in the Navy, where the standard practice was to place offenders 
in irons, whip them, or informally execute them. One wonders how many African-American 
military mutinies happened but did not make it into the historical record because superiors 
informally quelled them, giving writers less motivation to document them.7 
Scholars have also struggled to narrow or expand the behaviors falling under mutiny. A 
1914 work on naval courts-martial referred to events where sailors merely halted their duties as 
“so-called mutinies [that] were in fact simply strikes”; to be an actual mutiny, the men would 
have sought to take power of the ship. On the other end of the spectrum are two studies of the 
topic in a 2001 edited volume that crafted overly broad definitions, classifying Confederate 
Army deserters and Italian partisans as mutineers. In between these two extremes are Christopher 
M. Bell and Bruce A. Elleman’s definition—“a deliberate act of collective insubordination 
against lawful naval authority”—and Cornelis J. Lammers’ argument that due to shared 
collective goals—improving interests and acquiring autonomy—“work stoppage’’ and ‘‘seizure 
of power” constitute two types of mutiny. Both framings closely match that of the current 
 
7 War Department, Revised United States Army Regulations of 1861 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1863), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/AGY4285.0001.001?rgn=main;view=fulltext; Navy Department, 
Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States: 1876 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1877), 173; John F. Fannin, “The Jacksonville Mutiny of 1865,” Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 88 
(Winter 2010): 368-396; Cornelius J. Lammers, review of Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in 
Comparative Perspective, by Jane Hathaway, International Review of Social History Volume 48, Issue 3 (December 
2003), 479.  
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project. That officers in both the Army and Navy treated work stoppages and violent seizures of 
power by African-American servicemen with similar levels of seriousness, and that both 
activities brought the flow of military duties to a halt, suggests that the boundary between 
“strike” and “mutiny” is a blurred one. Yet, scholars’ emphasis on the collective nature of 
mutinies proves only partly accurate, since servicemen acting individually could also revolt 
against lawful authority, scaring their superiors into subduing them to prevent the ill-discipline 
from spreading. The current work disputes naval historian James Valle’s assertion that violent, 
disrespectful behavior from individual enlisted men against their superiors fails to qualify as a 
“real mutiny” because these actions “threatened their (officers’) status and image rather than the 
actual safety of their ships.” While cases fitting Valle’s description exist, he paints with too 
broad a brush. Bloody insubordination by a single soldier or sailor may not have the same 
tangible effect as a large collection of men trying to seize command over their base, but these 
former incidents nevertheless represented a challenge to the military command structure.8  
 
8 William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (BeardBooks: Washington, D.C., 1896); U.S. Navy, Naval 
Courts and Boards, Section 46, 1937; David Hannay, Naval Courts Martial (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1914), 117 (first quote); Jane Hathaway, ed., Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative 
Perspective (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2001); Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An 
International Perspective, Christopher M. Bell and Bruce A. Elleman, eds. (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2003), 1-3 (second quote); Cornelius J. Lammers, “Strikes and Mutinies: Comparative Study of 
Organizational Conflicts between Rulers and Ruled,” Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 1969): 
562–565 (third quote); James Valle, Rocks and Shoals, 117, 123. For an example of Valle’s point, see Records of 
the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), Court of Inquiry, April 21, 1862, Box 89, file no. 3111, RG 125, 
National Archives and Record Administration (NARA). A “mutinous riot and affray” occurred on the bark 
Fernandina off Wilmington, North Carolina, in April 1862, prompting a court of inquiry. The ship’s officers tried 
stopping a crowd of men from loudly and drunkenly “skylarking.” One perpetrator told an officer “Browne, you son 
of a bitch, I will kill you. You are not worthy to wipe my a-se” before attacking him. As the incident escalated, 
officers received an order to arm themselves because “some of the men were inclined to mutiny.” Eventually, an 
officer “considered the ship to be in a complete state of mutiny.” The alleged mutineers included William Hillman 
(fair complexion, captain of the maintop), John Hillman (dark complexion, from Wellfleet, Massachusetts, enlisted 
in 1855 at age 22), Michael Heeney (dark complexion but from Ireland or a white New Yorker and captain of the 
guard), and Charles Mowatt (florid sailor from Baltimore or New York). The last man listed above angrily refused 
to put irons on Heeney, declaring that such a task was the master-at-arm’s job. The court-martial ruled that the 
events failed to meet mutiny status. 
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Acts of resistance that only indirectly subverted officers’ authority further complicate the 
task of defining African-American mutinies. Black soldiers performing occupation duties in all 
eras frequently encountered the second nemesis of the long emancipation: white civilians. When 
this group made black servicemen feel threatened, abused, or discriminated against, and they felt 
that their officers failed to adequately protect them from such mistreatment, they resisted through 
race riots. These armed clashes between stationed black troops and white community members 
blur with mutinies because they shared the same motivations, tactics, rhetoric, and goals. At 
times they merged with each other, as exemplified by Houston in 1917.  
The author joins the small number of scholars who explore the question of why under 
certain circumstances, mutinies did not occur. Raymond Callahan argues that despite colonial 
discrimination and hardship, Indian soldiers during the world wars avoided mutinying because of 
not only the prospect of independence, but also because mobilization bolstered men’s social 
status and expanded their opportunities. Likewise, the current project explores why no recorded 
mutinies can be found for certain African-American Army units and numerous generations of the 
Navy’s black personnel.9 
The personalities, decisions, and surrounding contexts of uniformed African Americans 
who did mutiny touch on an abundance of topics in social, cultural, political, and military history 
fields. Among these topics is the masculine side of gender history. The main justifications that 
USCTs, Buffalo Soldiers, and black sailors gave for their acts of resistance drew on nineteenth-
century notions of masculinity. American men in general linked manhood with someone who 
defended the honor and well-being of their families and sweethearts. Historians of black Civil 
War soldiers document how the desire to become and act like a man motivated these troops to 
 
9 Raymond Callahan, “The Indian Army, Total War, and the Dog that Didn’t Bark in the Night,” in Christopher M. 
Bell and Bruce A. Elleman, eds., Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century, chapter 7. 
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fight for their and their loved ones’ emancipation. By putting on a uniform and thereby 
transforming into men, African Americans disproved the white belief that they were perpetual 
children or subhuman. A source of mutiny was how white officers from the upper and middle 
class sought to instill refined manners through regulations and courts-martial, which clashed with 
the rougher masculinity of working-class enlistees. Using the case of Frederick Douglass, who 
physically brawled with an overseer, A. Kristen Foster examines a martial masculine form of 
citizenship to which many African Americans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
subscribed. As Foster shows, after initially promoting a universal citizenship based on natural 
law, by the late-antebellum period, Douglass contended that African-American men, like he did, 
needed to commit violence. Doing so would counter a post-revolutionary model of American 
republican citizenship that excluded them. For Douglass, the black soldier best symbolized 
republican manhood because he courageously defended the nation and willingly fought for 
himself, his country, and his family. As Kellie Carter Jackson uncovers, numerous other black 
abolitionists concluded that violence, not moral suasion, was the most effective method of 
liberating their people. For servicemen, their choice to mutiny against unfavorable conditions 
was consistent with trying to remain committed to this masculine ideal.10  
Observers and scholars sometimes recognize a darker side of martial manhood. Carole 
Emberton expands on W.E.B. Du Bois’ remark in Black Reconstruction that “only murder makes 
men,” referring to the idea that African-American men could only prove themselves worthy of 
 
10 Reid Mitchell, The Vacant Chair: The Northern Soldier Leaves Home (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); 
Stephen W. Berry, All That Makes a Man: Love and Ambition in the Civil War South (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); Jim Cullen, “‘I’s a Man Now’: Gender and African American Men,” in Catherine Clinton and Nina 
Silber, eds., Divided Houses: Gender and the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 76-91; Lorien 
Foote, The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union Army (New York and London: 
New York University Press, 2010); A. Kristen Foster, “‘We Are Men!’ Frederick Douglass and the Fault Lines of 
Gendered Citizenship,” Journal of the Civil War Era 1, no. 2 (June 2011):143-175; Kellie Carter Jackson, Force and 
Freedom: Black Abolitionists and the Politics of Violence (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019).  
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freedom and manhood by producing or becoming corpses on the battlefield. Numerous white 
Americans considered black Civil War soldiers to be an expendable replacement for whites and 
hoped that military service would discipline, rather than liberate, blacks. The postbellum 
continuation of this white fixation on black discipline ultimately led to Redemption. Thus, the 
extolling of violence at the heart of martial manhood ultimately proved fatal to African 
Americans after slavery. Black mutineers throughout the long emancipation process knew that a 
tragic fate likely awaited them; the likelihood of a mutiny’s success was always marginal, and 
mutinying nearly guaranteed death or a dishonorable discharge and hard labor. When applying 
these points to black mutineers, the martial type of manhood pushed servicemen to commit 
additional actions that threatened their lives, finances, and family welfare.11  
Black mutinies during the early Jim Crow era complement the existing historiography on 
how African-American society responded in gendered methods to what is generally considered 
the nadir of U.S. race relations at the turn of the twentieth century. At a time when black men in 
the Niagara Movement and NAACP resisted the wave of disenfranchisement, segregation, 
lynching, and convict leasing, a number of black soldiers rose up against prejudiced officers and 
hostile civilian communities. Based on their actions and rhetoric, the post-slavery generation in 
the regular U.S. Army assumed for themselves W.E.B. DuBois’ proclamations that “I rejoice as 
a strong man to run a race” and “We are men; we will be treated as men.” When black men 
invoked martial manhood as their response to the establishment of a new racial caste system, 
they contrasted with black women who pursued a diplomatic approach to political activism. 
While responding to new circumstances, Jim Crow-era mutineers compare with their 
predecessors in the antebellum, Civil War, and Reconstruction periods who believed in the need 
 
11 Carole Emberton, “Only Murder Makes Men”: Reconsidering the Black Military Experience,” The Journal of the 
Civil War Era, Volume 2, Number 3, September 2012, pp. 369-381, 385-388 (quotes).  
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to forcefully struggle for the rights due them as men: bodily autonomy, family stability, legal and 
political rights, and socioeconomic independence.12 
Since some black men during the long emancipation era felt the need to aggressively 
challenge the authority of abusive or apathetic white officers, African-American mutinies 
contribute to the scholarship on the relationship between black enlistees and white officers in the 
Army. This debate colors both USCT and Buffalo Soldier historiography. In his study of the 
Civil War and its immediate aftermath, Joseph Glatthaar’s Forged in Battle paints black soldier-
white officer ties in largely cooperative terms. Glatthaar accurately documents the breakdown of 
these ties immediately after Union victory, but wartime mutinies display large, preexisting cracks 
in this relationship. While scholars have always recognized that racial discrimination colored 
much of the Buffalo Soldier experience, historians like William Dobak and Thomas Phillips 
contend that regiments occupying the late-nineteenth-century West received equal military 
resources and duties to that of white units. Carole Emberton focuses on the hostile aspect of the 
Civil War’s white officer-black soldier relationship. As she reveals, white officers often held 
indifferent and condescending attitudes towards black recruits, who in turn felt pessimistic about 
each new commander they acquired.13 Other historians of the nineteenth-century Army’s race 
 
12 W.E.B. DuBois, “Address to the Country,” 1906, 
http://college.cengage.com/history/ayers_primary_sources/niagaramovement_address_1906.htm (first quote); 
W.E.B. DuBois, “Declaration of Principles,” 1905, https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/pageturn/mums312-b004-
i092/#page/1/mode/1up (second quote). As journalist William J. Farris remarked, DuBois’ refutation of 
Washington’s ideas “roused the dormant manhood of the Negro.” See William H. Ferris, The Africans Abroad, or 
His Evolution in Western Civilization Tracing His Development under Caucasian Milieu (New Haven: Tuttle, 
1913), 403. For an overview of scholarship on black gendered activism at the turn of the century, see Ayumu 
Kaneko, “A Strong Man to Run a Race: W. E. B. DuBois and the Politics of Black Masculinity at the Turn of the 
Century,” The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 14 (2003): 105-122; Matthias Speidel, “‘A Race That Is 
Thus Willing To Die For Its Country’: African-American Volunteers in the Spanish-American War 1898,” in War 
Volunteering in Modern Times: From the French Revolution to the Second World War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
92-108. For black women’s activism during Jim Crow’s establishment, see Glenda Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: 
Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996). 
13 Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 11-33, 149, 203-204, 228-229; William A. Dobak and Thomas D. Phillips, 
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relations have introduced more nuanced interpretations. Keith P. Wilson’s study of black Union 
soldiers’ camp lives notes that most USCT officers appreciated black military service, but they 
tended to focus on their own ambitions. Rather than a sign of emancipation’s disappointments, 
Wilson claims, the Army’s discipline merely tried to indiscriminately preserve order. However, 
the Union Army’s preference to assign black troops to fatigue duty taught them that white 
comrades enjoyed privileged treatment. According to Charles S. Kenner, while the 1860s and 
1870s represented a period of inter-rank tensions within the Buffalo Soldier units, relations 
improved in the 1880s before deteriorating again in the 1890s. Marvin Fletcher argues that 
particular personalities, locations, and circumstances determined Buffalo Soldier race relations.14 
Meanwhile, the Navy’s white commander-black enlistee relationship depended on the 
era: until the nineteenth century’s end, it represented the sole integrated branch; from the dawn 
of Jim Crow to the 1970s, it engaged in some form of segregation. Scholars of the nineteenth-
century Navy have consistently noted that no matter how racially restrictive official policy was, 
officers recruited as many blacks as they could to meet manpower shortages. When officers 
acted tyrannical and abusive, it grew out of a broader maritime culture based on stringent 
discipline for all sailors. However, for most of the twentieth century, black sailors felt 
marginalized by white shipmates and superiors. This dissertation explains what the Navy’s 
unique racial order tells us about the long emancipation process. Given the rarity of racially-
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motivated black naval mutinies in the nineteenth century but a far greater likelihood of it in the 
twentieth, the white officer-black sailor relationship was dynamic and relative.15  
The phenomenon of black military mutinies highlights the confrontational aspect of this 
relationship, but not entirely. The existence of mutinies across generations—concentrated in 
outbreaks or scattered in isolated incidents—shows that these inter-rank bonds were consistently 
fragile. Experiences more akin to Emberton’s black troops than Glatthaar’s can be seen 
throughout. Yet, the role of white allies to the long emancipation process gives credence to the 
Glatthaar view. Whites became allies when they fostered conditions that discouraged mutinous 
behavior, refused to suppress a mutiny, testified on accused mutineers’ behalf, and/or demanded 
more lenient sentences for convicted mutineers. That certain Army units were more prone to 
rebellion than others, and that until the early twentieth century, soldiers in the Army were more 
likely to mutiny than sailors, help to validate Fletcher’s and Kenner’s lessons.  
Scholars have used the officer-enlistee relationship within the military justice system to 
emphasize the new liberties black troops gained. As Ira Berlin notes, while former slaves who 
enlisted in the Union Army replaced obedience to a master with obedience to a white officer, the 
majority of black soldiers clearly distinguished the two figures. Slave discipline had an 
inherently personal, arbitrary nature; military discipline derived from abstract law. Also, black 
troops understood that military regulations demanded kindness and justice from officers. Army 
justice gave formerly enslaved black soldiers their first taste of formal legal procedures and 
rights. Christian Samito reveals that mutineers and those charged with other offenses had access 
 
15 Michael Cohn and Michael K.H. Platzer, Black Men of the Sea (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1978), 68-81; W. Jeffrey 
Bolster, Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 
131-157; Steve Sheinkin, The Port Chicago 50: Disaster, Mutiny, and the Fight for Civil Rights (New York: 
Roaring Brook Press, 2014); John Derrell Sherwood, Black Sailor, White Navy: Racial Unrest in the Fleet during 
the Vietnam War Era (New York and London: New York University Press). 
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to counsel, possessed the right to testify and to cross-examine whites, and witnessed a court 
trying to balance legitimate black grievances with maintaining discipline. Samito cites instances 
in which strong testimony from witnesses and from defendants themselves helped acquit those 
accused of mutiny. Officers sometimes commuted capital sentences, and lesser punishments 
could be suspended if the trial proved defective. Officials treated mutineers with leniency if they 
determined that officer racism inspired the revolt. According to Samito, the military justice 
system treated black soldiers equally with whites.16 While racism drove many black soldiers to 
mutiny in the year following the Civil War’s end, numerous convictions for the offense preceded 
sentence reductions and followed trials in which black defendants and witnesses enjoyed the 
legal rights afforded all U.S. soldiers.  
Christian Samito and Ira Berlin use courts-martial to shed light on how white officers and 
black soldiers grappled with emancipation and compared the harsher aspects of military 
discipline with slavery. James S. Brisbin, a Pennsylvania abolitionist and brigadier general, 
placed the responsibility for a black soldier’s murder of a white comrade on whites for enslaving 
blacks. Through mutiny and defending themselves in trial, black soldiers were “refuting their 
past as slaves now to claim rights as freedmen, soldiers, and citizens.” As Samito points out, 
black mutineers envisioned themselves as U.S. citizens with the full right to equal treatment. 
Officers such as Colonel Thomas W. Higginson thought that military discipline and regulations 
would foster self-respect among his troops and help them shift from slavery to freedom. 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Stone recognized that the Army must create an environment in which 
black soldiers interpret an act of disciplinary punishment as a legal action. However, other white 
 
16 Ira Berlin, et. al., Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series II: The Black Military 
Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 433-436; Christian G. Samito, “The Intersection 
between Military Justice and Equal Rights: Mutinies, Courts-martial, and Black Civil War Soldiers,” Civil War 
History 53 (June 2007): 170-202. 
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officers refused to sympathize with black experiences and thought only harsh punishments 
maintained discipline among men who remained degraded due to their enslaved past. As Ira 
Berlin explains, “The very distinctions that black soldiers drew between punishments incidental 
to slavery and those acceptable in freedom reveal the significance of their involvement” in the 
military justice system. On the one hand, black soldiers often viewed their white officers as new 
masters and slave drivers. On the other, USCT officers needed to enforce discipline in the ranks. 
Despite surrendering freedoms given to civilians, black soldiers attained a greater degree of 
legally-protected equality through their service.17 Nevertheless, African-American servicemen 
living in the long emancipation era served under unsympathetic officers who thought strict 
discipline and corporal punishment were appropriate for ex-slaves. Since in their minds, 
punishments in the ranks often came to close to resembling slavery, they thought mutiny was the 
appropriate reaction.    
Since the black mutiny phenomenon targeted the oppressive aspects of the military’s 
wage labor system, it expands on recent studies merging military and labor history. This hybrid 
military-labor history field has shown that infantry personnel, regardless of race and time period, 
have performed noncombat manual labor, such as building infrastructure, for low pay and 
without their consent and have resisted this unfree labor regime. Other military-labor history 
scholarship explores the primacy of certain soldiers’ working backgrounds in pushing them to 
enlist. Additional historians frame even the combat aspects of soldiering, with its numerous tasks 
and hardships, as a form of work itself and rebellious actions like desertion and mutiny as labor 
 
17 Christian G. Samito, “The Intersection between Military Justice and Equal Rights,” 172-175, 178-179; Ira Berlin, 
The Black Military Experience, 438-439, 441. 
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conflicts, which, they argue, deserve a place alongside the civilian subjects of traditional labor 
history.18  
The Civil War’s USCT mutinies against a particular socioeconomic issue—the 
government’s decision to pay runaway slaves and free blacks in uniform nearly fifty percent less 
than their white counterparts—also warrant a fusion of military and labor history. Many of those 
Civil War-era Americans who conducted racially-motivated mutinies first fled an unfree civilian 
labor system to join one based on wage labor under a government bureaucracy. As scholars have 
shown, this flight helped destroy the bondage system by draining it of its workforce, mirrored the 
mobility of antebellum fugitives who went North, and foreshadowed the waves of postbellum 
black agricultural laborers who moved in search of better employment opportunities. Next, the 
runaways to Union lines became soldiers in an army of liberation, during which they refused to 
perform duties, from manual labor to combat functions, until their white superiors resolved the 
discriminatory nature of their pay scale, the inability of this pay scale to support their destitute 
families, and unsafe working conditions such as summary punishments. Like other mutinies in 
world history, those of the USCT show that workers, civilian and military, have refused to 
perform assigned duties to force concessions from exploitative employers or commanders.19  
 
18 For work on the U.S. Army’s “enlisted laborers,” see A. Hope McGrath, “‘A Slave in Uncle Sam’s Service’: 
Labor and Resistance in the US Army, 1865–1890” Labor: Studies in Working-class History of the Americas 
Volume 13:3-4 (December 2016), pp. 37-56. Scholarship on British colonialism has produced rich studies of 
military-labor history. See Glenford Howe, Race, War, and Nationalism: A Social History of West Indians in the 
First World War (Kingston: Ian. Randle Publishers, 2002); Humphrey Metzgen and John Graham, Caribbean Wars 
Untold: A Salute to the British West Indies (Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2007); Richard 
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Consciousness (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004); Peter Way, “Memoirs of an Invalid: James Miller 
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on the Working-Class Experience, 1756-2009, Donna T. Haverty-Stacke, and Daniel J. Walkowitz, eds., 
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Working-class History of the Americas Volume 13:3-4 (December 2016), pp. 57-82. 
19 For works emphasizing black initiative and mobility in the toppling of slavery, see Stephanie Camp, Closer to 
Freedom: Enslaved Women and Everyday Resistance in the Plantation South (Chapel Hill and London: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2004; Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South 
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By accompanying the explosion of black civilian strike activity covered by labor 
historians, the African-American mutinies that hit the Reconstruction-era Army add more to the 
military-labor history subfield. The civilian and military types of resistance to wage labor each 
entailed a greater degree of black organizational abilities. John Rodrigue explores how the gang 
labor of sugar production fostered collective resistance methods among Louisiana’s freedpeople 
during labor struggles with planters. As the free-labor system matured into the 1870s, they relied 
on work stoppages or relocations to increase their purchasing power. However, during the sugar 
strike of 1887, as planters sought to reduce wages and union-organized workers demanded 
higher wages and an end to scrip payments, a force of militiamen massacred strikers. After 1887, 
sugar workers thereby became a rural proletariat. During the late 1870s, in places like Louisville 
and St. Louis, black members of the Knights of Labor union employed on Jay Gould’s railroads 
struck and conducted educational campaigns denouncing monopoly and advocating public 
regulation of or ownership over the railroads. When Republican President Rutherford B. Hayes 
used federal troops to crush the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 in defense of property rights, 
African Americans who joined the emerging Gilded Age labor movement began appealing not to 
the GOP but to union organizations. Labor historians have shown that blacks in numerous other 
southern towns, especially port cities, took advantage of Reconstruction’s socio-political climate 
by forming unions and striking for higher wages and protection from job competition with 
foreign workers: black washerwomen in Jackson, Mississippi; black waterfront workers in 
Charleston, South Carolina; and black longshoremen, plantation hands, and millworkers across 
Florida. These postbellum examples of black working-class militancy demonstrate that the long 
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emancipation process became an even greater struggle over labor rights once most black 
southerners earned compensation for their work.20   
As Reconstruction labor historians have also uncovered, slavery’s downfall enabled 
African-American women to gain a measure of control over their labor. Like men, they 
interpreted freedom to mean working without white interference. Many freedwomen withdrew 
from agricultural and domestic employment, claiming the privileges of elite white women who 
lived leisurely. Other freedwomen resisted white supervision. They stole clothes and other 
household items from former mistresses, advocated for land ownership, drove off returning 
planters and overseers from plantations on which they worked independently, chose their own 
supervisors, set their own work schedule, and organized work gangs. As African Americans of 
both sexes took advantage of greater freedom to interact with each other in the years after the 
Civil War, black men in uniform occasionally found it necessary to resist white attempts to 
regulate this intimate aspect of their lives.21 
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This dissertation additionally offers an intersection point for both military-labor history 
and the scholarship on the officer-enlistee relationship. The long emancipation’s mutinies bolster 
the findings of those works that link the processes of emancipation with physical and cultural 
forms of slave resistance to white overlords that tried to give blacks greater control over their 
own lives. Both rebellious slaves and black mutineers revolted against a practice of white 
oppression that violated their claimed right to live free from physical abuse and from regulations 
over their bodies. To be sure, the officer-soldier relationship did not reach the level of 
domination characterizing that of masters and slaves. Yet, the defiance seen in both relationships 
served the same goal of weakening white supremacy. Also, the officer-soldier relationship can be 
seen as a military counterpart of the employer-employee relationship in the wage labor economy. 
Mutineers and strikers alike revolted against superiors who mistreated them and deprived them 
of the fruits of their labors.22 
Finally, by incorporating the mutinies of both black soldiers and black sailors, this project 
bridges gaps in military history. In Civil War historiography especially, the vast majority of 
scholars exclusively study the Army while a tiny number fill in gaps in naval knowledge. 
Decrying specialization, Cornelis Lammers once called on future works to compare both land 
and sea-based mutinies, the "dry" and "wet" kinds, rather than one or the other. In examining 
both the dry and wet mutinies of African-American servicemen, this dissertation sheds greater 
light on the long emancipation than if it limited itself to one military branch.23 
 
22 For links between slave resistance and emancipation, see Stephanie Camp, Closer to Freedom. Camp documents 
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The body of this dissertation structures itself according to both military branch and 
chronology. While most chapters cover Army mutinies, its bookends feature the other branches 
of the armed forces that contended with rebellious black men. The work opens with a study of 
why so few black naval personnel throughout the long nineteenth century mutinied compared to 
the Merchant Marine’s black sailors. The unique race relations seen on the ocean compel us to 
reframe how scholars understand the narrative of black resistance and emancipation. Moving 
from sea to land, Chapters 2 through 5 examine the Army’s experience with African-American 
mutinies. The second, third, and fourth analyze the three eras of the United States Colored 
Troops (USCTs): Civil War, immediate postbellum period, and early postwar Reconstruction. 
With the peculiar institution in free fall, the first USCT mutineers sought to rid the Union Army 
of anything reminiscent of slavery, especially insufficient compensation for their labor and cruel 
abuse from their superiors. When the twin causes of Union and emancipation triumphed in the 
summer of 1865, a second wave of mutinous USCTs arose out of men’s despair over learning 
that instead of going home, they would relocate a thousand miles away while suffering the most 
acute examples of white officer cruelty of their careers. Meanwhile, as the last remaining USCTs 
conducted occupation duties in the Reconstruction South, they combatted counter-revolutionary 
white civilian communities. Chapter 5 looks at the next half century of African-American Army 
history, focusing on the Buffalo Soldiers. Stationed in the West, these regular troops reacted 
against grievances held over from the USCT eras as well as their country’s regression from the 
promises of Reconstruction to the disappointments of Jim Crow. In the conclusion, the 
dissertation comes full circle, giving an overview of the massive wave of African-American 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen who rose up during watershed twentieth-century conflicts. The 
revolts of World War II and the Vietnam conflict both built on the previous century of black 
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mutinies while also paving the way for, and growing out of, the protests of the modern civil 
rights movement.  
Regardless of where in the armed forces or when they served, African-American men in 
uniform during the long emancipation process vigilantly protected their rights to control their 
bodies and destiny, keep their families intact, and enjoy the fruits of their labor. These mutinies 
occurred as an old racial caste system collapsed and a new oppressive order emerged to replace 
it. As long as any white supremacist system existed in some form, multiple generations of black 



















Masters of the Vessel: African-American Mutinies on the Nineteenth-Century Sea 
 
On July 7, 1861, William Tillman, a free black merchant sailor, discovered the combined 
promise and peril of the Atlantic Ocean facing generations of African Americans. By pursuing a 
maritime career, the twenty-seven-year-old Rhode Islander, cook, and steward occupied a 
cosmopolitan world in which he possessed greater opportunities for advancement as a black man 
than he could hope for on land. However, before his ship, the S. J. Waring, could dock at New 
York, he needed to fight to prevent his enslavement, adding to a tradition of resistance begun by 
his Middle Passage ancestors. On that July day, slave trading privateers of the Jefferson Davis 
took command of the vessel as part of the Confederacy’s irregular naval war against the Union 
blockade and northern ships. Planning to sell Tillman and the other black crewman into bondage 
in Charleston, South Carolina, the privateers assigned a prize crew of six to carry out the plan. 
Declaring that he was “not going to Charleston a live man” and that “they may take me there 
dead,” Tillman organized an uprising with his shipmates. In the middle of the night of July 16, 
they beat the prize crew members with clubs or axes, killing three and dumping their bodies 
overboard. Passenger Bryce Mackinnon provided graphic eyewitness testimony in the press, 
describing how the mutineers’ weapons cleaved the Confederate sea captain’s skull, cracked that 
of the mate, and continuously fell on persons pleading for their lives. As one abolitionist later 
documented, the “black man,” meaning Tillman, had become “master of the vessel.” Under 
Tillman’s leadership, the liberated crew safely arrived in New York harbor on July 21, 1861. 
Occurring more than a year before the Union embraced emancipation as a war aim, the jubilant 
New York welcome party viewed the Waring mutiny as a triumph for the Federal cause.  
While contemporaries never used the word “mutiny” to describe William Tillman’s 
actions, its features—a subordinate individual using defiant language, wielding weapons, 
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disrupting the regular course of a workplace’s duties, and aggressively subverting an established 
command hierarchy, all in the interest of correcting an injustice—qualify it as such. Its goal of 
preserving the free status of its perpetrators against white supremacist forces in a military 
context, albeit of the unconventional sort, additionally makes it a notable episode of the 
phenomenon of black mutineers advancing the long emancipation process.24  
William Tillman’s experience personifies much of the story of nineteenth-century 
African-American sailor mutinies, though black merchant seamen like him shared the water with 
bondspeople and the U.S. Navy’s black sailors. Evidence demonstrates that until the turn of the 
twentieth century, the emancipation process was relatively more advanced on the seas than on 
land. It also reveals that the “wet” theater of this process took an especially convoluted trajectory 
where human cargo, merchant sailors, and naval servicemen respectively formed a spectrum 
from furthest and closest to realizing the goals of the long emancipation. Tillman’s status as a 
merchant sailor who fought an irregular naval battle to prevent his enslavement placed him at the 
intersection of all three groups.  
If Tillman had joined the Navy, it is likely that he would have never conducted a 
seaborne revolt. While other chapters mainly explore why numerous generations of African-
 
24 Charles S. Greene, Thrilling Stories of the Great Rebellion (Philadelphia: John E. Potter and Co., 1864), 23-25 
(first quote on 23); William Brown, The Negro in the American Rebellion: His Heroism and His Fidelity (Boston: 
Lee and Shepard, 1867), 74-76 (second quote on 75); “The Lion of the Day,” Harper’s Weekly, Aug. 3, 1861, 
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/the-lion-of-the-day/; Brian McGinty, The Rest I Will Kill: William 
Tillman and the Unforgettable Story of How a Free Black Man Refused to Become a Slave (New York: Liveright, 
2016); C.R. Gibbs, "Blacks in the Union Navy," Negro History Bulletin, volume 36, no.6, (1973), p. 138; Michael S. 
Davis, “‘Many of Them are Among my Best Men’: The United States Navy Looks at its African American 
Crewmen, 1755-1955,” PhD Dissertation, Kansas State University, 2001, 43. With defeats like Fort Sumter and 
First Bull Run fresh in their minds, New Yorkers gave Tillman a hero’s welcome. The New York Tribune 
proclaimed that, “To this colored man was the nation indebted for the first vindication of its honor on the sea.” 
Quoted in William Brown, The Negro in the American Rebellion, 75. The feat earned him a $6,000 award. 
According to McGinty, the Civil War’s development—ever-larger battles and casualty rates—quickly and 
thoroughly overshadowed Tillman’s story to the point that the country forgot it. Tillman thereafter almost 
disappeared from the historical record. Due to its semi-military nature, his mutiny can be considered an example of 
the unconventional battles fought within the broader Civil War, blending the boundaries of Merchant Marine and 
Navy history, just as land-based guerrilla warfare blurs the lines between military and civilian social history.  
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American servicemen conducted numerous rebellions against white supremacy, the current one 
in part asks why a certain component of this group seemingly did not do so or at least were less 
likely to during the same time period. In contrast to the plethora of mutinies in the U.S. Army 
during the long emancipation period, such events prove elusive to the researcher of African-
American naval history before the Second World War. African Americans mainly felt the need 
to resist on water when they were still enslaved or if they toiled on repressive merchant ships.  
To be sure, a level of racial tensions and discrimination existed in the nineteenth-century 
U.S. Navy. Black sailors found the highest ranks closed off to them, and the Civil War’s influx 
of runaway slaves aggravated many white sailors. However, the existence of integrated crews 
until naval ship reorganization in the early twentieth century corresponds to a small number of 
racially motivated black mutinies in the historical record. The documented mutinous behavior 
that did involve black naval sailors during this period tended to have motivations common to the 
goals of both the black freedom struggle and white men struggling to attain their own masculine 
independence. Otherwise, the racially-motivated mutinies that erupted on U.S. naval ships were 
of the white supremacist variety. It was not that rebellion categorically was rare among sea-borne 
African Americans compared to those laboring and serving on land; it depended greatly on the 
nature of their status on a particular ship. The complex story of black resistance on the seas will 
help us further construct a theory on why mutinies borne of racial animosities broke out.  
This chapter presents an overview of African-American naval history from the birth of 
the United States to the dawn of Jim Crow, all while highlighting the ways in which it intersected 
with the history of blacks in the Merchant Marine and the Atlantic slave trade. While navigating 
this era, it highlights key moments and developments to explain why black naval personnel 
rarely appeared to engage in acts of resistance to combat white supremacy and promote social 
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equality, but nevertheless came from a tradition of insurrection forged by bondspeople 
transported on slave ships and African-American sailors laboring on merchant ships. While 
certain factors forestalled mutinies in the Navy, these were less likely to be present across much 
the land-based armed forces. On water, blacks enjoyed permission to enlist and performed their 
duties in integrated spaces due to a combination of commanders’ pragmatic concerns and the 
influence of white allies. It was not until the Civil War that blacks could serve their country on 
land in a permanent capacity, and only then in segregated units. The interplay of pragmatism and 
biracial alliances proved key to black freedom on land and sea.  
This chapter ends by paving the way for the conclusion’s coverage of the Navy in the 
first three quarters of the twentieth century, when it ceased being the sole integrated component 
of the U.S. military and moved in the same white supremacist direction as the rest of the 
services. After so many years during which the sea offered greater economic independence and 
upward social mobility, the water became just as unwelcoming to individuals with dark skin as 
the solid ground. Despite this turn of events, more than any other branch, naval service gave 
African Americans during the long nineteenth century the closest they ever came prior to the 
modern civil rights era of enjoying relative equality of opportunity and fair treatment while in 
uniform.  
That the Navy’s race relations were so different from the Army’s in the pre-Jim Crow 
decades and then so alike by the time of the modern civil rights movement testifies to the non-
linear nature, and complex trajectory, of the long emancipation process. Blacks across 
generations could hope for a better world, realize something resembling that world for a time, 
and then find their people regressing into another oppressive racial caste system. African-
American scholars have proven the existence of this trajectory in political, socioeconomic, and 
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military scholarship,25 but analyzing why black men did or did not mutiny across different 
military branches in multiple time periods more clearly illustrates this contingency in U.S. race 
relations. Martin Luther King, Jr., famously declared, and many Americans have since repeated, 
that “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” However, black 
servicemen have occasionally needed to actively bend the moral universe toward justice 
themselves. As multitudes of them learned at one time or another, if they were insufficiently 
vigilant or if events otherwise escaped their control, this arc was often, if not always, in danger 
of reversing course away from justice.26 By taking advantage of the unique circumstances of life 
at sea, black sailors gained an edge in this struggle.  
To develop explanations for the glaring absence of black mutinies on U.S. naval ships in 
pre-twentieth-century America, the current chapter uses the scholarship on African-American 
maritime history, civilian and military, as a starting point. As this field demonstrates, men of 
African descent have served in American naval forces since the colonial period. Historians show 
that in doing so, blacks have encountered unique prospects for, and barriers to, the goals they 
devised for their freedom and emancipation. This chapter merges two areas of scholarship—
general histories of naval mutinies and those of black maritime history—taking an African-
American history approach with the former and forging a military history analysis out of the 
latter. Previous black maritime scholarship established the importance of the topic to the long-
 
25 Here the author references the country’s cyclical expansion and contracting of black citizenship rights in general, 
illustrated by the following examples: the movement from slavery to a biracial democracy in the Civil War and 
Reconstruction; Redemption’s overthrow of Reconstruction; and the emergence of Jim Crow in the 1890s followed 
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term black freedom struggle. The current work builds upon that foundation by focusing more 
narrowly on what water-based mutinies, or the lack thereof, tell us about the struggle’s progress.  
Researching African-American naval history in general and black sailor mutinies in 
particular poses a set of challenges that have prevented these subfields from becoming as rich as 
African-American soldier history. Most prominently, since ships were integrated, it is 
challenging to confirm the racial backgrounds of most crew members. In the historical record, 
maritime entities rarely identified sailors’ skin color. Complicating the matter further is how 
naval court-martial records are arranged by date, not alphabetically. The lack of segregated units 
also makes this research more difficult. Other sources or references are needed to determine an 
individual’s race. Enlistment documents typically list the sailor’s complexion, but the high 
number of duplicate names makes unclear which specific individual was being tried.27  
Overall, the seas proved to be a double-edged sword for African Americans since their 
ancestors first arrived on slave ships. It was through human navigation across the Atlantic Ocean 
that the trade in humans and the products of slave labor first emerged. Between the sixteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, millions of West Africans suffered an agonizing experience during the 
Middle Passage. Slave traders kidnapped them from their homes and transported them to the 
African coast, where the former tightly stuffed the latter into ships as human cargo constrained 
by chains. After a brutal voyage, the survivors spent the rest of their lives as coerced laborers and 
the property of another person. Captives suffered a multitude of traumas: the anguish of being 
 
27 This particular barrier to naval research has long been known; in 1842, the Navy Department told Congress the 
same in response to a request for an estimate on how many African Americans served in the branch. Secretary A. P. 
Apshur to Speaker John White, August 5, 1842, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-
room/title-list-alphabetically/c/colored-persons-in-the-navy.html; “Web: US, African American Civil War Sailor 
Index, 1861-1865,” https://www.ancestry.com/search/collections/9748/. Rather than scanning the names of Army 
soldiers the researcher knows for certain are African American because the finding aids list defendants by their 
segregated unit and then alphabetically, he or she needs to dig further to research the Navy’s Sable Arm. Scholars 
can now access an Ancestry.com database of every African American who served in the Union Navy. However, 
such digitization exists for neither antebellum nor postbellum sailors. 
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forcibly separated from their kin; the dread of seeing the vessel off coast; the confusion of seeing 
European sailors for the first time; the sensory discomforts of residing in crammed, hot quarters 
filled with human waste, perspiration, and disease; the physical pain of floggings; and the 
combined curiosity and fear regarding what new horrors awaited them on the other side of the 
Atlantic. In a precursor to naval service, slave ships possessed elements of a warship/naval 
vessel: captains imposed unilateral, stern discipline on the crewmen as well as slaves, and ships 
were armed with cannons with which they could wage imperial conflict. Aboard slave ships, 
captured Africans began forging a common culture and devising ways to resist, escape, or better 
endure bondage. These coping mechanisms shaped the lives of all subsequent generations of 
African Americans during and after slavery.28 The sea constituted the lifeline for the trade in 
human property, that institution which created the need for African Americans to wage a struggle 
for freedom in the first place.  
Ironically, the same bodies of water that contributed to their enslavement later offered 
black Americans opportunities to acquire or bolster their freedom, including boats that sailed to 
locations that had outlawed slavery. South Carolina slaves like John Andrew Jackson escaped via 
Charleston harbor in 1846. Following the death of a despotic slaveholder due to inherit him, 
Jackson concluded that “God willed me to myself” and left the plantation on which he brutally 
toiled. Concealing himself in the harbor’s wharves, he searched for a vessel due to sail to a free 
state. When dockworkers demanded that he inform them to whom he belonged, he gave a 
curious reply: “I belong to South Carolina.” According to Susanna Ashton, “he was…trying to 
belong to a broader South Carolina identity that would not claim him.” He could not find a 
 
28 Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano Or Gustavus Vassa, the African, 
Written by Himself (London: Author, 1794), 30-57; Marcus Rediker, The Slave Ship: A Human History (New York: 
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dockworker willing to assist him, but he located a ship heading to Boston and hid between two 
cotton bales in a four-by-three-foot space. As the boat moved “side to side,” Jackson realized 
that he was “now upon my journey from slavery to freedom.” Reaching free territory in February 
1847, Jackson recollected in 1862 that “felt as I have never felt before—that is, master of 
myself.” The sea thus enabled coastal slaves to give substance to claims of self-ownership, 
undermining the South’s racial hierarchy. Escaping slavery over water, in a reversal of the 
Middle Passage, constituted a major symbolic victory for runaways, both metaphorically and 
physically.29 Despite the great threats to their freedom that the seas presented, African 
Americans found ways to use them to their advantage. This dual nature of waterways 
characterized the black relationship with it during the entirety of the long emancipation period.  
Works on black maritime history accompanied the explosion in African-American history 
scholarship unleashed by the modern civil rights movement. This wave demonstrated that the 
black struggle for greater social equality took place not just on land, but also at sea. The black 
sea experience consisted of more than the one-way trip of those sold into the colonial Atlantic 
slave trade or antebellum domestic slave trade and included whaling, pirating, commercial 
shipping, voluntarily immigration, flight from slavery, and naval service. Despite their status as 
fundamental players in U.S. maritime history, blacks faced various threats: re-enslavement, 
performing the worst and most dangerous jobs, restrictions at port, and employment barriers. 
Yet, maritime service also afforded them chances to explore the world and attain positions of 
authority, which elevated their self-image and social standing. Across the centuries, African 
 
29 John Andrew Jackson, “The Experience of a Slave in South Carolina,” 1862, in Susana Ashton, I Belong to South 
Carolina: South Carolina Slave Narratives (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 83 (first quote), 1 
(second and third quotes), 106 (fourth quote), 84 (fifth quote), 4, 85-126. The most famous runaway slave of the 
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See Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave: Written by Himself 
(Boston: Anti-Slavery Office, No. 25 Cornhill, 1845), 107-115. 
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Americans in the Navy, Merchant Marine, and in port occupations played key roles in combating 
racism in the armed forces and the injustices blacks faced on and off shore.30 Overall, earning a 
living toiling on the water provided a better livelihood for blacks than what land offered them. 
Blacks’ experiences on nineteenth-century waters built on an extended past during which 
their ancestors utilized seafaring for financial gain. The maritime traditions of Africans and their 
descendants originated in the ancient world, when various cultures circled the continent to 
conduct trade. Long before Europe’s arrival in West Africa, its inhabitants mastered navigation 
of coastal and inshore waters to hunt aquatic life. Preserving these skills helped African 
Americans across the centuries, before and after liberation from bondage, better able to become 
economically independent and preserve their traditional culture. Bondsmen performing this labor 
enjoyed greater autonomy than field hands, and runaways utilized water transportation methods 
to hide in swamps. From the seventeenth century onward, native-born and immigrant whites, free 
and enslaved blacks, served as crewmen on coastal trade ships transporting food and fuel. 
Coastal trades faced perpetual labor shortages, allowing African Americans to move up the 
ranks. Whaling ships possessed the most diverse crews, bringing men together from the entire 
Atlantic World. Both coastal trades and whaling promoted African Americans to captain.31  
Shipbuilding especially gave blacks opportunities for upward mobility. Before 
emancipating himself, Frederick Douglass worked as a caulker in Baltimore’s shipyards 
alongside free blacks. There, a white sailor assisted the future abolitionist lecturer in escaping to 
freedom in the North. These heavily African-American worksites organized under the Caulkers’ 
Association in 1838. The union empowered them to negotiate for higher wages and better 
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working conditions. In making wooden ships watertight, caulkers like Douglass performed a 
skilled form of labor and enabled the border state city to become a maritime commercial power 
during the early national period.32 Thus, the point where land and ocean met proved essential to 
black victories in the otherwise white supremacist American labor movement.  
African Americans also formed a large part of the nineteenth-century Merchant Marine. 
Northern emancipation in the early nineteenth century opened up numerous opportunities for 
blacks in the institution. Despite legally-mandated racial quotas on vessels, labor demands kept 
the number of African-American sailors and the extent of racial integration on ships high into the 
twentieth century. Blacks made up between a quarter and half of the expanding American 
merchant fleet’s population by 1850, dwarfing their proportion in the general population. They 
labored as pilots, shipwrights, deckhands, and stevedores. The Merchant Marine developed a 
hiring policy based more on merit than race. Though employers exploited racial tensions through 
job competition, the nature of life at sea fostered biracial bonds. Sailors, regardless of color, 
endured the same harsh existence: long hours, powerful weather, disease, insufficient food, and 
tyrannical captains who enforced discipline through the threat of irons and the lash. As scholars 
of black maritime history note, while serving in the Merchant Marine, black seamen lived at the 
intersection of multiple cultures: African-American, white, and Atlantic. Comparable to naval 
ship integration, culturally diverse merchant vessels fostered camaraderie and wage parity. While 
their jobs were commercial, not military, in nature, African Americans working on merchant 
ships lived under a disciplinary regime and cultural environment not unlike that which 
characterized naval service.33 Black maritime history in general blends labor and military history. 
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However, following the mid-century mark, the quantity and quality of maritime jobs 
declined for blacks. When African Americans could find maritime employment, it tended to be 
of the menial sort, as cooks and stewards. They gradually lost their “community of labor” with 
other black sailors, forcing them to rely on eroding biracial bonds. By the end of the century, 
changing capital investments, low-wage European immigration, and recruiting agents who 
prioritized whites all displaced black sailors. A parallel, more gradual, decline in African 
Americans’ position in the Navy took place around the same time period. Despite demographic 
shifts, remaining African Americans in the Merchant Marine played active roles in the Gilded 
Age labor movement. They helped organize the Atlantic Coast Seamen’s Union, the 1893-1894 
winter strike (which shut down half of the country’s deep-sea tonnage), and the Marine 
Firemen’s Union.34 Like black caulkers earlier in the century, black merchant sailors understood 
the need to organize against threats to their livelihood and economic independence. Such a 
course was key for them to forestall or reverse a regression in their emancipation process.  
Various realities across the Atlantic World complicated the extent to which the sea placed 
African Americans, civilian and military, further along in the long emancipation process during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. First, ships and southern naval yards employed slaves for 
most of the early nineteenth century, with their wages going to their masters, as in other hiring-
out arrangements. Also, despite free blacks’ higher wages and relatively greater equality on the 
water, numerous reminders of the tenuous nature of their liberty existed. When their ships 
docked near plantations at which bondspeople toiled, a white sailor acquired an opportunity to 
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sell a black shipmate into bondage.35 The emancipation process for black sailors was far from 
linear; one’s progress depended on time period, geography, and contingency on macro and micro 
factors. Not only did slavery end in different countries and regions at various times, but the 
systems replacing bondage in Atlantic societies underwent their own uneven trajectories.  
Among the greatest challenges civilian black seamen faced to their freedom while 
situated in ports included regulations governing the coastal areas of the antebellum American 
South. In 1822, South Carolina’s state legislature passed a law requiring the confinement of free 
black seamen while their merchant ships occupied the Palmetto State’s ports. It also stipulated 
that if the captain neglected to pay for the imprisonment, authorities would sell the sailor into 
slavery to cover these costs. During the remaining antebellum decades, various other states along 
the southeast coastline passed similar “Negro Seamen Acts.” Sailors affected by enforcement of 
the laws spent anywhere from days to years in prison. During these suspensions of their freedom, 
African Americans endured corporal punishment and convict labor. The motivations for these 
regulations were two-fold. First, slave states were worried that free northern or foreign blacks 
would incite slave insurrections modelled off of what Denmark Vesey, a free black man, had led 
prior to the enactment of South Carolina’s law. Secondly, after the British Empire ended its own 
system of bondage, southern states expected it to liberate American slaves.36  
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Linking these two factors together, by the nineteenth century, the Atlantic World had also 
entered an era in which proslavery ideologies competed with the natural rights philosophies 
unleashed by the most radical elements of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions. As 
Michael A. Schoeppner describes the Seamen Act policy, imprisoning or enslaving free black 
sailors amounted to a “quarantine” from the ideologies espousing freedom as a birthright, ideas 
which these sailors threatened to convey to the local bondspeople.37  
Despite the rarity of black naval mutinies during the nineteenth century, enslaved and 
free black merchant sailors engaged in frequent acts of unrest and resistance. While land-based 
revolts such as those of Nat Turner, John Brown, and Denmark Vesey failed, the antebellum 
era’s wet slave rebellions enjoyed a remarkable degree of success. Enslaved sailors could more 
easily seize power over the sites of their bondage because ships were smaller and more isolated 
than plantations, making it more difficult for proslavery forces to quell them. If an insurrection 
succeeded, the liberated could then sail the ship to free land, bypassing slaveholding territory.  
Blacks began conducting rebellions on the water from the time Atlantic slave traders 
kidnapped them. With the English Empire increasingly using slave labor alongside indentured 
servants by the mid-seventeenth century, its ships occasionally met the fate of one that set anchor 
in Gambia in 1651. The boat’s captors “got weapons in their hands, and fell upon the Saylors, 
knocking them on the heads, and cutting their throats.” Incidents like this became so frequent 
that the Guinea Company directed ships to carry shackles and bolts with which to constrain 
“your negers as are rebellious,” as well as to keep bondspeople fed “in due season that they ryse 
not against you.” White slavers hired other African peoples to detect signs of insurrection by 
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living among and sleeping next to the enslaved, and to whip resisters. On another ship, a group 
of these black guards crushed an uprising when they shot thirteen rebels. In 1750, four rebellious 
slaves aboard The Wolf suffered the penalty of drowning. Revolt always carried great risks.38  
Just like Army mutinies involving individuals of African descent, the above persons 
faced a range of choices: resist and risk death; or save oneself by either staying clear of the 
violence or by aligning with those in power, the slavers. Early colonial slave ship mutinies 
demonstrate that the long emancipation process needed individuals to engage in violent 
resistance to advance itself forward from the moment that African peoples first found themselves 
at the bottom of a racial caste system operated by those of European descent. Moreover, the 
guidance slave ships issued to each other revealed that whites understood that dominating black 
bodies and depriving them of the means of subsistence and control over their own destinies were 
the main drivers of revolt, the first step of the long emancipation process.  
This tradition of resistance continued into the nineteenth century as black sailors aboard 
slave ships, taking advantage of British emancipation, mutinied. One evening in early November 
1841, a group of enslaved American sailors took advantage of the international abolitionist 
movement’s successes to emancipate themselves. In early November 1841, a group of enslaved 
sailors mutinied aboard the merchant ship Creole while it sailed from Richmond to New Orleans 
transporting tobacco and one hundred and thirty-five slaves. The Creole was a component of the 
domestic slave trade, which redistributed people, wealth, and crops from the Upper to Lower 
South during the antebellum period.39  
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Building on earlier resistance to bondage, Madison Washington played a prominent role 
in the Creole mutiny. Having earlier fled Virginia for Canada along with other fugitive slaves, 
Washington formed ties with British abolitionists and Underground Railroad operators. He came 
aboard the Creole after slavers captured him while he attempted to free his wife in the Old 
Dominion. Following Washington’s leadership, eighteen other rebellious slaves shot, struck, and 
stabbed the white crew members and slaveholders aboard the Creole, killing one and mortally 
wounding another. Both sides incurred several minor injuries, and four bondspeople died. 
Washington reportedly verbally commanded the mutineers, proclaiming that “We have begun 
and must go through. Rush, boys, rush aft, and we have them!” After taking control of the vessel 
and keeping the second mate, his family, and the captain in custody, the mutineers demanded 
that the mate send them to the territory of an empire that had recently abolished slavery. When 
the brig arrived at Nassau, in the British Bahamas, which had a large black population, the 
American consul treated the wounded captain and others on board, and kept the slaves from 
coming ashore. U.S. authorities jailed them, but the governor refused to repatriate them, 
considering the slaves free because the British lacked the jurisdiction over the mutiny and 
murder charges of which white Americans accused the mutineers. The British colonists thus 
treated the mutineers as passengers with freedom of movement, in contrast to the consul, who 
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contended that they were a portion of the ship’s cargo. While some emigrated to Jamaica, and 
five refused the offered emancipation and returned to the U.S., most remained in Nassau 
following their liberation. For successfully freeing themselves, the Creole mutineers became 
heroes in abolitionist circles. Meanwhile, with British authorities ordering the emancipation of 
American slaves, white southerners raged, straining Anglo-American relations and fueling 
sectional tensions over the legality of the peculiar institution.40 
Antebellum black resistance on the seas involved free African-American civilian sailors 
as well. In February 1846, a violent mutiny consumed the barque Cactus. Baltimorean John 
Harding killed the second mate by fracturing his skull, and a Virginian named William Grimes 
acted as the ringleader. Other mutineers hailed from New Jersey, Bermuda, and Portugal, giving 
the rebellion an international flavor common on merchant and naval ships. The incident resulted 
from the officers harshly disciplining sailors with whippings and beatings with handpikes for 
minor offenses. After refusing to clean the decks, the mutinous crew used these same handpikes 
as weapons against their officers. Once the captain acquired his pistol and the cabin boy gave a 
cutlass to the first mate, the officers restored order. While getting ready to strike the first mate 
next, Harding backed off and dropped the handpike upon seeing the firearm. The officers placed 
Harding in irons and compelled the rest of the crew to resume their duty in submission. During 
the remainder of the voyage, the officers dreaded a second outbreak. The Baire Patriot referred 
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to the “negroes of different nations” working on the ship as “that worst description of crews.” In 
April of that year, the U.S. revenue schooner Forward arrived in Philadelphia with seven 
mutineers from the Cactus, all of whom were black. A civilian court convicted Harding of 
mutiny and manslaughter and gave him a three-year prison sentence.41  
Regardless of mutineers’ racial composition, Americans understood that corporal 
punishment like that seen on the Cactus was the most likely of all aspects of life at sea to drive 
crews to rebellion. During a congressional debate over the utility of flogging in the Navy, a 
senator described the “barbarous, degrading, and humiliating” practice as “a system so repulsive 
to the feelings of a man, that it ought to produce mutiny.” Additionally, sailors wrote exposés in 
which they confirmed that the practice bred mutiny. They pointed to how the lash contradicted 
their citizenship and manhood by subjecting them to emasculation and dependence.42  
Though white sailors themselves felt enslaved when flogged, it was more concrete and 
less metaphorical for black sailors. As established by the Army’s mutineers, the similarities 
between maritime corporal punishment and that of slavery provide another motivator for free 
blacks to rebel on the seas. Since slave ships and plantations all enforced the domination of black 
bodies through whipping, the punishment was synonymous with bondage, even though merchant 
and naval sailors of all races were legally free. That the ringleader and the most violent 
participant of the Cactus revolt were from U.S. slave states suggests they likely drew from the 
same tradition of violent slave resistance as the occupants of the Creole.  
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Yet, the interracial bonds formed within the integrated ships of the nineteenth-century 
seas often merged the white republican case against flogging with that of the black freedom 
struggle. During its 1837-1839 voyages, the biracial crew of the whaler Hudson mutinied against 
corporal punishment. The ringleader, Samuel Maloney, whom ship logs identified as “Negro,” 
and his shipmates conducted a work stoppage against the flogging of another black sailor, 
William Peterson. To give themselves leverage, they halted their duties at a time when their 
captain had assigned them to unload over one hundred barrels of oil. In his 1854 account, white 
mutineer Jacob Hazen referred to Maloney as “old black Sam,” illustrating camaraderie. The 
strike enjoyed success, ending when the captain pledged to cease whipping and rebuked the first 
mate. Calling on his readers to uphold the manly independence of all mariners regardless of race 
or place of birth, Hazen’s retelling promoted an egalitarian model of masculine citizenship.43   
Examples also exist of free African-American sailors trying to liberate slaves, utilizing 
their mobility across the water to advance the emancipation process for others. Two involved 
bondspeople in Savannah, Georgia. According to the 1825 narrative of William Grimes, nine 
years earlier, black shipmates of the Boston brig Casket convinced him to leave Savannah by 
coming aboard while posing as the crewman’s master and then hiding in cotton bales during a 
voyage. In July 1857, Bill Owens, of the Baltimore schooner George McClire, was arrested and 
whipped for as the press worded it, “attempting to abduct two negro girls from their owners.”44  
Black sailors on merchant ships in the postbellum years expanded upon the tradition of 
seaborne African Americans conducting mutinies in the face of white supremacist violence. A 
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representative case was a June 1871 mutiny on the brig J. L. Bowen. As the ship carried tobacco 
and stores from New York to Gibraltar and Cadiz, an international group of six black crewmen 
clashed with members of their exclusively white officer corps. After four peaceful days, tensions 
emerged due to officers’ dissatisfaction with the crew’s labors. In response, First Mate J. W. 
Sleeper, as one press account put it, “used epithets that would arouse the ire of the lowest human 
mortal. The hot blood of the copper colored seamen was aroused, and they replied in a similar 
strain.” Those present included James Thomas of Portau Prince, William Johnson of Virginia, 
Peter Anderson of Spain, Emanuel Antoine of the Cape Verde Islands, Thomas Roach of 
Jamaica, and Mike Antoine of Portugal. When the first mate angrily accused Thomas of 
performing a task half awake and referred to him as a “damned black-hearted son of a bitch,” the 
latter stood up for himself: “Mr. Sleeper, I came on board this vessel to work just as I have been 
ordered and am ready to do my duty every time. But I can’t be called what (you) called me just 
now.” Sleeper responded with greater animosity, threatening to strike Thomas if he did not 
resume working. This escalation brought Captain James O. Armsbury and second mate to the 
scene, who cheered the first officer. A brawl broke out, with reports disagreeing over which side 
struck first. Every participant armed himself with a heavy pike or piece of wood. Asserting self-
defense, Thomas struck the captain in the head with a capstan bar, splitting open his head and 
killing him. Another capstan bar beating disabled the first mate, dislocating his shoulder and 
producing two head wounds. A German ship named the Europa intercepted the Bowen because it 
had waved its distress signal, arranging for U.S. marshals to arrest the mutineers. The accused 
ultimately won acquittals, with Johnson and Anderson avoiding prosecution altogether.45   
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As with certain black soldier mutinies, the Bowen’s became the focus of media outlets 
with different social agendas. The New York Herald interpreted the mutiny through the lens of 
racial prejudices. It criticized the captain of the Europa over neglecting to “send a sufficient 
number of men on board to put the black ruffians in irons.” The stunned New York editor 
reported that the captain gave these “scoundrels,” “desperate cutthroats,” and “batch of villains” 
an opportunity to claim another valuable life and/or to escape from law enforcement. The Boston 
Daily Journal painted the mutiny as a typical scuffle on the level of urban drunken fights, one in 
which tensions escalated from “the first angry words” to “the terrible blow which sent Captain 
Armsbury into eternity.” Contradicting other reports characterizing the men as “murderous-
looking demons,” the Boston paper claimed that such coverage proved false and that “in fact a 
more quiet lot of sailors is seldom seen.” It refused to place complete blame on either party. 
These contrasting press accounts show that black mutinies drove whites to either sensationally 
tap into white fears of black aggression or calmly address broader problems in U.S. society.46 
In the late nineteenth century, African-American merchant sailors like those of the Bowen 
rebelled against white officers to resolve grievances regarding crewmen’s material well-being. 
They perceived that the pillars of their envisioned freedom, devoted to socioeconomic prosperity 
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and bodily safety, to be as risk. Blacks considered the threat especially acute because of the 
ongoing decline of their status in the Merchant Marine. The Atlantic Ocean increasingly was 
becoming more a source of danger than opportunity.   
The place of blacks in the nineteenth-century U.S. Navy derived from their positions in 
the Merchant Marine, despite contrasts between the two. During the antebellum years, sailors 
alternated between naval service and merchant work. The typical black sailor endured racial 
prejudice and discrimination. Unable to comprehend equality, white sailors feared blacks 
because the latter reminded the former of the common brutalities in maritime and plantation 
labor. They also worried about the possibility that free blacks sought revenge for slavery and 
would try to emancipate those still in bondage. Moreover, they subscribed to the antebellum 
northern cultural notion that saw African Americans as perpetual children and criminals who 
needed white guidance and control and who possessed inferior mental faculties. Racial equality 
would, the thinking went, bring whites down to the level of blacks. These views created and 
maintained a segregated society with separate white and black public facilities and institutions. 
However, sea life was also one of greater racial equality and integration than life on land. 
Challenging white sailors’ racial ideology, in each armed conflict, wartime realities and 
pressures forced the Navy to recruit more blacks and to elevate them to a more equal position.47  
Despite the Navy and Merchant Marine’s shared personnel, along with the comparable 
experiences of naval and commercial seamen, black sailors were far more likely to mutiny in the 
latter than the former. A probable explanation concerns the Navy’s more informal, harsher, and 
prompt disciplinary practices. As scholars have speculated, these practices generated a service-
wide culture that made naval mutinies less attractive and less likely to be documented. Also, 
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given the manpower needs of the Navy in armed conflicts, even racist officers deemed it prudent 
to downplay their prejudices when interacting with their men. In contrast, merchant mutineers 
faced the formal civilian court system, attracted more media attention, and served under officers 
who possessed fewer incentives to avoid sparking racial antagonisms.48 
It is remarkable that despite protecting a country with a strong white supremacist streak, 
the United States Navy maintained integrated ships from the time of its eighteenth-century 
predecessors until the end of the nineteenth century. When they started serving in the late 
colonial period, black sailors ate, slept, and fought alongside white counterparts and generally 
enjoyed equal opportunities for promotion. During the American Revolution, like the ground 
forces, black naval sailors served with both the Royal and Continental Navies. Foreshadowing 
subsequent black U.S. military service, African Americans formed about ten percent of Patriot 
naval forces. Blacks enlisted out of both patriotism and a desire to expand their freedom. States 
offered manumission to enslaved sailors who served in the War for Independence, along with 
land grants and bounties to any black sailor who did so. In the years following the American 
Revolution, the U.S. Navy accepted black recruits with few or no conditions.49  
However, an early threat to the water-based theater of blacks’ emancipation process 
emerged from the young nation’s civilian leadership. At different times, Secretary of War Henry 
Knox, and then the first Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, banned black naval 
enlistment in 1798. These prohibitions, foreshadowing the Navy’s Jim Crow incarnation, 
occurred in a context where the specter of black sailor mutinies and insurrections, if not in 
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concrete form, terrorized white commanders and government officials, likely due to the Haitian 
Revolution. In June 1798, a frightened Secretary Knox informed President John Adams of the 
possibility of the French using captured U.S. vessels to unleash tens of thousands of rebellious 
Caribbean blacks in southern states. The following day, Major Lewis Toussard reported the 
gathering of a mutiny at quarantined ships near Fort Mifflin, which he commanded. As he noted, 
between “250 and 300 negroes” on numerous ships “seem to have adopted between them the 
most desperate measures to the execution of which they are incited by their owners.” Toussard 
added that these black sailors were “well armed, trained to war” and allegedly advertised plans to 
launch an attack without regard to either the law or their lives. However, this simmering mutiny 
proved to be a false alarm, and when the quarantine concluded, the ships’ personnel landed 
without incident.50 Rumors of black military rebellion in a climate of acute racial anxieties re-
emerged in later decades. While whites could point to actual slave insurrections and later, black 
Army revolts, as evidence, the threat of black sailor mutiny was still a temporally distant threat.   
The naval ban on African-American recruits proved illusory as well, in the long and short 
term. U.S. manpower needs during the 1798-1800 Quasi War with France and the War of 1812 
led to the ban’s cessation. The Quasi War saw black sailors continue to serve on military vessels, 
as white officers neglected to enforce their secretaries’ rule. This undeclared war featured a rare 
black sailor mutiny. Yet, rather than a revolt against his officers Moses Armstead led a rebellion 
against French crewmen who captured him and his shipmen as prisoners aboard their brig 
Betsies. After liberating the ship, another French naval force seized the Betsies’ men, 
imprisoning Armstead in Puerto Rico. By mutinying against captors instead of his official 
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superiors, Moses Armstead’s mutiny can be considered a precursor to that of William Tillman 
six decades later. In this conflict, as a mid-twentieth-century black officer put it, the Navy 
maintained its “traditional attitude…toward the use of Negroes,” namely, the notion that skin 
color does not “affect a man’s qualification or usefulness.”51  
This attitude was even more acute when American guns shifted their sights to another 
European adversary in the 1810s. As was common throughout the nineteenth century, this 
egalitarian racial attitude in the Navy stemmed more from personnel shortages than from 
progressive attitudes. The Navy needed manpower of any color, as well as black pilots’ 
knowledge of coastal waters on the Eastern Seaboard, to fight the British. While individual 
officers expressed racism and physically mistreated certain black sailors who committed offenses 
in ways that violated the Articles of War, there is no evidence that black sailors received extra 
harshness from the naval justice system at large during the nineteenth century. Further, 
commanders praised the abilities and heroism of their black sailors under fire. As Captain Isaac 
Hull of the USS Constitution proclaimed in 1812, “I never had any better fighters than those 
niggers.” They “fought like devils” and tried to outperform white sailors. Such comments reveal 
that the Navy’s relative racial equality depended on African Americans proving themselves in 
battle. Throughout U.S. military history, when blacks displayed exceptional combat skills, some 
white commanders ignored or reconsidered racist views.52 
Accompanying these practices and sentiments were legislation and policies that further 
elevated the African-American naval role during and after the War of 1812. A March 1813 Navy 
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Act mandated the recruitment of U.S. citizens, including natural-born “persons of colour,” which 
reopened official black enlistment on the seas. Black sailors utilized this welcoming atmosphere 
to serve with distinction against British warships on the ocean, rivers, and Great Lakes, making 
up between six and twenty percent of the Navy during the conflict. Black men relied on the Navy 
for employment, especially as the branch raised their wages as incentives to serve. The 
prevalence of African Americans in the seaborne armed forces continued beyond the 1812 
conflict despite opposition to it from whites between the top and bottom ranks. Commodore 
Isaac Chauncey, one of the dissident voices, declared that “I have yet to learn that the Color of 
the skin, or cut and trimmings of the coat, can affect a man’s qualifications or usefulness.” 
However, under pressure from southern politicians, the antebellum Navy instituted quotas for 
black sailors ranging from five to 4.2 percent. Also, African Americans could leave slavery for 
an integrated force, but they tended to occupy the lowest ranks. Meanwhile, the Army as of 1815 
viewed “soldiers of color as being unfit to associate with (white) American soldiers.”53  
Despite racial restrictions, throughout the antebellum years, the U.S. Navy gave African 
Americans a unique opportunity for social advancement. Banning slaves, recruiting regulations 
enacted in 1841 proclaimed that “free blacks…were only to be entered by the approbation of the 
commander of the station.” Yet, like the earlier complete ban, liberal recruitment practices on the 
ground precluded enforcement of the latest regulation. Due to the branch’s harsh disciplinary 
methods, dangerous working conditions, extensive hours, and poor pay and food, its recruitment 
struggled to such an extent that it needed to enlist any able-bodied recruit. Due to the racial 
notion that those of African descent possessed immunities for tropical diseases, during the 
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Mexican-American War, the Navy replaced ill whites with blacks in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Whether from manpower needs, stereotypes, or sincere acceptance, the U.S. Navy during the 
first half of the nineteenth century consistently maintained a sizeable Sable Arm.54  
The Navy’s system of relatively more equal race relations persisted deep into the 
nineteenth century, and likewise blacks continued serving in large numbers throughout the 
antebellum years. The attitudes of a minority of white commanders, and especially the pragmatic 
approach of the racist majority to enlist African Americans, demonstrate the frequent importance 
of biracial alliances to the advancement of the long emancipation process. While full equality 
never existed in the military’s only integrated branch, its relative egalitarianism makes it 
unsurprising that racially-motivated black sailor mutinies are so difficult to find in the historical 
record. Black men viewed the Navy as a positive force for their emancipation goals to such an 
extent that they spent their careers fighting foreign enemies, not superiors under whom they 
served. With the Navy giving blacks high wages, greater employment opportunities, and a high 
level of racial equality compared with U.S. society at large, African-American sailors did not see 
their status as under a great enough threat yet to think about, let alone justify, rebelling against 
their officers. The Navy’s unique system remained in place when the Civil War began.     
Despite the tens of thousands of books that have been written on the Civil War, all 
covering a seemingly endless variety of topics, African-American Union sailors remain one of 
the most neglected members of the wartime generation. Yet, a handful of historians have built a 
firm foundation. James McPherson’s Ordeal by Fire noted that blacks had “a long history of 
maritime service” and manned the conflict’s first Union warships. Shedding light on the 
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cosmopolitan nature of maritime service, David Valuska argues that black sailors in the Union 
Navy served at an intersection of white, black, and military cultures.55 
Existing historiography on the Union Navy has proven that Federal forces on the sea 
were relatively more racially progressive than those on the land and that this status grew out of 
the practices of the antebellum U.S. Navy. What the scholarship needs to explore further is what 
the Union Navy’s unique place in wartime race relations means for how we should understand 
the Civil War’s emancipationist legacy. The Army’s evolving policy from protecting slavery in 
1861, to hiring runaway slaves by 1862, and finally deciding to attack the institution by 1863 has 
been well-documented and is central to the “new birth of freedom” school in Civil War 
historiography. The “dark turn” in Civil War historiography makes us careful not to exaggerate 
the extent to which African Americans’ new freedoms had substance. Subsequent chapters use 
black soldier mutinies to add to, and complicate, both movements’ findings. When one pays 
greater attention to the war’s naval aspect in general and the absence of racially-motivated black 
sailor mutinies in particular, though, the narrative of the Civil War becomes even more 
complicated. The recruitment and personnel policies seen in the Navy present us with a segment 
of American society that had its own, more acute, and older “new birth of freedom.”56 
As with previous conflicts, in the words of a lieutenant in the 1950s, “military necessity” 
during the Civil War gave “the Negro the right to do his share of the fighting.” Building off of 
antebellum practices and facing a manpower shortage due to poor white enlistment, the Union 
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Navy accepted free blacks from the start of the conflict and employed contrabands as early as 
July 1861. The branch’s longtime preexisting practice of recruiting blacks brought in 
experienced African-American sailors. Federal ships on southern rivers and coasts received a 
flood of fugitive slaves from boats or nearby land. Matching the predicament facing land forces, 
these runaway men, women, and children forced the Navy to figure out what to do with them, 
leading to the employment of able-bodied men for routine chores or transporting the rest to 
contraband camps and military stations until ships received formal guidance. To be sure, racial 
tensions simmered on U.S. naval ships. However, due to the relative interracial camaraderie 
produced in these integrated crews, combined with growing opportunities for African-American 
promotion, the historical record lacks instances of black Union sailors conducting racially 
motivated mutinies the way their land-based counterparts did.57  
To a limited extent, the Union Navy adopted preliminary segregationist practices on 
vessels that foreshadowed twentieth-century customs. The level of segregation depended on the 
squadron and ship. It was lowest on the blockade, where any interest in maintaining a color line 
succumbed to the collective need to chase blockade runners and weather Atlantic storms. In 
contrast, the Mississippi Squadron’s gunboat officers delegated separate shifts to white and black 
crewmen. Overall, ships whose crews were most susceptible to tense interaction and who had the 
weakest pragmatic need for prioritizing skill over skin tone tended to be more segregated. Since 
operations relied on teamwork in close quarters, segregation was impractical and uncommon on 
most ships and remained so until the Navy restructured itself at the turn of the century.58  
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Perhaps a key factor in why no racially-motivated black sailor mutiny was documented 
during the Civil War is that despite white supremacist hostility, the Union Navy offered benefits 
that made African-American sailors feel that they had come a long way from bondage. The ten-
dollar wage that the bottom naval ranks earned exceeded the seven dollars USCTs received. 
While barriers to promotion remained, the Navy never engaged in wage inequality, a common 
driver of Army mutinies. Contrabands received the daily grog ration, enabling them to join a 
central part of sailor culture, communal drinking. Officers gradually promoted contraband sailors 
to skilled positions such as gun crewman and night watchman. Armed duties shattered the notion 
of whites having a monopoly on martial skills and contradicted the concept of the Civil War 
being a “white man’s war.” Whites began to notice that black crewmen enjoyed their new 
occupations and displayed a high degree of skill, work ethic, and discipline. This performance 
earned the admiration of white officers, who desired contraband crewmen. Over the course of the 
war, so many contrabands joined the Union Navy that they reached fifteen percent of the service 
(18,000 men) and ranged between one quarter and a majority on ships. In December 1862, the 
Navy ended rating restrictions for contrabands, providing them with the same paygrades as 
whites and free blacks.59 Like the first half of the nineteenth century, the seas proved relatively 
friendlier to the black freedom struggle during the great cataclysm of the mid-century U.S. 
Ironically, the infrequency with which the Navy tried black sailors for racially motivated 
mutinies increases the difficulty of finding their voices in the historical record. Only several 
newspaper letters from black Union sailors exist. Though a small sample, it nevertheless offers a 
window into how African Americans viewed their naval service. In these letters, they reported a 
small degree of prejudice, a lack of quarter from the Rebels, and the liberation of slaves, white 
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Unionists, and wounded black soldiers. In May 1864, Drummer George W. Reed asserted with 
pride that his Potomac Flotilla was a more “perfect terror to the rebel community” than even 
Ulysses S. Grant’s Army forces. While participating in the blockade of coastal Texas as the war 
was winding down in late May 1865, a gunboat sailor using the alias “Jack Halliards” reflected 
on a substantial degree of upward mobility between the issuing of the Emancipation 
Proclamation and the time of writing.60 Though they personally were further along in the 
emancipation progress than those who became soldiers when the war started and never felt that 
their status was as threatened as some USCTs did as the conflict progressed, black Union sailors 
understood the gravity of the moment for their people.  
While it is difficult to determine which, if any, Union Navy mutiny sought to improve the 
status of African Americans specifically, plenty of documented instances of another form of 
racially-motivated rebellion exist, one devoted to maintaining white supremacy. Since the Union 
Navy offered greater chances for black men to support themselves and their families, and to 
enjoy the prestige that came with serving in a combat role, much of the racial violence among 
sailors entailed not black enlistees revolting against white officers, but white enlistees waging 
violent campaigns against anyone who promoted or symbolized the long emancipation process. 
The U.S. Navy had always been more welcoming of blacks, but this became even more so amid 
the emancipationist winds unleashed by the Civil War. Integration may have been tolerable to 
white sailors, at least with reservations, but the influx of runaway slaves and greater upward 
mobility for black sailors during the conflict proved too radical for certain white seamen.  
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Racial tensions in the Union Navy originated in antebellum white sailors’ fears that they 
resembled slaves. For them, their status as lowly laborers suffering from drudgery, long hours, 
and abuse from despotic officers too closely resembled plantation life. Working alongside black 
sailors and seeing contrabands move up the ranks exacerbated such anxieties. These fears 
discouraged other whites from joining Union naval forces at the war’s outbreak, ironically 
creating the manpower shortage that encouraged black enlistment. How certain men expressed 
their sentiments made one naval historian call white Federal sailors “some of the roughest, ill 
tempered, and violent recruits the Union war effort collected.”61 
Officers were therefore worried over how their men would treat contrabands, which 
changed as the war progressed. Initially, most white seamen peacefully accepted fugitives 
coming aboard, giving them food and blue sailor clothing. Yet, white sailors nevertheless 
complained about the extra labor contrabands gave them and about their large number. 
Complicating matters further, these same white sailors refused to return contrabands to slavery 
because they saw firsthand the miseries inherent in slavery and listened sympathetically to 
horrific accounts of bondage. They learned of experiences—hunger, fear, and abuse—with 
which white sailors could relate. However, the main reason why most white sailors accepted new 
black crewmembers was pragmatic: the latter would transfer labor from the Confederacy to the 
Union. Orders that white sailors supervise and clean contraband sailors fed into the former’s 
belief in racial superiority. Pranks and harassment owed to the initiation rites all new sailors 
endured as well as racist beliefs about the black body. Ships gave the runaways the lowest 
crewman rank, “boy,” which conformed with white notions of blacks being perpetual children, 
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limited contraband wages to ten dollars a month (the lowest), and guaranteed contrabands the 
worst jobs. Thus, white sailors received a version of David Roediger’s “wages of whiteness.”62  
The leveling from upward black mobility caused white sailors not to reconsider their 
racist beliefs, but instead to experience an increase in their anxiety as working-class Americans 
struggling to reach the republican ideal of free, independent men. Before the war, othering blacks 
and slaves enabled white sailors to avoid being seen as “wage slaves.” Also, while the Navy had 
banned flogging in 1850, disciplinary punishments of the violent, degrading sort persisted. These 
included the “irons,” the shackling of one’s arms and feet, which spawned images of slavery. 
White sailors realized that they now closely resembled contraband sailors: young, impoverished, 
uneducated, and unskilled. Civilians taunted white sailors, accusing them of being black, 
enslaved, imprisoned, and emasculated. White sailors longed for the day when they became their 
own master, reaching the socioeconomic independence lionized in republican ideology. Unlike 
the Army, more and more whites in the Navy opposed the Union’s escalating emancipationist 
war effort beginning in 1863. After the issuing of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in 
September 1862, “frictions”—exchanges consisting of bickering and violence—increased. With 
emancipation fostering a sense of pride among black sailors, whites condemned any behavior 
indicative of social equality. According to whites bitter over emancipation, officers gave blacks 
preferential treatment, blacks now enjoyed better conditions on ships, and reverse racism rather 
than merit explained black sailors’ upward mobility. Following the full implementation of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, white sailors on the blockade and Mississippi squadrons engaged in 
“corrections,” or rites of passage consisting of intimidation, humiliation, and forceful acts aiming 
to reestablish white supremacy. When contrabands ate out of mess pans, white sailors compelled 
 




them to carry heavy objects while bound with a rope for several hours. White sailors took 
pleasure in watching minstrel shows, conjuring up homicidal fantasies, and observing officers tie 
up contraband sailors charged with disobedience by the thumbs.63  
When blacks refused to heed the above warnings, whites violently attacked them. As a 
black sailor walked through a block of white sailors dancing a quadrille and stepped on James 
Collins’ foot with an uncertain intent, they “gave him a good biff…he got a pretty good tossing 
all around." Murderous cases exist of white sailors shooting blacks, crushing their skulls, or 
throwing them overboard. White Landsman John Gavin, who inflicted severe facial injuries to 
contraband Leri Lee, told his superiors in 1863 that “you can’t expect justice from a set of 
damned nigger lovers.” With race relations deteriorating, and some blacks deserting in response 
to this environment, officers hung white sailors who killed contrabands. By 1864 and 1865, these 
conditions reached such a level that race riots hit ships. Episodes on individual ships 
foreshadowed the postbellum racial violence hitting northern and southern cities.64 
Escalating racial tensions occasionally broke out into mutiny. In October 1862, the 
Western World became an early example. As the ship sat near Doboy Sound, Georgia, the 
mutineers gathered on the spar deck refused to serve under the current Acting Master Samuel B. 
Gregory or “any tyrannical commander” any longer because of pro-contraband policies, desiring 
to replace him with Executive Officer B. G. Pettingell. Pettingell committed actions on the 
steamer Western World which also led to his prosecution for violating the mutinous sections of 
naval regulations. Filling in for Gregory as acting master, Pettingell listened to the mutineers 
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inform him of their intention to no longer obey the commands of the former. When Gregory 
returned later that day, Pettingell and several other officers repeatedly refused orders to arm 
themselves and help the commander suppress the rebellion until threatened with punishment.65   
The trigger for the Western World mutiny was “a difficulty” that had broken out between 
white crewman Michael Whaley and a contraband named Jacob. While the sailors were 
implementing an order to rub the deck with sour oranges, someone threw a portion of the fruit at 
Jacob, on which he blamed Whaley, who in turn pled his innocence. Jacob threatened to report 
Whaley to the captain if he threw another orange at him, which prompted Whaley to strike Jacob 
with such force that he bled from below his eye. Whaley continued to deny throwing the orange, 
but he admitted to Gregory that he not only struck Jacob, but would do so to any “negro…when 
he replied to him.” Thus, Jacob incurred wrath for daring to talk back to a white man. Gregory 
then called on the master at arms to place Whaley in double irons. Escalating the situation, 
Whaley “threatened to throw me upon the deck, and tried to do it.” However, Gregory restrained 
the belligerent until the master at arms arrived to arrest him. The acting master proceeded to 
finish gathering fuel for the ship’s boilers ashore.66  
Upon returning, he encountered a mutinous assembly. Boatswain’s Mate Robert Lewis 
informed Gregory of their demand “to no longer serve under my tyrannical command.” When 
the men denied that they sought to conduct a mutiny, Gregory notified them that their use of 
verbs like “will” and “won’t” brought their actions to the level of the crime. They rejected his 
subsequent order to return to duty, with Lewis, Master at Arms George Bell, and Gunner’s Mate 
John Deverence proving themselves the ringleaders. Regarding their preference for Pettingell, he 
informed the sailors that they did not possess a choice in who commanded them as captain. They 
 




objected to how he “loved a nigger better than a white man, and would believe a nigger quicker 
than I would a white man.” The acting master replied that he was a Democrat and as such 
endorsed state’s rights and white supremacy, but needed to follow naval regulations if a white 
man assaulted a black man or vice versa. He emphasized that he put Whaley in irons not because 
of the altercation with Jacob, but because the white crewman defied a superior. Meanwhile, 
Jacob was also in irons, and both would continue to do so until they “agreed to do their duty 
afterwards.” This explanation also seemed to appease the crewmen, who contended that “they 
had been deceived or mistaken” regarding Gregory’s leadership choices. For compelling Acting 
Master Gregory to put down the work stoppage more unilaterally, the Navy found Pettingell 
guilty on all counts, sentencing him to a six-month imprisonment and subsequent discharge.67  
The above white supremacist mutiny highlights various aspects of Union Navy race 
relations and helps explain the dearth of black naval sailor mutinies. By the fall of 1862, the 
white sailors of the Western World had become so disaffected with their government’s recent 
move to couple abolition with preservation of the Union that they collectively refused to do their 
duty and attempted to replace their commander with one who more closely reflected their racial 
views. Despite this bigotry, however, contrabands like Jacob could expect the military justice 
system to prosecute and convict those who mistreated them, discouraging them from conducting 
their own revolts. Even when black sailors served under racist commanders, they generally 
enjoyed the protection of their equality under military law. In contrast, Union Army officers 
repeatedly made the black rank-and-file feel so expendable and disrespected that a richly 
documented record of USCT mutinies exists. In the Civil War-era U.S. military, on land and sea, 
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African Americans could expect a greater commitment to rule of law and due process than in 
society generally. Such was a welcome sign that the emancipation process was moving forward. 
Despite racial tensions on ships, official naval policy mandated equal treatment for all 
enlisted men when enforcing military regulations. The Navy judged each individual according to 
merit and rank. Through equal treatment, the Navy could not always root out racism by white 
sailors, but it inadvertently improved African-American lives by focusing on efficiency. When a 
drunk white coxswain murdered a contraband in November 1863 and received a lenient sentence 
from the Army, the Navy objected. Commodore Bell blamed the sentence for incentivizing a 
subsequent episode in which a white crew member threatened another contraband with an iron 
bar. In cases where white crewmen killed black civilians, naval officials tried the accused and 
permitted black witnesses to testify.68 The military justice systems of both branches gave blacks 
an unprecedented degree of equality, but that of the Navy proves less dramatic of a change when 
considering the relative egalitarianism characterizing nineteenth-century black maritime history. 
Another area in which African-American sailors enjoyed equality, removing a central 
motivator for mutiny, concerned demobilization following Confederate defeat. Although African 
Americans enlisted in the seaborne forces much earlier than they could in land units, this was not 
the only reason why black sailors, unlike their Army counterparts, could return to civilian life 
once the Confederacy collapsed.  In June of 1865, following the war’s conclusion, the Navy 
released a large number of sailors, both white and black, whose terms expired before January 
1866. By May 1865, numerous contrabands successfully applied for discharges in order to take 
care of their families. A number qualified for either free transportation back home or a three-
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cent-per-mile allowance. The Navy discharged sailors en masse by September 1865.69 The much 
later discharges that African Americans in the immediate postbellum Army drove one of the 
largest waves of black mutinies in U.S. history.70  
The socio-cultural impact of serving in integrated crews might also explain why racially-
motivated black mutinies likely did not occur in the Union Navy. As Civil War naval scholars 
like David Valuska reveal, while enlisted soldiers in all-black segregated regiments formed 
bonds with each other, black sailors faced constant pressure to conform to white culture from 
their Caucasian shipmates. In contrast, enough white sailors formed the bonds necessary to 
conduct white supremacist rebellions because they comprised a majority on most ships.71 
During the Civil War, black sailors aboard Confederate vessels were more likely to 
conduct racially motivated mutinies in the form of slave revolts than their Union counterparts. 
Robert Smalls led the most famous example of this type of resistance against white supremacy. 
In the early morning hours of May 13, 1862, with the white officers ashore at Charleston harbor, 
he and the seven other black crewmen of the C.S. steamer Planter guided their family members 
aboard and hijacked the ship. Smalls, the ship's pilot, sailed the vessel past a Confederate 
sentinel and with a white flag waving, to a Union blockade force. Once there, Smalls delivered 
the ship, with its supplies, weapons, and ammunition, to the Federals. As Smalls proclaimed, 
while serving the Confederate Navy as a pilot, “it occurred to me that I could not only secure my 
own freedom, but that of numbers of my comrades in arms, and moreover, I thought the Planter 
might be of some use to Uncle Abe.” For conducting such a daring operation in service of both 
their emancipation and the Union war effort, the eight sailors received a financial reward. Smalls 
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continued this dual effort as a U.S. naval pilot, utilizing his knowledge of coastal and interior 
waterways. This feat combined slave revolt, sailor mutiny, and a southern bondsperson’s flight to 
the free North. When Smalls and his companions successfully took control of a ship, they 
accomplished what the most overt naval and merchant sailor mutineers traditionally dreamed. 
After liberating himself and assisting the wartime collapse of slavery, Smalls moved on to 
additional stages of the emancipation process during Reconstruction and afterward. He pursued 
an education and starting in 1876, served in the South Carolina legislature for five terms.72 
To make sense of the convoluted directions the long emancipation process took on water 
during the nineteenth century in general and Civil War era in particular, slave revolts like those 
of Robert Smalls should be examined alongside free black northerner William Tillman’s own 
battle against the Confederacy’s proslavery mission. Rather than allow themselves to stay at, or 
plunge to, the level of a dependent individual with no control over their destiny, Smalls and 
Tillman risked their safety fighting to gain or regain liberty. While non-enslaved black sailors 
rarely rose up, if they found themselves losing their freedom entirely, they knew that armed 
resistance would be necessary to preserve or gain their liberty. The trajectories of Robert Smalls 
and William Tillman—both men receiving financial rewards for boldly emancipating or re-
emancipating themselves and aiding the Union cause, and Smalls serving in politics in the 
1870s—outline the Civil War and Reconstruction stage of the emancipation process in 
microcosms. Through mutinies against the Confederate Navy and its privateer auxiliaries, 
African Americans paved the way for greater economic, educational, and political rights. 
Mirroring antebellum predecessors, these slave revolts against the Rebel naval forces indicate 
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that African Americans were more likely to engage in wet mutinies when they were further 
behind in the emancipation process than blacks serving on integrated Union ships.    
Despite the small odds that any U.S. naval vessel would become the site of a pro-
emancipation rebellion throughout the nineteenth century, the early Reconstruction period almost 
brought a wet mutiny to accompany the dry ones then erupting in southern communities. In June 
1866, black sailors aboard the U.S.S. Vermont allegedly plotted a mutiny against their officers, 
followed by a land raid with African-American civilians against houses near the Brooklyn Navy 
Yard. They planned to murder their officers and all persons who resisted them before seizing a 
boat in the naval yard and escaping. When First Lieutenant Mitchell learned of it, he informed 
his superior, who in turn ordered the searching of all two hundred black sailors aboard. 
According to press coverage, the search confirmed the existence of the conspiracy. Some alleged 
conspirators planned to use “badges, silver stars and other insignia.” The white officers arrested 
six ringleaders and confined them with irons. As a New York Herald article put it, “the whole 
matter seems to be the idea of some hair-brained fellow, who, if he had the least idea of the 
difficulties the mutineers would have to encounter, would never have put it on foot.”73  
The above case, as well as the Army episodes discussed in other chapters, perpetuated the 
specter of black-on-white violence more commonly associated with the 1865 Christmas 
Insurrection scare and rumored and actual antebellum slave revolts. With African Americans 
poised to gain an unprecedented degree of political, socioeconomic, and cultural autonomy out 
of the ashes of bondage and the Reconstruction of the ex-Confederacy, whites feared a 
postbellum, post-slavery version of prewar mutinies like the Creole. They worried over the 
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spilling of white blood on land as well as sea. If the Vermont plot was as real as whites feared, it 
foreshadowed the retaliatory mutinies, riots, and rampages African-American soldiers and sailors 
later inflicted against the defenders and remnants of Jim Crow. 
Despite the scarcity of pro-emancipation mutinies on nineteenth-century U.S. military 
vessels, many sailors, regardless of racial background, framed their insubordination and 
rebellions as actions promoting their own liberation from the brutal conditions of naval service. 
These sea-borne mutinies, comprised of all-white and biracial participants, along with the 
common motivators behind these mutinies, provide insights into how a mutiny in the military’s 
sole integrated branch could indirectly affect the long emancipation. Such mutinies either 
promoted the black freedom struggle or demonstrated that the degree of inter-racial solidarity 
that existed on ships made the need for an emancipationist mutiny less necessary.  
Before and during the Civil War, numerous parallels existed between racially motivated 
black soldier mutinies and acts of resistance involving U.S. sailors in general. Union sailors, 
ninety-percent of whom were white, staunchly defended their personal autonomy against sadistic 
and overbearing officers in much the same way that black soldiers did so. From their perspective, 
the 1862 regulation banning alcohol violated the terms of their enlistment, a view not dissimilar 
from how black servicemen perceived racial discrimination. As an 1865 naval officers’ manual 
noted, “The sailor is the most profound stickler among men for what he conceives to be his 
rights…he will fight to the bitter end for them,” which were “divine and human” in origin.74 
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Labor regimes consisting of rigid discipline and despotic leadership tend to make those working 
under them most conscious of their rights and liberties, since these individuals know the most 
about the limits and enforcement of these freedoms. 
This naval commitment to protecting one’s terms of enlistment and perceived human 
rights led to at least one notable confrontation in the early national period. In the spring of 1804, 
Seaman Robert Quinn of the frigate President penned a letter to his captain listing many 
grievances. His complaints centered on seventeen-hour duties and denial of warm clothing. 
According to Quinn, these abuses from his ship’s commanders were “enough to turn any man’s 
heart to wickedness.” He hoped to eventually “get redress” from this “tyranny,” which had 
turned him and his fellow sailors into “unhappy slaves.” Mirroring republican and martial 
masculine discourse that fueled the Patriot cause of the American Revolution and centuries of 
slave revolts, Quinn concluded that “death is always superior to slavery.” His Captain Samuel 
Barron treated the letter as a threat “calculated to incite mutiny,” and the resulting court-martial 
made an example out of him. The judges ordered the shaving of his head and eyebrows, the 
branding of the word “mutiny” on his forehead, the wearing of a white cap identifying him as a 
mutineer with large capital letters, three hundred lashes, and the drumming of the convict on 
shore.75 Foreshadowing the arguments of future generations of formerly enslaved Army 
mutineers regarding the cruel nature of their own service, many sailors characterized the brutal 
life at sea as contrary to the freedom to which Americans were entitled. While whites like Quinn 
invoked “slavery” in the abstract, referring to a man’s dependence on another that prevented him 
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from serving his family and country free from self-interest, in African-American eyes, 
mistreatment conjured up the concrete bodily domination and dehumanization of chattel slavery. 
As labor strikes became a hallmark of American industrial capitalism in the early to mid-
nineteenth century, sailors of unclear racial backgrounds mutinied because of disputes over terms 
of service, pay, and discipline. In 1852, men from the St. Lawrence harassed officers, demanding 
discharges because they had completed a long voyage despite having not completed their three-
year terms. Officers blamed the disaffection on the recent abolition of flogging as punishment, 
which they thought encouraged troublemakers to erode the Navy’s discipline. In 1839, the crew 
of the Independence “refused to do duty” and developed “a great state of excitement and 
insubordination” because of the practice of officers arbitrarily lengthening terms of service. On 
the Cincinnati during the Civil War, shipmates approached their officers to demand payment of 
wages due fourteen months previous. When their superiors refused, they dropped their mops. 
Since commanders stereotyped sailors as men who wasted money on alcohol and gambling, the 
Navy sometimes failed to pay monthly wages in a regular fashion. Struggling to support their 
needy families, sailors felt swindled. These sailors also resented the Federal practice of 
indefinitely extending three-year terms after expiration. This form of “impressment,” as they 
deemed it, was “contrary to the constitution and to the laws of the United States.” Similarly, 
some USCTs stacked their arms and refused payment rather than continue accepting tardy and 
unequal wages, and likewise refused to perform their duties over a dispute regarding their own 
terms of service. Comparable to USCT outbursts against arbitrary punishments for minor or 
nonexistent offenses were the Brooklyn’s crew. In May 1863, this group yelled and threw chain 
chalk at a master’s mate for arresting a shipmate on false and unclear pretenses, deeming it a 
“great injustice.” Further, just as many USCT officers viewed their men as racially inferior, 
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superiors on Union vessels tended to look down on the average rank-and-file sailor in such terms 
as “scum” and drunken “Jackys.” Intensifying class tensions on ships was a key driver of both 
the harsh discipline and the resulting mutinous behavior on U.S. ships from 1862 onward.76  
Shortly after the Civil War, a sailor conducted his own mutiny in defense of his perceived 
right to both determine his leisure time and avoid physical abuse. In August 1865, Boatswain’s 
Mate William Williams of the U.S.S. Yucca committed three offenses: staying absent longer than 
his designated leave, disobeying orders to come aboard, and engaging in mutinous conduct by 
threatening to stab his superiors and striking one who tried putting him in irons. The officers 
finally put him in custody after an intense struggle. His language included “damned son of a 
bitch of a downeaster” and denials of the officers’ authority to shackle him. For his mutiny, 
Williams received a five-year prison sentence. Given the popularity of this boatswain’s name, it 
is difficult to determine which among the many men who shared the name conducted this 
mutiny. Most in the enlistment records were white, but two of them were of African descent.77  
The imperfect demographic information provides a range of possible meanings for these 
episodes. If the mutinies had biracial participants, one can interpret them as an extension of the 
nineteenth-century Navy’s relatively more egalitarian nature. If so, these incidents join the 
Readjusters and Populists on the list of biracial social and political movements that overcame 
racial divisions to focus on common socioeconomic grievances. However, if most mutinous 
crews were mainly drawn from the white segment of the service, then sailor uprisings and black 
 
76 James E. Valle, Rocks & Shoals, 121, 124-125, 127; Michael J. Bennett, Union Jacks, 119-124, (first quote on 
120, second quote on 122); Proceedings of a NGCM, Trial of John Simpson, RG 125, 3177, NARA. For USCTs, see 
chapters 2 and 3. 
77 Proceedings of a NGCM, Trial of William Williams, RG 125, 4144, NARA; “Web: US, African American Civil 
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Detroit, Louisville, South Carolina, Alexandria, Philadelphia; mariner, seaman, waiter, mariner.  
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soldier rebellions emerged out of different traditions of resistance and understandings of liberty. 
All mutineers to some extent observed violations of citizenship and human rights; black mutinies 
in particular had an added layer of past and present racial troubles and traumas.78 
When African American sailors do appear in the court-martial records for mutinous 
activity, it is for non-racial reasons, such as the poor discipline resulting from alcoholic 
consumption. The naval court-martial records offer seemingly endless examples of these types of 
episodes. A New York-born cook when he enlisted in Boston in June 1862, the mixed-race, 
twenty-two-year-old Landsman William Henry Norton of the U.S. steamer South Carolina was 
charged with “being present at mutiny without making any effort to suppress it” and disobeying 
orders on the evening of November 23, 1863. The officer of the deck, J. W. Magune, had placed 
irons on white Seaman Nicholas Johnson for acting disorderly and loud and striking Acting 
Ensign Bourne. Exclaiming “damn him [Magune], that’ll never do” and leading the pack, Norton 
and between five and ten others rushed to the scene to release Johnson, who had called for 
assistance. When Acting Master-at-Arms F. F. Banny commanded Norton to submit to being 
placed in his own irons, he retreated to a gun room and threatened to stab this officer. Thus, 
officers contended that the mulatto landsman “did aid and abet” an “effort to suppress this 
(mutinous conduct),” violating Article 3, Section 1 of naval regulations. Meanwhile, the other 
mutineers obeyed the orders, standing down. With great effort, the officers finally constrained 
Seaman Johnson and Landsman Norton. In Norton’s court-martial defense, he contended that no 
mutiny ever occurred and tried to instill reasonable doubt by claiming that all landsmen carry 
knives and noting equivocations in witness testimony. The judges found him guilty of “being 
present at and inciting insubordination,” sentencing him to double irons and solitary confinement 
 
78 For a seventeenth-century interracial naval mutiny, see Marcus Rediker, Many-Headed Hydra, 130-131. 
68 
 
for thirty days along with pay forfeitures and a reduction in rank. The judges ultimately 
disagreed with the characterization of his actions as “mutinous.”79  
There are at least two ways to frame the South Carolina mutiny. In this drunken brawl, 
rich statements presenting deep lessons about American social and power relations are absent. As 
such, the mutiny aboard the ship confirms that in the nineteenth century, black sailors tended to 
revolt for the same, non-racial reasons as white counterparts. On the other hand, that Norton tried 
to spare Johnson from discipline at a time when officers were cracking down on vices like 
drunkenness, one can also place Norton’s involvement in the mutiny in another light: the efforts 
of a biracial alliance of working-class sailors to resist their affluent officers’ excessive 
regulations of personal behavior. The latter interpretation holds when comparing Norton’s 
actions to USCTs attempting to free their land-based comrades from custody.  
Though its specific details are a source of scholarly and contemporary controversy, the 
Somers Affair of 1842 offers the best example of an inter-racial naval revolt in the nineteenth 
century. According to one viewpoint, the brig became the site of an aborted mutiny of between a 
dozen and twenty U.S. sailors, who planned to kill their officers and turn the ship into a pirate 
vessel that would plunder and pillage merchant ship crews across the Atlantic. Another 
perspective counters that the ship’s paranoid captain made a farfetched conclusion about the 
aims of the defendants, and that in prosecuting them, the Navy violated their due process rights. 
Either way, on the night of November 25, while the brig was sailing back to the U.S. 
from Africa, Purser's Steward James W. Wales learned of the alleged plot, which officers moved 
to abort. A subsequent inspection located a document written in Greek laying out this conspiracy 
 
79 Proceedings of a NGCM, Trial of William Henry Norton, RG 125, 3444, NARA (first quote); William H. Norton 
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https://www.ancestry.com/search/collections/webasm-9748/?count=50&f-F0005868=South+Carolina&f-
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and the names of twenty others. Convinced that a mutiny was brewing, officers placed the 
would-be mutiny’s instigators, all of whom were white— Midshipman Philip Spencer, along 
with Boatswain Samuel Cromwell and Seaman Elisha Small—into custody before anything 
occurred. Concluding that “the safety, our lives and honor to the flag entrusted to our charge, 
requires that the prisoners be put to death, as the course best calculated to make a salutary 
impression upon the rest of the crew,” the ship’s commanders hung the three ringleaders on 
December 1. A subsequent court of inquiry endorsed this swift act of punishment on the grounds 
that the commanders were in immediate danger and keeping the ringleaders alive made it 
probable that other mutineers would free them. Furthermore, a court-martial in early 1843 
acquitted Commander Alexander Mackenzie of charges incurred for carrying out the executions. 
Among the list of other alleged conspirators were two African Americans: Henry Waltham, the 
wardroom steward, and Edward Gallia, the steerage cook. Waltham later received repeated 
whippings for stealing alcohol and for having been associated with the Somers mutineers. 
Besides Walham’s experiences, the Navy never formally punished the other suspects.80  
Regardless of its true nature, the Somers Affair offers substantive lessons for African-
American naval service and the topic of wet mutiny. If the alleged plot was legitimate, it 
provides another example of black sailors seeking money and greater power and thereby trying 
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to end oppression by any means. The menial labor Waltham and Gallia performed could have 
fostered a desire for an extra-legal shortcut to a life in which they had more personal autonomy 
and greater access to affluence. As scholars of the subject have documented, the phenomenon of 
piracy in the Atlantic world subverted social hierarchies. On pirate ships, men of multiple races, 
ethnicities, and cultures elected their officers, limited the power of their captain, divided up loot 
equitably, and generally eliminated the rigid disciplinary regimes seen on merchant and naval 
vessels. Thus, the pirate ship was the most egalitarian version of the sea’s levelling tendencies.81 
If something else took place or if mere paranoia ruled on the Somers, the affair sheds light on the 
fear among maritime personnel that the isolation and intra-crew resentments that characterize life 
on the sea could breed violence from those of any socio-cultural group.  
Finally, the ways in which the Somers’ commanders quelled the uprising—preemptively, 
swiftly, and without formally charging anyone with mutiny—provide two likely reasons for the 
rarity of black naval mutinies in the historical record beyond the contentment produced by the 
branch’s greater degree of racial equality. First, a number of such incidents could have occurred, 
but in the absence of sensationalist headlines and courts-martial, relevant personnel simply never 
wrote about it. Secondly, the lack of due process given to Spencer, Cromwell, and Small might 
have discouraged some frustrated African-American sailors from even planning minor acts that 
their white superiors could also interpret as worthy of an extra-legal death penalty.   
A range of incidents during the Civil War did not reach the level of mutiny, but 
nevertheless form part of a campaign by black sailors and white allies to advance the cause of 
emancipation. In doing so, white supremacy’s legions expressed alarm over the specter of black 
insurrection during a period when bondage was buckling under the strain of armed conflict and 
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social displacement. In September 1862, the Union Navy censured and dismissed Master's Mate 
Sidney McAdam from a gunboat flotilla for kidnapping African Americans within Union Army 
lines and selling them into slavery. Commodore C. H. Davis condemned the offense as 
"scandalous and dishonorable conduct." Black Federal naval personnel could generally count on 
superiors to protect the freed status of former slaves, which was essential for the emancipation 
process to have forward momentum.82 
This non-mutinous campaign hit Rebel ships as well. African-American desertions from 
the Confederate Navy, like their Army counterparts, connect military emancipation with the 
antebellum fugitive slave phenomenon. In August 1861, two bondspeople on the C.S.S. Sumter, 
including the commander’s personal servant, fled while the ship was docked at the South 
American city of Paramaribo. Exposing the pillar of white supremacy that black resistance 
targeted in the Rebel Navy, the above commander declared that “the negro is not only bound to 
service on board this ship but is also valuable private property,” and upon the Confederate 
government reclaiming him, it does so according to both principles. When bondspeople fled, 
they often offered information on the enemy to Union ships, which in turn granted them 
protection and rations, just as land-based contrabands did. These incidents demonstrated that 
whenever African Americans rebelled against a white supremacist system, they did not merely 
respond to local circumstances but also acted within the broader social, political, economic, and 
legal order underlying and shaping these circumstances. Both the black resisters and white 
oppressors recognized the deeper meaning attached to bondspeople’s desertions. Echoing 
Frederick Douglass’ descriptions of his antebellum flight to freedom, these actions constituted a 
black man’s theft of his body from the master who owned it. Yet, when an enslaved person fled 
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72 
 
from the Confederate military, he or she was not just stealing themselves from an individual 
master, but also a slaveholder’s republic.83    
In an unprecedented change of course, the opportunities the Navy gave African 
Americans on the seas eroded by century’s end. In the postbellum years, prospective and actual 
African-American sailors faced the same minimal restrictions as they did since the early 
republic, but signs of a different order were emerging. However, by the late-nineteenth-century, 
the U.S. Navy gradually became less welcoming to its black sailors, paving the way for 
emancipationist-type mutinies to become far more likely in the twentieth century. As Michael 
Bennett notes, “After the Civil War, the navy abandoned its policy of an integrated navy.”84 
Despite the general accuracy of this statement, a fresh look at the evidence shows that the 
segregation of the Navy developed more gradually, not gaining much steam until the 1890s and 
1900s. The white backlash towards the Navy’s contraband policy was only the first step in a long 
trend. Blacks’ percentage in the branch dropped from a peak of one-fifth during the Civil War to 
thirteen percent in 1870. With the service still prioritizing skill and intelligence, blacks made up 
between ten and fourteen percent of naval enlistees in the last three decades of the century. 
Although they mostly served as landsmen, cooks, and stewards, some became seamen and 
specialists (firemen, storekeepers, carpenters, water tenders, and oilers). Petty officer was still 
the highest rank African-American sailors could hope to attain; of the six black men appointed to 
the Naval Academy between 1872 and 1900, only three attended, but did not graduate. To be 
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sure, African Americans continued to eat and sleep next to white shipmen during the late 
nineteenth century, preserving the Navy's status as the sole integrated branch.  
Nevertheless, as the twentieth century approached, signs indicated that African 
Americans' status was changing. Trends in pre-service occupations between the 1870s and the 
1890s demonstrated this: as mariners' proportion fell from thirteen to six percent, that of service 
workers like cooks and waiters rose from a third to half of all black sailors. Paralleling the rise of 
Jim Crow in the country generally, culminating in Plessy v. Furguson, the Navy spent the turn of 
the century segregating its ships on a large scale for the first time. Thus, the Navy was shifting 
from being less a segment of a prosperous black maritime community to more an avenue of 
escape from civilian black poverty. Following the example of public institutions and workplaces 
becoming segregated throughout American society, naval vessels in the 1890s and 1900s started 
shifting from having racially-mixed areas to maintaining separate spaces for the two races. A key 
factor was the Navy's construction of steel battleships to aid overseas commercial and imperial 
efforts. When manning these new vessels, the service trained civilians lacking in seafaring 
backgrounds rather than rely on the culturally diverse pool of merchant sailors. The new vessels 
enforced a specialized, de jure ratings system. Though African-American sailors had struggled to 
advance from landsmen to seamen throughout the nineteenth century and remained mostly 
confined to manual labor and service positions, it was through de facto practices on the ground. 
This new Navy established a messman branch, into which black sailors were trapped without 
hope of transfer or promotion. As one naval scholar puts it, this organizational change “marked a 
perceptible shift toward the drawing of a line of demarcation between white and black sailors.” 
To be sure, blacks were still present in every major naval engagement of, and won medals for 
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heroically serving in, the Spanish American War.85 Recognition for this exceptional service, 
however, failed to stem the tide of segregation, the social context for the last major waves of 
black military mutinies.   
The Old Navy placed black men far ahead most of the rest of their people on the long 
emancipation process; the New Navy created the conditions for black sailors’ position to regress 
to that of the average African American in the Jim Crow United States. Due to the relative racial 
egalitarianism borne out of shared suffering and integration, mutinies in the service of the long 
emancipation rarely happened. On the more oppressive slave ship and merchant boat, African 
Americans showed their country and the international community that they were willing to spill 
blood and sacrifice themselves to ensure that by the time they returned to land, they were more in 
control of their material well-being and bodies than when they first set sail. Naval mutinies 
continued to be rare into the first four decades of the twentieth century, but more as a result of a 
near- or total ban of African Americans during much of that time period. Once a large influx of 
black men joined the Navy amidst World War II’s mass mobilization and social winds that 
advanced the modern civil rights movement, black naval mutinies became a frequent occurrence 
from the 1940s to 1970s, just as much as they were in the Army throughout and on nineteenth-
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“Strong, united, persistent protest”: Mutinies of the United States Colored Troops during 
the Wartime Collapse of Slavery 
  
When the paymaster arrived in July 1864 and again in August, most of the men in the 
Pennsylvania-based Thirty-second United States Colored Infantry (USCI), then serving in South 
Carolina, refused their money. At seven dollars, the monthly compensation African-American 
soldiers like them received amounted to six dollars less than what white Union troops earned. 
Their white officers encouraged them to instead accept the inferior pay, assuring them that 
eventually they would receive what the Army owed them. Yet, when these superiors realized that 
their men refused to budge, the former started physically abusing the latter as punishment for 
rebelliousness. As a private writing an account of the incident termed it, the protesters found 
themselves treated “like dogs”: bucking and gagging, placement on a knapsack drill, and ordered 
to stand in the hot sun for four hours. The soldier’s letter decried these injustices as “bad,” 
“ridiculous,” and “a shame.” Another soldier told the Christian Recorder that “there were but 
few” for the Army to pay because of his and his comrades’ peer pressure to reject the insulting 
paycheck. These troops stand out because they avoided formal court-martial proceedings. 
Though no one involved used the word “mutiny” to describe the Thirty-second USCI’s 
resistance, the rank-and-file’s defiance of their superiors’ authority and the seriousness with 
which the officers approached the paycheck refusals placed the incident among a large outbreak 
of black mutinies that hit the Union Army during the American Civil War.86 
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The injustices the Thirty-second endured—unequal pay and physical abuse—brought this 
mutinous wave to numerous U.S. Colored Troops (USCT) camps. The campaigns that many 
African-American soldiers waged against discrimination motivated some to take extreme 
individual and collective actions including mutiny, which in turn caused Army commanders, 
journalists, and American society at large to debate how the Union Army should properly use 
black troops during its operations, as well as how these troops should appropriately respond to 
such treatment. As this chapter reveals, the Civil War’s black soldier mutinies, the circumstances 
that spawned them, and American society’s reactions to them all shed light on a particular 
watershed moment in U.S. race relations and citizenship rights. 
The century of African-American mutinies against the discriminatory policies and 
practices of a segregated U.S. military began with the formal entry of black men into the U.S. 
Army during the Civil War. While it was rare for black sailors to revolt until the twentieth 
century, African Americans in the country’s land-based forces participated in numerous 
mutinous episodes from the moment they enlisted. As southern slavery was in the midst of 
collapse and as the country at large began to grapple with what a Union without bondage would 
look like, the reactions to discrimination by black infantrymen, cavalrymen, and artillerymen are 
key to understanding the long emancipation. These actions demonstrated how determined 
African Americans were to take advantage of a sectional crisis to combat racial power relations. 
In the long term, wartime USCT mutinies helped pave the way for how blacks advanced the 
freedom struggle in the decades between the end of slavery and the course of the modern civil 
rights movement. While the specific motivations for mutinying evolved from the Civil War to 
twentieth-century conflicts, the former introduced black troops to the inequality and abuse that 
systems of racial segregation breed. Their sentiments toward, and responses to, real and 
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perceived racism while in uniform set the stage for a century of African-American history. It was 
during the Civil War that would-be and actual black mutineers experienced their initial 
encounters with a number of factors shaping their experience over the decades: the utility of 
mutinying vs. less overt alternatives; the importance of white allies; barriers to legal redresses of 
grievances; and gaps between expectations for, and the reality of, one’s military service.  
By beginning the fight against wage labor in the U.S. Army, the Civil War’s black soldier 
mutinies lend further credence to the notion that emancipation constituted a long-term process 
rather than a single event. This process temporally moved far beyond the destruction of chattel 
slavery between the outbreak of civil war in early 1861 and the ratification of the Thirteenth 
Amendment in late 1865. The Civil War’s wave of USCT mutinies against financial and physical 
oppression in the ranks demonstrates that the black freedom struggle entailed more than attacks 
on bondage; more work needed to be done to give substance to black freedom after slavery. 
The USCT mutiny phenomenon engages the debate over who among the Civil War 
generation could claim responsibility for breaking bondspeople’s chains and how exactly this 
came about. Generally, military historians credit the Union Army’s operations; political 
historians give the honor to coercive and legislative actions from the federal government, 
especially the Emancipation Proclamation; and social historians argue that the enslaved people 
freed themselves when they fled to Union lines and performed essential labor for the Federal war 
effort, thereby pushing U.S. forces to become an army of liberation. A number of factors—
USCT mutineers considered it their responsibility to take the initiative to prevent re-
enslavement; the overall campaign against unequal pay eventually succeeded; and white 
commanders occasionally seconded mutineers’ grievances—strengthen the social history 
argument. However, the perpetrators of defeated mutinies who requested the aid of white allies 
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while using deferential language, along with sympathetic officers who never prompted their men 
to revolt, give credence to military and political interpretations that emphasize the essential 
decisions of white officials.87 Merging the “long emancipation” and “who freed the slaves?” 
subfields, this chapter examines responsibility for giving substance to the liberty of freedpeople 
and their descendants, which mutineers and their white allies claimed for themselves. 
In showing how some African-American men highlighted glaring misgivings with the 
progress of race relations despite the Union helping to liberate their people, this chapter joins 
recent works challenging the triumphalist narrative of emancipation historiography. However, it 
also takes the more nuanced approach of some recent works that cautiously approach the “dark 
turn” in Civil War scholarship. Amidst the physical suffering and emotional turmoil of the 
emancipation process studied in Jim Downs’ Sick from Freedom, there were also cases of whites 
recognizing blacks’ worthiness for freedom and blacks learning that their social position would 
not regress to re-enslavement, as some feared. To be sure, USCT mutinies mostly highlight the 
dark side of the equation. Yet, the complex, variable nature of the black Civil War experience, 
captured in Chandra Manning’s Troubled Refuge, Amy Amy Murrell Taylor’s Embattled 
Freedom, and essays in Rethinking Emancipation, is also apparent when studying the decision of 
the Sable Arm to revolt or to not do so. On one hand, mutinies prove that Joseph Glatthaar 
exaggerates the degree to which the white officer-black soldier relationship was cordial; on the 
other, the absence of mutinous episodes in the careers of some USCT units at certain times and 
in particular places prevents us from over-generalizing in the other direction. That a number of 
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black men in blue made the risky choice to lead or join a rebellion shows that this generation 
perceived their newly-won rights to be in danger but also still within reach if they fought harder 
for them. Historians should strive to capture both triumph and tragedy in their works.88 
While black Union soldiers correctly framed undesirable circumstances and policies as 
discrimination, their white counterparts could cite a relatively similar ordeal of freedoms under 
siege. Over the course of the war, members of one Maine and four New York units stacked up 
their arms against the government’s failure to pay them, leaving their families destitute, and/or 
its decision to lengthen their terms of service. At least four commands—the Fifteenth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, the Forty-fourth New York Infantry, the Second Rhode Island Cavalry, 
and the Loudoun Virginia Independent Rangers—resisted unit consolidation orders that infringed 
on local or state allegiances and the right to choose which types of duties to perform. White 
mutineers also defended the right to elect commanders. As Thaddeus Romansky reveals in his 
study of Union Army mutinies, white mutineers drew on Anglo-American traditions of self-
government: the “scrutinizing (of) governments” when the state violated its obligations to 
citizens and the right to form associations possessing autonomy from centralized authority.89  
Also like USCTs, white Union mutineers risked severe punishment when fighting for 
their liberties. As scholars of Union Army discipline note, officers did not hesitate to swiftly use 
force against boisterous white enlistees, the latter of whom generally resisted the former’s harsh 
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disciplinary measures like the tying up of limbs. Though black mutineers framed physical abuse 
as an outgrowth of plantation justice, white Union soldiers faced cruel treatment rooted in 
northern socioeconomic tensions. Affluent officers subscribed to a refined model of masculinity; 
the working-class rank-and-file were committed to martial masculinity. Comparable to convicted 
black mutineers, whites received a range of punishments for similar crimes: most received loss 
of pay, dishonorable discharges, and hard labor; the Army only gave a small number the 
maximum penalty, execution. Most imprisoned mutineers, white and black, successfully 
appealed for reduced sentences, or someone did so on their behalf, especially once the Union 
Army demobilized after the war. The military justice system at times prosecuted most alleged 
perpetrators of an incident; at others, it singled out the ringleader(s). As with white and black 
sailors, Army personnel from both racial groups could cite threats to their liberty understood in 
the context of American political culture, but for African Americans, the threat always operated 
in the context of their unique past based on a struggle against racial oppression.90  
A sample of twenty-one African-American mutinies and seventeen white mutinies offers 
an equivocal answer to whether the Union Army, a segregated institution with documented 
racially discriminatory practices, treated black offenders worse than whites during the Civil War. 
Five of the white mutinies (29%) resulted in hard labor sentences, while ten black revolts (nearly 
half) did so. Discounting commutations and rulings lacking a specified length of imprisonment, 
the average white hard labor sentence equated 8.3 months and black sentences averaged 13.1 
months. Courts-martial ruled that twenty-four African Americans would toil for the remainder of 
 
90 Lorien Foote, The Gentlemen and the Roughs, 156; Steven J. Ramold, Baring the Iron Hand: Discipline in the 
Union Army (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), 205. On white soldiers cutting down comrades 
tied up for punishment, see Ramold, 363; Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Trial of Private William Daniels, 
OO-188, RG 153, NARA. For more thorough analysis of racial equality in the Union Army justice system, see the 
immediate postbellum chapter. 
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their terms, but officials told 201 members of the white Twentieth New York, who mutinied 
together in a single episode, that they would do so for the duration of the war. It was rare for 
either black or white mutineers to suffer capital punishment. Officials gave the death penalty to 
three mutinous USCTs. While no court-martial decided to execute a white mutineer, two white 
ringleaders died at the hands of a summary firing squad. Since the Twentieth New York 
mutineers also received dishonorable discharges, more white (202 of 212, or 95%) than black 
defendants (twenty-three of fifty-five, or 42%) suffered the disgrace of expulsion from the Army 
because they chose to rebel. If we remove the Twentieth New York, only one white mutineer of 
eleven (9.1%) suffered a dishonorable discharge. The other possible punishment for those court-
martialed—the partial or total loss of pay—occurred in thirteen of twenty-one (62%) black 
mutinies and nine of seventeen (53%) white rebellions. When either a white or black soldier 
stood trial, the Army generally found them guilty, with each racial group in the sample 
containing two full acquittals and one acquittal for mutiny plus conviction for a lesser crime.  
Moreover, a pattern in both groups indicates that whenever a mutiny consumed most or 
the entirety of a unit, and it avoided engaging in violence or other physical force, officers were 
less willing to prosecute non-ringleaders. Nine white mutinies saw anywhere from a whole 
company to regiment revolt, with only the Twentieth New York subject to mass court-martial 
proceedings, three units’ officers being informally dismissed, another seeing thirty-five 
mutineers put in custody for several months before being released, and one command whose two 
ringleaders informally faced a firing squad. Meanwhile, of the five USCT mutinies that fit this 
category, only a single sergeant of one episode was prosecuted; a second event saw authorities 
arrest and then release the perpetrators; and a third resulted in the mutineers being bucked, 
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gagged, and ordered to stand in the hot sun but ultimately released. The Union Army spared one 
third of mass white mutinies and two-fifths of the black ones any sort of punishment.91 
A number of lessons can be derived from this sample. Overall, USCTs tended to receive 
harsher hard labor sentences and endure a greater likelihood of losing wages; whites were 
statistically far more or less likely to be dishonorably discharged, depending on whether we 
include the Twentieth New York or not; only a small handful in each group were executed or 
acquitted by courts-martial; and strength in numbers generally limited punishment to black and 
white ringleaders. In certain areas, the Union Army engaged in a degree of relative racial 
equality when prosecuting the most serious military crime. One can come to two possible 
conclusions or a combination of both regarding the data that demonstrated unfavorable treatment 
from white court officials towards black enlistees accused of mutiny: either white northerners 
were more committed to punishing guilty blacks, or they viewed white motivators of mutiny—
opposition to unit restructuring without their input—in more sympathetic terms. Further, to the 
extent that black Civil War troops might have desired the rights and privileges that came with 
whites’ preferred unit missions and organization method, more immediate concerns, like forcing 
the government to fulfill its stated promise to pay them equally, took precedence.  
While USCT revolts during the Civil War shared elements with those of later periods, the 
former occurred in their own contexts. With their emphasis on demanding better compensation 
 
91 Data based on spreadsheet in author’s files. The white units involved were the Anderson Cavalry (Fifteenth 
Pennsylvania), First Louisiana Cavalry (Union), Second New York Infantry, Third Arkansas Cavalry, Fourth 
Massachusetts Cavalry, Fourth Maine Infantry, Seventh Vermont Infantry, Ninth New York Infantry, Eleventh 
Missouri Cavalry, Twentieth New York Infantry, Twenty-first New York Battery, Thirty-ninth New York Infantry, 
Forty-fourth New York Infantry, Seventy-ninth New York Infantry, Ninety-third New York Infantry, Second Rhode 
Island Infantry, the Marine Regiment, and the Loudoun Rangers. The African-American units cited were the Third 
South Carolina Infantry, Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Infantry, Fifty-fifth Massachusetts Infantry, Thirteenth USCI, 
Forty-ninth USCI, Fourteenth Rhode Island USCHA, Twenty-fifth USCI, Thirty-second USCI, Thirty-sixth USCI, 
Thirty-third USCI, Fifty-seventh USCI, Seventy-sixth USCI, Eighty-first USCI, Eighty-fourth USCI, and 113th 
USCI. This sample excludes the mutinies that hit the Union Army in the immediate postbellum months, the subject 
of the next chapter.  
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and working conditions and their tendency to apply the tactics of worker strikes, wartime 
mutinies were distinct in the degree to which they linked with nineteenth-century black labor 
history. Also, in contrast to later black mutinies, the wartime context meant that mutineers knew 
that slavery’s death was not a forgone conclusion. As James McPherson has pointed out, since 
northern public opinion on emancipation and the military’s ability to protect contrabands 
relapsed at key moments, “the tide of freedom could have been swept back” throughout the 
war.92 Blacks nevertheless had high hopes for their future once the armed conflict with 
Confederates morphed into a social revolution. While these hopes failed to completely 
materialize in the coming years, subsequent wars over the next century resurrected and then 
dashed dreams of racial equality achieved through military service. Repeatedly, it was when 
these dreams seemed most at risk that some African-American soldiers overtly challenged the 
authority of superiors. 
When examining the long emancipation, black soldier mutinies against discrimination 
during the Civil War form part of an extended narrative of black labor strikes and slave 
resistance across the nineteenth century. Just as some black Union soldiers refused to perform 
their duty or otherwise physically objected to insufficient compensation and dangerous working 
conditions for their labor-intensive service, African-American civilians conducted work 
stoppages to promote their material well-being during the antebellum years. As the Market 
Revolution created industrial workplaces, an early labor movement emerged among male and 
female, white and black workers who resented dependence on wage labor in a boom-and-bust 
economy. Meanwhile, bondspeople never ceased the forms of resistance against their horrific 
 
92 James M. McPherson, “Who Freed the Slaves?” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 
Vol. 139, No. 1 (March 1995), 1-10, quote on page 9. 
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circumstances conducted since the peculiar institution’s founding. When USCTs mutinied, they 
were following in the footsteps of predecessors who also struck for more control over their labor. 
Among the many ways in which enslaved black workers resisted their oppression was by 
engaging in truancy until authorities met certain demands. In 1837, an overseer on a Georgia 
plantation reported that six bondsmen fled when he “gave some of them a few lashes” as 
punishment for inadequate work. The overseer expected them to return once they could speak 
with their owner. An 1856 slave narrative by John Holmes revealed that he hid in a swamp in 
response to an overseer’s threat to whip him. He refused to reappear until, “they told all the 
neighbors…they wouldn’t” do so. To forcibly improve conditions, slaves withheld their labor.93   
Also in response to the brutal nature of bondage, enslaved people inflicted damage on 
plantation property or personnel. Scholars of slave resistance have identified subtle and overt 
types of resistance: verbally disapproving of provisions, destruction of tools, theft, arson, 
injuring or murdering a master or overseer, and insurrection. Others tried escaping the plantation 
permanently, seeking the free North, Canada, or maroon communities. Through the forceful use 
of weapons and limbs, violent black mutineers’ own blows against white oppression built on this 
foundation of slave resistance.94 
Among the earliest instances of free African Americans conducting the long 
emancipation via a work stoppage was the Washington Navy Yard strike by black and white 
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caulkers and carpenters between late July and mid-August 1835. Various safety hazards and the 
long hours of those who toiled at the Washington Navy Yard eventually motivated three-quarters 
of the workforce to strike when a new commandant enacted a series of strict mealtime rules on 
the grounds that employees stole items from the workplace. One black Washington Ship Yard 
worker and former slave, Michael Shiner, described about how coworkers responded to the 
policy: feeling insulted, “evry one of them struck and said they wouldnt work anny moore.” To 
end the strike, Hull agreed to remove the accusations of thievery from the rules.95  
Even antebellum-era free black southerners who enjoyed a more advanced position along 
the emancipation process found resistance necessary. In July 1838, a mulatto barber and 
bathhouse keeper named Anderson defended his Wheeling shop from a white customer who 
refused to pay. An altercation broke out during which Anderson “raised his hat” and “struck the 
rascal.” For acting forcefully towards a white man, Anderson incurred the wrath of Virginia law 
enforcement and a cycle of mob violence that led to the town banishing him to secure the peace. 
While more economically autonomous than a wage laborer, this mixed-race shop owner still 
needed to aggressively prove his worthiness for freedom from white attacks on his finances and 
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person. He thereby foreshadowed the black prosperity that incited Jim Crow’s rise later in the 
century.96 
The ways in which contrabands occupied a twilight zone between slavery and freedom 
further helps set the stage on which USCT mutinies erupted. As southern slavery collapsed, 
blacks tried to purge the country of remnants of slavery, which deprived them of economic 
independence and control over their own labor. Such actions were especially important during 
the Civil War because Americans lacked the benefit of knowing that bondage would cease 
existing as an institution by the end of 1865. As Chandra Manning emphasizes in her work on 
contraband camps, the four hundred thousand refugees who arrived in Union lines entered a 
“liminal stage” between bondsperson and citizen. Similarly, Amy Murrell Taylor’s examination 
of these camps notes how African Americans’ journey from slavery to freedom moved in “slow 
motion” and often “was…continually constructed—built and rebuilt again” throughout the war. 
Studying enslaved and freed peoples’ literacy, Christopher Hager notes how freedom during and 
after the war often took on the following characteristics: “bounded, contingent, and…illusory.” 
For blacks, overt action became desirable because they lived under the persistent threat of either 
returning to slavery or entering a new system with subtler elements of the old order.97   
Almost immediately after the war broke out, and increasingly as the Union adopted an 
emancipationist effort, runaway bondspeople headed to U.S. lines, where they struggled to attain 
independent living arrangements. In creating a free labor system in the South, Federal officers 
and northern civilians obstructed their path to land ownership, which freedpeople saw as the only 
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substantive course for material security and autonomy. As an ex-slave contended, the key for 
their future prosperity was when those “who have watered the soil with their tears and blood” are 
“allowed to own it when they have earned it by their own labor.”98  
In Union camps, contrabands became impoverished and dispossessed military laborers, 
constructing fortifications, operating wharfs, or growing crops on Federal-run “government 
farms.” Initially, the high command only distributed rations to contrabands. When officials 
started paying wages, this compensation fell short of what able-bodied men needed to support 
their dependents. Throughout the Union-occupied South, contrabands suffered from poor shelter, 
disease, death, robbery, and abuse from white soldiers, which encouraged some to flee the 
camps. The persistence of low, nonexistent, or delayed payments created black disillusionment 
with free labor and confirmed their preference for land ownership over wage earning. 
Meanwhile, many Union commanders interpreted freedpeople’s desires for autonomy, 
subsistence, and leisure as signs of blacks’ inherent laziness when free from the driver and the 
lash. Among the most crushing defeats to landed freedom was the decision of direct-tax 
commissioners in February 1864 to abort a plan to sell government-seized land to ex-slaves in 
the South Carolina Sea Islands, even after some had purchased plots.99  
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These circumstances explain why blacks viewed their emancipation vision as so 
incomplete that it necessitated resistance. The emancipation process was far from linear; the 
formerly or currently enslaved occupied different stages in different places at different times. 
Their progress advanced forward, regressed, or stagnated, depending on the white personnel with 
whom they worked and lived. African Americans thereby concluded that resisting racial injustice 
in the Union was as important as fighting slavery in the Confederacy.100  
Infringements of freedpeople’s notions of labor rights and economic independence 
motivated some who were becoming accustomed to wartime opportunities for material well-
being to actively obstruct this violation through their own examples of labor unrest. When 
officers in January 1862 cut rations to laborers’ hungry families, several stopped working. 
Officials jailed and whipped the strikers. Abolitionists condemned the Union Army’s system of 
abusive labor, deeming it “government slavery.” Less sympathetic commanders repeatedly 
expressed concerns over contraband families over-burdening Federal resources. The severe 
punishment distributed among the strike’s perpetrators foreshadowed the risks black soldiers 
later took to their physical well-being when they rebelled against white officers. Though a 
minority, strikers show that African Americans navigating the gray area between slavery and 
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freedom had grievances and disappointments. Those who resisted such setbacks had lost patience 
and felt that legal recourses either had been exhausted or did not exist.101  
While some chose overt resistance, wartime petitions represented a preferred means for 
aggrieved, but still hopeful, African Americans to improve their lives and escape oppression 
during the Civil War era. As scholarship on the relationship between writing and emancipation 
reveals, literacy “symbolized the end of” blacks’ “enslavement, but it also was a dizzyingly new 
part of their venture into an uncertain era.” Merely composing, signing, and/or distributing a 
petition itself constituted revolutionary acts because slavery sternly prohibited reading and 
writing. For current or former slaves to become literate, they performed a difficult feat requiring 
initiative, hard work, limited instruction, and the risk of physical punishment. Moreover, 
developing reading and writing skills enabled blacks to understand what liberty in the U.S. 
meant. As blacks used the Civil War to escape bondage, they could more freely foster these skills 
and pursue unprecedented access to formal schooling. That freedpeople produced writings 
expressing grievances and addressed to Union Army officials, who in turn read them, signified 
that the emancipation process had advanced forward. However, there was no guarantee that the 
relevant personnel would act in these authors’ favor, demonstrating further the tenuous nature of 
black freedom. Frustration with the limited ability of written or spoken words to end 
discrimination in the Army created the conditions for overt resistance.102 
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The Union Army’s practice of impressing black laborers sparked an uproar that 
dominated petitions. Impressment, like the peculiar institution, violated the right of African 
Americans to freely live where they wanted and forcibly separated family members. Northern 
minister Lewis C. Lockwood described impressment as a continuation of slavery. In a November 
1863 petition to recognized white ally Benjamin Butler, seventeen North Carolina freedmen 
denounced impressment without compensation, noting that it prevented them from paying their 
rent and providing for their families. They begged the general for relief. When the Army failed to 
follow orders for better treatment, freedmen felt their last resort was the Lincoln administration. 
In March 1865, on behalf of freedmen from Roanoke Island, black school teacher Richard Boyle 
wrote the president and secretary of war asking for clarification of their rights given the coercion 
within the Army’s labor system. They pled for a chance to earn an independent living.103  
Written protests often fell on unfriendly or deaf ears. A superintendent’s July 1865 reply 
attributed Boyle's petition to blacks feeling entitled to government rations rather than learning 
self-sufficiency. According to him, they refused to work and received overly generous 
provisions, of which they were unappreciative. Such responses failed to understand 
freedpeople’s poverty and desire for eventually attaining economic independence.104 
 
103 Ira Berlin, et. al., The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Upper South, 98-99, 104; “Statement of Armistead 
Lewis of Zenia Ohio,” September 1863, S-18 1863, Letters Received, Series 360, Colored Troops Division, RG 94 
(B-477), quoted in Ira Berlin et. al., Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series II: The 
Black Military Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 177; Lewis C. Lockwood to Senator 
Wilson, January 29, 1862, L-130 1862, Letters Received, RG 107 (L-9), and Report of Colonel T. J. Cram et. al, 
March 1862, V-222 1862, Letters Received, Series 12, RG 94 (K-751), quoted in Ira Berlin, et. al., The Wartime 
Genesis of Free Labor: The Upper South, 112-120; Robert Henry et al. to Major General B. F. Butler, November 20, 
1863, Miscellaneous Letters and Reports Received, Series 5076, Department of VA and NC and Eighteenth Army 
Corps, RG 393, Part 1 (C-3044), quoted in Ibid., 166-167; Roanoke Island N.C. to Mr. President, March 9, 1865, 
and Roanoke Island to Secretary of War, March 9, 1865, B-2 1865, Letters Received, Series 15, Washington HQ, 
RG 105 (A-2966), quoted in Ibid., 231-235. 
104 Captain Horace Grace to Colonel J. S. Fullerton, July 10, 1865, B-2 1865, Letters Received, Series 15, 
Washington HQ, RG 105 (A-2966), quoted in Ibid., 235-236. 
91 
 
The written protests against impressment shed light on the component of the black vision 
for emancipation centered on the liberty to live one’s life where and how one wants. While in 
some cases flight from coerced labor served their emancipationist interests, staying put in 
defiance of impressment could serve the same ends in other circumstances. In both scenarios, the 
individual in question asserted their right to freedom of movement, a rejection of the authority of 
whites to constrain or relocate black bodies. Overt acts of resistance became desirable because 
despite repeated inquiries, freedpeople could never find a clear answer to the question of why the 
government kept abridging their personal autonomy and well-being.  
Finally, the dynamics of black Army enlistment during the war helps provide context for 
why some enlistees eventually rebelled. From the time they were only prospective soldiers up 
until the moment they became uniformed mutineers, these men would have observed firsthand 
numerous examples of how far they had advanced as well as how much more they had to gain in 
the emancipation process. 180,000 African-American men ultimately desired to push the process 
forward by serving in the Union Army, enabling them to prove their manhood and worthiness for 
citizenship while helping topple a slaveholders’ republic. Since the outbreak of hostilities, black 
men tried to enlist in the Federal Army. Though blacks were already serving in the Union Navy, 
most white northerners initially viewed the conflict as a white man’s war with the sole goal of 
crushing the rebellion with slavery intact. Two years of activism eventually convinced the U.S. 
government to adopt a policy of black soldier enlistment in a war for liberation.105 
A prologue to the African-American struggle to secure recruitment in the Union Army 
and to subsequently mutiny against its racist policies centers on the legacy of black enlistment in 
the American Revolution and the antebellum efforts by blacks during and after northern 
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emancipation to engage in armed self-defense. During the American War for Independence, 
Patriot state governments granted freedom to slaves who served in the armed forces. Thus, from 
the time of the United States’ birth, black men linked military service and emancipation. Some of 
those blacks who lived outside of slavery prior to joining the Union Army owed their status to 
the military service of their grandfathers. USCTs hoped that contributing to their own 
generation’s war could complete a gradual liberation begun eight decades prior.106 
Just as USCTs attempted to kill Confederates on the battlefield and mutineers used their 
status as armed personnel to bring extra change to American race relations, black men in the 
nineteenth century resisted white supremacy on land by organizing informal armed bands. In the 
1850s, amidst the escalating sectional debate over slavery and increasing black militancy, 
African Americans demanded inclusion in northern militias. During a February 1853 speech to 
the Massachusetts state legislature, foreshadowing mutineer rhetoric on masculine citizenship, 
William J. Watkins proclaimed that “We are men, and we wish to be treated, as men in the land 
of the Pilgrims should be treated.” When denied this recognition, independent black militia units 
formed with private funds across the late-antebellum North to protect black communities from 
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. Whenever whites blocked efforts to promote the right of blacks to 
defend one’s family and community, black resisters chose arms and organization to resist.107  
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After the enactment of the Emancipation Proclamation at the start of 1863, the U.S. Army 
agreed to recruit black troops in segregated regiments. Recruitment documents and the national 
debate over the utility of African-American enlistment all shed light on the white understanding 
of what motivated black soldiers to fight in the context of slavery’s ongoing expiration. This 
discourse matched how white officers later framed mutinies. The tones and messages of these 
writings ranged from supportive and progressive to condescending and hostile.   
How the Union Army accepted black men into its ranks depended on region. Recruitment 
in the free states entailed recruiting black men who had already known freedom firsthand but 
nevertheless still lived in a white supremacist society. Northern governors joined federal officials 
in organizing units. With the federal government declaring slaves free in the South, black men 
could volunteer upon entering Union lines. In the border states and Union-occupied Tennessee, 
places exempted from the Emancipation Proclamation, the Federals encouraged Unionist masters 
to manumit and enlist their bondsmen in exchange for a financial award. Regardless of how they 
joined the Army, African-American men responded to perceived injustice in similar manners.108 
When African Americans early in the Civil War pushed their case for Union Army 
recruitment, they laid out visions of a biracial democracy that drew on real and imagined 
examples of military service. Portraying blacks as highly patriotic, they crafted such a policy as 
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necessary to save the Union and to put down the rebellion. While it is unclear if these men 
sincerely subscribed to Unionist ideology, the key to winning over white allies to the cause was 
appealing to the latter’s allegiances. A small number of free blacks joined white regiments early 
in the war as ambiguous “independent men.” Writing to the black paper Pine and Palm during 
his year of service, one such soldier, William Johnson, blamed the loss at First Bull Run on the 
supposed Confederate use of enslaved soldiers. He continued the letter with a call for the Union 
to start recruiting blacks for an antislavery crusade. In November 1861, bridging antebellum 
militia service and Civil War enlistment, a “defensive association” of African Americans from 
Connecticut formed in preparation for potential black military recruitment.109   
Just as they did over poor compensation, black civilian workers in the Union Army 
engaged in the equivalent of labor strikes to jumpstart the process of black enlistment. In 
February 1863, a lieutenant reported that one hundred contrabands at a North Carolina camp 
“had refused to work” due to their “impression that they were soldiers” in a new regiment. An 
unidentified white soldier who agreed with their new status led them in performing drills. 
Authorities arrested the individuals and informed them that the Army had not yet authorized their 
unit’s formation. Despite the willingness to enlist, they were still bound to their labor duties. 
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Except for nine contrabands and the white soldier, the provost marshal thereafter released the 
men upon their promise to resume their work. This form of resistance, which at times gained 
white allies, occurred at every step from enslaved labor to military service.110 
The discourse of northern governors and Union Army commanders on the utility of black 
enlistment and which Army positions African Americans should hold captured the range of 
white wartime racial attitudes. In turn, they illustrated the long emancipation’s need for white 
allies to increase its chances at success. Some whites did not see an important role for blacks in 
the Army, preferring that they perform fatigue duty to free up combat roles for whites. Others 
promoted black enlistment in strictly practical terms, as a means of winning the war by depriving 
Confederacy of slave labor. A third group, however, recognized enlistment’s benefits for African 
Americans themselves. The commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, 
General Benjamin Butler, issued directives regarding enlistment in December 1863 advising that 
political and social figures take into consideration “the former condition of the blacks…the new 
rights acquired by them; the new obligations imposed on them; the duty of the Government to 
them; the great stake they have in the War.” Tackling the issue of discrimination that later 
sparked mutinies, the general contended that “the colored man fills an equal space in ranks while 
he lives and an equal grave when he falls.” Once ideas for enlistment produced recruitment 
methods, whites continued to give blacks lessons on the meaning of biracial bonds.111   
White Union soldiers also expressed racial attitudes that could strengthen or undermine 
the black struggle for freedom. Ashbel Landon, stationed in Hilton Head, South Carolina, 
 
110 Lt. George F. Woodman to Lieut. Col. Hoffman, February 19, 1863, W-31 1863, Letters Received, ser. 3238, 
Department of North Carolina and 18th A.C., RG 393 Part 1, quoted in Ira Berlin, et. al., The Black Military 
Experience, 129. 
111 Samuel J. Kirkwood to General Henry W. Halleck, August 5, 1862, K-493 1862, Letters Received, Series 22, RG 
108 (S-29), quoted in Ira Berlin, et. al., The Black Military Experience, 85-86; General Orders No. 46, Head 
Quarters Dept. of Va. and North Carolina, December 5, 1863, Vol. 52 VaNc, General Orders Issued, Series 5078, 
Dept of VA and NC, RG 153 Pt. 1 (C-3062), quoted in Ira Berlin, et. al., The Black Military Experience, 135-138. 
96 
 
described how black troops in his department “make excellent soldiers and will fight like tigers.” 
Meanwhile, as another white soldier put it in the weeks after the issuing of the full Emancipation 
Proclamation, presumably due to the common white northern fear of an exodus and resulting job 
competition, “freedom of slaves would be a greater curse to the north than slavery is to the 
nation.” Commenting on a black unit in his camp, Captain Ralph Buckley argued that nothing, 
even weapons and uniforms, would elevate black troops above the position of “baboons.”112  
Due to this hostility, the white supremacist type of racially motivated mutinies at times 
characterized Union Army race relations. In July 1862 Major Edward Bacon led a revolt among 
three fellow officers of the Sixth Michigan Infantry as the unit was stationed in Baton Rouge. 
The mutineers refused to obey an order “to deliver up fugitive slaves.” The conservative white 
Unionist troops of Kentucky rebelled against the Emancipation Proclamation, with numerous 
officers resigning and rank-and-file soldiers deserting. The men of the Twenty-fourth Kentucky 
Infantry rejected an order to withdraw from Frankfort, requiring the Forty-fourth Ohio Infantry 
to place their border state comrades aboard cars under the threat of the bayonet.113 Such racial 
attitudes filtering into the USCT officer corps eventually caused mutinies among black troops for 
the opposite reason: to expand, not contract, African-American rights. When whites treated them 
like baboons, they felt the need to act like tigers.  
Despite the black dreams for a biracial democracy, as the federal government launched its 
black enlistment agenda in 1863, African Americans learned that this policy also had aspects that 
violated their personal autonomy. Though the Union Army barred black recruits during the first 
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two years of the war, the latter half of the conflict brought the other extreme: the coercion of 
blacks who did not desire to serve. Like the impressment of civilian contraband labor, the ways 
in which whites conscripted blacks into the Union Army shed light on the twilight zone between 
freedom and slavery in which Civil War-era African Americans found themselves. Any man who 
refused to enlist suffered a range of punishments from officials: harassment, assault, 
imprisonment, or even execution. One white official wrote a grim September 1863 report in 
which he laid out the counterproductive nature of conscription: blacks “have lost, not gained, by 
the proclamation of the President. They are, nominally, free, but in reality, the most unprotected 
of serfs.”114 On this issue, white Americans had common cause with blacks; whites resented the 
national conscription laws of both warring republics during the war. Yet, African Americans 
viewed the draft through the lens of their struggle for racial equality.115  
In a September 1863 letter written in the context of these problematic Union policies, an 
anonymous New Orleans resident provided a more bitter black opinion on the war’s racial 
effects. The author, identified only as “A Colored Man,” declared that blacks have a “rebel 
master and a union master.” The former desired black labor to grow crops without compensation; 
the latter wanted it to fight battles under white officers for money and the Union. White officers 
only desired the monetary compensation, making them “Slave holders at heart.” The author 
explained how blacks sought “liberty,” which “must take the day nothing Shorter.” “A Colored 
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Man” wondered whether blacks will return to slavery regardless of the war’s outcome. While 
African Americans appealed to their patriotism with whites, according to the author, blacks “care 
nothing about the union,” for “we have been in it Slaves over two hundred And fifty years.”116  
Such repulsive treatment made African Americans wonder about the state of the 
emancipation process. A number of blacks could not help but notice similarities between the 
racism of whites on both sides of the Civil War. The Union cause had shifted in an 
emancipationist direction, but its armed forces continued to uphold a familiar racial hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, they remained dedicated to converting the United States into a biracial democracy. 
With their cherished rights to personal and family autonomy under assault, blacks concluded that 
the envisioned freedom that motivated them to potentially sacrifice for a new Union without 
slavery remained unattainable under their new northern “masters.” 
Regardless of the recruitment method, once black men entered the U.S. Army, they 
encountered a host of additional violations of their freedom that made resistance desirable, just 
as it had under slavery, in wage labor, and during the Union’s evolving enlistment policy. To be 
sure, a number of white officers fully or partially recognized their humanity. As the triumphalist 
school of emancipation historiography has noted, the USCT officer corps drew segments of New 
England’s abolitionist and other idealist social reform movements. Among the less progressive, 
seeing slavery’s horrors firsthand, serving alongside black men, and recognizing their bravery 
under fire converted white officers to the view that black soldiers had proven their manhood and 
earned their freedom.117 However, the phenomenon of black Civil War soldier mutinies vividly 
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exposed the darker side of officer-enlistee relations in the USCTs, which the triumphalist school 
overlooks or downplays. Harmful Army policies, along with the conservative attitudes of 
numerous white officers, sparked the next chapter of black rebellion.  
A range of injustices violated uniformed black men’s commitment to live free of white 
coercion, achieve economic independence, and enjoy control over their labor. The controversy 
over pay centered on the U.S. Army’s practice of paying blacks ($10) three dollars less than 
whites ($13), along with withholding money for clothing, which brought their net wage down 
further to $7. Thus, white troops made almost double their black counterparts. Also, certain 
officers made excessive use of corporal punishment. These experiences and black men’s 
responses to them within the Union Army’s combat forces mirror, and constitute an outgrowth 
of, the ordeals of civilian contrabands. After the physical abuse and unpaid labor of slavery, 
insufficient compensation in wage labor, and coercive military policies, African Americans faced 
another slate of obstacles to the emancipation process’ completion. However, at every step of the 
way, sympathetic whites defended accused mutineers and/or prevent mutinies from happening.  
USCTs added to the developing tradition of black resistance through mutiny. Putting on a 
blue uniform and carrying firearms gave African-American men greater collective strength and 
leverage than that enjoyed by slaves, wage laborers, and contrabands. It was not enough that 
black men received permission to serve in the land-based armed forces; such a major victory for 
the black freedom struggle meant little if the same injustices that long plagued black civilian life 
characterized Army race relations as well. Just as strikes and truancy did in civilian life and non-
combat military functions, mutinies tried to root out injustices in Army camps. Such overt acts of 
resistance against insufficient and discriminatory compensation mostly involved work stoppages, 
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refusing to do one’s prescribed labors and other duties in order to force superiors to correct those 
wrongs that sparked rebellion. Compelling white superiors to make these corrections was 
essential for the blacks’ emancipation goals to shift from abstract dream to concrete reality. 
What stands out in the condemnations of the Union Army’s racially discriminatory pay 
policy that eventually led to revolt in the ranks is a multi-layered set of grievances. USCTs 
endured not just insufficient pay with which they could not adequately support their families, but 
an insult to this injury: being paid less than a white comrade represented a betrayal by the 
government and thus an indignity beyond the mere financial element; it symbolized that the 
government viewed them as inferior. The pain of both poverty and demoralization launched a 
protest campaign. As African-American troops and their families continued to endure such 
injustices, eventually some acted in more insubordinate, militant ways. In doing so, they 
publicized injustices, telling the government that equal compensation had deeper importance.118  
Northern governors and other officials captured white attitudes towards unequal pay. The 
racially progressive recognized wage discrimination as a violation of both the terms of USCT 
enlistment and the law. May 1863 saw Governor John A. Andrew of Massachusetts proclaim to a 
Virginia Assistant Superintendent of Contrabands that “Unless they are paid like other troops 
then they will have been cruelly misled.” In the summer of 1863, a frustrated Ohio Governor 
David Tod demanded from Secretary Edwin Stanton authorization to recruit a black regiment 
under the July 1861 enlistment law that paid U.S. soldiers thirteen dollars. For him, the pay issue 
was “an insurmountable objection.” On October 3, 1863, Major John C. Chadwick pointed out 
that a speedy fix of this injustice was needed to forestall the sowing and rooting of “the seeds of 
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discord and discontent.”119 Meanwhile, others, such as a Captain O. Brown, preached the need to 
avoid fostering freedpeople’s “dependence upon Government or upon charity.” White Federals 
became annoyed with criticism of public compensation for black families even after the 
establishment of pay equality in the summer of 1864. While black soldiers could rely on white 
allies, they also needed to contend with those less sympathetic towards their poverty.120   
Black troops themselves, along with kin, expressed their views on the pay issue to the 
federal government. In their letters, they made clear their expectations about military service and 
how they often failed to measure up to reality. The longer the unequal pay system remained in 
place, the more the Federals’ Sable Arm appeared to be dangerously close to a state of mutiny.  
Some petitioners placed themselves within social hierarchies to defend a just pay scale. In 
September 1863, Corporal James Gooding of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, writing to President 
Lincoln, asked regarding unequal pay, “Are we Soldiers, or are we Labourers”? According to 
Gooding, since lifelong freemen like himself had the “advantage of thinking, and acting for 
ourselves,” they desired compensation as soldiers, not “menial hierlings.” Similarly, in July 
1864, Orderly Sergeant George Hatton of the First USCI proclaimed unequal pay as something 
“no man but the poor, down-trodden, uneducated, patriotic black man would be willing to fight 
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for.” Both men elevated their status above that of wage laborers, which under republican 
ideology disqualified them from citizenship because it entailed dependence on someone else.121 
Other African-American petitioners and their families emphasized their loyalty to the 
Union, the government’s contractual obligations to them, and the material suffering low pay 
inflicted on families. Corporal Gooding also claimed that blacks deserved equal pay because he 
and his comrades had performed all their duties and have joined white Unionists in painting “the 
ground with blood, in defense of Union, and Democracy.” In October 1863, a father of a New 
Yorker drafted in July demanded to know from Secretary Stanton why his son was being paid 
less than whites. It was difficult for his son to endure this injustice, since he was dedicated to 
faithfully serving his country “like a man.” During the first half of 1864, the wives of the enlisted 
men in the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Massachusetts lamented their various sufferings resulting 
from financial deficiency: children dying of the families’ inability to afford food and medical 
care, and wives being “untrue to their husbands” and abandoning their children. Therefore, these 
impoverished wives encouraged their husbands to desert and return home.122   
Amidst the wave of protest and petition in 1863 and 1864, USCT commanders worried 
about more hostile reactions to the reviled discriminatory pay system. Days prior to their unit’s 
 
121 Corporal James H. Gooding to Abraham Lincoln, September 28, 1863, enclosed in Harper and Brothers to 
Abraham Lincoln, October 12, 1863, H-133 1863, Letters Received, Series 360, Colored Troops Division, RG 94 
(B-408), quoted in Ira Berlin, et. al., The Black Military Experience, 385-386; “George W. Hatton, Orderly Sergeant, 
First USCI, Hampton Virginia Hospital, July 1, 1864,” Christian Recorder, July 16, 1864, quoted in Edwin S. 
Redkey, A Grand Army of Black Men, 256-257. However, the record shows that Gooding was actually born a slave. 
He likely claimed free birth to distance himself from the dependence associated with bondage. 
122 Corporal James H. Gooding to Abraham Lincoln, September 28, 1863, enclosed in Harper and Brothers to 
Abraham Lincoln, October 12, 1863, H-133 1863, Letters Received, Series 360, Colored Troops Division, RG 94 
(B-408), quoted in Ira Berlin, et. al., The Black Military Experience, 385-386; Samuel Roosa to Abraham Lincoln, 
January 24, 1864 (1865), filed with P-133 1865, Letters Received, Series 360, Colored Troops Division, RG 94 (B-
181), quoted in Ibid., 477-479; Aaron Peterson to Edwin Stanton, October 29, 1863, P-98 1863, Letters Received, 
Series 360, Colored Troops Division, RG 94 (B-40), quoted in Ibid., 374-375; Brigadier General A. Schimmelfennig 
to Captain W. L. M. Burger, June 2, 1864, Volume 58 DS, 148-149, Letters Sent, Series 2413, Northern District, 
Department of the South, RG 393 Pt. 2 No. 145 (C-1672), and Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell to the Secretary of War, 




mutiny in November 1863, the commissioned officers of the Third South Carolina brought 
attention to the issue. They found no legislative justification for the discriminatory pay scale. 
They also recognized that it constituted “the cause of much grievance to the colored Troops of 
this Command.” The Third’s leadership requested restoration of the rations promised for the 
men’s impoverished families until they receive a raise. In June 1864, Lieutenant Colonel Fox 
expressed concerns about a potential mutiny involving his men in the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, 
which, he worried, would result in the disarming and imprisonment of the whole regiment.123 As 
tensions boiled over, officers could see a mutinous storm on the horizon. 
In between formal petitions and outright mutiny, a number of USCTs engaged in actions 
that disrupted the regular order of military life while still not directly threatening their white 
officers’ authority. Some behaviors fell within the realm of legal protest. Meanwhile, others 
constituted a crime but of a less serious nature than mutiny, inciting mutiny, or mutinous 
conduct. However, they all suggested the lengths blacks would take to show their displeasure 
against prejudice during a crucial period in the history of their race.  
Black officers of the Louisiana Native Guard regiments resigned from their positions. For 
these socioeconomic elites, who previously earned between $60 and $45 depending on rank, the 
hated $7 represented a major demotion. In March 1863, Lieutenant Robert H. Isabelle explained 
how spending five or six months in the blue uniform made him conclude that “the same 
prejudice still exists and prevents that cordial harmony among officers which is indispensable for 
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the success of the army.” Isabelle lambasted northern Federals who assumed that every African 
American in New Orleans was a contraband. He detailed how well-educated, economically 
successful, and cultured the city’s elite blacks were. Isabelle defended the patriotism of men, like 
him, who left their prosperous lives to keep Louisiana in the Union. They had been willing, he 
added, to fight anywhere despite waiting in vain for a pay check and learning of the proclamation 
from C.S. President Jefferson Davis designating black troops the equivalent of rebellious slaves. 
His patience had run out. Thus, the U.S. Army’s controversial pay policy did not just prevent 
most African-American men from escaping the bottom of the social ladder despite their escape 
from slavery, but also threatened to bring well-to-do blacks down to a lower-class status.124 
The Louisiana Native Guard resignations add a layer of complexity to how black resisters 
in the Union Army viewed freedom and emancipation. The wealthy blacks of New Orleans who 
received commissions long before the large-scale enlistment of black soldiers in the Union Army 
were further along in the emancipation process. Yet, upon assuming their duties, the Native 
Guards found themselves in a similar position as any member of the Sable Arm. To their 
consternation, commanders used them for fatigue and guard duty, and they faced hostility from 
white comrades. However, men like Lt. Isabelle demonstrate that elite African Americans 
sometimes appealed to common class interests with white Union officers as a means of 
improving their social status when it suited them. By the full onset of black Army enlistment in 
early 1863, the Union removed most of the Native Guards’ founders.  
Closer to the level of mutiny were instances when USCTs deserted rather than serve 
under a problematic compensation policy. While a serious military crime, unlike mutiny, 
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desertion entailed escaping injustices rather than forcing their superiors to resolve them. A 
deserter from the First Louisiana Native Guard received a six-year sentence at Tortugas, Florida. 
Private Warren D. Hamelton justified his offense in a petition for release in May 1865, arguing 
that he violated his terms of enlistment because the government had already done so by denying 
him full payment of what it promised him. He explained his need to support his aging mother 
and emphasized that he found no legal way to redress his grievances. As a brigade commander 
noted in the summer of 1864, black soldiers from the South Carolina coast who served in 
operations against Charleston and Virginia “deserted by the score because their families were 
starving” from the combined effects of crop failure, ration cuts, and unreliable, low pay. On June 
22, 1864, musician Charles Brown of the Sixty-first USCI deserted for a better-paying job on a 
steamer. In mid-August, a patrol captured Brown. A court-martial sentenced him to one year of 
hard labor with a ball and chain and a forfeiture of pay. USCT soldiers who deserted resisted in a 
method comparable to those of antebellum bondspeople who fled to the North.125  
Despite a widespread, robust campaign of protest, the numerous critics of the federal 
government’s decision to pay USCTs less than white personnel found their worst fears justified. 
Beginning in the fall of 1863 and continuing into the spring of 1864, rank-and-file disaffection 
with the policy escalated to the most overt types of revolt. Since these forms of rebellion risked 
extreme disorder, they brought the full wrath of the Army’s criminal justice system.  
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Just as enslaved and free black workers antagonistically challenged miserable and 
otherwise undesirable conditions in antebellum American society and in Union contraband 
camps, USCTs facing similar realities took matters into their own hands. Since their superiors 
chose to pay them less than white soldiers as they risked losing their lives, limbs, and/or sanity 
battling Confederates and maintaining fortifications, failing to fulfill a core component of the 
bargain of black enlistment, a number of USCTs concluded that they were not obligated to 
follow the requirements of military service. Therefore, they put down their arms while in camp 
or stayed silent during a muster. Taking the form of work stoppages, mutinies against unequal 
pay, both in motivation and in tactics, resembled labor strikes in which civilian workers dropped 
their tools and neglected their tasks until their employers agreed to their demands. Because these 
confrontational, yet non-violent, examples of insubordination challenged the authority of 
superiors, undermining the hierarchical structure and regular course of Army life, the white 
officer corps deemed them to be as serious as the forceful and violent variety.126  
Both the South’s former slaves and free black northerners chose mutiny to vent their 
sense of betrayal and general frustration against being paid less than white comrades. Southern 
USCT mutineers drew from slave resistance, interpreting injustices from the Army in a similar 
light as those of their masters. Meanwhile, black northerners brought to the Army life-long, 
cross-generational frustrations over their own section’s racism. While legally free, they could not 
vote, lived amidst occasional race riots, and had fewer economic opportunities. While they did 
not know slavery first-hand, they would have been familiar with runaway slave narratives, 
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abolitionist rhetoric, and the fear of enslavement from enforcers of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law. 
Moreover, those growing up amidst or after northern emancipation knew more than southern ex-
slaves about the need for continued resistance to further the black liberation process.  
The various backgrounds of black mutineers certainly played direct or indirect roles in 
their actions, but the end result—the specific mutinous actions—often blurred these boundaries. 
Individual preference and the circumstances of a particular unit’s camp tended to determine 
whether a northern or southern member of the USCT revolted and in what manner. An important 
aspect of these shared qualities among northern and southern blacks was that they performed 
identical labors and duties as soldiers in the Union Army regardless of their upbringing. All 
African-American Federals were more likely than whites to serve in less glorious, noncombat 
roles and receive inferior provisions. Both northern and southern black troops came from heavily 
impoverished communities, with the former residing in the bottom tier of the working class and 
the latter owning little more than the clothes they wore. Thus, military service weakened the 
distinctions among black men of different socioeconomic and cultural worlds. The recently 
liberated and those born free alike thus had similar responses to shared injustices.127   
On November 19, 1863, while stationed at Hilton Head, the troops of Company A, Third 
South Carolina Infantry, launched one of the first major USCT mutinies against the pay issue. 
Their regiment consisted of former slaves who had experienced the peculiarities of bondage in 
the Palmetto State. While Upper and Border South USCTs originated from a region decreasingly 
dependent on large-scale agriculture and thus more populated with small enslaved labor forces 
and free blacks, black South Carolinians lived in a society based on huge rice and cotton 
plantations and the largest farms of the mid-nineteenth century, a function of its semitropical 
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climate and its colonial origins as an extension of the West Indies. Gullah backgrounds and 
isolated plantations made enslaved South Carolinians more culturally homogenous, and they 
formed part of a large black majority in the state, which the domestic slave trade boosted.128 
The Third’s enslaved background suggests indirect determiners for why the unit’s troops 
engaged in mutiny. Since Union Army employment and military service represented their first 
taste of free labor, unleashing the Civil War’s social revolution, the mutineers could not let the 
emancipation process’ momentum slow down via pay discrimination. Also, the large plantations 
on which they labored prior to the war would have taught them the power they possessed in 
collective numbers, even more so now that they were uniformed and armed.129  
The existence of the Third South Carolina owed to Union operations along the Atlantic 
coast as well as the large African-American population of eastern South Carolina, especially the 
Port Royal area, making it the birthplace of wartime Reconstruction. In November 1861, General 
David Hunter’s forces invaded this area. With planters fleeing, blacks flooded into the Union-
occupied Sea Islands. Over the next year, after losing forces to relocation in the summer of 1862, 
U.S. commanders weighed black enlistment proposals. Finally, amidst the dawn of the Federal 
black recruitment policy following the Emancipation Proclamation, infantry regiments emerged 
in the Palmetto State. The Third South Carolina began its duties on June 19, 1863. In the months 
leading to their mutiny, its members performed garrison duty at Hilton Head. Doing monotonous 
labor like coaling ships caused Company A’s men to become so exhausted that their commander 
reported in early August that “My men are giving out.” Despite previous promises by the 
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secretary of war that South Carolina’s USCTs would earn the same thirteen-dollar monthly wage 
as white units, the government paid them the hated seven dollars.130   
The Third South Carolina’s Company A believed that unequal pay during their time of 
service grossly violated the emancipation process. Sergeant William Walker acted as their 
ringleader. A runaway slave, Walker made the mistake of moving from the more racially 
progressive Navy to the Army on the word of several officers that the pay would be equal among 
all volunteers. As the previous chapter indicated, had he remained a sailor, he likely would have 
never participated in a mutiny. Sergeant Walker led the company in stacking their weapons and 
ammunition and marching to their commander, Lt. Colonel Augustus G. Bennett. When Bennett 
inquired into what was occurring, Walker informed him that the mutineers were “not willing to 
be soldiers for seven dollars per month.” The lieutenant colonel informed the men that they had 
violated Army regulations and ordered them to resume their duties. Instead, they returned to their 
quarters, leaving their arms behind. The next day, commissioned officers arrested Walker, 
demoted him to private, and tried him for mutinous and ill-disciplined conduct.131 
Sergeant Walker’s testimony during his court-martial clearly illustrated the gap between 
USCTs’ expectations and realities regarding their service as it related to their freedom, as well as 
how the resentment over unequal pay could combine with other grievances to form a powder keg 
of emotions. Walker contended that ninety percent of his unit’s officers had acted “tyrannical in 
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the extreme, and totally beneath that standard of gentlemanly conduct which we were taught to 
believe as pertaining to officers wearing the uniform of a government that had declared ‘freedom 
to all’ as one of the cardinal points of its policy.” Walker testified that such “treatment, prepared 
the way for the events that occurred when it was announced to us that we could receive but $7 
per month pay.” He tried to persuade the judges that he and his comrades were merely making a 
“peaceful demand for the rights and benefits that had been guaranteed them.” Further, his whole 
company never received a proper education on Army regulations during the entirety of their 
terms; they instead had to learn their duties on the job based on informal instructions.132 
In producing this statement, Sergeant Walker did not only try to convince judges to 
acquit him as a defendant; he painted for white northerners the collective and individual 
identities black soldiers had formed while serving together in an army of liberation, as well as 
also bringing attention to the failures of the white officer corps. Family, which a slave sale could 
tear apart in an instant and whose stability blacks prioritized as they implemented emancipation, 
stood at the center of enslaved and freed-people’s socio-political worlds during the nineteenth 
century. Protecting kinship remained paramount as freedpeople entered the free labor system and 
established their own households. Yet, once former bondsmen enlisted in the Union Army, those 
circles expanded to include others. Even prior to enlisting, USCTs became part of what Stephen 
Hahn calls the world’s largest and most successful slave revolt—the hundreds of thousands of 
slaves who helped topple the peculiar institution during the Civil War. Once they performed 
soldierly duties, black men in blue became comrades who worked together for common military 
goals while under the command of white officers held to high moral and behavioral standards. 
When officers fell short of these standards, this camaraderie became one based on shared 
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injustices. In calling his superiors despotic and un-gentlemanly despite serving in an army 
fighting for egalitarian ideals, Walker framed Army racism as contrary to the Union war effort 
and the principles for which it was fighting. Further, these men shared the same frustrations and 
traumas associated with being ex-slaves who now encountered a form of white northern racism 
and a violation of the terms of their service. The sentiments boiled over to such an extent that the 
men withdrew their side of the bargain, stacking up their arms. In doing so, they sought to fix a 
system that repeatedly had disappointed African Americans struggling to establish a biracial 
democracy during the trajectory from bondage to enlistment.133  
In addition to his physical actions, Sergeant Walker highlighted this identity through his 
use of the plural words “we” and “them” while detailing their insufficient pay and training. 
Though he himself was on trial as the ringleader, he communicated the collective motivations 
and widely shared circumstances that bred the incident in question. They all felt the pain of 
struggling to support their impoverished families while undergoing the added insult of 
discrimination. Also, he spoke of his comrades as a group distinct from the white officers, while 
also empathizing with the latter. Both the black rank-and-file and white officer corps responded 
to the situation according to their own vantage points. The collective identity indicated by his 
plural language foreshadows future developments in African-American life. Blacks’ collective 
identities continued to expand in the postbellum years, through the formation of political clubs, 
farming cooperatives, labor unions, churches, and the Buffalo Soldiers. Despite the frequency of 
individual black soldiers’ revolts, the welter of episodes in which groups of black men conducted 
 
133 Stephen Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, page number; cite camaraderie in USCT scholarship.  
112 
 
a rebellion together signifies that African Americans throughout the emancipation process were 
developing an elaborate web of collective identities.134 
A letter by Lt. Colonel Augustus Bennett, commander of the Third South Carolina, to a 
captain, and later forwarded to Brigadier General R. Saxton, sheds more light on the context for 
the mutiny of Sergeant Walker and his comrades. Writing on November 30, 1863, Bennett 
brought attention to how his men’s seven dollars a month made them “unable to render the least 
assistance towards the support of those who are depended on them.” Therefore, Bennett 
recommended that soldiers’ families, who “are in a deplorable condition,” should receive rations. 
Also, “great dissatisfaction” permeated the regiment because of knowledge that black workers 
employed in the quartermaster department earned between ten and twenty-five dollars and 
because these workers’ families enjoyed rations. However, according to Saxton, these rations 
would breed dependence on the government, and he disagreed with the notion that families 
whose husbands and fathers earn seven dollars a month could be “destitute.”135  
The origins of the Third South Carolina’s mutiny were also not confined to resentment 
against unequal pay. A revealing June 1864 letter from Colonel M. S. Littlefield, the 
superintendent of black recruitment in the Department of the South, to the department’s provost 
marshal documented miserable circumstances the regiment endured. From the time of their 
enlistment in the spring of 1863, the former slaves in the unit endured a harsh existence which 
likely played a role in further inflaming tensions in the ranks. According to Littlefield, men like 
Sergeant Walker began their terms with inadequate clothing, “little or no instruction,” and 
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incompetent officers who had since left the unit. The colonel noticed that by the time of writing 
his letter, the recent arrival of exceptional officers, who replaced the “worthless” ones and 
properly guided the troops, had improved the quality of the regiment.136  
As the black Army experience shows, poor white leadership increased the likelihood of 
black rank-and-file revolt. Even before they received their first seven-dollar payment, the Third 
South Carolina’s mutineers felt a variety of negative emotions that intensified when whites lied 
to them about their compensation. Linking the letters from Bennett and Littlefield with Walker’s 
testimony, one can add sympathetic whites to the socio-political lives of formerly enslaved 
soldiers. In addition to relying on each other to advance the cause of emancipation, African 
Americans at times enjoyed examples of whites helping them build a biracial democracy.  
The William Walker court-martial established trends in the phenomenon of black military 
mutinies which would characterize them throughout the long emancipation: mutineers took grave 
risks to their lives and well-being; and while some white officers sympathized with black 
mutineers’ motivations enough that they advised leniency, others strictly enforced Army 
regulations. The judges found Walker guilty, giving him the death penalty. In an appeal letter, 
Colonel Littlefield acknowledged the Army’s violation of numerous terms of service. He 
contended that since the mutineers were ignorant of the illegal nature of their action, they did not 
technically commit a crime. As the colonel understood it, the receipt of half of their promised 
pay told troops that they were no longer obligated to perform their duty.137 
Walker’s mutiny ultimately cost him his life. Despite the appeal, the Army executed him 
by firing squad on March 1, 1864. In doing so, the Army made an example out of him as the 
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ringleader, since nine other soldiers tried for participation in the company’s strike received 
prison sentences. While most convicted African-American mutineers during and after the Civil 
War escaped capital punishment, Sergeant Walker’s case illustrates that any soldier who chose to 
express his grievances in the most overt, aggressive manner could lose his life. In the case of 
South Carolina’s black regiments and others composed of former bondsmen, the main issue 
which sparked the November 1863 mutiny would not be solved until March 1865, by which they 
had received full back pay from the time of their enlistment. Yet, on the other hand, this mutiny 
showcased the leniency, resolution, and sympathy white commanders could give mutineers. An 
investigation by the Department of the South in June 1864 argued that the “bad management” of 
officers was "more to blame than” the mutineers themselves. In the conclusion of their report, the 
investigators successfully recommended restoring the imprisoned mutineers to duty. Finally, the 
Third South Carolina’s late 1863 rebellion foreshadowed how over the next century, mutinies 
often constituted the climax of various crises plaguing military race relations and servicemen’s 
well-being for weeks and months leading to the event.138  
Drawing on understandings of contracts and republican ideology, the abolitionist press 
offered its own perspectives on black soldier mutinies against unequal pay in general and of 
Walker’s mutiny in particular. The Liberator published an article the following year about the 
tendency of tyrannical power to deceitfully apply honorable names to favorable entities and 
persons and dishonorable ones to the unfavorable. As an example, the paper highlighted the word 
“mutiny,” which whites used for black soldiers who revolted against a government that violated 
its terms of a contract by paying the former late or unequally and denying formal redress of 
grievances. The execution of an unpaid soldier constituted robbery and murder. Thus, the paper 
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continued, the designation of “mutiny” originated from power obscuring its crimes through 
phraseology: “The act of killing him for standing thus upon his rights, and doing his part towards 
the claim of equitable treatment for his people, is called ‘the punishment of mutiny.’” According 
to the writer, Walker engaged in not mutiny, but “just and manly conduct.” His execution 
therefore highlighted the need for “strong, united, persistent protest, by all who love justice and 
hate tyranny.”139 At the time of the Civil War’s USCT mutinies, the most vocal supporters of 
black civil rights understood the broader significance these episodes and the mainstream 
culture’s discourse on them held for the emancipation process. 
Episodes between late 1863 and the spring of 1864 involving groups of black northerners 
showed that the struggle against unequal pay escalated within USCT units raised in the North as 
well. In addition to the Thirty-second USCI whose experiences opened the current chapter, the 
Fifty-fourth and Fifty Fifth Massachusetts Infantry regiments declined to accept discriminatory 
paychecks. While they never stood before a court-martial, they committed actions and made 
statements that could have led to formal prosecution if they served under stricter officers. With 
both black Massachusetts units encamped in coastal South Carolina, they shared geographic 
proximity with the Third South Carolina’s ex-slaves at the time of the latter’s own rebellion 
against unequal pay. Though northern and southern troops had metaphorically taken different 
paths to freedom thus far, USCTs shared the same injustices during their military careers, 
regardless of background and often physically next to each other. 
The enlisted men of the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts “received unfavorably” the news of 
unequal compensation. Since this discrimination violated the terms under which they enlisted 
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and compromised “their self respect,” they refused their payment. In a November 1863 letter to 
Governor John A. Andrews, Colonel E. N. Hallowell expressed his understanding that his men 
“enlisted because men were called for,” not because the government offered them money. They 
would rather fight for the Union without pay for the entire war than accept such inequality; if 
they did, he added, then they would “acknowledge that because they have African blood in their 
veins, they are less men, than those who have saxon.”140  
When the paymaster refused to issue them an amount exceeding seven dollars in the 
summer of 1864, members of the Fifty-fifth Massachusetts also rejected their checks. To explain 
this decision, they wrote the president defending their right to equal pay. They referenced July 
1861 legislation under which their unit and white commands had formed that established all 
soldiers’ pay at thirteen dollars a month. As they noted, “to us money is no object”; rather, “we 
came to fight For Liberty justice and equality. These are gifts we Prise more Highly than Gold.” 
Over the past thirteen months, they had “cheerfully and willingly” performed trench and fatigue 
duty and demonstrated “conspicuous valor and endurence in Battle.” Being paid unequally 
constituted “Having Been enlisted under False Pretence.” The letter concluded by threatening 
that, “if imediate steps are not taken to Relieve us we will Resort to more stringent measures.”141  
The Massachusetts men continued to protest by declining their insulting pay even when 
in December 1863, their state government offered to make up the federal pay difference to bring 
it to the level of white soldiers. Since the issue centered on principle rather than money, men in 
both regiments politely refused the subsidy in order to “wait justice from the proper source.” 
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Only when Washington, D.C., agreed to pay all Union soldiers equally would they feel satisfied. 
The seventy-four signers from the Fifty-fifth pointed out that they did not enlist in a system 
whereby separate levels of governments each paid a component of their wages. This stance 
persuaded their officers to agree with, and second, their decision.142 
When they refused payment, the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Massachusetts could count 
on the endorsement of their commanders. All grew out of the abolitionist movement: Robert G. 
Shaw and Edward N. Hallowell, Norwood P. Hallowell and Alfred S. Hartwell, respectively. 
According to these white allies of emancipation, if the federal government refused to uphold its 
end of the bargain, it should muster these men out of the service.143  
However, the Massachusetts officers faced a more difficult situation when the discontent 
that produced pay refusals and petitions escalated. Observers reported hearing proclamations of 
“money or blood” and “muster us out or pay us.” The unleashing of this mutinous energy led to 
individual troops and small bands of men in the Fifty-fifth clashing with officers over not just 
unequal pay, but also their families’ poverty, the ban on blacks earning officer commissions, and 
poor-quality weapons. Officers tried to make disciplinary examples out of these “few 
malcontents.” To deescalate the situation, Colonels Norwood Hallowell and Hartwell tried 
reassuring their disaffected men that Congress will eventually pass an equal pay law. However, 
these reassurances often resulted from rumors or inaccurate reports, undermining trust between 
commanders and the enlisted men. Only the strenuous efforts of black noncommissioned officers 
to prevent escalation of tensions and the implementation of the June 1864 law in August 
prevented the simmering degree of tension in the Massachusetts camps from boiling over into 
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widespread mutiny.144 Perhaps the men of the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Massachusetts never 
conducted a full work stoppage against equal pay because there remained a semblance of legal 
recourse in the form of sympathetic officers who protested on their behalf. 
In a demonstration of what could have happened in the Massachusetts camps on the 
Carolina seaboard, a large-scale mutinous wave among other black northern troops broke out on 
the other side of the country. In the spring of 1864, after “trouble” had been “brooding for a long 
time,” as an officer later put it, tensions reached a boiling point with two groups of Rhode Island 
artillerymen stationed in coastal Texas. These two episodes demonstrate that as the federal 
government continued to allow the unequal pay policy to continue into 1864, the animosity 
towards this and related offenses only worsened and spread.145 
A Rhode Island recruitment poster from late 1863 sheds light on the high expectations of 
these black artillerymen and in turn, why they felt resentful enough to mutiny when reality 
dashed these expectations. It advertised the following: “Equal State Rights! And Monthly Pay 
with White Men!!”; “Freedom to Over Three Millions of Slaves”; and “Protection of Colored 
Troops.” On the second page, the poster denounced claims that blacks would not fight due to 
natural cowardice: “A viler slander Satan never uttered through the lips of a traitor.” To refute 
such lies, the poster cited twelve engagements in which blacks displayed valor on the battlefield, 
as well as praise from the president and white officers and soldiers. The poster included a call to 
its “Colored Citizens.” Along with the same $13 monthly pay as white troops, the poster 
promised blacks full support for their families, lifetime pensions for the wounded and for the 
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families of those killed in battle, and the highest state bounty ($250). The unit’s duty would 
consist of defending the New England coast from Rebel pirates. The poster concluded by calling 
on black Rhode Islanders to “rally…around the old flag,” suppress “the most wicked rebellion 
that ever polluted the records of heaven,” and to “heed” the “cry” of those still held in slavery. 
Once soldiers restored the Union and set their brethren free, they could look back on their service 
with pride. Since everything the poster promised failed to measure up to reality, Rhode Island’s 
black soldiers felt especially betrayed. Not only did they learn that they would receive less pay 
than white soldiers, but they also found themselves performing fatigue duty in a distant corner of 
the country, neither defending their local territory nor displaying their capacity for bravery.146 
After they learned they were to be paid the hated seven dollars a month, those of the first 
group of mutineers refused to answer their names during a March 17, 1864, inspection, 
preventing them from mustering. Like the infantrymen of the Third South Carolina and the Fifty-
fourth and Fifty-fifth Massachusetts, these members of the Fourteenth Rhode Island Heavy 
Artillery (RIHA) had enlisted with the understanding that they would hold the same status as 
white soldiers, which entailed equal financial compensation. In the wake of the violation of this 
contract, the artillerymen conducted a collective stoppage. Though this differed from the Third 
South Carolina’s stacking of arms, both methods disrupted the regular course of military 
procedures and told superiors that the rank-and-file were refusing to perform their duties. The 
noncommissioned officers and twenty privates who perpetrated the act received hard labor prison 
sentences at Fort Jefferson, Florida, ranging from three months to a year. Major J. J. Comstock, 
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Jr., who recommended the above charges, deemed the sentences lenient for a mutiny. These 
Rhode Islanders were fortunate to avoid a death sentence like Sergeant William Walker did.147  
The tensions that unequal pay unleashed in the Fourteenth Rhode Island persisted into 
early April. At that point, Lieutenant Potter shot an enlisted man during a confrontation over the 
issue. In retaliation, a second mutinous group demanded that the lieutenant leave the island and 
threatened to kill every white officer in the unit. General Dana sent two light batteries and two 
white regiments to the camp to suppress the disturbance. This force held the entire battalion in 
custody for twenty-four hours, an action that restored order. In his report of both mutinies, Major 
Comstock praised Potter’s earlier violence and wished that Captain Fry, then in command, had 
likewise executed the mutineers. According to the major, only a climate of fear will discourage 
black soldiers from rising up against their white superiors. Thus, some white officers received 
implied permission to kill any would-be mutineer without prosecution.148  
More so than the two Massachusetts regiments and the Third Carolina, the Fourteenth 
RIHA offered a cautionary tale to any white man commanding African-American soldiers during 
the Civil War and beyond. As Major Comstock failed to realize, when officers instilled a 
relationship based on respect for their men’s freedom and manhood, not oppression and force, 
disciplinary problems like mutiny dropped in frequency and likelihood. This error in judgment 
plagued race relations in the segregated U.S. Army during the entire long emancipation era.  
As USCTs and white allies fumed over the controversy, tirelessly lobbying a resolution to 
it and/or outright rebelling against it, the U.S. government finally acted. In June 1864, Congress 
passed legislation mandating pay equity for all Union soldiers and retroactive back pay for those 
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black troops who were free when the conflict began. The War Department implemented the act 
between the late summer and early fall, and by the following year, the attorney general applied 
the retroactive provisions to all black volunteers. Since they had finally pushed the federal 
government to accept equality between white and black Union soldiers, celebratory activities 
took place in USCT camps. To be sure, it was mainly political pressure and knowledge of low 
morale among the USCTs that finally convinced stubborn congressmen to enact pay justice. 
Moreover, isolated cases exist of the government failing to regularly and fully compensate the 
USCT rank-and-file as late as June 1865. Yet, the mutinies against this example of 
discrimination, along with the threat of additional ones, contributed to the broader pressure 
against the government to officially resolve the equal pay issue, albeit long after prosecuted 
mutineers had lost their lives or received a dishonorable discharge. During Congress’ debate over 
equal pay legislation, Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, no doubt aware of the equal pay 
movement among his own state’s black troops, cited the Walker mutiny, calling it “impelled by a 
burning sense of our injustice.” However, unlike unequal pay, the second major motivator of 
black Civil War mutinies did not resolve itself in such a favorable manner.149 
Just as black soldiers followed the lead of slaves, antebellum free black laborers, and 
contrabands in disrupting the regular order of their workplace for better material compensation, 
they also built on longer traditions of black resistance and labor unrest when they rebelled 
against physical abuse. As labor history has demonstrated, worker uprisings tended to fight for 
better working conditions as well as for higher compensation. As seen in later chapters, the 
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grievance of white cruelty towards blacks links African-American servicemen throughout the 
long emancipation era. While unequal pay ceased being an issue that triggered mutiny by the end 
of the Civil War, the USCTs and their successors in the postbellum U.S. Army struggled for 
decades, with little success, to find a way to end physical harassment and abuse. Growing out of 
long-and short-term factors—nineteenth-century America’s racist culture, the centuries-long 
white fondness for violently disciplining black bodies to uphold social order, diversity in racial 
views among the Union high command, and particular officer recruitment policies—the USCTs’ 
own version began with African-American struggles to rid the practice in the armed forces. 
Slavery’s use of the lash to enforce discipline made any form of bloody mistreatment from a 
white overlord to a black subordinate a serious violation of uniformed soldiers’ status.150  
As with grievances over pay, whether African-American troops felt physically exploited 
enough to mutiny often depended on the racial attitudes of their white commanders. In May 
1865, a soldier in the Twenty-second USCI, then stationed in Chapel Point, Maryland, related to 
a black newspaper that General Benjamin Butler, commander of the Army of the James, proved 
to be a white ally in African-American struggles against racism. In contrast, his successor, 
Edward Ord, struck them with a sword during a parade. The soldier looked back nostalgically on 
the tenure of Butler: their beloved ex-commander was a “noble patriot and true soldier” who 
would have prosecuted the offender and provided redress, and who valued his “true and trusty” 
men’s lives. Now, the soldier revealed, protesting the injustice constituted “insubordination.”151 
USCTs relied on white allies to realize their hopes regarding military service.  
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While stationed at Fort Jackson, below New Orleans along the Mississippi River, on 
December 9, 1863, the Fourth Regiment Infantry, Corp d’Afrique, later known as the Seventy-
sixth USCI, became one of the first black commands to rebel against physical abuse. This unit’s 
uprising resulted from the ways in which the Union Army filled some of its officer positions, the 
occasionally tense relations between commanders and enlisted men, and the consequences of 
black Union soldiers disproportionately performing garrison duty. As historians have 
demonstrated, white northerners preferred relegating African Americans to non-combat roles 
because of racial views emphasizing black laziness and the black worthiness for only a second-
class type of citizenship. After assaulting and capturing Port Hudson earlier in the summer, the 
Fourth occupied Forts Jackson and St. Philip between August 1863 and February 1864. Civil 
War soldiers, black and white, generally resented the unglamorous aspects of fort occupation: 
construction, maintenance, parades, drills, and guard duty. The boredom resulting from 
monotonous tasks at forts instead of fighting traitors on the battlefield undermined discipline, 
which in turn made officers stricter. It further prevented commanders from earning respect 
gained through battlefield performance among their men. As officers tried displaying their 
authority exclusively through discipline, enlisted men viewed such treatment as despotic and 
arbitrary. The cumulative effects of garrison duty exacerbated preexisting socioeconomic class 
tensions between officers and the rank-and-file, which became ever more acute when race 
entered the equation. Despite what eventually occurred, according to Major General N. P. Banks, 
commander of the Department of the Gulf, the regiment was “among the best disciplined and the 
best instructed regiments of this class of troops.” This reputation changed when, as one 
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commander described them, “men disqualified by want of character” flooded the Corps 
d’Afrique. This contrasted with other black units that chose officers according to high standards 
in the areas of training, morality, experience, and abolitionist views.152 
Like mutinies against unequal pay, the specific grievance of corporal punishment shaped 
how soldiers revolted against it. First, they mutinied because they observed a gross violation of 
the terms of service as well as their emancipation. The Louisianans of the Fourth joined the unit 
with the understanding that they would not suffer from disciplinary punishments suggestive of 
bondage, such as whipping. Also, the mutineers against this grievance tended to act forceful, 
loud, and belligerent, making a cycle of retaliatory violence likely.153 To be sure, corporal 
punishment also existed in white Union camps. Yet, the legacy of American racial violence, 
coupled with the documented racist views of some officers, prevented the USCT rank-and-file 
from separating the draconian nature of military discipline from slave lashings and race riots. 
 Prompting members of the Fourth Regiment to mutiny in late 1863 along the Mississippi 
were the brutal actions of one such white officer recruited from the pool of those deficient in 
character. Lieutenant Colonel Augustus W. Benedict whipped two drummer boys, Harry 
Williams and Munroe Miller, who had entered the sentinel and reported that the sergeant of the 
guard had permitted them to leave. When Colonel Charles R. Drew, who had a reputation for 
abuse, neglected to intervene, half of the regiment charged into the parade grounds.154  
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The angry mutineers armed themselves, fired into the air, demanded the release of the 
drummers, and shouted obscenities. They called for the capture and killing of the lieutenant 
colonel if he did not comply with their demands, adding that they did not enlist to be whipped 
and that, “we want to be treated as soldiers.” The officers gathered to quiet the men, ordering 
them to return to their quarters and disarm, and informing them that while Benedict had 
committed a wrong, their mutiny was unjustifiable. A group of men, especially Corporal Lewis 
Cady and Privates Jacob Kennedy, Charles Taylor, and Willis Curtis, all laborers when they 
enlisted, refused to obey the order, continuing to fire outside Fort Jackson at the half-hour mark. 
Curtis remarked that “This thing (officer abuse) has been going on long enough.” The most 
aggressive participant in the revolt proved to be eighteen-year-old Private Abraham Victoria. A 
laborer born in Louisiana’s St. James Parish, he proclaimed that “if none of the damned non-
commissioned officers would take command, he would,” and that if he captured Colonel 
Benedict, “I would eat his heart.” While noncommissioned officers tended to enjoy prestige in 
the USCTs, soldiers like Victoria assumed such positions for themselves when they deemed their 
emancipation goals under siege. The macabre war cry against Benedict speaks to how black 
Union troops considered all obstacles to their human rights, whether of Confederate or Federal 
origin, to be targets of bloody retribution. Forming the companies and promises of justice 
enabled the officers to quell the mutiny within an hour.155  
This incident resulted from preexisting tensions that developed between the men and Lt. 
Colonel Benedict while the regiment was stationed at Fort St. Phillip. There, he physically 
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harmed them on a regular basis. When Benedict and a portion of the unit relocated to Fort 
Jackson, many asked in vain to remain stationed at St. Philip to avoid continuing to serve under 
Benedict. Instead, commanders failed to prevent the situation from festering. 
Much of the documentation for Benedict’s violent episodes resides in the report of a 
military commission. Captain William H. Knapp told the commission that he had observed the 
offending officer punch and kick men “because their brasses were not bright enough or their 
boots not polished.” The commission learned about other harsh punishments: confinement in the 
guardhouse, carrying a ball and chain, tying up by the thumbs, and covering accused thieves in 
molasses all day. Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas emphasized to the men who complained 
about Benedict’s behavior that the Army had a policy of terminating the commissions of abusive 
officers. This assurance failed to match reality. With their superiors continuously ignoring or 
overlooking their plight, Benedict’s last of countless abuses finally drove much of the regiment 
over the edge. General Thomas addressed the situation by reminding the officers of the proper 
treatment of their men and the penalties for violating this code of conduct. He then informed the 
enlisted men of the justice system to which they had access when they suffered mistreatment. 
The decision to mutiny, the general concluded, owed more to “an ignorance of their rights and 
the proper means of redress than to any pre-concerted plan of revolt.” Commission investigators 
like General Nathaniel Banks saw “nothing to impair the confidence of the Government in the 
efficiency and reliability of black troops.” Banks went further, arguing that the shortage of 
quality officers in the regiment directly caused the “outbreak” and “was such as could hardly be 
expected to produce any other result.” While rare, the U.S. military’s high command sometimes 
viewed mutiny as inevitable in certain undesirable conditions.156   
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The Army’s prosecutions in this case illustrated its official commitment to its duty to 
punish both officer cruelty and rank-and-file insubordination. It convicted Lt. Colonel Benedict 
of cruel and unusual punishment, dishonorably discharging him from service for acting like a 
violent plantation overseer. Twelve enlisted men—drummer Edward B. Smith; Corporals Lewis 
Cady and Henry Green; and Privates Frank Williams, Jacob Kennedy, Charles Taylor, Abraham 
Victoria, Abram Singleton, Volser Verrett, Willis Curtis, Julius Boudro, and James Hagan—
faced charges of mutiny, while Private James H. Moore was tried for insubordinate conduct. The 
court found eight guilty. While two awaited execution, General Halleck commuted their 
punishment to imprisonment. Six convicted mutineers received sentences of hard labor from one 
to twenty years, while Moore endured hard labor under guard for one month. The guilty served 
their sentences at Fort Jefferson in Dry Tortugas, Florida. On February 27, 1865, while toiling in 
Florida, Private Taylor became involved in an altercation of an uncertain nature during which he 
resisted prison guards. The incident resulted in the guards shooting the prisoner, inflicting 
wounds from which he died on March 3 or 4. While his service record lacks details, Taylor 
continued physically resisting perceived oppression while performing undesirable labor, an 
approach which cost him his life. All surviving convicts in the Fourth received remitted releases 
between February and April 1866.157 While the black Louisianans got a degree of justice against 
an exceptionally cruel white officer, the mutineers among them could not escape punishment.  
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An epilogue to the Fourth Regiment, Corps d’Afrique’s, mutiny, documented in a report, 
sheds light on the ability of at least one commander, Brigadier General William Dwight, to learn 
lessons from such incidents and to recognize the ties between black soldier mutinies and the 
African-American struggle for emancipation. In late January 1864, Colonel Charles Drew, who 
had ignored Benedict’s whipping of the band members the previous month, went into custody for 
arbitrarily assaulting enlisted men of his own regiment for trivial offenses. The following month, 
Dwight explained his arrest of the colonel with the acknowledgment that the Fourth “will rise in 
revolt if the abuse of its soldiers is suffered to continue.” In words that foreshadowed the violent 
USCT mutinies of the immediate postbellum months, Dwight warned that the next rebellion 
against officer cruelty “will not be bloodless.” While Drew’s victims appealed “to higher 
authority for protection against severe punishment,” the general noted, not every soldier will do 
likewise. Drew’s decision to kick and strike four troops constituted not discipline, but “physical 
terror, and when that goes beyond endurance, there follows—mutiny.” As long as officers like 
Drew and Benedict commanded those under Dwight, the latter felt that the post and garrison 
risked “worse scenes than those which followed” Benedict’s whipping. Therefore, General 
Dwight recommended a prohibition on Drew leading the Fourth.158  
More broadly, General Dwight desired to purge the Fourth Regiment of all its “rotten” 
components by disbanding it: discharging its officers and redistributing its men to other units. A 
root cause of these components was that the regiment’s initial corps of officers consisted of 
proslavery men. As Dwight put it, when individuals of such sentiments command USCTs, too 
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many blacks were “placed in their power for them to make good soldiers of,” driving them to 
assume the status of “bad and brutal overseers” who mistook “tyranny…for discipline.” Thus, a 
number of officers in Louisiana had begun their military careers under those who from the start 
opposed the Union’s shift to emancipationist war aims. This notable aspect of the Fourth 
Regiment’s career more directly connects the broader phenomenon of black soldier mutinies to 
the goal of nineteenth-century African Americans to not only destroy the institution of slavery 
but to rid U.S. society of its social, economic, and political remnants.159 For the post-abolition 
order to carry any substantial meaning, the former bondsman should never serve under those 
who once opposed his right to claim personhood and citizenship. 
General Dwight continued to display a remarkable understanding for a white man of why 
some black troops decided to mutiny during the Civil War, but his most ambitious solutions to 
what caused the Fourth’s mutiny ran into obstacles. USCT mutineers and comrades sympathetic 
with them would have agreed with his conclusion that the December 1863 Fort Jackson mutiny 
resulted not from an ingrained “spirit of mutiny,” but from a desire for freedom and fair 
treatment. The late mutiny constituted an act of “resistance to oppression and violence from 
which they find no means of legitimate appeal and protection.” However, Colonel Drew not only 
remained in the Army but also eventually commanded a black division by the summer of 1864. 
Also, Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, commander of the Department of the Gulf, refused to 
implement Dwight’s plan to disband the Fourth. Numerous other USCTs revolted in the very 
manner described by General Dwight, as did their Buffalo Soldier successors.160 While some 
commanders fully understood black soldier motivations and African-American visions of liberty, 
numerous others came short. The nineteenth-and early-twentieth-century U.S. Army never cured 
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itself of the toxic elements that violated the terms of emancipation and thereby caused black 
mutinies. Despite the conclusions of General Dwight, the Union Army kept enough aggrieved 
blacks ignorant of recourses, made these recourses difficult to pursue, and maintained enough 
white supremacist officers to ensure that camps remained fertile ground for black mutinies.   
The experience of units like the Thirty-sixth USCI offer a case study in how the above 
instances of abuse followed by mutiny were avoidable. Reports from a black journalist named 
Thomas M. Chester repeatedly demonstrated the link between the likeliness of mutiny and 
officer treatment of the rank-and-file. He noted in August 14 that the Thirty-sixth was otherwise 
a “model regiment…distinguished by the undaunted bravery of the men and the gallantry of its 
officers.” Also, during combat operations in mid-October 1864, commissioned officers praised 
the performance of the regiment’s black sergeants in leading their companies. Two months later, 
when another officer, Lieutenant J. B. McMurdy, abused a black sergeant, Colonel Holman “sent 
(him) off…in disgrace to report to General Butler.” As Chester also noticed, under Holman’s 
command, “no one in this division, so long as he commands it, will be permitted to abuse any 
man, whether he be white or black.” In late October, their brigade commander dismissed one of 
their sutlers for price gouging. Furthermore, observers like Chester singled out the Thirty-sixth 
USCI as an example of how due to missionary schools constructed in regimental camps, former 
slaves by early 1865 had risen above “the depths of ignorance.” The record shows that no further 
mutinous incidents erupted in this unit. When USCTs saw their superiors ruling in their best 
material interests and opening up opportunities for personal advancement, they could point to 
evidence that their emancipation process was moving ahead, forestalling armed resistance.161  
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The Civil War wave of African-American soldier mutinies proved to be merely the start 
of a decades-long story in which men of color revolted against perceived racism while serving in 
the U.S. Army. As with every other aspect of black life, soldiering in the postbellum period, 
from the immediate postwar months to Radical Reconstruction to Redemption and Jim Crow, 
presented new as well as old sets of challenges to the cause of black liberty. Though the Civil 
War killed slavery as an institution, it was only the latest stage in the long emancipation process. 
Just as black men no longer in chains during the war found remnants of bondage existing within 
a great manifestation of freedom—military service—African Americans in general found the 
promised land still a great distance away despite creating a new Union founded upon abolition in 
the summer and fall of 1865. As Christopher Hager describes emancipation, postbellum African 
Americans encountered “the close of a horrific era as well as the inception of a new odyssey of 
struggle.” Recognizing this reality as early as November 1862, Frederick Douglass, regarding the 
building of black life after the arrival of freedom, proclaimed “Verily, the work does not end 
with the abolition of slavery but only begins.”162 This aspect of emancipation as a long, 
complicated process even after the Civil War became apparent among black Army personnel 
during the slow demobilization of the United States Colored Troops between mid-1865 and early 
1867. While USCTs could claim victory over unequal pay, the physical abuse and infringements 
on bodily autonomy plaguing regiments did not just persist, but in some ways intensified, after 
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“All I want is to get out of the army, or, my rights”: African-American Soldier Mutinies in 
the Immediate Postbellum Era 
 
On July 24, 1865, Private John Higgins of the Fifth U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery 
(USCHA) resisted the labor and discipline of Army life since the end of the Civil War. After 
spending two grueling years performing garrison duty in Mississippi, the government’s decision 
to keep his unit in the ranks after the fall of the Confederacy pushed Higgins over the edge. 
When ordered to fill a dozen comrades’ canteens, the artilleryman claimed he was too tired to do 
so and used the occasion to condemn what he perceived to be racist practices in the Union Army. 
As he noted, “the colored soldiers are imposed upon,” “trample[d] on,” “kept cooped up like 
dogs,” and continuously “kept under guard.” Meanwhile, his white comrades could move about 
freely. When an officer ordered Higgins bucked, the private threatened the life of anyone who 
intervened in his mutiny. Higgins also lambasted any black soldiers who “will stand by and see 
another tied up for nothing,” referring to them all as “a set of damned cowards.” Such cowardice 
invited white transgressions; if black soldiers sufficiently resisted, the mistreatment would cease. 
Directing greater anger to black collaborators, Higgins proclaimed that “any damned Negro that 
would assist a white man and punished a colored man was no soldier,” as well as “God damn any 
Nigger that would help to tie another one, just to please the white men.” He concluded his 
outburst by declaring that “the Negro had been run over long enough by white men, and it was 
time they defend themselves.” The surrounding officers eventually placed Higgins into custody, 
tying him up by the wrists and bucking him. An August 1865 court-martial convicted him of 
mutiny, sentencing him to two years of hard labor at Fort Jefferson, Florida, and a loss of pay.163 
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Seeking an early release, in late May 1866, Higgins wrote the Secretary of War. In the 
letter, Higgins emphasized the “very light” nature of his original offense and the “torture” he 
endured at the hands of his officers. With deferential language that contrasted with his previous 
bellicosity, he called the secretary “Honorable Sir,” in whose “Kindness and well Known 
generosity” he trusted. Echoing other USCTs demanding a return to civilian life, the plea brought 
attention to Higgins’ mother, wife, and four children, all of whom he was unable to support 
while incarcerated. He would not need to wait long. That June, the War Department released 
Higgins as part of an effort to free imprisoned soldiers whose units had mustered out.164  
 Along with this individual soldier’s actions, hundreds of black men in other USCT units 
collectively revolted against the harsh circumstances of military service during the immediate 
postbellum period. The U.S. Army’s personnel decisions sparked widespread resentment and an 
eruption of African-American mutinies lasting from the early summer of 1865 to the spring of 
1866. These months present one of the most concentrated and widespread episodes of African-
American mutinous behavior. Amidst this rebellious storm, however, as Higgins’ appeal and 
release revealed, USCTs also at times enjoyed leniency and sympathy from white allies. 
The mutinous outbreak in the year following the cessation of hostilities sheds additional 
light on why any serviceman would risk his life or livelihood in choosing to mutiny and why 
mutinies occurred more frequently in certain periods. As seen previously, during the Civil War, 
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black troops were more likely to mutiny during the height of the unequal pay controversy and/or 
if they endured neglect or abuses from their superiors. Since the early postwar months brought 
even more intolerable abuse to USCTs, the rates of mutiny expanded likewise across the U.S. 
Army’s “Sable Arm.” Forced to remain in the service despite Union victory, these black troops 
believed that their family’s livelihood, their manhood, and their autonomy as U.S. citizens were 
again under grave threat. As the war-ravaged nation began to demobilize and rebuild, these 
disgruntled troops rose up, threatening to overwhelm the U.S. Army.  
As this chapter reveals, the USCT mutinies in the year following the Civil War’s end 
form another part of the larger narrative illustrating how nineteenth-century African Americans 
revolted against whites holding positions of authority over them in order to gain bodily 
autonomy and enjoy improvements in their material well-being, the goals of the long 
emancipation. The numerous wartime mutinies helped shape the African-American struggle for 
freedom as slavery was collapsing and as the seeds of a biracial democracy were being planted. 
Thus, these rebellions immediately following the conflict constituted the next stage of the 
emancipation process. Though the military justice system largely defeated their efforts, these 
dissident acts tried to aid African Americans with shaping the terms of their new freedom after 
they had broken the chains of bondage. Given these direct connections to the long emancipation, 
certain USCT mutinies of the immediate postbellum period allow us to examine what black men 
envisioned for their post-slavery lives and what challenges they faced in doing so. Such 
contradictions between expectation and reality depended on various contexts: the particular unit, 
location, and point in time. The mutinies among black Civil War veterans who had yet to muster 
out connect with the broader cultural, political, social, and historiographical themes of the era. 
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A quantitative comparison of sentencing from twenty-one wartime and eighteen 
immediate postbellum mutinies involving the USCTs highlights the reduced tolerance that white 
commanders had for ill-disciplined African Americans in the months following the 
Confederacy’s collapse. Ten of the wartime mutinies (nearly half) resulted in hard labor 
sentences, while twelve postwar black mutinies (exactly two-thirds) did so. Discounting 
commutations and rulings without a specified length of imprisonment, the average hard labor 
sentence for mutiny given to black Union troops during the Civil War equated to 13.1 months; 
the average hard labor sentence for a black veteran still in uniform more than doubled to 30.01 
months. On the other hand, convicted black mutineers were more likely to be sentenced to 
imprisonment and drudgery for the rest of their terms of service during vs. after the war. Courts-
martial ruled that twenty-four of fifty-five African Americans (44%) convicted of mutiny 
between 1863 and spring 1865, eighteen of whom did so together in a single episode, would toil 
for the remainder of their terms. Officials later told thirteen of seventy-seven (17%) that they 
would perform hard labor until mustered out if found guilty from the summer of 1865 to 1866. 
While the Army put only three participants in a total of two episodes to death during hostilities, it 
subsequently executed eight in two of the conquered South’s own episodes. Complementing the 
greater sense of urgency to which mutineers attributed their situation beginning in early summer 
1865 was an increased risk to their livelihoods and lives if they chose to disrupt operations and 
subvert authority as a desperate means of effecting positive change or expressing frustration.165 
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seventh USCI, Thirty-eighth USCI, Forty-first USCI, Forty-third USCI, Forty-fourth USCI, 103rd USCI, 109th 
USCI, 116th USCI, 117th USCI, and 127th USCI.  
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Despite the reality that early postbellum mutineers were much more likely to receive 
longer hard labor sentences and die at the hands of a firing squad than if they had rose up earlier 
in their careers, African-American Union soldiers never stopped enjoying unprecedented due 
process rights. First, no soldier suffering at Dry Tortugas or another federal prison stayed longer 
than two years; when the prisoner’s unit mustered out of existence, he was finally granted his 
desired release into civilian life. By 1867, every Civil War volunteer regiment, including the 
USCTs, had retired. Also, while only two USCTs (3.6%) charged with mutinous conduct during 
the war were acquitted, fourteen accused postbellum mutineers (18.2%) experienced the relief of 
hearing their name cleared. Further, strength in numbers, which helped USCTs avoid prosecution 
altogether during the Civil War, maintained its utility in the early postbellum U.S. Army. Mass 
mutinies, those consuming anywhere from an entire company to a full regiment, still tended to 
shield perpetrators from legal trouble. Of the five wartime mass USCT mutinies, only one 
sergeant of a single episode was prosecuted; a second event witnessed officers free suspects from 
custody; and a third saw the mutineers suffer from corporal punishment but then released. 
Among the early postwar Sable Arm, the record indicates that no African-American enlistee 
faced legal consequences in either of the period’s two mass mutinies. When the entire Fifty-
seventh USCI (wartime) and the 117th USCI (postbellum) rose up, Army authorities decided to 
only punish their white ringleaders, dismissing them from the service in both cases.166  
The prosecution or lack thereof of mass USCT mutinies suggests that the high command 
was most concerned with setting an example. If only a small portion of a unit rebelled, officers 
prosecuted and convicted as many offenders as the evidence allowed, advising the non-mutinous 





unit, officers expressed a willingness to discourage further acts by telling prospective ringleaders 
that they were far more likely to suffer consequences. Once the presiding officer listened to 
testimony and deliberated, however, they acquitted those for whom insufficient evidence existed 
to tie them to a recent mutiny. African-American soldiers shared justifiable concerns about the 
tenuous nature of their freedom if they were among the unfortunate group ordered to perform the 
least glorious duties seen in the USCTs’ entire career. Yet, the legal decisions that spared dozens 
of would-be convicts of degrading punishment or the maximum penalty would have reassured 
them that their long emancipation process had not regressed as much as they feared. 
As the above data indicates, after all they had struggled for and achieved during the war, 
African Americans, now part of a new Union that forbid slavery and welcomed then as citizens, 
were still willing to struggle to implement their vision of emancipation. In the year following the 
end of the war, the actions and words of non-mutineers provide insights into African-American 
soldiers’ expectations and grievances, sentiments which drove others to mutiny. Perceived 
violations of the rights of a formerly enslaved black man to care for his family as a household 
head and to protect his person from despots constitute one such gap between expectations and 
reality. Confederate defeat and the destruction of slavery, in USCT eyes, had secured such rights.  
With the war finished and slavery gone, a goal of emancipation was, as one formerly 
enslaved sergeant put it, a life where, “no man can say to me come and go, and I be forced to 
obey.”167 The strict hierarchy of the military, based on the rank-and-file obeying their superiors 
without question, constituted a temporary relationship. However, this relationship lasted a year 
longer than black troops had hoped. Since white units had enlisted earlier in the war, they 
 
167 Elijah P. Marrs, Life and History of the Rev. Elijah P. Marrs, First Pastor of Beargrass Baptist Church, and 
Author (Louisville, Ky: The Bradley & Gilbert Company, 1885), 25. Marrs felt uncomfortable continuing to receive 
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fighting for my freedom, and this thought filled my heart with joy.” See Ibid. 
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disproportionately received discharges as victorious U.S. forces demobilized. As a result, 
African-American troops moved from eleven percent of the Army at war’s end to thirty-six 
percent by fall 1865.168 Since the slaveholding aristocracy laid in ruins, there was no legitimate 
reason to continue to delay the realization of black soldiers’ envisioned freedom. 
The masculine devotion to one’s family remained paramount as USCTs entered the 
postbellum era. In May 1866, a member of the 116th U.S. Colored Infantry (USCI) related an 
account of suffering families in a petition to the president signed by six comrades. To justify 
relief for their families to his white audience, the petition emphasized his comrades’ patriotism 
and discipline. In contrast to mutineers, the writer agreed that soldiers have a duty to follow all 
orders. He and his comrades enlisted in “this great and Noble coas” without hesitation and 
afterward “came out like Men.” They proved obedient and orderly while performing picket and 
garrison duty, and had only recently dreaded their service. They documented how “we Poore 
Nation of a Colered rast [race]” left their homes and families to serve in the Army so that they 
could ultimately improve their condition and become self-sufficient. Despite these goals and 
sacrifices, freedpeople lacked money and property, a material condition that closely resembled 
that of slavery. The petitioners had various questions. What options did they have when “the 
Poore old Soldier had nothing to leave” himself or his family? After spending the prime of their 
lives in slavery, was it the destiny of freedpeople to “lye out of Doors Like Beast or sum brute”? 
To this, “I says No.” The root of the problem, they claimed, was that their officers illegally 
compelled enlisted men to work as servants or cooks and inflicted severe punishment without 
due process. These soldiers’ fears match those of some black civilians. Looking ahead to a bleak 
future, in May 1865, the newly freed slaves of James Greenlee remarked that “it was poor 
 
168 Ira Berlin, The Black Military Experience, 733. 
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freedom to starve” and have “nothing to live on or to work on.”169 As during the wartime period, 
a number of USCTs hoped that non-mutinous collective action, such as petitioning the 
government, would advance a vision of freedom that spared them of material insecurity.  
These same grievances motivated other USCTs to mutiny. Unlike petitioners, mutineers 
considered all legal, peaceful avenues of redress exhausted. Petitioners hoped that greater 
publicity of Army injustices would usher in a resolution while mutineers, having reached the end 
of their rope, felt that they had nothing left to lose. Though most USCTs never mutinied, the 
mutineers and the disciplined alike shared the same gap between hopes and reality. Mutiny 
represented the most extreme reaction against despised conditions. Many USCTs had endured 
southern slavery or northern racism, performed their duty well in order to create a better life for 
themselves and their families, and yet they faced a future of destitution and second-class 
citizenship. For some, such a legacy of their service was too appalling to accept peacefully.  
In the months following the Civil War’s end, many African-American soldiers did not 
mutiny, but decided that the solution to their desire to return to civilian life was to simply leave. 
The Fourteenth USCHA saw their unit’s desertion numbers jump to thirty men between May and 
July 1865. Since they occupied their own state, these North Carolinian artillerymen could more 
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easily head home than one stationed in another state or region. Rather than confront their officers 
and demand a formal discharge from them, these artillerymen bypassed the Army altogether.170  
  A controversial personnel relocation order proved crucial in pushing those resentful of 
remaining in the Army after war’s end to revolt. General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant commanded 
Major General Phil Sheridan to send a force to the Southwest border. Its mission was to enforce 
the Monroe Doctrine against the French imperial forces that invaded Mexico in 1861. 
Preoccupation with crushing the rebellion prevented the federal government from acting on this 
foreign policy issue earlier. To fulfill Grant’s order, Major General Henry Halleck sent his all-
black Twenty-fifth Corps to Texas. He identified a “want of discipline” in the corps that “renders 
it a very improper force for the preservation of order in” Federal-occupied Virginia, as well as 
their poor “influence on the colored population.” The role of U.S. troops in the Lone Star State 
was to present a show of force to, and potentially go to war with, the French regime, all while 
removing USCTs from Virginia’s newly-freed black and ex-Rebel population centers.171  
A major issue for the troops about to undertake this journey was how it would separate 
them from their struggling families in nearby contraband camps, exacerbating an already 
desperate situation. On the date they set sail from Norfolk to Texas, June 10, 1865, an order 
cutting off rations for soldiers’ wives and children went into effect. According to the capitalist 
philosophy inspiring Federal contraband policy, state aid stifled individual initiative. White 
northern officials contended that wage parity meant that black troops could now support their 
families themselves. This logic ignored the severity of ex-slave poverty and the inability of black 
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soldiers to support family members from a thousand-mile distance and with delayed payments. 
While the attainment of equal pay promoted black freedom, the continuation of insufficient pay 
attested to how much more ground remained in the pursuit of economic independence.172  
Frightening rumors of re-enslavement also motivated units of the Twenty-fifth Corps to 
revolt against the upcoming Texas expedition. Not only did the prospect risk nullifying the 
Union’s victory, but it would also have separated the men from their families to a degree 
comparable to the devastating results of antebellum slave sales. A commissary sergeant reported 
that “there was quite an excitement” among members of the Twenty-ninth Connecticut Colored 
Infantry after hearing their officers planned to sell them into Latin-American bondage during the 
voyage. The First and Second U.S. Colored Cavalry (USCC) believed that the underlying 
purpose for the move was their forced employment as white soldiers’ servants for five-year 
terms. Another rumor held that the troops would toil on cotton plantations to pay off the national 
debt. While these stories proved inaccurate, the USCTs’ overall discontent with postbellum 
military service and the poor planning and communication on the part of their officers made the 
situation ripe for rumor and unrest. A First USCC lieutenant reported that despite numerous men 
receiving assurance from officers that the rumors were incorrect, “a marked change came over 
them, and they became sullen and disobedient.” Whatever benefit refutation of the rumors 
brought, it did nothing to lessen the anger resulting from the confirmation of the order cutting 
rations and the realization that they still needed to wait longer to return to civilian life.173  
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In the minds of mutineers and non-mutineers who shared their sentiments, the Virginia-
to-Texas voyage itself constituted a potentially grave setback to the continued process of their 
emancipation. As one white officer noted in his account of the below mutiny, during the 
domestic slave trade, Texas represented, “a sort of hell to which they would be sold if they 
misbehaved.”174 Memories of the domestic slave trade must have crossed these former 
bondsmen’s minds. One also wonders whether the voyage to Texas also reminded the men of the 
colonial Middle Passage, the first and worst forced voyage blacks endured at white hands. 
Further, the rumors hit a sore spot, calling into question the permanence of soldiers’ newfound 
freedom. These soldiers’ reaction represents their determination to resist any partial return to 
coerced labor, no matter how fantastical the rumors may appear to be in hindsight. Their non-
linear, incomplete path from slavery to freedom also made them suspicious of white plans.175  
Among those in the Twenty-fifth Corps who mutinied in response to the order to ship out 
to Texas were members of the First USCC, a regiment recruited from Virginia’s formerly 
enslaved population. Organized at Camp Hilton, Virginia, in late December 1863, the unit began 
its career occupying Fort Monroe and Williamsburg. The First fought with Benjamin Butler’s 
Army of the James south of the James River in the weeks leading up to the Petersburg Campaign 
in May 1864. After participating in the Petersburg siege, the regiment moved back to 
 
Ibid.; “Norfolk. The Mutiny among Colored Troops. How it Originated! The Negroes Told They Were To,” The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 06-19-1865, Ibid. For a mutiny within the Twenty-ninth Colored Connecticut, see 
Proceedings of a GCM, Trial of Robert Cuffey, MM-3067, RG 153, NARA. 
174 Personal Narratives of Events in the War of the Rebellion: Being Papers Read before the Rhode Island Soldiers 
and Sailors Historical Society, Sixth Series, Nos, 1-10 1903-1905, page 38.  
175 While the most notable of their type, the mutinies of the Twenty-fifth Corps against the forced relocation from 
Virginia to Texas were not the only ones to have such a motivation. In May 1866, two companies in the Arkansas-
based Fifty-seventh USCT briefly mutinied against orders to join the Third U.S. Cavalry on an expedition to New 
Mexico. They “loaded their guns,” but “when the test came…they obeyed orders…to stack their arms.” Their 
officers quelled the mutiny. See Robert Patrick Bender, “Fifty-seventh Regiment, United States Colored Troops 
(US),” http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?search=1&entryID=6256; “Mutiny 
among the Colored Troops,” The Macon Daily Telegraph, 06-21-1866, “American Civil War Newspapers, 1840-
1877,” Redex, https://infoweb-newsbank-com.www.libproxy.wvu.edu/. 
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Portsmouth’s eastern Virginia defenses in August, where it remained until war’s end. In 
preparation for the Texas expedition, the Army sent the command to City Point.176 
The regiment’s mutiny played out gradually. As press coverage put it, “for some time a 
mutinous spirit has existed in the colored cavalry brigade belonging to the” corps. Not just 
members of the First, but also of the Second and Fifth USCC, declared that they, “would not be 
sent to Texas” and "that the government had no right to send them there." Initially, officers 
across the corps considered rumors that their men would rise up “as the grumblings peculiar to 
the African race.” When Colonel James Shaw of the Seventh USCI visited his men’s camp one 
evening, he heard them thank the Almighty for protecting them, “on their voyage on the mighty 
deep.” Shaw believed “that kind of men don’t mutiny.” In the case of the Seventh USCI, the 
soldiers boarded the ship and sailed to Texas without incident.177  
While certain regiments avoided the crisis, the reports that other units in the Twenty-fifth 
Corps would revolt proved accurate. The mood of discontent finally worsened to the point of 
open mutiny when the troop transports arrived at a Fortress Monroe wharf on June 12, 1865. The 
First USCC’s troops felt especially aggrieved by their inability to materially support their 
families if they departed, compounded by a six-month delay in payments to the soldiers.  
While making their way down the James River from City Point, aboard the steamer 
Whildin, the cavalrymen began by firing their newly-issued carbines at the shore. Lieutenant 
Frederick W. Browne, who tried halting this, recollected that as he drew his revolver and 
approached the men in the lower deck, “a dozen carbines were put to my head and breast, and I 
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was told that I could kill one man, but it would be the last one I ever would kill.” Once the troops 
arrived at Hampton Roads, they refused to board the transport Meteor. Officers persuaded three 
of the four companies aboard. The fourth company proved incalcitrant, staying on the Whildin. 
The companies aboard the Meteor then began acting unruly. Soldiers threatened to shoot those 
officers who implemented the Texas expedition. The most ambitious proposed taking the officers 
into custody and seizing control of the ship themselves. Concluding their men to be at “the 
height of mutiny,” Meteor officers directed the ship to a wharf near Fortress Monroe. White 
Pennsylvanian troops arrived under orders to quell the most mutinous company, pointing 
artillery guns at its members. The Pennsylvanians’ commander, Major Von Schilling, sent the 
Whildin to the wharf, where a number from his unit boarded with loaded muskets and drawn 
bayonets. The next part of Schilling’s plan involved removing the mutineers from the boat two or 
three at a time in a single-file line. When an officer reminded the mutineers that as soldiers, they 
needed to obey orders, the Whildin group reluctantly agreed to disarm. The officers put the 
prisoners under guard before taking them back aboard and placing the ringleaders in irons.178 
Black civilians from Hampton and Slabtown flooded to the wharf to observe the event. 
Most spectators were black women who sympathized with the soldiers and who as a newspaper 
account put it, “glanced deprecating looks at the piles of carbines and sabers.” The visitors also 
fed the hungry mutineers with pies and cakes. These actions suggest that civilian freedpeople 
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recognized that mutinies like that of the First USCC formed part of the broader struggle to 
advance the livelihood of the entire African-American community.179  
Schilling directed his men to place those black soldiers still aboard the Meteor on land 
before disarming them in a similar process. Some Meteor mutineers mistakenly thought that their 
superiors took them ashore due to a cancelling of the Texas expedition. According to Lieutenant 
Browne’s 1908 account, once brought back aboard, the Meteor group resumed their riotous 
behavior after realizing that the voyage to Texas would still happen. One mutineer, Browne 
contended, climbed on the pilot house near the bow and shook his fist at the officers on the 
quarterdeck while declaring, to a cheering audience: “You damned white livered —— of —— 
we will throw you overboard.” The proclamation prompted three officers, armed with their 
revolvers, to plow through the crowd, jerk the orator off the pilot house and drag him to the 
quarterdeck. When the orator repeatedly resisted corporal punishment, Captain Whiteman shot 
him, mortally wounding him. The mutineers charged at the officers with axes and lumber, 
halting when they noticed their targets preparing to fire. Afterward, authorities disarmed the rest 
of the black cavalry brigade as it arrived from another ship. Schilling’s white artillerymen, along 
with the fort’s guns and water surrounding the newly arrived black cavalrymen, served to 
discourage further mutinous behavior during the disarming process. As they surrendered, 
observers noted pained expressions on their faces. A general reporting on the mutiny praised the 
officers for promptly restoring order. Virginia’s Freedmen’s Bureau blamed the mutiny on the 
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government’s failure to adequately provide for the finances of black soldiers and their 
families.180  
Remarkably, the mutineers of the First USCC, unlike others in the immediate postbellum 
months, suffered few consequences for their offenses. The record contains no court-martial of 
anyone for conducting the mutiny. It ultimately managed to only delay, not block, the voyage to 
Texas. The regiment served along the Rio Grande until it mustered out in February 1866.181  
In December 1865, anonymous members of the First USCC wrote to an unidentified 
Washington official giving their side of the story regarding the mutiny of the previous summer. 
They deemed the government’s decision to suspend aid for their families as equal to punishment 
for treason. The soldiers described how they had endured fatigue duty since July without a 
furlough, all while their families wrote them desperately describing their misery. The writers 
sought to know the reasons for this “dishonorble in treatment.” They expected to be mustered out 
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of the Army by this point in time, which “any good hearted man” would support. They enlisted 
as U.S. soldiers, before finding themselves treated once again as slaves. The wives of 
Confederates, they contended, received more care and protection than black soldiers’ spouses. 
Desperate to protect their needy families, the petitioners offered to pay the War Department for 
one year of service in exchange for a discharge. The soldiers asked to be rewarded for, “what 
wee have done right” during their service just as they have been punished, “for any thing that 
wee do” wrong.182 The mutineers witnessed the confirmation of fears about what would become 
of their families if they lost support from the household head. 
The great concern the First USCC’s mutineers had for their families’ welfare can be 
traced to their state’s experiences with bondage and abolition. As residents of an Upper South 
state involved in the domestic slave trade, their masters might have sold family members to the 
Deep South in the 1850s. Those who enlisted in the regiment lived under regulations of enslaved 
and free black behavior passed in the early nineteenth century in response to Gabriel’s and Nat 
Turner’s slave insurrections. They also resided in the state targeted by John Brown’s Raid, after 
which paranoid whites formed militias in preparation for another northern abolitionist invasion.  
Martin Delany, an African-American writer born in the Old Dominion, lionized overt 
black resistance in his 1858-1861 work Blake. In the book, the main character emphasized 
“stand[ing] still and see[ing] the salvation,” defined as the act of clandestinely plotting an 
insurrection and implementing the plan once someone gave a signal to do so. The First USCC’s 
mutiny followed an African-American tradition of occasionally engaging in full-scale revolt, as 
modeled in Blake, to free and improve the lives of themselves and their families. For the 
mutineers, the government’s recent actions—cutting off rations, delaying payments for months, 
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and compelling them to move across the country—represented the latest example of white abuse 
and control dating back to slavery’s heyday. These injustices mandated an uprising.183 
When white Virginians brought the state into the Confederacy and began resisting Union 
invasion, enslaved and free black Virginians took the first steps toward full emancipation. They 
first fled plantations or C.S. fortifications for U.S. lines. The eastern black-majority tobacco belt 
counties, drained of white men as residents hurried to enlist, feared servile revolt. Justifying 
these worries, the tide of runaway slaves grew accordingly as the Union Army penetrated deeper 
into the Old Dominion and shifted to a hard war policy. As they gradually toppled the 
antebellum social order, black Virginians located lost family members, reestablishing kin 
networks disrupted by slavery. To bring down the slaveholders’ republic and earn money for 
their families, black Virginian men enlisted and participated proudly in the Petersburg and 
Appomattox campaigns. The U.S. Army presence and its employment opportunities offered 
black families a double-edged sword: legal emancipation, official spousal unions, rations, and 
wages on one hand; and impressment, unsanitary camps, and physical injury or death from abuse 
or combat on the other. The hardships soldiers’ wives and children faced at federal camps meant 
that the familial separation resulting from the Texas expedition was the latest in a long line of 
threats to the livelihoods of USCTs’ loved ones. As historian Michelle A. Krowl has noted, the 
military emancipation seen in Virginia gave black men an unprecedented opportunity to assume 
the role of family protector, which slavery had denied them. It was this role the mutineers of the 
First USCC assumed while on the James River in mid-June 1865.184 
 
183 William Blair, Virginia’s Private War: Feeding Body and Soul in the Confederacy, 1861-1865 (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 13, 15, 24, 29-30; Martin R. Delany, Blake; or, The Huts of America, 1859-
1862, Floyd J. Miller, ed., (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).  
184 William Blair, Virginia’s Private War, 41, 46-47, 78, 122-123; Michelle A. Krowl, “For Better or For Worse,” in 
Catherine Clinton, eds. Southern Families at War: Loyalty and Conflict in the Civil War South (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 35-48; A. Wilson Greene, The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign: Breaking the 
Backbone of the Rebellion (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2008).  
149 
 
Having advanced the cause of black freedom through their wartime flight and military 
service, black mutineers in the First USCC felt they needed to continue the struggle to promote 
family welfare as they entered post-emancipation life. Following their eventual return to civilian 
life, black veterans looked to the Freedmen’s Bureau and their own initiative to secure the most 
fruitful labor arrangements. Thus, this type of mutiny occurring after the war but before African 
Americans mustered out of the Union Army served as the final act of resistance in the 
transitionary stage between slavery and freedom.185 
As they would in other time periods, newspapers captured the American public’s views 
of immediate postbellum black mutinies like that of the First USCC. Beyond publishing accounts 
of the events, the press shed light on white debates and anxieties over black citizenship and the 
process of emancipation.186 As the Philadelphia Inquirer put it, since the black cavalrymen who 
mutinied against the order to sail to Texas, “have all along behaved so admirably, even under the 
most trying and disadvantageous circumstances,” this conduct took, “everybody by surprise.” 
The correspondent then noted that such an event makes blacks and their white allies regretful 
because this happened just as the push for black suffrage in the South was gaining steam. A New 
York Times article decried the acute poverty into which the government had allowed USCTs and 
their families to descend. As it emphasized, “Everyone at all familiar with the army, knows that 
nothing so tends to breed discontent and mutiny as the withholding of the soldier's pay.”187  
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Other papers presented unfavorable views of the mutiny, promoting racial stereotypes. 
The Daily Constitutional Union, of Washington, D.C., outright dismissed the grievances of the 
mutineers. Its account began with the assertion, “No matter what crimes the colored men 
commit, there are people who either justify or have an excuse for them.” The Daily 
Constitutional Union claimed that the black soldiers who mutinied at Norfolk previously, “had 
quite an easy time” of their duty. Rather than long marches and tough fighting, they had enjoyed 
“plenty of early vegetables and little work, except to stable their horses and keep themselves 
clean, if they knew how.” The article continued to portray the mutineers as lazy: “All their 
dreams of bliss and ease were knocked in the head by the order of removal to Texas. This 
peremptory order was more than Sambo bargained for, as fighting was anticipated ‘down dar.’” 
According to the Daily Ohio Statesman, in an uncorroborated account, the mutineers “ran riot 
through the town.” In a lieutenant’s unsympathetic postwar account, the First USCC mutineers 
got “wild drunk,” becoming “half-drunken devils” and “wild beasts.”188 Accusations of black 
vice populated accounts of subsequent mutineers’ revolts in the long emancipation.  
More equivocal than other papers, the Crisis stated that it exhibited caution in its 
reporting on the mutinies against the Texas expedition. It revealed that its “correspondence 
abstained from giving publicity to exceptional cases” of mutiny in the Twenty-fifth Corps’ 
cavalry brigade. The paper’s motivation was to avoid “furnish[ing] food for the prejudice already 
existing against the employment of colored men as soldiers.” However, the editor nevertheless 
considered the First USCC’s mutiny notable enough to warrant detailed coverage. While 
seemingly sympathetic to African Americans elsewhere, the same column also reported on race 
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riots in the surrounding region in ways that disapproved of the implications of emancipation: 
“the negroes in Richmond are found to be so riotous, lazy and thieving that strong measures have 
been taken to quell them”; “the negroes in Maryland, under the teachings of Abolition, have 
become unbearable” by demanding land ownership. Among the headings of the column was 
“The African Elephant Becoming Troublesome”; it was unclear whether the editor used this 
animal imagery in reference to just the civilian riots or to the USCT mutiny as well.189  
The Crisis’s metaphorical use of an African elephant to symbolize black Americans 
formed part of a nineteenth-century racial discourse. In particular, it re-emerged during the white 
backlash to Radical Reconstruction. An 1869 article in the Daily Columbus Enquirer deeming 
African Americans mentally inferior referred to them as a “very dangerous and expensive 
African elephant on its [the Republican Party’s] hands.” The image that this language conveyed, 
of a large land mammal “becoming troublesome” likely spoke to the perceived gravity of the 
race question. It was a massive and potentially destructive problem for American society to 
resolve as it debated the proper status of freedpeople in the body politic and economy. Like the 
African species of elephant, this problem involved individuals with origins on the African 
continent who could crush institutions under its great weight.190 
Newspaper coverage of black soldier mutinies thus allows us to explore American 
discussions on black citizenship in nineteenth-century America. For part of the press, a USCT 
mutiny was an unfortunate event for those who otherwise had performed well as soldiers and 
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who could look ahead to greater citizenship rights. Yet, for other publications, mutinies 
confirmed the notions of blacks’ inherent character flaws, which only coerced labor could 
remedy. White southerners in the immediate postbellum period generally recognized that acts of 
defiance in which black troops violently asserted their autonomy and masculinity were 
instrumental as the country underwent the social revolution of the 1860s.  
Threats to not just soldiers’ families, but also their persons, fueled the wave of USCT 
mutinies immediately following the Civil War. The monotony plaguing the soldiers’ new lives 
led to a lack of discipline that in turn provided African-American troops with concrete evidence 
that their early postbellum military service was degenerating into something comparable to 
bondage. An increase in intoxication and other forms of behavior deemed immoral by the 
military prompted white officers to intensify the discipline they imposed on the black rank-and-
file for even minor infractions. The most hated punishment, tying up troublemakers by the 
thumbs while their feet were barely touching the ground, could be inflicted on a soldier who was 
sloppy on drill or failed to keep items clean in filthy Army camps. According to Richard Reid in 
his study of North Carolina-based USCTs, mutinies against such disciplinary methods suggest 
that, “the enlisted men were less willing to accept treatment in ways that they felt were 
inappropriate for soldiers and free men.” While officers carried out cruel punishments during the 
war as well, they did so more frequently after Union victory. Moreover, the coming of peace told 
the men that this treatment no longer served military necessity; they had become used to the 
laxer discipline of combat zones; and they felt their wartime service had earned them a greater 
degree of freedom precluding punishments better suited for slaves.191  
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Though any army’s transition from war to peace can create disciplinary problems, the 
addition of racial tensions into this case exacerbated the resulting animosities. As one soldier put 
it in a complaint to the Christian Recorder in the fall of 1865, it was already detestable that their 
officers had asked them during the war, “to forget old grudges and prejudices, and fight like men 
for a common cause, meaning for us to not let the cruel and unjust treatment of the officers to the 
men…influence us to disregard for our duty.” Now that these officers no longer needed to worry 
about dying on the battlefield, they, he continued, “are exercising all the arrogance and 
despotism that their power gives them.” The soldier further wondered, “what appeals has an 
enlisted man if he applies for redress to the superior officer?” When Private John Ayers of the 
Forty-first USCI, a unit composed of Pennsylvanians, spoke out against the harsh disciplining of 
a comrade, he told a superior that, “you must think you are driving a flock of sheep.” Such 
language illustrates the USCT view that their officers had become despotic and viewed them in 
dehumanizing terms, a clear sign that the freedom for which they had fought in the war was in 
jeopardy. Considering these disciplinary methods even more unacceptable now, and doubting 
that they possessed other avenues of redress, numerous USCTs mutinied. Though most still 
quietly endured the circumstances or formally protested, others felt that since their white officers 
had become greater tyrants, they had justification for revolting.192  
Members of numerous USCT units rose up against perceived harsh discipline leading up 
to, during, and after the voyage from Virginia to Texas, as well as elsewhere in the newly 
conquered South. First, USCT camps in and around City Point experienced a great deal of 
mutinous activity in May and June 1865. Episodes saw men aggressively oppose the punishment 
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of their comrades or conduct work stoppages. Just as the First USCC’s mutiny compared with 
Civil War rebellions promoting the emancipationist goal of economic independence, the host of 
early postwar revolts against corporal punishment represented an outgrowth of the wartime 
mutinous campaign dedicated to another aim of the black liberation struggle: protecting black 
bodies from white abuse. The following examples illustrate how the strict discipline of the 
immediate postbellum months caused chain reactions of mutinous eruptions. 
Two dozen members of the 116th USCI, organized in Kentucky, were among the first to 
rise up against an officer who tied up comrades by their thumbs. The Army court-martialed the 
men for participating in, exciting, or for failing to suppress, the mutiny. Sergeants William Kease 
and Doctor Moore led fellow members of Company I in an armed demonstration on May 11, 
1865, to the quarters of their commanding officer, Captain Sumner Warren, at City Point. The 
group demanded the release of Private George Seignior from the guard house, where Warren had 
confined him. Kease then refused to obey Warren’s order to send the group back to its quarters. 
Rejecting his officers’ authority, Private Robert Corperton encouraged the mutiny “by saying 
that he was glad it begun and that he was not going to be commanded by the damned white sons 
of bitches any more.” Private Perry Hawkins declared that “I am in for taking him down and any 
man that is not in for it.” He expressed his willingness “to help to kill all” and advised that “the 
company ought to go and help to take him down.” Corporal Irvin Stone announced to a member 
of the guard that, “I am willing to go and to help untie him.” Corporal Thomas Thumpkins 
endorsed the mutineers, stating that “They are right in doing as they do, and by God I am going 
to help them.” Demonstrating his commitment to martial masculinity, Private Dudley Limes 
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announced that “if this is the way colored soldiers are to be used, I would as well…die here as 
anywhere” for declaring his intention to help take his comrade down from the pole.193  
The scene showcased the peer pressure common in the black military mutiny 
phenomenon, reminding African-American men of the tenet of republican ideology holding that 
their worthiness for freedom depended on their willingness to fight for it. For example, Private 
Clay Lilly called Corporal Samuel Maddox “a coward for his attempting to dissuade the enlisted 
men of his company from performing any mutinous actions.” Corporals John Piper, Irvin Stone, 
and Monroe Hummerite, along with Private George Fishback, encouraged several comrades to 
assist the mutineers. They told their comrades, “Come boys get your guns let’s go.”194  
Additionally, three New Yorkers in the Thirty-first USCI conducted their own mutinies 
in sympathy with those of the 116th. On May 11, 1865, Privates Henry Valentine, Maddison 
Coleman, and George Jacobs refused orders to quell the 116th’s revolt. Commanded to fall in 
with his company for this purpose, the first declared that he, “didn’t come here to fight against” 
his “own color and” was “not going to fall out for no man.”195  
These men’s refusal to quell a mutiny highlighted a degree of inter-unit African-
American solidarity that had formed in the Union Army’s Sable Arm. Even if their own unit did 
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not become mutinous, black soldiers still had a range of choices if one broke out nearby. They 
could refuse to suppress it, which aided its attempt to advance the emancipation process or they 
could agree to arrest or harm comrades struggling for more humane treatment, becoming 
complicit in white supremacy’s campaign of keeping black bodies under the threat of force. 
The extent to which African Americans enjoyed inter-racial solidarity boosted the 
prospects of the biracial democracy envisioned by African Americans in the 1860s. Among those 
prosecuted for the 117th USCI’s May 12, 1865, mutiny at Camp Lincoln, Virginia, a reaction 
against Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Hutchins disciplining all sixty men of Company H for four or 
five men’s sloppiness during a dress parade, was the company’s white commander. Using 
“contemptuous and disrespectful language” toward his superior, Major Edward Bacon, Captain 
Frank Doggett, who considered himself his men’s “friend,” protested the order for his company 
to remain standing at attention on the parade ground. He objected “to that manner of punishing a 
whole company for what a few have done” and demanded the authority to dismiss every non-
offender. For “criticizing the discipline of his commanding officer” in ear-shot of enlisted men 
and other officers, his court-martial charged him with inciting and encouraging mutiny. When a 
rowdy crowd of armed soldiers with fixed bayonets from the rest of the regiment subsequently 
formed to protest the mass reprimand and Doggett led his company back to its quarters, Major 
Bacon accused the captain of failing to participate in the effort to suppress the mutiny. For 
voicing his opposition to the excessive disciplining of the black rank-and-file during the early 
postbellum period, Captain Doggett received a conviction and dishonorable discharge.196 A 
white officer serving as an accomplice to a black mutiny illustrated the extent to which biracial 
alliances formed during the long struggle for emancipation. White allies not only sympathized 
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and bonded with black troops and advocated lesser punishments under their prescribed authority, 
but also risked their own careers defending them in the midst of an episode.  
The early postbellum wave of mutinies moved to a new stage while the Twenty-fifth 
Corps was en route to Texas, from late May to late June 1865. Many in the corps still opposed 
the journey because it entailed a boring, unsanitary voyage to a place far from their families. 
Soldiers who undertook the nearly-two-thousand-mile journey suffered from seasickness, 
cramped quarters, inadequate and insufficient rations, and continued harsh discipline. Such 
conditions bred disease and malnourishment, killing as many as twelve men every day in the 
115th USCI. After restocking and re-fueling at Mobile Bay, the corps sailed for the island of 
Brazos Santiago at the mouth of the Rio Grande. The destination’s rough water and the Army’s 
few boats added further misery to the soldiers’ conditions. By the time the already agitated 
USCTs began sailing from Virginia to Texas, persistent white officer injustice and poor material 
conditions made a mutiny on the ocean ever more likely.197  
Among those who revolted during the voyage to Texas were the Kentuckians of the 109th 
USCI. Like the rest of their corps, these troops thought they had achieved freedom from white 
domination. However, events during the journey created a sentiment that their officers sought a 
new racist order. The 109th’s mutineers reluctantly agreed to set sail but could not contain their 
frustrations once conditions deteriorated on the troop transports. Their seaborne mutiny followed 
a familiar pattern: first, officers punished enlisted men; next, mutineers tried to free the victims 
of the punishment, during which they made incriminating statements; and finally, the officers 
stepped in to suppress the revolt and try perpetrators.  
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Aboard a troop transport named the Thomas A. Scott, off the Gulf Coast, a group from the 
109th joined together to force the release of Privates Allen Johnson and Armistead Martley. 
During an earlier inspection, a captain had arrested Johnson and Martley for failing to clean their 
guns, an offense constituting neglect of duty. When Lieutenant James Dony arrived to guard the 
two soldiers, they repeatedly insulted him and provided him with false names. This 
insubordination prompted the officer to tie them up by the thumbs.198  
Angered at such treatment, a detachment of fifteen to twenty soldiers from the regiment’s 
various companies decided to try to free Johnson and Martley, who endured their punishment on 
the rear side of the vessel. At least one mutineer expressed the group’s view that the chosen 
punishment for Johnson and Martley did not fit the crime. Prior to the mutiny, Private Edwin 
Hawes remarked that no one aboard the “damn dirty boat” could adequately clean their guns.199 
Due to this objection, the mutineers marched to their officers’ quarters. Sergeant Samuel Green 
reportedly asked to see Captain A. H. Keene. Leading the group of mutineers to Keene, Green, 
“in a noisy manner,” demanded that Keene release Private Johnson. Green threatened the captain 
that if the officers did not release Johnson, the soldiers would “raise the devil.” After Keene and 
other officers ordered the group “to go back” and commanded Green to “quiet the men” and 
return them to their quarters, the mutineers decided to free the prisoners themselves.200  
The mutineers made various hostile statements to the officers guarding Johnson and 
Martley. Privates Sheldon Penock, James O’Banan, and William Murrell armed themselves and 
repeatedly threatened to shoot anyone who interfered with their attempt. Murrell stated he was 
prepared to die in the effort to free Johnson and to blow up the boat. While Lieutenant John M. 
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Shoemaker tried to “quell the disturbance,” Private George Mudd threatened the lives of the 
officers if they failed to release the two. When the mutineers finally approached Martley and 
Johnson, Penock called out, “untie the prisoners!” Using a knife Private John May acquired, the 
group cut Johnson’s bounds loose. However, the mutineers failed to free Martley.201  
The regiment’s officers eventually restored order; the mutineers dispersed and returned to 
their quarters. After the tensions calmed down and some officers went to bed, a colonel worried 
that the men “may rise again.” The next day, the officers arrested thirteen alleged mutineers. 
That autumn, the U.S. military court-martialed the suspected mutineers.202 
A closer look at the socioeconomic backgrounds of the 109th USCI’s mutineers, followed 
by another set of witness statements, helps us better grasp how these men understood their role in 
the long black freedom struggle. Like other black mutineers, they believed that liberty meant the 
ability to live independently without coercion, harassment, and abuse from white overlords, 
especially after Union victory. Unlike USCTs from the Deep South, however, the soldiers of 
units recruited from the border states, including the 109th’s Kentuckians, arrived at this notion of 
freedom in ways that reflected the region’s unique ordeal with bondage and liberation.  
The 109th USCI’s mutineers emerged from Kentucky’s slave system. Its proximity to the 
North meant a shorter path to free territory. Like other states with a surplus of enslaved labor, the 
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Bluegrass State participated in the domestic slave trade. Matching the general experience of 
American slavery, ill-disciplined bondspeople in Kentucky endured punishments such as 
whippings, brandings, and tying up by the thumbs. The state also cracked down on the autonomy 
of its small free black population. Laws disfranchised them and restricted their physical mobility. 
Free blacks also faced the prospect of enslavement if they failed to prove their free status and/or 
were kidnapped by slave traders.203   
The mutineers of the 109th and their conception of freedom were also products of their 
home state’s wartime experiences. The federal government initially tried to protect the peculiar 
institution to prevent the border states from seceding. However, the constant stream of runaways 
to Union lines gradually undermined slavery in 1862 and 1863. Since the Emancipation 
Proclamation freed bondspeople only in Rebel territory, it did not apply to any Union slave state. 
Slavery legally survived in the Bluegrass State until the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification. 
However, developments on the ground nevertheless weakened Kentucky’s slave system over the 
course of the war. After first hiring slaves to work on fortifications, the Union Army in Kentucky 
next recruited black troops, assembling enough to form three regiments, including the 109th.204 
These black regiments typically consisted of three main types of men: runaway slaves, 
those who enlisted under the Slave Claims Commission, and free blacks. … and three fellow 
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mutineers were among the fugitive slaves who enlisted. As a runaways, they already had 
experience with rejecting white authority. By voluntarily joining the Union Army, black 
Kentuckians like him asserted the right to live according to their own will.205  
Meanwhile, Sandy Fenqua, Sheldon Penock, and five other mutineers left bondage and 
either voluntarily or involuntarily joined the Union Army under the Slave Claims Commission. 
Created by General Order No. 329, this program allowed masters to manumit their slaves for the 
purpose of enlistment and to later claim monetary compensation. The master received a $100 
bounty immediately and a promised payment of $300 after the war. For the latter, they needed to 
demonstrate loyalty to the Union and ownership over the enlistee. Almost 2,500 other Kentucky 
slaveholders applied through the commission. The record shows that the federal government 
rejected all six claims made by the ex-owners of the above mutineers. Though the documents 
lack specifics, the applicants likely failed to acquire witnesses confirming a Unionist allegiance. 
Since the program could enlist a slave without his consent, it constituted another instrument of 
white coercion comparable to conscription. However, if one wished to serve, he might have 
concluded that his master’s permission ensured a safer path to the Army, as bondsmen who 
decided to join the Union Army risked murder or injury at the hands of masters and white mobs. 
Either way, the manumitted remained free even with a rejected claim, and by the time of his 
revolt, Fenqua and the other mutineers sought freedom from white control and abuse.206  
Finally, the record also reveals that three mutineers, including Private Henry Rector, 
came from Kentucky’s antebellum free black population. It is not clear whether they became free 
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at birth or later in life. Regardless, they had tasted emancipation by the time of the war’s 
outbreak. However, the subordinate social position of free blacks meant that they had as much of 
a stake in ending white oppression as those who experienced slavery their entire lives.207 
Despite their three different paths to emancipation, a full year of military service and 
comradery helped the men of the 109th forge a common conception of freedom. The regiment 
first served as a military occupation force in their home state. In October 1864, the 109th received 
orders to join the Army of the James in Virginia. Here, the unit mostly performed garrison duty, 
before eventually participating in combat operations that helped break the Petersburg 
stalemate.208 
A source of racial animosities leading to the 109th’s mutiny was a dispute over the 
regiment’s black chaplain, Francis A. Boyd. Born enslaved in Lexington in 1843, Boyd acquired 
manumission by the eve of the war, worked as a house servant, and joined Louisville’s white 
First Christian Church. Prior to enlisting in the Union Army, Boyd’s white Unionist pastor 
appointed him as a missionary to contrabands. In 1864, he developed a calling to become a 
chaplain in the new black army being formed to help destroy slavery and preserve the Union. 
Colonel John Hammond assured Boyd he would be the 109th USCI’s chaplain following his 
enlistment in June. In November, General Benjamin Butler officially appointed Boyd in this role. 
However, that position went to a white clergyman instead; the regiment’s white officers, whom 
Boyd claimed had “dark” and “bitter” prejudices, opposed the appointment, and the War 
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Department revoked it because he was not elected to the position by regimental officers. 
Asserting that he as a black man possessed the same abilities as whites, and citing the favorable 
testimony of his Christian Church ministers, Boyd protested at each level of the military 
command. He considered the rejection “an insult to me, and my race.”  He wrote that African 
Americans were, “the only people who were loyal as a class in the United States” and therefore, 
“if any among them rose upon their merits, no one had a right to try, to defraud them out of their 
office.” By late 1865, he never convinced his superiors to award him with the chaplaincy.209  
Coupled with the frustrations of remaining in uniform after winning the war and the harsh 
disciplinary climate of the postwar Army, Boyd’s unsuccessful struggle to become chaplain 
added an extra dose of racial tension to life in the ranks of the 109th. Just as white commanders 
prevented black troops from beginning new lives as free civilians who could care for one’s 
family, they also blocked Boyd from realizing his potential in his chosen occupation. In each 
case, white authorities restricted African Americans from acting according to their will. Tensions 
reached such a level that some members of the regiment rose up in defiance against the latest and 
most egregious example of white officers exerting unwarranted control over black soldiers’ lives. 
The mutineers’ trial transcripts record the racial language they used to express their 
conception of freedom, which centered on black autonomy. In the midst of the attempt to free his 
comrades, Private Sandy Fenqua called the officers “white sons of bitches” who have “lied to us 
long enough.” This angry reference to dishonesty can be traced to resentment over his officers 
preventing him from enjoying his new freedom.210 Fenqua’s language also reflects the hostility 
towards whites he developed under slavery and in the Army. He proclaimed that “he would not 
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allow any white man to run over him,” since “he never allowed his master to!” Fenqua thereby 
connected a refusal to tolerate prejudice in the Union Army with bondspeople challenging the 
power relationship central to slavery. Secondly, he implied that he previously clashed with his 
owner. In both slavery and the military, Fenqua resisted white abuse to advance his freedom.211  
Condemnations of their officers for thinking “they can do just as they please with us” and 
similar quotes populate the trial transcripts of Sandy Fenqua, Sheldon Penock, and three others. 
These suggest that the mutineers thought their superiors infringed on their personal 
independence. Thus, the mutiny formed a part of a broader struggle to protect all African 
Americans from white behavioral constraints. Angry over such mistreatment, Penock declared 
that he would, “be damned if he wouldn’t go with any of the boys to untie the prisoners.”212 
Citing Private Henry Rector’s persistent demands for the prisoners’ release, a lieutenant testified 
that Rector was “one of the foremost ones engaged” in the incident. When the officers ordered 
the mutineers to disperse, Rector denied the former’s authority to instill discipline.213 
The comments of James O’Banan, Samuel Green, and Jake Mattingly on the harsh 
disciplinary measures specifically emphasize the USCT belief that their new status should spare 
them of physical abuse that recalled bondage. O’Banan proclaimed, “We will see if these officers 
are going to tie up a colored man. We are free, our Colonel [Bates] told us so, and we will fight 
before they shall keep our men tied. They had better release that I tell you!” Both Green and 
Mattingly pointed to how they and their comrades “came away from home to [be] rid of such 
treatment as this.” They highlight the soldiers’ understanding that service in the Union Army 
freed them, which meant that cruel treatment violated the terms of their emancipation and 
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contradicted the free status they held as they understood it. Revolting against their current white 
superiors represented the next stage of their effort to establish a world in which African 
Americans could exert control over their circumstances without the threat of white violence.214  
After U.S. Army officials finished administering the courts-martial in the fall of 1865, 
they acquitted four and convicted nine of the accused. All of those sentenced forfeited their pay 
and performed hard labor with a twenty-four-pound ball attached to one leg for either the 
remainder of one’s three-year term of service or a set number of months. Most toiled at Dry 
Tortugas, a remote island off the coast of Florida. All of those who received the maximum 
sentences were released early, by February 1867, as their unit at last mustered out. Those soldiers 
who departed from the military justice system without a guilty verdict benefitted from comrades 
who testified in their defense that they did not participate in the mutiny, or from convincing the 
general courts-martial that they cautioned against the men freeing the prisoners.215  
The cycle of perceived injustices followed by ill-discipline and mutiny continued to 
shape the experiences of the Twenty-fifth Corps’ USCTs after landing in Texas in mid-June 
1865, lasting until near the end of the sixteen-month deployment. Part of the reason was that the 
unfortunate conditions plaguing the voyage followed the soldiers to land. The military post on 
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the island of Brazos Santiago gave the troops insufficient and inadequate water, food, and 
supplies. Making matters worse, they faced countless other miseries—seclusion, heat, sand, 
snakes, insects, gulf storms, and disease. As one chaplain put it in October, during the previous 
summer, no “set of men in any country ever suffered more severely than we in Texas.” The 
growing of fruit and vegetables beginning in late August improved overall health by 1866. Yet, 
Texas never stopped bringing high temperatures, filth, exhaustion, and loneliness. The Twenty-
fifth Corps soldiers on Brazos held an isolated slice of territory far from Reconstruction’s white 
violence and government assistance to freedpeople. Meanwhile, those who occupied the border 
town of Brownsville fifteen miles away interacted with hostile white civilians, like other federal 
troops throughout the postwar South. Rather than enjoy peacetime as freedpeople, African-
American soldiers along the Rio Grande in the year following war’s end endured an unforgiving 
landscape and a painful separation from their families living on the other side of the continent.216 
To be sure, USCTs were not the only Union Army veterans to resent postwar service to 
such an extent that they mutinied. In early 1866, various white units in Texas did so partly in 
response to others mustering out before they could while they continued the monotony of 
garrison duty in a harsh natural environment. Just as they had during the Civil War, white units 
resented unfavorable unit organization. As the Army gradually mustered out those who had 
served the longest, it merged the reduced regiments as battalions, bringing together troops 
without preexisting camaraderie. In March, the homesick, demoralized men of the Forty-eighth 
Ohio Infantry Battalion, the product of three weakened veteran regiments, conducted a work 
stoppage, stacking their weapons and refusing to continue their duties. In contrast to USCTs who 
mutinied at the time, these white Ohioans all received honorable discharges and avoided court-
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martial proceedings. Additionally, to their jubilation, the remaining Civil War volunteers 
mustered out once regular forces could replace them.217  
Other white U.S. forces revolted for reasons familiar to USCTs. While stationed in 
Austin in February 1866, the First Iowa’s cavalrymen devised a mutiny against their commander 
George Armstrong Custer’s physical mistreatment of them. Among their grievances were his 
fondness for upholding discipline through whipping, withholding rations, and ordering them to 
act as his wife’s servants. They planned to fire their carbines from concealed positions. However, 
General Custer learned of the ambush plot, prompting him to leave early. While it is unknown 
which punishments, if any, the Army gave the anti-Custer mutineers, they represent a 
continuation of a wartime trend. Both blacks and whites in blue suffered, and rebelled against, 
degrading abuse, but for the former, it could not be separated from the legacy of slavery. 
Moreover, as the two above cases are among a few known white mutinies in the immediate 
postbellum months, they paled in comparison to USCT rebellions in scope and frequency.218 The 
horrid conditions of Army life in early postbellum Texas leaves little wonder as to why black and 
white soldiers in numerous regiments mutinied along the Rio Grande.  
However, diverse treatment along the Rio Grande helped explain which conditions were 
necessary to cause a black soldier mutiny and which reduced its likelihood. When regiments 
served in Texas under softer discipline, like the Thirty-sixth USCI did, they avoided the acute 
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dissent that struck others. Regimental commander Major William Hart assigned camp police 
duties to noncommissioned officers of the day, conveying trust to his men. To foster cooperation 
in upholding order, Hart held competitions in which he gave the company that performed the 
best at cleaning their quarters a week off from fatigue duty. In their camp on Brazos Santiago, 
the Thirty-sixth ate better, stayed healthier, and lived in superior quarters compared to other 
black regiments in the area. Inspection reports reveal that the fortunate Thirty-sixth continued to 
enjoy higher morale than other units despite being among the last regiments to occupy the Lone 
Star State.219 Even when performing an unpopular duty in a harsh landscape, when African-
American troops felt valued and appreciated, they tended to avoid acting mutinous.  
Yet, since other white officers were stricter and crueler than William Hart, black soldier 
mutinies kept the military justice system busy throughout the Texas border region. A member 
from the Thirty-first USCI mutinied near White Ranch, Texas. On June 10, 1865, Private 
Richard Mills went into custody for rejecting orders to surrender his musket and stop talking. 
Connecting his current military service to his past experience with slave resistance, Mills was 
quoted as saying, “I whipped my master man once he whipped me afterwards but he had to get 
help to do it I am not afraid of any one white man – all I want is to get out of the army, or, my 
rights.” Though his regiment consisted of New York and Connecticut residents, Mills’ reference 
to slavery suggests that he was a bondsman who fled north. While the specific words mutineers 
used in Virginia and the Gulf of Mexico tended to be indirectly tied to the acute USCT desire to 
quickly muster out, Mills clearly cited this desire and directly connected it to black resistance to 
 
219 Ibid., 270-272. For another example of why black soldiers who felt valued were less likely to mutiny while 
mistreated ones often rebelled, see Reid’s comparison of the Thirty-fifth and Thirty-seventh USCI: Ibid., xv, 15, 38-
41, 67-93, 98-109, 111-112, 154, 164-169, 174-175, 187-216, 272-295. 
169 
 
white supremacy. For bringing his rebellious spirit leftover from slavery to the U.S. Army, the 
private received a dishonorable discharge, pay forfeiture, and two-year hard labor sentence.220  
Later, in March 1866, the wave of Texas mutinies increased in frequency. That month, 
Private Richard Lewis of the 117th USCI reportedly threatened violence against Lt. David Bond 
in Brownsville as the latter attempted to arrest the former. Witnesses later claimed Lewis drew a 
knife from his pocket and told Bond “don’t lay your hands on me, if you do I’ll kill you.”221 
Private Jesse Gibbons, a substitute and also of the 117th USCI, “did cause and excite a mutiny” in 
another company. He threatened to shoot Sergeant James Miller if he attempted to punish 
William Goldburough of Company D. In response to Sergeant Richards Grubbs’ order to leave 
Company D’s street, he proclaimed that “he would be G[o]d d[a]m[ne]d if he would.”222 
Furthermore, at Brazos Santiago, Texas, Private James Hall, of the Thirty-eighth USCI, drew his 
knife on his superior officer, First Lieutenant J. H. Russell, threatening that, “If you touch me, 
I’ll put this into you.”223 In March and April 1866, soldiers in the 114th USCI, another Kentucky 
regiment, could not stay out of trouble in Brownsville. Privates John Stone, Dudley McQuarry, 
and Charles McFeeters stood trial for committing such acts as joining “with other soldiers of his 
guard in a mutinous disturbance,” speaking to officers “in a contemptuous and disrespectful 
manner,” and threatening to kill and physically assaulting superiors.224 
The mutinies of the immediate postbellum Rio Grande region followed a familiar pattern. 
Privates Mills, Lewis, Givins, Hall, Stone, McQuarry, and McFeeters rose up, often violently, 
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against their superiors for perceived abuses. When facing the hammer of the military justice 
system, they enjoyed due process rights. Rather than the maximum punishment of death, Mills, 
Hall, McQuarry, and McFeeters received the common mutineer trifecta of performing hard 
labor—Mills for two years, Hall for five years, and the latter two for remainder of their terms—
forfeiting all or almost all pay, and awaiting a dishonorable discharge upon release. Meanwhile, 
Gibbons was transferred to another regiment and lost pay for only twelve months. Judges 
acquitted both Lewis and Stone, confirming that the U.S. Army afforded an unprecedented 
degree of legal rights to its African-American soldiers. Regardless of the course of resulting 
court-martial proceedings, the first year of “peace” constituted a period of widespread revolt of 
USCTs against harsh Army discipline. The unforgiving circumstances of those ordered to Texas 
at each step, along with the never-ending perception that this ordeal resulted from racial 
animosity, ensured that this period lasted as long as the USCTs remained in uniform.  
USCTs in different parts of the immediate postbellum South also revolted against harsh 
disciplinary measures. While the Texas force had an international mission, those kept in the rest 
of the conquered South assumed the role of keeping the peace, a function of northern uncertainty 
over how ex-Confederates would act. Comparable conditions that bred mutiny in both groups of 
early postbellum USCTs reveal that discontent with involuntarily staying in the ranks after 
Confederate defeat spread across the Sable Arm.225 The mutineers of this force included Ohio 
troops who enlisted in the Kentucky-based Twelfth USCHA.  
While resembling the mutiny of the 109th USCI in its causes and character, this other 
African-American revolt stands out through its demographic tensions, length, and rich court 
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testimony. According to numerous witnesses at the resulting court-martial, each of the mutineers 
had been transferred from the Seventy-second Ohio Colored Infantry, which they joined in 
January 1865 just two weeks prior to the mutiny. The extent of the Twelfth USCHA’s mutinous 
episode so shocked the judges presiding over the resulting trial that they described it as an “overt 
act” and “not something which may have taken place a year ago.” This statement suggests that 
USCT mutinies became more aggressive after the Civil War, a function of the acute frustration 
over being unable to enjoy civilian life in the new, post-slavery Union. What helps explain this 
reaction is the testimony from a captain that the fort at which the mutiny took place was “highly 
disciplined” before the arrival of the Seventy-second’s “Ohio men.” Furthermore, officers 
described the incoming northerners as well-educated, smart, and influential among the 
preexisting men. Yet, the rank-and-file Kentuckians in the Twelfth considered these newcomers 
to be interlopers. Corporal George Frazier called them “strange men” whose character he could 
not determine. Another witness, the white sutler George Wright, could only identify one specific 
mutineer, Corporal James Carter, because the former was, “not acquainted with the squad of men 
from Ohio.” These black troops could therefore relate to the collapse of white soldiers’ esprit de 
corps during the early postbellum unit consolidations.226  
Despite this language populating the court-martial trial testimony and sources confirming 
that half the mutineers had connections to Ohio, the current author has found no evidence that 
the Seventy-second Ohio Colored Infantry ever existed as a unit. According to their service 
records, every prosecuted mutineer was southern-born, with fourteen originally from Kentucky 
or other slave states. Five had escaped from slavery, and three were substitutes. Those of 
Company B joined the Twelfth at Camp Nelson in the summer of 1864, along with most 
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members of the Kentucky-based USCTs. However, Company M’s mutineers were recruited in 
the Ohio towns of Ironton, Columbus, Toledo, Cincinnati, Circleville, and Hillsborough during 
the winter of 1864/1865. In mid-July 1865, four Company M mutineers—Privates Henry Clay, 
Frank Stokes, Jerry Walters, and Charles Allen —reportedly transferred to the Twelfth USCHA 
from the Seventy-second USCI, organized in Kentucky due to an expiration in its members’ 
terms of service.227 This evidence suggests that at least Company M’s members had previously 
fled the slave South to live in the free North. Unless they inaccurately assumed the Seventy-
second was an Ohio unit, that witnesses would conjure up a fictional black northern regiment to 
which they would subscribe the mutineers’ membership speaks to how the “Ohio men” had a 
reputation as outsiders. Since no evidence connecting Company B to the Buckeye State exists, 
this group may constitute life-long southerners who sympathized with southern-born Ohioans.228 
Whatever their backgrounds, in early August 1865, at Fort Boyle, near Colesburg, 
Kentucky, the mutineers of the Twelfth USCHA conducted a series of rebellious behaviors over 
the course of several nights, during which they tried to free an imprisoned comrade named 
Cornelius Taylor of Company M. In a single trial, the Army charged the following men with 
exciting, causing, or joining in a mutiny or sedition: James Thornton, Jeff Lisle, Charles Spotts, 
Alfred Roe, James Woodson, and Lyman Ferrill of Company B; and James Carter, Gibson 
Wormley, James Beach, Thomas Hodge, Henry Clay, Frank Stokes, Jerry Walters, John 
Williams, and Charles Allen of Company M. Taylor’s offense was “improper language toward 
an officer,” disrespectful behavior, “insulting language,” and “insubordinate, mutinous conduct” 
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over the course of several days. Taylor drew his officers’ wrath after he recommended that a 
corporal use a light source to locate a missing cap and repeated the suggestion to the captain. 
When fort commander Captain H. T. Potter took “offense at the manner of the remarks,” he 
kicked and arrested Taylor “considerably” before tying him up by the thumbs on the night of 
August 2. Taylor’s weight broke the ropes. Potter then beat him in the face, spilling blood, before 
tying him up again. Captain Potter, while testifying for the prosecution, described Taylor as "a 
very bad man" who deserved this punishment because he, “became so mutinous.” Potter wanted 
to "shut his mouth" and make him an example to the rest of the men.229 
Those who mutinied on Cornelius Taylor’s behalf on August 4 objected to this treatment 
due to a perceived underlying racial hostility that had no place in the new, emancipated Union. 
According to one witness’ testimony, “I can see no reason for” this treatment “but that he is a 
black soldier.” Defending the country’s emerging biracial democracy, he added, “the laws of the 
country place them in exactly the same situation as regards the mode and quantity of punishment 
as any other soldier.” He related that both his past brigade and division commanders—Major 
General W. B. Hazen and General William Nelson, respectively—were among the “strictest 
disciplinarians.” However, never in his four years of service had he ever witnessed punishments 
so severe for so minor a crime, going beyond both Army regulations and practice.230 
Declaring that Taylor had been tied up “long enough” and that “they would not stand 
that,” referring to the above abuses, an hour and a half after the start of the punishment, the first 
set of mutineers arrived at the guard house. Numbering around a dozen, most came from 
Company M. Potter ordered the men back to their quarters. However, these men returned with 
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loaded weapons and partially cut the rope attached to Taylor’s thumbs before leaving. Under the 
camp’s regulations, this action constituted an unlawful assembly because they lacked permission 
and because the officers prohibited loaded weapons. The men also proclaimed their intention to 
no longer obey their officers and threatened to kill anyone who interfered or touched Taylor. To 
determine the extent of the mutiny via a roll call, Potter ordered other soldiers from his Company 
B to form a line, sent guards to the barracks, and directed Captain Edmund Hulanski to have his 
Company M fall in. When Hulanski and his men gathered to quell the disturbance, the mutineers 
charged and pointed their weapons at him. Despite ringleader Corporal James Carter’s efforts to 
keep the assault going, the men fell in when Hulanski fired an unloaded weapon at them. The 
officers arrested those with loaded weapons, which proved their involvement in the mutiny.231  
Another, larger-scale mutiny largely involving Company B’s members occurred the night 
of August 4. This accompanying revolt resulted from the officers carrying out another harsh 
punishment on Taylor.232 The former compelled the latter to lift a heavy stone. Angry comrades 
called on Taylor to drop it. As the situation escalated, an older sergeant reportedly commented 
that, “the boys are together for mischief tonight.” According to court testimony, Charles Spotts, 
James Thornton, Alfred Roe, and Lyman Terrill were the most prominent figures in this second 
incident. During it, the soldiers all stated in similar language that “by God it’s played out,” 
meaning “they wasn’t going to be punished anymore.” With fixed bayonets, they moved up to 
the guard house. Upon learning that trouble was brewing, Lieutenant Robert Tyler arrived. Spotts 
told the lieutenant that he did not need to fear harm to himself, but he cursed Hulanski, Potter, 
and other officers. The angry squad convinced Taylor to drop the stone before freeing him. 
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Fearing that their superiors planned to fire cannons at them, the mutineers next threatened to use 
the artillery on the officers, which non-mutineers, including Corporal Ransom Fry and George 
Wright, prevented. “This mutinous spirit was finally quelled” when Lt. Tyler demanded silence. 
An officer afterword placed Taylor in the guard house, and the mutineers went into custody.233  
Though the regiment’s commanders had quelled three mutinies thus far, the troubles had 
one more chapter. On August 6, with Potter absent and Hulanski still in command, a number 
refused to obey the latter’s orders and demanded the release of several participants of the 
previous events. One soldier reportedly loaded his weapon and “brought it to bear…in a 
threatening manner.” Hulanski immediately put the man in custody. Upon hearing this news, 
Potter became worried about the “spirit of insubordination” and determined that something 
needed to be done before the situation worsened. Meanwhile, Cornelius Taylor, the powder keg 
of the regiment’s late-summer crisis, deserted. By the time of the trial, Taylor was still 
missing.234  
During the multiple-part revolt in the Twelfth USCHA, those who decided against 
participating advised their rebellious comrades to be more pragmatic, which invited accusations 
of disloyalty and cowardice. One witness testified that he had told the mutineers to be careful 
and that, “it would not do any good even if they did get the upper hand of the officers because 
they could have aid from Louisville in a short time.” Sergeant Frank Shelton begged the men to 
peacefully leave the matter alone. Charles Spotts laughed at him, replying that “You undoubtedly 
must be appealing for the officers.” Corporal George Frazier drew accusations of spinelessness 
when he informed Henry White, Alfred Roe, Jeff Leisle, Lyman Terrill, Jim Thornton, Taylor 
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Williams, and Aaron Bufort, “about [him] not having anything to do with” the second mutiny 
and when he chastised their decision to disrupt their officers’ duties. According to the mutineers, 
as many men as possible should prevent the officers from punishing them the way they have 
done Cornelius Taylor; the enlisted men were too numerous to permit such abuses.235 The debate 
centered on whether to engage in cautious self-preservation or to live up to the dangerous martial 
masculine ideal. As seen later, the clash over which option best promoted the emancipation 
process permeated African-American discourse and action deep into the next century.  
The defense testimony sheds further light on the unit’s disaffection with Cornelius 
Taylor’s punishment while also trying to foster doubt about the validity of the charges facing the 
defendants. Corporal Lewis Ries of Company M told the court-martial that James Beach and 
Thomas Hodge performed guard duty when ordered to fall in with the others on the first night of 
the disturbances. Like the mutineers, Ries had transferred from the Seventy-second USCI to the 
Twelfth USCHA, enlisting in Cleveland. While denying that he heard comrades discuss rescuing 
Taylor, he did listen to remarks in the barracks at night that Taylor did not deserve being tied up. 
In frequent responses during the defense component of the trial, the witnesses pled ignorance 
about numerous occurrences, sights, and sounds, including statements from comrades and their 
locations. The witnesses on both sides repeatedly revealed that they could not recognize 
mutineers due to darkness, distance, and unfamiliarity. One defense witness wondered whether 
enough solid evidence, minus hearsay, existed that would enable a witness to identify anyone.236  
A written statement the defendants’ attorney, J. H. Ward, gave in the mutineers’ defense 
offers their views on racism in the country at large and in the Army particularly, as well as an 
understanding of judicial process and rights. The document identified inconsistencies and 
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imperfect memories in the prosecution’s narrative. It also used the chaotic nature and extenuating 
circumstances of the mutiny to further establish reasonable doubt. Ward discussed Shelton’s 
prejudice against the “Ohio men,” or “Ohio party.” This prejudice, the document asserted, 
formed “one of the causes of the war,” and “the successful issue of the contest” “entirely 
obliterated” this prejudice. However, it persisted in this black regiment and was being directed 
toward “not only those here on trial but those whose testimony has been given in this case.” The 
statement called into question testimony using the verb “supposes.” It noted that due to the 
hurried nature of the trial, the defendants had been unable to corroborate their notes and memory 
with those of the recorder. A number of the prosecution’s witnesses only identified the 
defendants at points in time apart from the mutinous affairs. According to the counsel, key 
defense witnesses were absent. The document further asked the court to consider whether a 
soldier possessing a loaded weapon justified the death penalty, since this fact could originate 
from the incident’s confused, excited circumstances, or from the order to fall out. The scene’s 
darkness meant that another armed person whom no one noticed could have been present. Ward 
wondered whether the officers who testified might have had faulty memories. Moreover, he 
noted, Lt. Tyler and the ordinance sergeant each failed to recognize anyone who moved towards 
the guard house. Contradicting how officers generally understood mutiny, the attorney disagreed 
that Charles Spotts’ verbal objections to the harsh discipline of his comrade constituted a crime. 
Overall, the attorney emphasized the high standard of conclusiveness required for evidence in 
courts martial, evidence which excludes all other possibilities, probabilities, and theories. 
The legal strategy of the defense was partially successful. In the trial, held in late August, 
the court acquitted Thomas Hodge, Charles Allen, Henry Clay, Frank Stokes, and Jerry Walter. 
They were thus released and restored to service. Those convicted and sentenced to death by 
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firing squad were James Thornton, James Carter, Gibson Wormsley, James Beach, Charles 
Spotts, Alfred Roe, Jeff Lisle, James Woodson, and John Williams.237 
Commenting on this case, Judge Advocate General William H. Coyl discussed the legal 
philosophy behind mutiny prosecutions, which confirms the current work’s theoretical definition 
of mutiny. As he put it, Coyl heard no argument proving the innocence of the accused, and the 
events did indeed constitute a mutiny. It was not proper for either the official or the court to 
determine whether Cornelius Taylor’s punishment was justified. The court is to only decide who 
encouraged, and participated in, the mutiny and why they did so. The general cited O’Brien, 
“American Military Law and Courts-Martial,” page 72. Under the law, in the case of a mutiny, 
sedition, riot, or any other unlawful action, every participant, not just the leader and regardless of 
intent, is responsible for the criminal acts that result from the offense. Those who incited or 
joined a mutiny shared culpability and deserved an equal sentence. The only persons deserving 
leniency were the “misguided and deluded tools of factions and unprincipled men.” Such persons 
contrasted from “those, who, by their guilty machinations, have urged others to the commission 
of a crime of such magnitude.” Further guiding the court was recognition that under the Articles 
of War, even if someone uttered the “merest word” against lawful authority and had the most 
minor involvement in an incident, he was guilty of mutiny and subject to any punishment 
decided by the court martial, even the most severe type. The punishments for mutiny served to 
promote social order, reminding all current and prospective soldiers that their primary duty 
centered on obedience. The Twelfth USCHA’s rebellion constituted a mutiny because 
participants subverted the military hierarchy, regardless of the extent to which they did so, 






General Coyl challenged the mutineers’ view that their commanders threatened the terms 
of their emancipation. He interpreted the defendants’ accusations of racial discrimination as “a 
little to gross a mistake” and as the product of demagoguery. If any officer mistreated them for 
racial reasons, he was not representative of the general Army experience or of its customs. The 
judge advocate contended that the prosecution tried the defendants only based on their violations 
of the law, not their race. Article 7 of Army law dictates that anyone who commits or incites a 
mutiny faces the death penalty or any other punishment decided by a court-martial. According to 
the author’s understanding of the custom of the service “from time immemorial,” and before the 
enlistment of black soldiers, all mutineers should be shot. Moreover, this custom would remain 
in the future, when everyone in the present has passed away and “when negro soldiers shall have 
been a permanent and fixed thing.” Since the accused men were U.S. soldiers, “We have certain 
responsibilities towards them, and they have certain responsibilities towards us.” A soldier’s 
primary duty is to obey his superiors in all circumstances. When mistreated, they have remedies 
besides disobedience. In the case of the defense’s absent witnesses, Thomas Carter and James 
Breach, the court overruled their affidavits because their applications failed to include their 
location at the time of the second mutiny, invalidating it. Furthermore, nothing in the affidavit 
would have benefitted the prisoners, for the official could have disproven them and the two 
witnesses, “were engaged from the first part of the mutiny.”239  
While the Advocate General may have given a strong case for racially-blind justice, he 
nevertheless overlooked the men’s perspective. Given their abuse and the fragile status of their 
freedom, it was not too farfetched for them to assume that worse treatment, such as artillery fire, 
was in store for them, comparable to the rumors of re-enslavement in Twenty-fifth Corps. The 
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mutiny of the Twelfth USCHA also shows that USCTs viewed injustices through the lens of 
American society and its racial codes, as well as through their entire experience in the service. 
Coyl neglected to consider why the mutineers might have felt that they lacked a legal avenue to 
redress their grievances. However, the general’s futuristic quote reveals that he envisioned a 
more racially egalitarian U.S. military. While not a full white ally, he expected and indirectly 
endorsed an advance in the long emancipation, even if he considered it successful enough to the 
point that mutiny was never justified for African-American soldiers. Therefore, Coyd occupied a 
middle ground between white ally and enemy of the emancipation process. 
The story of the Twelfth USCHA’s mutiny underwent another twist when the Army 
invalidated the case on a technicality, prompting a second trial of the convicted group of 
mutineers. In November 1865, this time around, the Army ruled Beach and Williams innocent, 
while Thornton, Lisle, Roe, and Woodson received sentences of four to six years of hard labor at 
Dry Tortugas. Thus, the defense’s decision to repeat the strategy from the first trial paid 
dividends. Meanwhile, the evidence was damning enough for Carter and Wormley to once again 
face capital punishment. However, their sentences were later commuted to ten years of hard 
labor. In the second trial’s testimony, Captain Hulanski and other officers recognized Carter as a 
participant more surely than the other defendants. Hulanski alone identified Wormley. Also, the 
outfits of Carter and Wormley matched the ones found at the scene of the crime. Regardless of 
guilt, by June or July 1866, all those convicted were released.240 
The decision by the supposed former members of the Seventy-second Ohio Colored 
Infantry to mutiny in the late summer of 1865 can be contextualized in the broader nineteenth-
century experience of African Americans in the North, the middle border region, and Ohio. 
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Living on the border between the free North and slave South, these men grew up in a free, but 
impoverished, black labor system, as well as in the specter of slave catchers. Though legally free 
since the passage of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, black Ohioans lived under “black laws” that 
deprived them of numerous citizenship rights, such as suffrage, jury duty, education, and militia 
service. Black hostility to second-class citizenship and violent white racism led to riots and a 
relocation of African-American Cincinnatians to Canada in the 1820s and 1830s. Moreover, 
given Ohio’s border with two slave states, those in the Seventy-second lived in a popular 
destination for those crossing through the Underground Railroad as well as the heart of the 
heated debates over fugitive slave laws. They resided in a section and state which saw black 
activists combat racism during the antebellum years by joining the abolitionist movement; 
advocating the repeal of the black laws, which had partial success in 1849; and forming protest 
organizations, newspapers, schools, and benevolent institutions. They thereby attracted a small 
number of white allies who rejected gradualism in favor of immediate abolition.241   
From the start of the war, northern African Americans, both free-born men and refugees 
from southern slavery, along with their white abolitionist allies, demanded to serve in the Union 
Army. They hoped to use the conflict as an opportunity to emancipate their southern brethren 
and to make a claim for full racial equality for free blacks. Once northern states finally started 
recruiting black regiments, the members of the Seventy-second Ohio would have shared the 
frustration of expecting equal pay but receiving unequal pay for much of the war. They also had 
 
241 Ira Berlin, The Long Emancipation: The Demise of Slavery in the United States (Cambridge and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2015), 78-79, 145-146; James Bissland, Blood, Tears, and Glory, 320; Richard S. 
Newman, The Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002); W. Sherman Jackson, “Emancipation, Negrophobia and Civil War 
Politics in Ohio, 1863-1865,” The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Summer, 1980), pp. 250-260; J. Reuben 
Sheeler, “The Struggle of the Negro in Ohio for Freedom,” The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr., 
1946), pp. 208-226; Stephen Middleton, “The Fugitive Slave Crisis in Cincinnati, 1850-1860: Resistance, 




enlisted in a state with a Copperhead stronghold that appealed to white Ohioan fears that an 
exodus of freed slaves from neighboring Kentucky and Virginia would overrun the state. 
However, other white Ohioans championed black enlistment. For these northern mutineers, the 
harsh discipline that reminded southern blacks of slavery would have been the latest of many 
examples of racial resentment that at times sparked black resistance. While free black 
northerners did not face the level of subjugation seen south of the Ohio River, they were just as 
committed to the completion of the long emancipation. Regardless of section, blacks who 
avoided becoming or re-becoming human property prior to the Civil War knew that they needed 
to wage additional struggles for black freedom after their or their ancestors’ enslavement ended.  
Furthermore, not just southern black troops with families in contraband camps, but also 
black northern soldiers desired a return to civilian life once they helped defeat the Confederacy. 
In July 1865, Private Richard McDaniel of the Eleventh USCHA, an Indianan, did not mutiny, 
but offered an account of conditions in the immediate postbellum era that give us an insight into 
a perspective of northern black men that drove some of them to mutiny. McDaniel traced his 
experiences with racism since the start of the war. In 1861, whites blocked his attempt to answer 
Lincoln’s call for troops to crush the rebellion, blamed African Americans for starting the 
conflict, and issued dire warnings of the consequences of black enlistment. He began to lose 
hope of ever enlisting. In the fall of 1863, Rhode Island recruiters arrived, at which point he 
enlisted in the Eleventh USCHA. After serving for almost two years, McDaniel wondered about 
whether black soldiers received honor after proving themselves as high-quality soldiers. He 
discussed white plans to prevent the northern states from living with black veterans now that the 
Union had been saved. He expressed hope that whites would never avoid “the negro question.” 
Eventually, McDaniel asserted, white officers begged black northerners and southerners to enlist 
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in the Union Army, not to free them, but to help win the war. To support this claim, he cited the 
lack of white officer support for black enfranchisement. Now that whites had won the war and 
saved the Union with black assistance, they no longer cared for, or had interest in living with, 
their former comrades. McDaniel emphasized the need for black men to resist this situation in 
order to promote the rights of education and suffrage. As this private shows, many African-
American servicemen felt that white northerners had abandoned them once the Civil War ended. 
Unjust punishment in the Army would have exacerbated these bitter sentiments.242   
Occupying the northern theater of the long emancipation, the men of the Seventy-second 
USCI/Twelfth USCHA used mutiny to continue the struggle for black freedom into the 
immediate postbellum period. They joined those black civilians in Ohio during the Civil War era 
who successfully fought for enfranchisement using activism. As Christopher Phillips has recently 
uncovered, during the antebellum era, Ohio’s political culture, based on white supremacist 
centrism, matched the other free states (Indiana and Illinois) as well as slave states (Missouri and 
Kentucky) of the middle border region. However, civil war and emancipation brought the free 
border states politically closer to the rest of the North. They supported Republican 
Reconstruction efforts during the 1860s, separating them from the former slave border states, 
which like the ex-Confederate states, embraced the Lost Cause and saw similar types of racial 
violence. In the months following the Union’s victory, a group of black Ohioans could not be 
certain that the emancipationist legacy would fully take hold, driving them to desperation.243 
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The acts of defiance by USCTs during the Civil War and in the immediate postwar 
months, and their criticism of those black soldiers who chose not to mutiny, grew out of early 
republican discourses on freedom, slavery, and resistance. The articulation of rights during the 
Civil War and Reconstruction followed decades of Americans disagreeing over what freedom 
meant. While abolitionists invoked the universal notion of rights contained in the Declaration of 
Independence, others used revolutionary rhetoric to preserve and justify slavery. Francois 
Furstenberg examines how revolutionary and post-revolutionary America drew on “liberal, 
republican, religious traditions to define freedom as autonomy, or the capacity for human 
agency—that is, individuals’ ability to act in secular time and shape their circumstances.” The 
American Revolution constituted a people’s heroic act of resistance against enslavement. 
According to Thomas Paine, enslavement requires humans to surrender and consent to it. While 
white Americans proved their worth for freedom by courageously waging the Revolution, 
enslaved African Americans deserved to remain in bondage because they cowardly chose not to 
fight and die for freedom. Only when an enslaved man broke his chains of bondage with 
violence or died doing so could he be worthy of freedom. Traditional white racial ideology 
painted enslaved black men as unvirtuous, dependent, feminine, and unwilling to resist, making 
them unfit for freedom. Whiteness represented virtue and liberty; blackness signified degradation 
and slavery. Forms of day-to-day, nonviolent resistance confirmed the stereotype of the lazy, 
deceitful slave who lacked virtue because proslavery ideology denied that such acts constituted 
true resistance. Proslavery ideology also disagreed that running away and rebellion was actual 
resistance because it attributed such actions to outside inspiration or as examples of disease; 
slaves inherently lacked agency and virtue. Meanwhile, abolitionists portrayed slave revolts such 
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as the Haitian Revolution as righteous struggles for freedom. The infamous rebellion proved that 
those of African descent were capable of self-government through demonstrations of martial 
masculinity and virtue. Radical abolitionists of the antebellum era called on African Americans 
to act for themselves, viewing death in a revolt as preferable to being human property. Different 
ideas of freedom, who can be free, and how they can attain it, all competed with each other.244 
Just as white Americans during the Revolution, early republic, and antebellum era 
invoked African slavery when discussing the need to resist government oppression and thought 
freedom was something they deserved through struggle, USCTs thought freed African 
Americans in the Union ranks should resist officer mistreatment to earn their newly won 
emancipation. Also, by living under a dominant culture that denied them manhood because they 
did not resist white oppression, mutineers sought to prove their masculinity by aggressively 
combating military racism, especially when such bigotry worsened in the summer of 1865. In 
fighting for their liberty after the collapse of slavery, immediate postwar mutineers wanted to 
follow the example of rebellious slaves and wartime black Union soldiers. When they noticed 
that most comrades seemed to accept white oppression through inaction, they considered them 
unmanly, cowardly, and undeserving of freedom. Early postbellum USCT mutinies represent the 
continuation of the republican, revolutionary ideology of resistance at a key moment in time.  
Mutineers’ harsh words for comrades who passively accepted Army life in the summer of 
1865 compare with Frederick Douglass’ argument that black men needed to fight for their 
freedom to attain recognition for this freedom. While Douglass’ ideology applied to bondsmen 
and black soldiers at war with slaveholders, the USCT mutineers in Virginia, Kentucky, Texas, 
and elsewhere transferred this manly struggle to black troops facing continued racism in the 
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postbellum Army. If they refused to resist excessive punishments for trivial offenses, they in 
effect consented to it and thereby encouraged their white officers to continue to abuse them. 
Their cowardice called into question the manhood they had proven through their military service. 
Also, mutineers’ experiences being bucked, tied up, and confined in a closed space under guard 
adds credence to Carole Emberton’s point that egregious forms of violence and coercion 
accompanied emancipation. Moreover, in telling officials that they could not provide for their 
families while in Texas or in prison, mutineers invoked the republican ideal of a man protecting 
his dependents and the white northern cultural connection between family and military service. 
That mutineers in numerous units levied this charge on non-resisters illustrates a widespread 
adherence to martial masculinity in the USCT ranks. However, as Emberton also notes, this type 
of manhood pushed soldiers to commit actions that threatened their lives, livelihoods, family 
welfare, and finances. The price of being so dedicated to martial masculinity consisted of 
imprisonment, hard labor, dishonorable discharge, and/or execution.245   
When a black mutineer refused an order to properly clean an item, conducted a tirade 
against white oppression and black cowardice, and/or tried to liberate an imprisoned comrade by 
force, he created a moment in which one can examine the tides of nineteenth-century American 
thought and the development of race relations in the Union Army’s final stage. During his 
mutiny, martial manhood struck against more passive forms of masculinity and more restrictive 
models of citizenship. In his own personal revolt, an African-American man made a claim to the 
same republican virtue that justified the American and Haitian Revolutions. He also laid out 
some of the terms for how American emancipation should unfold in Reconstruction now that he 
had helped topple a slaveholder’s republic. The early postbellum mutineer ultimately captures 
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the contradictions and contingencies of nineteenth-century America. When the long-simmering 
tensions within a unit boiled over, the resulting mutiny had motivations broader than their own 
localized circumstances. It tied in the legacy of slave resistance, the Union Army’s race relations, 
and the promises of the dawning post-abolition era. Mutineers used a common metaphorical and 
literal language of whites physically controlling black behavior, as suggested by the verbs 
“imposed upon” and “run over.” A black soldier’s life featuring any combination of slavery, 
kidnapping, impressment, conscription, or discrimination made these actions by white officers 
repulsive, especially at this crucial moment in the emancipation process. African-American 
troops grew weary of their bodies being forcibly relocated, struck, and trampled on at every step 
of their liberation thus far. Entrenched notions of martial masculinity led to the desire to confront 
the newest obstacles to their ability to enjoy any of the pillars of their envisioned emancipation: 
bodily autonomy, family security, and socioeconomic independence.  
Though the numerous mutinies immediately following the Civil War ultimately failed to 
end the U.S. Army’s neglect of black soldiers’ families and its severe disciplinary practices, they 
foreshadowed postbellum black political struggles through which freedpeople also tried to secure 
the freedom from white mistreatment and the right to exert control over their own lives. Acts 
such as black soldier revolts signified that African Americans in the post-emancipation era 
would fight to eliminate what they perceived to be vestiges of slavery and to finally enact racial 
equality. Among these vestiges were ex-Confederates committed to suppressing black political 
activity and reestablishing white supremacy, often by attacking black soldiers and lobbying for 
their removal. The presence of occupying black federals in the defeated Confederacy symbolized 
freedpeople’s newly won freedom and their hopes for the post-emancipation future. They also 
represented white southern fears of emancipation’s threat to society and their humiliating defeat 
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in the war. As Chad Williams shows, ex-slaveholders erroneously believed black troops would 
incite the Christmas Insurrection of 1865. Numerous instances occurred in which white southern 
paramilitaries beat, shot, and yelled racial epithets at black soldiers. Despite bondage’s death, 
armed blacks still conjured up the frightening image of a slave rebellion.246  
Against this fierce white opposition, after leaving the U.S. military, freedpeople struggled 
to secure political, social, economic, and cultural freedoms. Against fierce white opposition 
black southerners formed conventions and meetings demanding the right to vote. These efforts 
culminated with the ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in 1868 and 1870, 
respectively. Prior to this, white paramilitary groups like the Ku Klux Klan, the White League, 
the Red Shirts, and the Regulators brutally attacked African Americans and symbols of black 
autonomy in locations throughout the South. With suffrage, black men formed Republican Party 
voting blocs in local, state, and national elections. Pursuing other forms of autonomy, ex-slaves 
spent the postbellum period building their own independent churches and pursuing favorable 
work arrangements. During a postwar labor shortage, freedpeople signed contracts, which they 
had not been permitted to do as slaves, symbolizing their new freedom. To earn better wages, 
many alternated between employers. Such mobility symbolized a departure from masters 
prohibiting slaves from leaving the plantation and from officers requiring black troops to remain 
in the postwar Army against their will. In urban areas like Baltimore, black longshore laborers 
unionized to increase their wages while invoking the golden opportunity facing African 
Americans after the war: “Since the breath of political life had been breathed into the colored 
man, manhood had asserted itself, and American civilization made the colored man like all other 
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men.” After serving in the Union Army and in politics, black men now wanted to be “sufficiently 
paid for their labor.” In a successor to USCT mutineers berating comrades for not resisting as 
well, cases exist of black strikers throwing stones at co-workers who refused to join their work 
stoppage. When whites threatened to commit violence against blacks intending to vote in 1870s 
elections, and targeted free black agricultural laborers in the late 1860s, African Americans 
fought back. In various cities and rural areas, they came armed and prepared to once again 
struggle for their people’s rights to act as they saw fit and live independently without the threat 
of white abuse and control, just as USCT mutineers did. Since black Union veterans could 
purchase their weapons from the Army when mustering out, they used the same arms that 
defeated the Confederacy to resist ex-Rebels in paramilitary combat and to boast of their newly-
won manhood. In this way, the tradition of free black armed self-defense through antebellum 
black militia formation had postbellum successors.247 For the rest of the nineteenth century and 
into the twentieth, African-American servicemen and civilians needed to fight their struggle for 
freedom against the twin threats of white civilian hostility and U.S. military mistreatment.  
The black mutineers in the early postbellum U.S. Army did more than just rise up against 
their officers’ decisions to send them far away from their families, strictly regulate their lives, 
and tie up comrades by the thumbs. Having escaped slavery in various ways, and having played 
their part in defeating the Confederacy, these individuals thought that another chapter in their 
struggle for black freedom and fair treatment was necessary. They needed to once again assert 
their right to act independently before they could return to civilian life and finish implementing 
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Reconstruction. By mutinying, they hoped to secure an existence without white abuse and white 
control over their lives, a life they thought they had gained through their exit from slavery and 
through military service in defense of the Union. In defying white power, the mutineers can be 
placed at a key junction on the continuum of emancipation stretching from prewar slave and free 
black resistance to the mass black exodus to Union lines and to postwar African-American 
political activity. However, as Reconstruction progressed and as the U.S. Army built a new 
postbellum regular army with African-American units, black men in the ranks persisted in their 
mutinous behavior. Racial tensions leading to defiant and violent behavior would continue to 
characterize the black soldier experience in the country’s different regions well into the late 
nineteenth century. When black troops stopped revolting against the Army’s policies for shifting 
to a peacetime force, they still found mutiny necessary when they tackled the broader socio-
political struggles accompanying the South’s readmission to the Union and the country’s 














“I don’t care a damn for you, you take the advantage of me because I am a colored man”: 
Black Soldier Mutinies and Race Riots in the Reconstruction South 
 
In the spring and summer of 1866, Private Adam Johnson, a twenty-six-year-old 
coachman in the South Carolina-based 128th U.S. Colored Infantry (USCI), joined comrades in 
bloody rebellions against two sources of white supremacy. First, in May of that year in 
Charleston, he and seven others violently defended themselves against one of the many white 
civilians hostile to the presence of occupying black troops in the conquered South. The citizen, 
William Rollins, drew a firearm on them because they walked too close to his farm. He 
threatened that unless they avoided taking another step, “you damned black son of a bitch…I’ll 
blow your brains out.” During the incident, Johnsons’ corporal expressed a willingness to “blow” 
Rollins’ “brains out” and Johnson himself joined a bayonet charge against him. Later that July, 
while stationed on Folly Island, Private Johnson helped launch a mutiny on behalf of a comrade 
arrested and tied up for attending a dance with black women. Following the orders of another 
noncommissioned officer to “go up and cut him down” or else “they were no men,” Johnson and 
a group of comrades exchanged fire with white commissioned officers who eventually restored 
order. While sitting in prison for the second revolt, Johnson won a remittance after writing a 
letter to the high command in which he cited the suffering of dependent family members. The 
numerous decisions of Johnson and other black soldiers, especially to confront any antagonistic 
white man, military or civilian, helped form the basis of the next phase of the long emancipation 
struggle. For participating in two incidents while a member of a regiment that frequently rose up, 
Adam Johnson constituted the most mutinous member of the most mutinous regiment. That 
Private Johnson questioned the worthiness of non-mutineers for manly citizenship; resisted white 
regulations of blacks’ bodily autonomy, including their right to engage in leisure; and invoked 
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family welfare to minimize the consequences of his rebelliousness demonstrates that the African-
American vision for a complete liberation remained paramount as men like Johnson tried to 
shape the course of the country’s Reconstruction.248 
The black mutinies of the Reconstruction period occurred in part to influence the federal 
government as it tried to bring the conquered South back into the Union and determine the status 
of freed slaves. An outgrowth of the military effort that defeated the Confederacy, the federal 
government used an occupying army to implement the Reconstruction project. Since African 
Americans enlisted later in the war than white soldiers, black units formed a disproportionate 
share of the early Reconstruction-era occupation force. The USCTs and other federal occupation 
forces faced the task of helping freedpeople in the South move from bondage and war to freedom 
and peace, all while confronting a hostile civilian population determined to restore white 
supremacy. Since African Americans wanted to enjoy the freedom that came with Union victory 
and were determined to defend their rights during Reconstruction America’s citizenship debates, 
troops occupying the former Confederacy continued the African-American tradition of overt 
resistance. The racial tensions that characterized much of Reconstruction’s duties prolonged the 
postbellum epidemic of ill-discipline and mutiny in the USCT ranks. 
As the country moved deeper into the postbellum era, African-American servicemen 
confronted a variety of threats to their full emancipation. Across Reconstruction America, black 
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troops revolted not only against despised white officers who threatened the progress of their 
emancipation, but also against a prejudiced white society that assumed this role as well. When 
they mutinied against the military, it was often when white officers or enlisted men appeared 
aligned with white civilians in opposing black civil rights. What differentiated the South’s 
immediate postbellum mutinies from Reconstruction-affiliated ones was that the latter’s 
participants tended to have social rather than military causes. Black soldiers rose up against 
perceived injustices associated not with remaining in uniform after the war, but with issues 
confronting those of their race in the long-term; they endorsed staying in the Army in order to 
improve the political and social standing of black Americans. Further, black soldiers 
occasionally joined civilian freedpeople in clashes with hostile whites, helping African-
American society conduct civil rights struggles. The root cause of these conditions was what 
Reconstruction-era black soldiers symbolized: inspiration for newly-freed blacks and bitterness 
for humiliated whites. This status shaped and bred the conditions out of which some troops chose 
to mutiny.249   
Soldiers stationed in the Reconstruction South assumed law enforcement duties and 
contended with antagonistic civilians, resulting in revolts against oppressive civilian authorities. 
Since these duties placed black troops as guards in southern jails, these sites tended to be among 
the breeding grounds of mutinous behavior in the Reconstruction era. Just as mutinies against 
officers upended the military hierarchy, this type of occupation service levelled the South’s 
traditional social hierarchy. Essentially, black resistance to white supremacy, whatever its form, 
centered on overturning or altering power relations. Uniformed African Americans tasked with 
maintaining civil order, on which antebellum whites had a monopoly, so upended southern 
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power structures that counter-revolutionary whites frequently targeted them. The need to 
continue implementing the long emancipation required black soldiers to resist such attacks.  
Most of the scholarship on Reconstruction-era African-American resistance to white 
supremacy focuses on social and political history. After slavery, work remained to determine the 
meaning of freedom and the proper course with which to clinch it. When beginning their new 
lives, ex-slaves faced the daunting task of ensuring that freedom meant something beyond 
merely leaving slavery, a status that many feared would not protect them from destitution and 
exploitation. A common thread throughout this historiography is the central goal of the long 
emancipation, liberty from white control over their lives, for which black mutineers fought.250   
The need of freedpeople to give substance to their freedom necessitated collective, direct 
action. Just as black soldiers rebelled against their white authorities to advance their 
understanding of citizenship, those in the civilian black working class, upon moving from a slave 
society to one based on wage labor, engaged in unrest to demand concrete improvements in their 
autonomy and well-being from their white employers. They also sought to end the practice 
whereby most white labor unions excluded blacks from membership, prompting them to create 
new, more inclusive bodies.  
This wave of organization especially hit the Baltimore-Washington, D.C., area, where 
labor militants often cited martial masculinity and the emancipationist legacy of the Civil War. 
From 1865 to 1883, African-American caulkers in Baltimore operated the Chesapeake Marine 
Railway and Dry Dock Company, a cooperative workshop. Another sign that African Americans 
desired collective action on the socioeconomic front was Washington, D.C.’s Colored National 
Labor Convention of December 6-10, 1869. Over two hundred mechanics, artisans, and other 
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skilled workers attended. In an address to the body, Rhode Islander George Downing noted how 
“the colored, as well as the white laborers of the United States, are not satisfied as to the estimate 
that is placed on their labor.” The Republican Party, Downing continued, deserved credit and 
support for “liberating us from unrequited toil.” However, there was more to be desired from the 
GOP, which should have fed and sheltered blacks while they still endured bondage. Looking 
ahead to the upcoming ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, Downing advised that in the 
interest of its durability, the party needed to recognize the working class’ intelligence, legislative 
needs, and unity. Drawing from slavery and the country’s revolutionary ideals, the speaker noted 
that “the colored man’s struggle until now has been for naked existence, for the right to life and 
liberty.” The Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification and black participation in the labor movement 
would enable African Americans to seek the next right, “the pursuit of happiness.” According to 
Downing, all workers shared the same interests, necessitating interracial collaboration. These 
lines reflected African-American calls for a biracial labor movement before the convention. The 
convention endorsed the creation of black-owned cooperatives and gave birth to the Colored 
National Labor Union (CNLU), which named Isaac Myers, a member of Baltimore’s black 
caulker cooperative, as its president. By the 1870s and 1880s, however, the egalitarian Knights 
of Labor became the dominant national labor body for black workers.251  
Meanwhile, Baltimore’s black workers continued to organize at a local level into the 
1870s. A Colored Mechanics’ and Laborers’ Association formed in 1870. The following year, 
black longshore laborers met to propose forming a body tasked with increasing their wages and 
fostering harmony in the city’s working class. They invoked their manhood and Union military 
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service: “Since the breath of political life had been breathed into the colored man, manhood had 
asserted itself, and American civilization made the colored man like all other men.” After serving 
in the military and in politics, black men now wanted to be “sufficiently paid for their labor.” In 
October 1875, a biracial oyster shucker procession celebrated a labor settlement with packers, 
during which they exhibited racial solidarity and the police confronted them. Black and white 
oyster shuckers delayed resuming work until the finalization of their agreement, which came 
several days later. Towards the end of the Reconstruction era, members of a workingmen’s 
meeting recommended that the local Workingmen’s Party court black voters, linked the cause of 
the labor movement with the war’s emancipationist legacy, and revealed that African Americans 
desired to join the party; others disagreed due to the party’s racism and the history of blacks as a 
GOP voting bloc. The Workingmen’s Party, however, struggled to win black votes in municipal 
elections. As African Americans entered the post-slavery American economy, they knew that the 
key to maximizing their socioeconomic independence was using their strength in numbers.252  
From these efforts at black labor organization, one can identify a recognition that the 
black freedom struggle moved to a new phase after the death of slavery, one looking ahead to a 
biracial political and economic democracy and backward to the Civil War. This movement 
towards collective action among African-American workers as a means of acquiring this biracial 
democracy crossed over into the U.S. Army as well. The weapons and organization structures 
that gave the first black soldiers unprecedented power during the crusade to destroy slavery 
became important once more as they determined what a post-bondage era should look like. 
The post-Civil War wave of black labor activism owed its existence to predecessors. 
Slaves had always disrupted their workplaces in order to improve their condition, and free 
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African-American workers participated in the prewar labor movement. Building off of both, 
black Civil War soldiers conducted a new struggle for equal and adequate pay and safer working 
conditions. Ex-slaves, black Civil War veterans, those experienced with earlier black labor 
activism, and the descendants of all three overlapping groups converted this preexisting energy 
into a robust struggle for the economic aspect of the envisioned biracial democracy that 
influenced American society during the rest of the nineteenth century.  
A common theme in Reconstruction scholarship centers on how the black family changed 
after slavery’s death. Emancipation allowed blacks to live with kin without the threat of a loved 
one being sold. Whereas slave marriages lacked any legal status, freedom meant that blacks 
could legally form marital unions. As Noralee Frankel reveals, emancipation transferred 
authority over the black family from masters to male African-American household heads and 
gave the black family new economic roles like care for the elderly and hiring children out. It was 
this role that drove African-American soldiers throughout the Civil War and Reconstruction era 
to rise up in defense of their dependents’ welfare.253   
Political historians show that African Americans shaped the terms of their emancipation 
following the Civil War through activism and voting. Emancipation transformed black 
southerners into a powerful electoral political force for three decades. They shifted from human 
property existing outside of formal politics to voters and officeholders in each level of 
government. Steven Hahn has demonstrated that in doing so, freedpeople built on political 
resistance and networks they formed under slavery. After the Union triumphed and the peculiar 
institution collapsed, blacks registered to vote, participated in state constitutional conventions, 
and demanded passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. During Radical Reconstruction, 
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freedpeople politically mobilized by establishing clubs, joining Union Leagues, electing 
Republicans, conducting rallies, and uniting to protect themselves from white supremacist 
violence. Freedpeople thereby revolutionized a southern electoral system previously dominated 
by white slaveholders. Even after Redemption, African Americans remained an electoral force in 
certain areas of the South. During the 1870s and 1880s, they formed biracial electoral alliances 
in the Readjuster and Populist movements. By the turn of the century, however, Jim Crow 
segregation and disenfranchisement severely weakened this southern black electoral influence.254  
Occupying the intersection of social and political history, some historians of 
Reconstruction note that partisan organizations could function as labor unions and vice versa; 
collective action blurred these boundaries. James Illingworth documents this aspect of 
Reconstruction in the urban and commercial South, examining how the black working class in 
cities like New Orleans did not just form an identity as wage earners but also constituted the base 
of Louisiana’s Radical state government. Urban slavery’s practice of hiring out bondspeople 
gave the Crescent City’s blacks greater autonomy than what rural slaves enjoyed, allowing the 
former to develop a politically engaged community following slavery. After fueling the Union 
war effort, urban black worker militancy helped overthrow Presidential Reconstruction and 
advance the Radical form of Reconstruction in Louisiana through voting, office-holding, and 
paramilitary combat. From the mid-1860s to the early 1870s, New Orleans’ African-American 
longshoremen, who worked in the commercial heart of the city, organized, marched, and struck 
against low wages and contract labor. Illingworth emphasizes how this black-led revolutionary 
tide gave freedpeople confidence and a sense of control over their destiny. As Illingworth shows, 
however, elite Republicans condemned striking black waterfront workers for violating 
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strikebreakers’ right to work, infringing on private property, and expecting upward mobility 
through government support rather than self-reliance. Due to this labor unrest, the Republican 
white elite began siding with employers against the black rank-and-file, quelling a series of 
strikes in the early 1870s. This shift paved the way for the northern retreat from Reconstruction 
and toward southern Redemption.255  
The radicalization of the Reconstruction-era southern black working class mirrors that of 
black mutineers, who also chose drastic actions to defend their rights. It was not enough to just 
become a civilian worker or military serviceman who earned wages with which a black man 
could support his family. Bread-winning arrangements could still entail insufficient 
compensation, exploitation, and white domination of black bodies, despite being less so than 
under bondage. Just as freedpeople at large clashed with northern and southern civilian whites, 
over the structure and nature of post-slavery life, black federal troops also struggled with white 
military leadership and civil law enforcement over the same issue during Reconstruction. For 
emancipation to mean anything, African-American laborers in the civilian economy and in the 
armed forces disrupted the regular course of their company or unit’s operations as a means of 
compelling their white employers to agree to alleviate or end injustices. 
The ways in which the white press used black soldier mutinies after the war to foment 
hostility to the Reconstruction chapter of the black freedom struggle compared with the 
messages it circulated about postbellum black labor unrest. In June 1871, black workers 
employed on public works projects in Washington, D.C., struck for a $2.00 daily wage, which 
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their white counterparts earned, instead of the current $1.25. The Hillsdale Standard of Michigan 
described these “negro laboring men” as “ignorant and inflamed…rioters.” Moreover, according 
to the paper, these strikers received rhetorical assistance from “some of the lowest negro 
demagogues,” who “made incendiary speeches,” by which the paper meant pro-labor, black 
Republican activists. The local D.C. press, such as the Evening Star, deemed the language of the 
strike leaders as “bloodthirsty” and comparable to the words uttered in the Paris Commune. 
Black mutineers, strikers, insurrectionists—all symbolized what white supremacists identified as 
the disastrous nature of a post-emancipation society. What represented bloody anarchy to the 
opponents of emancipation was to its defenders a necessary fight to attain human rights.256  
In a postbellum version of black resistance to unfree labor, the Reconstruction period 
furthermore witnessed African-American convicts rise up. The long emancipation entailed not 
just a struggle against perceived injustices in postbellum southern society and in the U.S. 
military, but also against the convict leasing system. After becoming part of an unfree labor 
system which scholars call “neo-slavery,” one based on the prosecution of bogus or inflated 
charges, African Americans became desperate to improve their lives. Without legal means of 
redress to do so, they rebelled against the authority of their white overlords.257 
Three examples of neo-slave resistance from 1875 resembled other forms of black 
rebellion. In Hagerstown, Maryland, one black prisoner, Justin Shipley, revolted against prison 
authorities in February 1875. Prison authorities shot the man three times, producing non-fatal 
injuries and forcing him to surrender. In March 1875, Richmond prison officials found the 
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twenty-seven African-American members of the chain gang they commanded “in a state of 
mutiny.” The black prisoners refused the officers’ orders to begin working. Meanwhile, the white 
convicts complied. When the officials inquired into the reason for this unruly behavior, 
ringleaders Samuel Robinson, Richard Banks, and Caesar Seaton cited insufficient food; they 
had decided against working until this issue was resolved. According to a white official, the three 
ringleaders pressured other prisoners into participating in the work stoppage and, in contrast to 
the ringleaders’ story, black prisoners already received the same amount of food as their white 
counterparts. When the captain proceeded to send all strikers to a dungeon, as a press account put 
it, “the conspiracy was soon dissolved.” November 1875 saw three black and two white convict 
workers, who labored in a Pittsburgh whip factory of ninety employees, corner and attack 
Charles Weaver, their contractor, with hatchets and iron bars. Armed wardens then forced the 
mutineers to surrender before placing them in dungeons. While it is not clear what motivated all 
three black prison revolts, the Richmond convicts’ desire for better sustenance fits with the 
broader emancipationist goal of an improved material existence and the forms they took—violent 
insurrection or work stoppage—match that of free labor strikes, slave revolts, and the mutinies of 
civilian sailors or military servicemen.258  
The phenomenon of black soldier mutinies during the Reconstruction era can be seen as 
yet another example of African Americans becoming more militant, confrontational, and 
organized when the moment arrived to create a biracial democracy between the mid-1860s and 
late-1870s. Black labor strikes, free and unfree, disrupted the economy. Meanwhile, black 
political mobilization shook up the government. Both types of black resistance forced white 
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superiors to agree to an expansion of African-American civil rights, social power, and economic 
autonomy. Likewise, black soldier mutinies upset the regular order of military discipline as a 
means of pursuing similar goals. On the other hand, the coordinated prewar resistance to slavery 
and the outbreak of mutinies in the early USCTs demonstrate that African-American society and 
culture already possessed strong networks of resistance going into the Reconstruction era.259  
The phenomenon of black soldier mutinies adds to the recent scholarly wave emphasizing 
the militarized nature of Reconstruction. As Gregory Downs contends in After Appomattox, 
Reconstruction represented a continuation of the Civil War in that it essentially was a military 
occupation. He reveals that despite the surrender of C.S. forces, the U.S. Army still exercised 
coercive wartime powers like martial law in the South between the end of the war in 1865 and 
the seating of Georgia’s congressmen in 1871. With President Andrew Johnson hoping for a 
quick, lenient readmission of the former Confederacy, congressional Republicans needed the 
Army to carry out their Radical vision of Reconstruction. Military personnel became 
Reconstruction’s de facto political leaders, upholding law and order, approving labor contracts, 
prosecuting insurgents, overruling civil authorities, interfering in elections, and defending 
freedpeople’s citizenship over the objections of ex-Confederates. The Army deemed its presence 
necessary to ensure the final destruction of slavery and the establishment of black male suffrage. 
Ironically, Downs highlights, without undemocratic coercion, the military occupation could not 
have ensured the creation of a biracial democracy.260  
Therefore, black troops involved in the occupation of the Reconstruction South 
recognized that the military type of emancipation was not complete when the country ended the 
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full mobilization that waged the Civil War. For some African-American soldiers, a logical 
extension of helping the U.S. Army carry out Congressional, Radical, and Military 
Reconstruction was defending their vision of emancipation in ways that violated military 
regulations. While the Army’s occupation was essential for the emancipation process, its Sable 
Arm engaged in its own attempts to advance this process forward when white officers and other 
authorities undermined it. Since Reconstruction’s military component intensified paramilitary 
white supremacist resistance to the project, and since many white northern officers still engaged 
in strict discipline and opposed full racial equality, some black soldiers waged an independent 
struggle. The revisionist school of Reconstruction historiography correctly notes that despite the 
Civil War freeing four million slaves, the aftermath constituted a missed opportunity for black 
civil rights. For this opportunity to be realized, a number of black servicemen found it necessary 
to participate in mutinies and race riots while rebuilding southern society in the decade following 
the Confederacy’s defeat. 
Because many black soldiers revolted against both officer cruelty and oppression from 
southern civilians, Reconstruction’s military aspect cannot be separated from its social one. 
Rebellious black troops stationed in the South thus faced a dual threat to their emancipation 
process. They needed to defend their conceptions of freedom from not just the white northerners 
of the commissioned officer corps but also the southern white civilians they policed and white 
civil authorities during a watershed moment of American race relations. 
Some former African-American soldiers chose the route of written protests and petitions 
to further their goals. In March 1866, a former USCT soldier from Maryland informed the 
Freedmen's Bureau that Confederate veterans frequently attacked black Union veterans and other 
freedpeople. He pled for protection against these grave threats to their freedom. In July 1867, a 
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group of 170 black veterans denounced Kentucky's exemption from the Reconstruction Acts, 
which deprived them of the right to vote and the resources with which to resist white supremacist 
violence. Meanwhile, a black veteran in New Orleans documented acts of white supremacist 
violence against freedpeople who sought an education. Like other eras, Reconstruction advanced 
the emancipation process forward, but this process nevertheless was relative and incomplete, 
qualities that made persistent resistance necessary.261   
Regardless of which path disgruntled African Americans took, they needed to take into 
account a white culture that advised them against rocking the boat. During the country’s debate 
over the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, African Americans learned that a number of 
whites respected those who passively followed the law rather than rebel against it. In April 1870, 
a Methodist preacher in Chicago gave a sermon in which he emphasized this message and 
touched on the goals of the long emancipation. Reverend W. H. Daniels reflected on the progress 
of black civil rights of the last two and a half centuries: “In the year 1620 the first negro slaves 
were brought to this country…in this year, 1870, the last restrictions of the rights of the negro as 
a citizen are removed, and he stands forth a free man and voter.” While the experiences of 
Redemption and Jim Crow eventually disproved this view, such reflections demonstrated that 
Americans understood emancipation in relation to large stretches of time. Speaking of a parade 
in honor of the Fifteenth Amendment, the reverend noted that it was fitting that police officers 
participated because though the legal system had enslaved the marchers, “these people always 
respected law; they have not been rebellious.” Rather than conduct actions like John Brown’s 
raid, to which Daniels referred as a failed “mutiny,” blacks “waited patiently for law to deliver 
them, and for government to adopt them.” Since law had previously oppressed them, “how 
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gladly they will obey it when it commands them to be prosperous and free.” The preacher 
continuously praised African Americans for peacefully and patiently waiting for the end of 
slavery. While this commentary on black passivity ignored the long tradition of overt and subtle 
black resistance to white supremacy and the key role resistance played in forcing changes in the 
status quo, it spoke to how blacks needed to contend with white perspectives when they 
contemplated rebellious actions.262 Black mutineers ultimately rejected or ignored such advice 
because they had exhausted peaceful and patient options.  
Black soldier rebellions against a counter-revolutionary southern society and military 
hierarchy began early in their Reconstruction duties. The difficulties of reconstructing the South 
often drove black troops to quickly and directly retaliate against white civilian abuse instead of 
seeking slower, official justice from their superiors. When enduring white civilian hostility, 
African-American troops needed to make cost-benefit analyses when deciding risky courses of 
action to defend themselves and their comrades, just as they did when they reacted against abuse 
from white officers.  
Men of the Fifty-seventh U.S. Colored Infantry (USCI), stationed at Fort Smith, 
Arkansas, near the town of Helena, were among those blacks who revolted against whites who 
opposed the egalitarian vision of emancipation and Reconstruction. Originally called the Fourth 
Arkansas Infantry (African Descent) and created in December 1863, the Fifty-seventh spent the 
war aiding Union operations against their state’s Confederate forces. In August 1865, the unit 
moved to Fort Smith, from which it upheld civil order in the surrounding area. Here, regiment 
members engaged in mutinous behavior in early January 1866.263 
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On January 2, 1866, Fifty-seventh USCI troops struck back against perceived injustices 
from both the Army and southern society. Private Thornton Gamble, a field hand from Virginia 
who enlisted at Devalls Bluff, Arkansas, in March 1864 at age twenty-two, was tried for a range 
of offenses. He illegally carried a pistol in the streets of Fort Smith, disobeyed an order to return 
to camp, and made threatening language to an officer.  
The mutinous acts illustrated the African-American commitment to bodily autonomy. 
The private reportedly proclaimed the following, after which he relocated a revolver from his 
boot to underneath his shirt and went to a store owned by a Mr. Shaw: “God damn that long 
nosed (Colonel) Craig, he had better wear his shoulder straps, or stay in the garrison.” As Craig 
himself testified, he observed a dozen members of the regiment occupying a corner and speaking 
in an “apparently excited manner” that night. John King, a civilian, heard similar commotion. 
Due to this behavior, the colonel ordered those on duty to head to the guard house or to the fort, 
while those not on duty needed to return to their camps. Craig described the response to the 
command as done “in a sullen manner.” An unidentified soldier refused to comply until a guard 
seized him. Craig added upon cross examination that he failed to disclose his rank and wore 
civilian garb. J. H. Harris testified remembering seeing Craig having “a difficulty with a colored 
soldier” outside his store. A white soldier who formed part of Craig’s guard saw the colonel 
order Gamble arrested and sent to the guard house. The white soldier, Private William Cox of the 
Sixty-second Illinois Infantry, then observed Gamble walk toward the river. Gamble approached 
Cox, asking about Craig’s location. After Cox informed him the colonel had gone to the post 
office, Gamble stated that he desired to inform Craig he would not go to his quarters and “hadn’t 
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done anything noway.” Promoting his commitment to martial masculinity, he asserted he would 
rather die first. Stating that “he had always been a good soldier,” and defending his right to 
control his own movements, Private Gamble denied Craig the “right to order him to camp.” 
Comrades testifying for the defense mentioned that Gamble received the order from Craig but 
did not include the harsh language. Gamble’s captain, Alfred Proctor, defended the private’s 
“good” character and clean record as a soldier, except for two or three trips to the guard house, 
for which he was never court-martialed.264  
Despite the defense’s witness testimony and the faulty memories of several prosecution 
witnesses, the court convicted the defendant of all charges while clearing him of certain 
specifications. They sentenced him to two months of pay forfeiture and hard labor, a relatively 
light punishment. He returned to duty in February 1866, eventually serving as a teamster that 
summer and fall and mustering out in November.265 Gamble’s recorded statements fit within the 
general trend of African-American soldiers desiring personal autonomy, even within the military 
command structure. After moving across the Upper South to become a Union Army recruit, 
fighting Confederates, and observing the process of emancipation and Reconstruction in 
Arkansas from the wartime to postbellum periods, Private Gamble had set a standard for 
individual freedom which he refused to abandon without resisting.  
Also on January 2, 1866, Private Warner Wilson committed a separate offense that 
amounted to the cousin of mutiny: the race riot. He allegedly joined other enlisted men and black 
civilians in conducting a “(riotous) disturbance and breach of the public peace” in Fort Smith. A 
farmer originally from Missouri, Wilson had enlisted in Cairo, Illinois, in September 1863 at age 
25. While it is unclear if he was free or enslaved, his action and subsequent legal maneuvers 
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during his court-martial convey that he was determined to fight racial injustice. As an indirect 
influence, one could factor in evidence that he continued to receive seven dollars a month in 
wages for months after the federal government established pay equity.266  
At the start of his trial, Wilson objected to Captain Simon Grate’s presence on the court 
because “he did not think the Captain would be as fair to a colored man as he would to a white 
man.” He added that Grate “would cashier a colored man when he would let a white man go.” 
The captain denied either knowing the prisoner or holding the alleged prejudice. The court did 
not consider the challenge “sufficient,” allowing Grate to remain. While the U.S. Army enforced 
black soldiers’ due process rights, defendants had little or no chance at successfully challenging 
a judge for racial reasons.267  
The alleged riot originated from a financial dispute and therefore touched on the 
socioeconomic aspect of African Americans’ envisioned freedom. While Private Wilson 
conversed with Private John Marshall on the river landing, a boat came ashore. Its white captain 
and crew walked up the wharf. Wilson demanded that Edward Nowland, the steamer’s captain, 
pay a debt owed to the private’s brother, namely, the money owed to him for working on the 
boat. Marshall advised his comrade to “keep out of it” while “he was out of a fuss.” Nowland 
agreed to pay Wilson’s brother only when he received an order to do so. Ignoring Marshall’s 
guidance, Wilson repeated his demand of an immediate payment. Nowland told him, “Go away 
from me you black son of a bitch and don’t say anything more to me about it.” Wilson replied 
that “you must not curse me.” The boat captain drew his loaded pistol, threatening to “shoot your 
[Wilson’s] head off.” This threat, black soldiers testified, prompted the private to pick up a rock 
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and prepare to throw it; white witnesses remembered seeing Wilson pick up the rock before 
Nowland armed himself. One of the two men accompanying Nowland, John King, seized the 
captain and pled with him not to shoot. At this point in the incident, Nowland went to town and 
Wilson returned to camp.268  
Meanwhile, three other black troops observed, and may have contributed to, the 
altercation. One of these troops, Private Russell Hutchins, and along with Marshall, emphasized 
the civility with which Wilson requested the payment. However, John King once or twice heard 
the defendant say, “God damn you” after demanding the payment, and described both 
perpetrators’ demeanors as noisy and “excited.” King identified further hostility towards the boat 
captain, noting that he heard the defendant threaten to shoot anyone “who would draw a pistol on 
him” and at least one soldier or black civilian recommend that Wilson “get a musket and shoot 
him through the head.” While running towards camp, King continued, Wilson called on his 
comrades “to keep their eye on him, and watch where he went.” The defendant gave no 
statement.269  
The ways in which the court decided Wilson’s court-martial as well as subsequent events 
illustrated the due process black defendants enjoyed while also revealing that defendants did not 
always receive sympathy for their motivations. The nature of the prosecution’s evidence led to a 
conviction minus the “riotous” specification and a sentence of one month of hard labor. The 
judge advocate general, upon reviewing the case, emphasized the following events during the 
clash to justify ordering a revision of the decision: the drawing of weapons, the use of violent 
language, and Wilson’s decision to repeatedly and threateningly make his demand. In another 
twist to this case, for unknown reasons, the court decided to acquit Wilson outright, which the 
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judge advocate general endorsed.270 The two January 2, 1866, incidents involving members of 
the Fifty-seventh USCI provide localized examples of how black men in uniform during the 
Reconstruction era felt that they needed to stand up and defend the social aspects of their new 
freedom. While Private Gamble resisted a violation of his freedom of movement, Private Wilson 
defended the right of his family to receive the fruits of their labor.  
Hyperbolic commentary in the press surrounded the August 1866 mutiny of two 
companies in the Fifty-seventh USCI in Helena, Arkansas. This coverage fully displayed the 
clash between the black and white southern visions for reconstructing the former Confederacy. 
The regiment performed law enforcement duties in Helena over the past year. During the 
Reconstruction period, as it had since the Union began recruiting African Americans, the mere 
presence of black troops inflamed white supremacist sentiments. Yet, the phenomenon of black 
soldier mutinies injected an extra dose of anxiety into the ex-Confederate and Redeemer 
mentality. Prior to the mutiny, the Army’s high command optimistically described the economic 
prospects of Arkansas’ black troops, along with the degree of government protection of their 
civil and property rights. Earlier that summer, the African-American community of Helena 
joined with scalawags to promote black education and suffrage.  
While the reason for the incident was the objection among the men towards being ordered 
to leave their home state and families to fight Native Americans in New Mexico, and while a 
clash between the mutineers and white civilians appeared to have happened, the white press 
circulated frightening reports of the incident. The Chicago Journal and the Weekly Wisconsin 
Union, for instance, stated that the mutineers had conducted a riot, seized control of the town, 
fired indiscriminately at white civilians, and threatened to massacre the town’s white inhabitants 
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and burn down their homes. However, other accounts deemed the above one to be grossly 
exaggerated. As the Burlington Daily Hawk Eye Gazette put it, this version originated from 
“either illy-informed, or evil-disposed” individuals. An unidentified source the Gazette cited 
attributed the violence that did occur to a small number of drunk soldiers and an intoxicated 
white man who insulted the U.S. flag; most mutineers did not participate and instead tried to 
quell it. This source blamed the Copperheads for the sensational accounts. The Gazette and other 
skeptical papers put the casualty range from few to none and eventually described the “riot” as 
two soldiers peacefully disarming a drunk civilian who failed to hit a target with his pistol. The 
police briefly arrested all involved before releasing them. Even when black soldier mutinies of 
the Reconstruction era did not physically involve southern society, they could still do so as a 
specter. Uniformed, armed black men mutinying confirmed the ingrained white southern fear of 
insurrection and race war resulting from emancipation.271   
White belief in a hostile ex-slave population persisted in the Helena area for the rest of 
Reconstruction. When an unknown assassin killed former Confederate General Thomas C. 
Hindman in September 1868, conservative whites used eventually-discredited evidence to pin the 
murder on a group of black men who acted on behest of the Radical Republicans and who also 
aimed to torch the town. The opponents of the long emancipation expected the same 
insurrectionary actions from all blacks, whether or not they were in uniform.272   
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North Carolinian USCTs contributed to the long emancipation’s Reconstruction phase by 
rebelling against racism in white southern society. During the Thirty-seventh USCI’s occupation 
of Wilmington, racial violence repeatedly broke out. Instrumental to this were a number of 
factors: the Union high command deciding to restore control over the town government under its 
pre-occupation officials, antebellum-era state laws allowing for whites to violently retaliate 
against any black “insolent language,” and the Thirty-seventh conducting patrols and guarding a 
railroad depot during an officer and supply shortage. Thus, here in Wilmington, the African-
American autonomy arising from the Civil War’s social revolution operated on a loose leash and 
confronted forces representing a white supremacist order determined to overturn this inversion. 
In July 1865, a provost guard ordered a Confederate veteran to remove his gray uniform, but the 
intervention of a white officer diffused the situation. The following month, a black soldier 
brawled with a white policeman who accused him of intoxication. Moreover, during the summer 
of 1865, the Army’s failure to adequately provide the Thirty-seventh with either officers or 
supplies led to white civilian complaints that black troops had plundered homes. The lack of 
sufficient additional white officers undermined the desire of commanders to keep black troops at 
their posts and away from white citizens. Intensifying racial animosities and overturning social 
customs further was the decision of civilian freedpeople to appeal to black troops for justice 
against white supremacist mistreatment, and of the latter to guide the former to the proper 
sources of redress.273   
Just as USCTs from the Bluegrass State during and after the Civil War conducted 
mutinies in which they demanded the release of wrongfully disciplined comrades, black 
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Kentuckians in the Army did the same for imprisoned black civilians. Freeing a perceived victim 
of racial injustice could involve a revolt against military or civilian authority. In the following 
case, black soldiers did so in order to destroy a legal practice that reminded them of slavery.  
Two members of the 119th USCI, Corporal Amos Morton and Private Payne Morton, 
tried to advance the emancipation process in the fall of 1865. At age twenty-one, Amos, the slave 
of Billy Morton, enlisted in Frankfort, Kentucky, in late May 1865. Payne, owned by Major 
Hanelly, joined while eighteen years old at Camp Nelson, Kentucky, and served as a drummer. 
Both mutineers had signed up as the war ended and had done so with their masters’ permission, 
due to the unique process of border state black enlistment. They thus lacked the motivations of 
mutineers angry over remaining in the Army after helping defeat the Confederacy, but they 
nevertheless had the personal experiences that would have reminded them of bondage when 
observing black men in chains. Their incidents took place as their regiment performed 
occupation duty, which it did in the Department of Kentucky from its birth in January 1865 to 
when it mustered out in April 1866. Never seeing Civil War combat, these USCTs’ service 
mainly consisted of implementing Reconstruction.274  
At around noon on October 8, 1865, at a railroad depot at Bowling Green, Kentucky, the 
Mortons and several others of the 119th USCI forcibly released two black individuals convicted 
of stealing and larceny from Sheriff Berry Lisle’s custody. Under orders to relocate to a 
Kentucky penitentiary, Lisle, along with his guards, moved George Van Liew and Lewis 
Johnson from their hometown of Clarkesville, Tennessee, to a railroad station in Bowling Green. 
Here, they were among a large crowd of civilians and occupying USCTs. Sherriff Lisle noticed a 
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mulatto in civilian garb briefly talk to the convicts as they sat on a platform. After leaving, the 
man returned with a group of armed and visibly angry black troops who proceeded to walk 
suspiciously around the sheriff and his guard and to further converse with the prisoners.275  
A heated exchange featuring references to past racial injustices and Civil War-era politics 
resulted. The soldiers, especially Payne, began to threaten Lisle and his guards that “if they had 
their way they would release those men,” adding that the officials lacked the authority to 
handcuff and transport the prisoners. This physical confinement, as a guard heard the soldiers 
say, “looked a good deal like old times when they were slaves.” When this guard, E. Herrmann, 
informed them that the convicts had been legally prosecuted, the soldiers denied the validity of 
the prosecution. The USCTs contended that since “those men in office” in Clarkesville “were 
secesh,” they “would do anything to put handcuffs on a negro.” Lisle heard Payne state that the 
prisoners’ handcuffs were “played out in this country” and should be taken off. Other statements 
quoted by witnesses included one expressing that the soldiers “would lose their last drop of 
blood to release the prisoners.” Another comment, which a witness attributed to Corporal 
Morton, connected the soldiers’ removal of handcuffs to their original motivation for enlisting: 
they had “joined the army” to take “such things off.”276  
Whether or not the Mortons accurately assessed the situation involving the prisoners, 
their rebellious actions represented the social disorder with which conservative whites associated 
emancipation. The situation continued to escalate. Lisle ordered the troops to desist, reminding 
them that civil law had legally prosecuted both prisoners. He requested a meeting with the 
soldiers’ white officer, whom Amos contacted in town for this purpose. While the sheriff waited 
for the commanding officer, the soldiers assumed custody over the prison guards and refused to 
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allow the group aboard their departing train. Despite a number of factors—Lieutenant Wright of 
the 119th sending an order to release the prison guards, a guideline that civilian convicts fell 
beyond the jurisdiction of soldiers, and the sheriff commanding them to stand back—the soldiers 
drew their bayonets and issued a “stand back” order of their own, to which Lisle complied. 
Corporal Morton told those who still intended to free the convicts the following: “Boys, you do it 
at your own risk; I am not going to have anything to do with it.” Payne and an unidentified 
soldier broke the prisoners’ handcuffs with an iron object and threw the shackles to the ground. 
As the rescue took place, other soldiers protected the liberators and liberated by standing in front 
of them with their bayonetted muskets drawn. Meanwhile, men like Sergeant Nicholas Walker 
and Privates Turner Miller and Smith Paxton obeyed Wright’s order to leave the prisoners and 
the station, and later testified for the prosecution. The mutineers fled towards their headquarters, 
threatening and cursing the sheriff and guard as they followed.277  
The civilian authorities won the race to the headquarters, where Lisle initiated an 
investigation and manhunt with the white officers that in turn led to the mutineers’ prosecution. 
Because the sheriff and another white official thought that “colored men dressed alike” and “look 
very much alike to me,” they failed to locate the perpetrators, which included the two Mortons 
and two other unidentified troops, across Bowling Green. Eventually, the Army captured the two 
defendants.278  
The due process rights African-American soldiers enjoyed since they first enlisted in 
1863 still benefitted them in the Reconstruction period. Black witnesses for the prosecution made 
numerous statements expressing ignorance over the defendants’ whereabouts, words, and 






their ultimate motivation was, one sees in their testimony an unwillingness to incriminate their 
comrades. Such testimony contrasted with the violent language white witnesses quoted to the 
judges. The court convicted the defendants of “conduct prejudicial to good order and military 
discipline” and sentenced them to a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay, and one year of 
hard labor at a state penitentiary. However, the judge advocate general determined that not 
enough evidence existed to show that the two men the defendants allegedly released were in the 
custody of the sheriff. Therefore, Amos and Paine won their release. While they proved unable to 
liberate George Van Liew and Lewis Johnson, they evaded substantial punishment for trying to 
do so. Such a result starkly contrasts with the racial discrimination in the civilian justice system, 
the system which had convicted Van Liew and Johnson.279  
The phenomenon of African-American soldiers seeking the release of a comrade or a 
black civilian during the Reconstruction period shows that these troops were determined to 
eradicate all remnants of bondage. Also, the national context of this episode involving the 
Mortons explains their suspicions on the means by which white authorities convicted two 
freedpeople. According to these men, seeing two black men on whose hands a white-run legal 
system had placed chains signified that the emancipationist war aim of the Union cause had not 
been fully accomplished despite the death of the Confederacy. African Americans did not trust 
the ex-Rebels running the South in late 1865 to treat blacks and whites equally under the law. 
These whites in power during the time of Presidential Reconstruction made this perceived threat 
concrete when they used the law to control black bodies. In the most acute example, southern 





plantation or domestic labor.280 The Union had won the Civil War, and the peculiar institution 
was physically in shambles and on the verge of constitutional abolition. Nevertheless, black 
troops stationed in the Reconstruction South did not view their original wartime mission as 
complete because African Americans could still be dehumanizingly placed into shackles on the 
pretense of criminality. This reality vividly reminded black soldiers of the chains used to 
constrict bondspeople’s mobility. Just as USCTs did during and after the war when they saw 
imprisoned comrades, the even mild physical constraints into which white policemen placed 
black prisoners drove blacks in uniform to take matters into their own hands to reverse a feared 
slide back into slavery. Absent rights they gained later, such as the vote and officeholding, the 
only ways to prevent a potential white counter-revolution from stemming the tide of black 
liberation were direct resistance to perceived unjust actions on the ground and taking the law into 
one’s hands.   
The above story foreshadows the racial solidarity the black working class exhibited 
throughout the late nineteenth century. In early June 1888, in Bramwell, Mercer County, West 
Virginia, a race riot occurred among coal miners involving similar fears of invalid prosecutions. 
During a strike for two weeks’ pay involving every miner in the local district, police arrested one 
black miner for disorderly conduct. In response to rumors that their white counterparts planned 
to lynch this man, one hundred black miners marched on the jail to demand his release. When the 
guards refused, the band fired at the building with pistols. The arrival of a white mob sparked a 
riot. After several suffered wounds and several more found themselves in police custody, the 
rioters dispersed. Since black men throughout the second half of the nineteenth century saw their 
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emancipation on the line whenever a white-run, untrustworthy criminal justice system, whether 
civilian or military, legal or extralegal, tried prosecuting another black man, they took collective 
action to halt the proceeding in its tracks.281  
As the Bowling Green incident also illustrated, occupying black troops encouraged 
civilian freedpeople to pursue greater equality in their lives or directly fought on their behalf to 
preserve their newly-won freedoms. This first emerged from how black troops and their officers 
worked closely with the Freedmen’s Bureau to reunite black families, craft fair labor contracts, 
provide relief, build schools, and protect freedpeople’s new rights. Through advice, action, or 
their mere presence, black soldiers often drove ex-slaves to act more assertive. USCTs spoke out 
when they felt that the government failed to look out for freedpeople’s welfare. Sergeant E. S. 
Robison, a Michigander of the 102nd USCI, told Major General Q. A. Gilmore on August 7, 
1865, that in Columbia, South Carolina, “the freedmen are Shamefuly abused.” Robison cited a 
case in which General Horton threatened to arrest a freedman who reported that a white man had 
plundered his home, taking the perpetrator’s side over the victim’s. Robison informed Gilmore 
that “in this I Could not hold my temper After fighting to get wrights that White men might 
Respect By Virtue of the Law.” In addition, African-American soldiers sometimes, as Gregory 
Downs noted, “took matters into their own hands and punished white assailants without waiting 
for orders.” For instance, if a freedwoman suspected that a white family had re-enslaved her 
child, black troops helped her retrieve her son or daughter. Like mutinies against U.S. Army 
officers, these efforts saw those struggling for black freedom use inflammatory language and 
force, all while risking disciplinary action from their officers. African Americans in both civilian 
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and military worlds maintained a mutually beneficial relationship based on inspiring and directly 
aiding each other.282  
The 128th USCI is an example of a black regiment whose members were so mutinous 
that they seemingly could not stay out of the military justice system. Starting in the summer of 
1865, the revolts increased in number as the unit’s occupation duty went deeper into the 
Reconstruction period. Many of the motivations for the era’s mutinies can be found in this single 
regiment, making it representative. As this chapter opened, this unit launched revolts against 
white civilian harassment and officers’ attempts to abuse their bodies and regulate their social 
lives. During the many incidents involving the regiment on Sullivan’s Island, South Carolina, in 
1866, participants cited past injustices from their 1865 occupation of Beaufort, South Carolina. 
This command’s ranks thus proved more committed to advancing the cause of the long 
emancipation than most regiments. They represent the African-American devotion to a wide 
range of social rights and freedoms during the course of Reconstruction. 
This regiment was one of six USCTs raised in South Carolina’s Low Country. U.S. 
military occupation of this region early in the Civil War planted the seed of the Union’s 
emancipationist turn and black enlistment, with abolitionist General David Hunter recruiting 
some of the first runaway slaves. Since Hunter also impressed black soldiers, those who 
eventually enlisted in the 128th USCI would have learned about this early post-slavery threat to 
black family security. The 128th was a late addition to the Union Army, organizing in April 1865. 
To a greater extent than the mutineers covered previously, those of the 128th saw their military 
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service more through the lens of Reconstruction occupation duty than through Civil War 
operations. Unlike the mutineers of the Border South who escaped bondage through a variety of 
methods, the 128th USCI’s South Carolinians generally enlisted on their own accord after fleeing 
plantations.283  
The 128th USCI’s rebellions took place during its home region’s particular ordeal with 
Reconstruction. As South Carolina completed its transition from slavery to free labor, African 
Americans challenged a market ideology espoused by landowners that demanded a disciplined 
workforce and told them that they could freely leave an employer to find more favorable work 
arrangements. They instead advocated independent land ownership. Since they comprised a 
black majority and learned lessons in group organization from the Union Army, the 
Lowcountry’s freedpeople were more likely than elsewhere in the state to engage in collective 
action to gain more control over their labor and lives. Black South Carolinians also organized 
politically through the Union League, Republican Party clubs, and other institutions like the 
church. Their collective culture entailed pressuring fellow blacks to vote and ostracizing those 
suspected of disloyalty, along with challenging injustices such as sharecropper evictions. This 
culture filtered into the 128th USCI when its mutineers demanded that officers and civilians treat 
them more humanely and pressured their peers to join uprisings.284   
Similar to the case of Mississippian John Higgins in the previous chapter, on June 21, 
1865, at Camp Stanton in Beaufort, Private John Grear of the 128th USCI acted mutinous while 
refusing to clean his weapon during an inspection. Only three months earlier, the Georgetown, 
South Carolina-born, twenty-two-year-old Grear had volunteered to join the unit at Hilton Head. 
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During his mutiny, when ordered to clean his weapon for an inspection, he declared that, “My 
gun is as clean as any man’s; and I’ll be damned if I clean it until I see the Colonel.” When 
Captain E. J. Scranton and Sergeant William Emory arrested Grear, the latter allegedly tried to 
strike his two superiors. He scolded the sergeant with the words, “God damn you, I will mark 
you for this.” The court convicted him of all charges and specifications except for the accusation 
that he tried to strike the captain. For three months, he forfeited ten dollars per month and 
underwent imprisonment at Fort Clinch, Florida, at which he endured close confinement, bread, 
and water every fourteen days. After returning to duty, he spent 1866 working in ordnance stores 
and on a boat crew.285 Black occupation troops throughout the Deep South resented what they 
deemed to be unfair orders to maintain cleanliness in a filthy environment, orders which formed 
part of a racist disciplinary regime. In Grear’s case, we see a soldier displaying an understanding 
of military justice and hierarchy. He refused to comply with his captain’s orders until he received 
input from his captain’s superior, the colonel. 
Mutinous incidents involving the 128th USCI also entailed clashes with white civilians 
that brought disturbing reminders of slavery. For such an action, Solomon Rose faced the charge 
of “conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.” On August 8, 1866, Rose threw a 
brick at Charleston civilian named Martin Wheelan, seriously wounding him. To explain why he 
did so, Rose informed the court that as he walked quietly through town, Wheelan’s dog “ran at 
me and took hold of my pants.” When he “told him to keep the dog off,” Wheelan “sat still and 
laughed at me.” He threatened to throw a rock at the dog if Wheelan did not retrieve the pet. 
Rose claimed that he intended to hit the dog, but the brick “glanced off the pavement and struck 
 




Mr. Wheelan.” However, Wheelan and another white civilian present insisted that the soldier 
designated the former as the target.286  
While this incident might be the result of someone becoming angry when someone else 
failed to control his pet, the use of trained dogs by slave patrols to hunt down and bite runaways 
might have entered Rose’s mind when such an animal left its white owner to attack him, a black 
man. After all, Rose had long lived in the Palmetto State’s slave society as a laborer before 
enlisting in March 1865 at the age of thirty-five. Also, in the months leading up to Rose’s act of 
retaliation, he served on detached duty at a freedpeople’s camp in Charleston, where he likely 
learned of the brutal experiences of other ex-bondspeople. Regardless, for this action, Rose 
received a sentence of hard labor for thirty days, the first fourteen of which while consuming 
bread and water.287   
On May 30, 1866, at Castle Pinckney, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, Sergeant 
Thomas Ramsey of the 128th USCI conducted his own individual mutiny against what he 
perceived to be his officers’ racial antagonism. A laborer from Charleston, S.C., who enlisted in 
March 1865 at age twenty-one, he received the following arraignments: disobeying orders, 
disrespecting his commanding officer, and “conduct prejudicial to good order and military 
discipline.” Captain Robert Aiton and an ordnance sergeant caught the defendant in the act of 
unhooking a boat in the fort’s boathouse, an action which only the ordnance sergeant had 
authority to do because the boat was his own private property. When they asked him to identify 
himself, Ramsey jumped into the water and swam to a point where he ran back to his quarters. 
The sergeant’s wet clothing and shivering body enabled Aiton to recognize him and turn him 
over to the custody of First Lieutenant J. H. Van Vort. While in confinement, Ramsey violently 
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and disrespectfully responded to Van Vort and Aiton’s orders to be quiet. As he proclaimed, “I 
don’t care a damned for you Lieutenant or the Captain…you are trying to take advantage of me.” 
He added that, “I will have satisfaction when I see the Colonel and Major.” Moreover, Ramsey 
accused the officers of racism “in an insolent manner”: “I don’t care a damn for you, you take 
the advantage of me because I am a colored man.” According to Sergeant Ramsey, the arrest and 
order to “shut up” occurred because, “I’m a negro and you are white.” When the lieutenant 
inquired about Ramsey’s reason for being in the boat house, the latter explained that he was 
under arrest for a previous offense and was trying to secretly bathe despite orders to remain in 
his quarters. Because the sergeant had attempted to steal a boat and had chosen an unideal 
location for a bath, the officers did not accept that excuse. Yet, Ramsey repeated that story in his 
statement at trial, adding that he fell off the boat and into the water accidentally and that Captain 
Aiton threatened to shoot him after arresting him. Finding Ramsey guilty, the court reduced his 
rank and sentenced him to five months of hard labor.288 
What stands out about Ramsey’s revolt is his understanding of the military hierarchy and 
its role in remedying sources of grievance. The sergeant rose up against his immediate superiors 
but sought the assistance of his high-ranking commanders. Unfortunately, when the court-martial 
later asked Captain Aiton why the prisoner decided to appeal, “to the Colonel or Major for the 
purpose of seeking redress for supposed wrongs,” the trial transcript merely states that, “the 
question was objected to” and that the court dismissed the question “as being irrelevant to the 
case.” However, Ramsey’s case can be compared with that of Grear, who also believed that the 
high-ranking officers would overrule their immediate superiors. Perhaps soldiers viewed those at 
the top of the military hierarchy as more paternalistic and lower-ranking officers as crueler. 
 
288 Proceedings of GCM, Trial of Thomas Ramsey, OO-1621, RG 153, NARA; Thomas Ramsey Service Record, 
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Regardless, African Americans navigating the often turbulent emancipation process needed to 
look out for white allies who could ease their path.289  
Not just racist military officers and civilians, but also white supremacist civil law 
enforcers, became the target of the 128th. In June and July 1866, numerous members of the 128th 
USCI added to their regiment’s mutinous legacy when they were court-martialed for clashing 
with authorities at the Charleston City Jail. Privates Thomas Jenkins and William Johnson, while 
on duty at the jail on July 16, 1866, used “harsh and unbecoming language toward, and 
threaten[ed] to beat” U.S. Marshal of South Carolina J. R. M. Epping. The trouble began when 
the official arrived at the jail’s gate to “execute a summons on Lieut. Manning” to implement a 
court order. After the guards—a corporal along with the two defendants—told him Manning was 
absent, he continuously requested the presence of a subordinate. Each time, the soldiers at the 
gate denied the presence or existence of the person. Despite making clear his position to, and 
demanding respect from, these guards, Epping revealed at the court-martial that his questions, 
“seemed to irritate them”; “they did not seem to think I had any right to ask them questions.” The 
guards expressed skepticism over Epping’s claims because he had neither a uniform nor a pass. 
The marshal’s persistent demands to enter prompted the men to increase their level of animosity 
towards him, which the former termed “abuse,” as indicated when they refused to provide him 
with their names and when they threatened to physically harm him. Johnson, according to 
Epping, “thrust his fist in my face” and declared, “damn you be off, or I’ll make you go.” When 
Epping threatened to report the men, Jenkins reportedly dared him to do so. During the 
confrontation, Jenkins conveyed that his orders prohibited him from letting any individual in 





withdrew. Giving his side of the story, Jenkins issued a statement in which he related how he 
honestly reported to Epping the absence of any officer on duty at the institution. Jenkins noted 
how Epping tried to violate the orders regarding entry. Possibly helping the defendants’ case was 
testimony, including that of a lieutenant, highlighting their clean records and good characters, 
and denying their use of profanity and violent threats. While the court-martial convicted them, 
the court cleared them of the specification related to threatening violence. The judges decided to 
be further lenient with Jenkins and Johnson, revoking passes for them for fifty days and releasing 
them. The court considered their thirty days in confinement as sufficient punishment.290  
Soldiers in the 128th USCI also continued the USCT campaign against military officer 
abuses in general and denials to engage in leisure in particular while stationed in the Charleston 
City Jail. There, on the evening of July 14, 1866, Private Prince Hamilton, a twenty-year-old 
laborer and life-long South Carolinian, objected to Lieutenant W. G. Bradford’s refusal to grant 
him and other soldiers a pass to go into the city. Earlier, in November 1865, Hamilton had lost 
his sergeant stripes for leaving his post and going into Grahamville, South Carolina, along with 
other noncommissioned officers, without a pass. As Bradford informed the private, he had orders 
from the high command, “to allow no enlisted men out that night.” Moreover, the granting of 
evening passes had not been a practice within the unit. According to the prosecution, the private 
 
290 Proceedings of GCM, Trials of Thomas Jenkins and William Johnson, OO-1781, RG 153, NARA. Armed clashes 
between white police officers and African-American soldiers in other units highlight the heated race relations of the 
Reconstruction South. In an illegible town, North Carolina, in mid-August 1866, Corporal George Moore of the 
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May 12, 1866, in Charleston, South Carolina, Privates Samuel MacClease and Kelly Barber of the Thirty-fifth USCI 
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persisted. However, Hamilton himself and the defense argued that he only asked for a pass once 
before Bradford called for the corporal of the guard tie him up by the thumbs. Hamilton declared 
that, “he would be damned if he would be tied up for” no legitimate reason “by any damned 
man.” He expressed a willingness to endure jail and a court-martial as a consequence. He added 
that Bradford as well as other officers in the 128th’s companies “had been tyrannizing over their 
men too much already.” One witness testified hearing him declare that, “none of the officers of 
the regiment did right by the men after they got off from the regiment.” Hamilton “had been a 
soldier long enough to know what was right” and wrong, as well as what constituted a soldier’s 
duties and the regulations under which he served. Therefore, he recognized that, “no officer or 
nobody could tyrannize over him.” A clerk at the jail described Hamilton’s demeanor as “very 
noisy.”291  
With the private resisting so forcefully, Lieutenant Bradford and Corporals Simeris 
Richardson and Joseph Rivers carried him to a jail cell, which led to court-martial proceedings. 
Bradford determined that Hamilton’s offense warranted charges rather than corporal punishment 
on the spot. Despite witnesses testifying in his defense that he exhibited good discipline and 
character, Hamilton was found guilty of “conduct prejudicial to good order and military 
discipline” and of disobeying orders. The court sentenced him to a dishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of pay, and a year of hard labor. However, the high command annulled the court-
martial proceedings, freeing the private in January 1867.292  
Upon seeking authorization for an enjoyable evening, Prince Hamilton interpreted a 
denial as the latest example of officer despotism. He did not include specifics when reflecting on 
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past officer actions, but this latest episode and the realization that he would be yet another black 
soldier tied up by the thumbs for a trivial offense proved to be the last straw for him. To be 
refused temporary, brief relief from constant police duty told black soldiers during 
Reconstruction that their white officers stood in the way of realizing their envisioned freedom.   
The black soldier mutinies against denials to engage in leisure can be compared to 
civilian freedpeople experimenting with freedom and opposing interferences with these 
experiments. No longer human property, many freedpeople stopped working from sunup to 
sundown. When the southern states created by Presidential Reconstruction passed vagrancy laws 
and other black codes, former bondspeople held public gatherings at which they demanded the 
northern Republicans to help stop such attempts to “nullify the Proclamation of Emancipation,” 
efforts which constituted, “practical reenslavement.” This activism helped push the military to 
annul these laws and Congress to repeal them. To remind him of his new rights, a group of white 
soldiers told one freedman that “you didn’t have to stay where you was, that you didn’t have no 
master, that you could go and come as you pleased.” As Booker T. Washington wrote regarding 
the personal freedom ex-bondspeople gained, “they must leave the old plantation for at least a 
few days or weeks in order that they might feel really sure that they were free.”293  
That USCTs chose mutiny as their response to superiors’ prohibitions against partaking 
in a “frolic” further revealed that African Americans viewed freedom from strict regulations of 
their personal behavior as critical to their full emancipation. Black men considered it their right 
to temporarily leave their place of work. These black occupation forces could count on the 
Republican-controlled Congress and the U.S. Army to repeal the black codes and to enact 
 
293 Quoted in Gregory Downs, After Appomattox, 85 (first), 52 (second), 123 (third).  
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Radical Reconstruction. However, mutineers found little redress for the Army’s own restrictions 
on personal autonomy.  
Using his ability to speak strongly, native South Carolinian laborer and twenty-four-year-
old 128th USCI Private Charles Robinson fought racism both in an individual mutiny and in his 
subsequent trial. Before the court, Robinson objected to various members of the court. He started 
with Captain B. H. Manning’s presence on the court. In most cases, the defendant answered in 
the negative when the court asked him if he opposed the membership of any officer on the body. 
According to this prisoner, Manning, “has been an enemy of mine ever since I have been in the 
regiment. He has never shown me justice in anything. I feel certain he would not deal justly with 
me.” Robinson added specific details of Manning’s past injustices: “while at Beaufort, he had me 
imprisoned several times for nothing.” When Robinson “once…was in a row with a citizen,” 
Manning “threatened to cowhide me.” Manning responded with a statement of his own disputing 
Robinson’s account, “except that I did imprison him. My action at that time was official, as 
Provost Marshal of Beaufort.” Private Robinson also challenged Captain Robert Aiton on the 
grounds that the officer would not rule the case justly. At Beaufort, Aiton allegedly imprisoned 
Robinson for being absent from guard duty despite the sergeant of the guard relieving him. Aiton 
denied remembering either the prisoner or punishing anyone while serving as officer of the day. 
The third and final officer Robinson challenged was Lieutenant W. G. Bradford, whom the 
private claimed had “threatened to kick him once at Beaufort.” Bradford responded that when he 
served as officer of the day at the time (approximately April 1865), Robinson occupied the guard 
house for fighting and interrupted him as he tried to question two men about the fight. When 
Bradford ordered Robinson silent until his turn to talk came, the private “said he would not do it” 
and “would talk when he pleased.” This belligerence prompted the lieutenant to threaten to strike 
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Robinson in the mouth. The court’s other judges deemed the challenges “groundless,” permitting 
Captains Manning and Aiton and Lieutenant Bradford to remain.294  
When Robinson ceased making challenges, he was arraigned on the charges of 
disobeying orders and “conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.” On July 10 or 
11, 1866, at the 128th’s camp on Sullivan’s Island, the defendant’s company officer commanded 
him to cease “talking in mutinous language.” He responded with the following language: “no 
God d – d white man could stop his mouth. I am just as good as any white man and I will let you 
know it. And I would like to see the white man that can stop me from talking…we will see if the 
d – d white officers will tell us to shut our mouths and put us in the Guard House.” As his 
officers took him to the guard house, he continued to curse them. Overall, he, “did behave in a 
mutinous manner before enlisted men.” For these statements, the court dishonorably discharged 
Robinson in December 1866.295 Robinson’s trial presents another case study of the complex legal 
rights afforded USCT defendants, namely, the right to challenge. Robinson’s case also contains 
some of the strongest racially-charged language one can see in a court-martial of a USCT 
member. For him, the great offense white officers had committed was trying to limit black 
soldiers’ right to speak.  
As a representative of Reconstruction-era black soldier rebellions, the mutinous behavior 
of the 128th USCI in South Carolina in 1866 derived heavily from southern social life, local law 
enforcement’s interactions with black troops, and the desire of newly emancipated black men to 
engage in leisure. When their officers, local police, or white civilians interfered in their lives, 
 
294 Proceedings of GCM, Trial of Charles Robinson, OO-3733, RG 153, NARA; Charles Robinson Service Record, 
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they revolted, sometimes violently. Like that of Higgins the year before, the 128th’s individual 
mutinies began with an everyday officer-soldier exchange before escalating into a revolt against 
not just the perceived injustice of the moment but also against the overall mistreatment of his 
comrades. Mutineers’ choice of language can be tied to republican ideology’s tenets about power 
and freedom and their perpetual struggle. It also speaks to how African-American soldiers 
understood their military service and the rights they earned from it, including the right to avoid 
harsh punishments for minor offenses. Like the mutineers of the 109th USCI the year before, 
those in the 128th did not distinguish between the original trivial offense and the more serious 
offenses that followed due to his later, more belligerent behavior, the latter of which are often 
what led to the harshest discipline.   
After the demobilization of the USCTs, the Reconstruction era remained one often 
characterized by paramilitary and extralegal violence. White supremacists opposed to the 
completion of the emancipation process, like those in the Ku Klux Klan, the Red Shirts, and the 
White League, lynched freedpeople and their white allies, and burned such symbols of black 
freedom as churches and schools. However, throughout Reconstruction, African Americans 
resisted white supremacist violence by forming their own paramilitary groups and violently 
defending their political and socioeconomic rights. The rebellious actions that USCTs committed 
as a means of directing Reconstruction towards their vision of socio-political autonomy early on 
remained part of their repertoire as they implemented Radical Reconstruction and later struggled 
to resist the tide of Redemption.296  
 
296 For paramilitary violence scholarship, see Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and 
Southern Reconstruction (Harper & Row, 1971); Stephen Hahn, A Nation under Our Feet; LeeAnna Keith, The 
Colfax Massacre: The Untold Story of Black Power, White Terror, and the Death of Reconstruction (Oxford: 
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The tradition of armed self-defense that produced antebellum northern black militias and 
African-American soldiers and sailors, mutinous and non-mutinous, also gave birth to a new 
generation of black militia groups in the postbellum South. Across the ex-Confederacy, the new 
Republican-controlled state governments of the late 1860s and early 1870s created segregated 
African-American state militias. Commanded by black officers, their duty was to maintain order 
and enforce Reconstruction laws in the near or total absence of federal troops. While black 
northerners struggled to gain state sanction for militia service before the Civil War, southern 
freedpeople succeeded in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Through militia service, 
comparable to joining the military and conducting mutinies therein, black men could live up to 
the martial masculine ideal of using arms to defend their homes and communities from white 
supremacy. USCT veterans and life-long civilians filled the ranks of units like Prince River’s 
company of Hamburg, South Carolina; Gilmer’s Rifles of Mobile, Alabama; and the Richmond 
State Guard. During and after Reconstruction, these units proudly displayed the “martial skills of 
the Negro” through parades and drills. Like the Buffalo Soldiers, black militiamen enjoyed 
respect from fellow African Americans who saw them as disciplined and courageous, as well as 
derision from whites who equated them with arrogance and disorder.297 
The Reconstruction experience made black militiamen, as well as more informal black 
paramilitary bands, recognize the need to take matters into their own hands and engage in armed 
self-defense if they had any hope of realizing the freedom of which they had long dreamed. As 
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white Republicans, the Army, and freedpeople moved to enact black voting and legal rights in 
the former Rebel states, Confederate veterans and other white paramilitaries seeking to restore 
conservative rule mobilized. In the lead up to local and state elections and a Radical 
constitutional ratification vote in April 1868, for example, African Americans in Wilmington, 
North Carolina, a town formerly occupied by the Thirty-seventh USCI, challenged the area’s Ku 
Klux Klan intimidation campaign. By patrolling the streets over the course of four 
“tempestuous” nights, armed associates of the local Union League helped ensure ratification of 
the state constitution and the election of GOP officeholders. Through such force, coupled with 
other forms of organization and collective action, former slaves gained unprecedented political, 
social, and cultural power in the late 1860s. The emancipation process was marching forward.298  
In a sign of the difficulty of preserving African-American freedoms, a more devastating 
episode of paramilitary violence broke out in the aftermath of a contested election in April 1873. 
With both the incumbent Republican sheriff and Democratic challenger claiming victory, and 
therefore possession of the courthouse in Colfax, Louisiana, this building became the site of the 
paramilitary engagement. Displaying a “semi-military character,” four hundred black Radical 
Republicans garrisoning the courthouse spent several days fighting off white invaders from the 
surrounding countryside who wanted to “suppress negro domination.” When conservative 
reinforcements from several other parishes arrived on Easter Sunday, the Radicals, which 
included Union veterans, held their position for two more hours. A white artillery barrage and 
infantry charge then broke the black stronghold. The attackers shot the remaining defenders, both 
those who tried fleeing and those who surrendered. The Colfax Massacre, which killed over one 
hundred freedpeople, serves as a reminder that when black men lived up to the martial masculine 
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ideal, they made a deadly choice. Those who did not resist the Redeemer insurgency could save 
their lives, but in doing so they risked paving the way to what eventually happened: the 
overthrow of Radical Reconstruction and the reversal of its hard-fought gains.299  
Redemption reversed the emancipation process in terms of armed self-defense not only 
on paramilitary battlefields, but also in court rooms. During Reconstruction, competing legal 
philosophies clashed, with Republicans promoting the federal right of black militias to bear arms 
and Democrats arguing that the Second Amendment protected states from congressional 
interference in their militia systems. The former party cited the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process and equal protection clauses, arguing they granted the federal government the authority 
to prosecute state-level violations of individual rights enshrined in the first eight amendments. 
Through the 1875 Supreme Court case U.S. v. Cruikshank, the states’-rights position, which 
narrowly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, triumphed in U.S. constitutional law for the 
next century.300 
Cruikshank settled the question over whether the Colfax Massacre’s perpetrators had 
violated their victims’ Second Amendment rights under the 1870 Enforcement Acts. Section 6 of 
the legislation criminalized conspiracies to “injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen 
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted 
or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Favoring the defendants, the 
high court ruled that the Second Amendment had “no other effect than to restrict the powers of 
the national government.” States could regulate their militia systems and individual firearm 
usage free from federal encroachment, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections applied to 
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state actions, not those of private individuals. This decision helped terminate active federal 
enforcement of African Americans’ right to defend themselves from white oppression regardless 
of its source.301  
Like black mutineers, African-American paramilitary troops understood that the war for 
their people’s liberation did not end with the Confederacy’s collapse. As Reconstruction 
historians have noted, building a biracial democracy ironically required first and foremost 
weapons and blood, not democratic cornerstones like ballots and civil debate. However, even if 
martial masculinity helped advance the emancipation process over the last decade, the 
Democratic Party’s brutal re-conquest of the South over the course of the 1870s pushed it 
backward. To be sure, despite Redemption, black militia units persisted until the Jim Crow order 
emerged in the 1890s. In this second major postbellum setback to the emancipation process, in 
addition to black men losing their remaining voting rights and naval ships and other institutions 
becoming segregated, states disbanded their Reconstruction-era black militias.302 
 The conflict African-American mutineers and race rioters waged in the Reconstruction 
period against hostile white military and civilian personnel in southern communities 
foreshadowed similar struggles in the dark American racial climate of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. With mixed results, the black rebellions of the 1860s and 1870s 
occurred as the country rebuilt itself following a devastating civil war, a social revolution, and a 
counter-revolutionary backlash. As seen in the following chapter, while becoming citizens and 
escaping the status of property, African-American men secured a permanent place in the U.S. 
Army and primarily did so in the West. However, violations of this coveted status persisted. 
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Later, as the country began fighting its first major overseas conflicts, while simultaneously 
grappling with the emergence of a new southern racial caste system, a later generation of black 
soldiers also felt the need to revolt against the latest perceived threats to their freedom. Their 
enslaved and USCT ancestors remained influential as models of black resistance, republican 
citizenship, and martial masculinity. Due to more ambitious goals and a renewed sense of 
urgency, the next chapter of the long emancipation process produced some of the most notorious 




















“We will reduce your houses and firesides to ashes and send your guilty souls to hell”: 
Buffalo Soldier Mutinies from 1867 to 1917 
 
In 1893, after enduring constant white civilian mistreatment while stationed near the 
town of Crawford, Nebraska, the black men of the Ninth U.S. Cavalry issued a broadside 
warning bloody retribution. Titled “500 Men with the Bullet or the Torch,” the document 
revealed that a white mob had yelled racial slurs at discharged Private James Diggs and would 
have lynched him if several comrades had not rescued him from jail and transported him to Fort 
Robinson. The document next contended that other members of their unit “have been beaten over 
their heads with six shooters by these thugs.” The authors demanded that Crawford cease these 
injustices. If they continued to act in this way under “Old Glory,” “we will repeat the horrors of 
San Domingo—we will reduce your houses and firesides to ashes and send your guilty souls to 
hell. We who would be free must themselves strike the blow.”303  
Since he possessed this broadside, Sergeant Barney McKay, an ironworker from Indiana 
who had been among Diggs’ rescue squad, was thereafter convicted of rioting for participating in 
a conspiracy to violently attack the Nebraska community and imprisoned at Fort Leavenworth 
for two years. Afterward, he repeatedly received rejections for a pension to alleviate lingering 
complications from an old wound. A “Declaration” he wrote in 1917 as an appeal to his 
conviction and pension application denials exposed his still raw bitterness towards his legal 
troubles. Attributing the broadside’s authorship to a “secret society,” he blamed his court-martial 
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to his officers’ desire to prosecute someone, general racism, and punishment for his opposition to 
lynching. He justified the document’s language, albeit “improper,” by pointing out that mobs had 
lynched three soldiers before the Diggs incident, in response to which their officers did nothing. 
According to McKay, he never received full due process, pointing to the failure of the court-
martial to speedily provide him with a copy of charges. He cited racist statements made against 
him by officers that torpedoed his pension applications. Regardless of guilt level, the broadside, 
as well as the decision of McKay’s comrades to not testify against him during his trial, speak of 
African-American soldiers’ solidarity in resisting bigotry. As American race relations 
deteriorated in the 1890s, some black men still clung to the notion articulated by rebellious 
bondsmen that a prerequisite to liberty is the willingness to kill or be killed in defense of it.304  
While a reaction against local ordeals, the threatened insurrection by a group of black 
troops in the 1890s reflected the numerous black soldier rebellions that broke out in the 
American West in the decades following the Civil War. The willingness of this set of men in one 
of the postbellum West’s four all-black regular Army regiments to forcefully resist mistreatment 
while risking prosecution captures a key aspect of African Americans’ lives in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. As they moved from celebrating the death of one racial caste 
system to protecting themselves against the rise of a new white supremacist regime, a number of 
those in uniform ensured that the tradition of overt black resistance continued to flourish. The 
“500 Men” broadside’s invocation of the Haitian Revolution demonstrates the link between a 
tradition birthed under slavery and efforts to promote black freedom by those who grew up a 
generation after bondage. The era’s African-American regulars troops built on the foundation 
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laid down by those Civil War volunteers who felt the best way to ensure racial justice after 
slavery was to rise up against abusive white officers and hostile white civilians. 
The three previous major chapters in the era of African-American soldier mutinies cover 
relatively short time periods in which American politics and society dramatically changed, 
especially in the South. The next key moment in uniformed black men’s revolts against white 
supremacy took place in the West across several decades. After the retirement of the Union 
Army’s Sable Arm, a new black army, nicknamed the “Buffalo Soldiers”305 and tasked with 
securing their country’s imperial designs, grasped the torch of mutiny for the rest of the 
nineteenth century and into the early twentieth. Just as USCT mutinies help us better understand 
the Civil War and Reconstruction years, those involving the first black regulars give us a lens 
into the period from Reconstruction to World War I. The former lived in the immediate shadow 
of bondage and as blacks began figuring out what freedom meant; the latter promoted black 
freedom as a new socio-political order increasingly threatened the progress blacks had made in 
the 1860s. They could vote and were no longer property, but the turn of the century proved that 
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whites could make these gains hollow. Three generations of Buffalo Soldier mutineers 
capitalized on the legacy of USCT resistance to oppression while also setting the stage for how a 
later generation of African-American military personnel revolted as the country approached the 
modern civil rights era, bridging the Civil War and World War II generations. While new 
motivators caused black men to decide to lead or participate in a mutiny, familiar ones 
stubbornly persisted. This new Sable Arm showed that African-American mutinies were 
intensifying their violent tendencies while nevertheless perpetuating a generations-old tradition 
of bloody resistance. Physical abuse moved from being one of several drivers to the sole 
motivator of black mutinous activity. In total, 51% percent of USCTs (twenty-eight out of a 
sample of fifty-five) rebelled against physical abuse, with 14% of mutinies resulting from 
inadequate compensation and 35% opposing unpopular orders. By contrast, all thirteen or 100% 
of recorded Buffalo Soldier revolts reacted against some form of violence.306 Finally, a key 
feature of Buffalo Soldier mutinies was a sharp drop in the government’s commitment to 
criminal justice rights that had previously afforded rebellious USCTs a substantial degree of 
legal protection. 
While the Reconstruction South witnessed black troops help maintain peace against 
paramilitary violence as ex-Confederate states re-entered the Union, in the West, they again tried 
to prove their worthiness for citizenship through the martial masculine act of combat. Between 
the mid-1860s and 1870s, a number of USCT veterans and new black recruits enlisted in the 
regular U.S. Army, marking the first time since the formation of the republic that blacks became 
a permanent fixture in this force. After the demobilization following the Confederacy’s defeat, 
 
306 Data based on spreadsheet in author’s files. USCT data matches that seen in the previous three Army chapters.  
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the smaller postbellum Army resumed its long-running conflict against autonomous indigenous 
tribes. In later decades, African-American troops served in colonial campaigns abroad.307   
The motivations for some Buffalo Soldiers to revolt closely resemble those of the 
USCTs. Namely, they confronted the twin threats of racism from both officers and civilians. 
While they could count on some of their commanders to sympathize with, and defend, them, they 
also continued to suffer from white superiors’ physical and emotional mistreatment. Therefore, 
one class of Buffalo Soldier mutiny matches those seen within the Union Army. While the 
African Americans making up the western U.S. Army defended white communities from hostile 
Native attacks, western whites were often just as much an enemy of black civil rights as they 
were in the South, especially in the South-West borderland of Texas. As a result, the violence 
between white civilians and black troops in much of the early postbellum South spread to the 
West between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In neither region could African-
American soldiers avoid grievances that the long emancipation process tried to rectify. With 
commanders, who had a duty to respectfully lead and uplift the rank-and-file, and civilians, 
whom black troops had sworn to defend, occasionally treating them as if they constituted an 
enemy occupation force at worst and a nuisance at best, some Buffalo Soldiers made sobering 
realizations. They concluded that the rebellious behavior that had weakened and eventually 
destroyed bondage and helped resolve the equal pay issue in the Union Army, despite great risks, 
was still needed to fully bring their people into the promised land of political, social, cultural, 
and economic freedom. The obstacles to this vision that mutineers and rioters had combated in 
the mid-1860s either persisted or adapted between the late 1860s and 1910s.  
 
307 William A. Dobak and Thomas D. Phillips, The Black Regulars, 3.  
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Beginning in 1866, after the last USCTs mustered out, the U.S. Army began creating new 
African-American units, consolidating them into the Ninth and Tenth U.S. Cavalry and the 
Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth U.S. Infantry by 1869. These four commands together 
comprised the “Buffalo Soldiers,” and built upon the distinguished combat record of USCT units 
and the social revolution they helped spawn. Unlike the black Civil War veterans who revolted in 
opposition to military service in a distant land, others volunteered to do so as Buffalo Soldiers, 
which gave them high regard in their home communities. This latter group of troops who 
mutinied against racial discrimination and abuse did so because of a new gap in their 
expectations for, and the reality of, their planned careers in the postbellum U.S. Army.  
The Buffalo Soldiers participated in the U.S. campaign of westward expansion. Making 
up ten percent of the regular forces, black troops served in an era when the frontier Army was 
small and its ranks mainly comprised of the working-class, black and white, native-born and 
immigrant. At outposts, soldiers engaged hostile Native bands, patrolled the Mexican border, 
constructed and maintained infrastructure and communication systems, and policed settler 
communities. Life mostly consisted of boredom, isolation, tedious drills and inspections, a harsh 
natural environment, and stern discipline. While white officers often praised the record of black 
enlistees in the Indian Wars and endorsed their presence in the Army, they possessed racist views 
about blacks inherently being immature, cowardly, and less intelligent. Positive words for black 
troops contained paternalism and condescension. White officers commanding the four regiments 
ranged from opportunists seeking career advancement to those who accepted the commissions 
reluctantly; only a minority embraced equal rights. This dynamic between officers and enlistees 
displays a high level of continuity from the time of the USCTs to the Buffalo Soldier era.308  
 
308 Ira Berlin, et. al., Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Series II: The Black Military 
Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 736-737; Garna Christian, Black Soldiers in Jim Crow 
242 
 
The story of the Buffalo Soldiers’ uprisings helps further the trend of scholarship since 
the 1970s of demolishing traditional images of western U.S. history. In the aftermath of the 
modern civil rights movement, and alongside the Revisionists’ overthrow of the Dunning School 
in Reconstruction historiography and the rise of social history in Civil War studies, an explosion 
of scholarship gave long-overdue attention to the acute African-American presence in the regular 
Army.309 Buffalo Soldier mutinies thus bridge Reconstruction and New Western historiography.  
In doing so, the Buffalo Soldiers provide a window into the complicated trajectory of 
American citizenship rights. By fighting in the last chapter of the Indian Wars, the U.S. Army’s 
black regulars tried expanding their own rights and opportunities while suppressing those of 
another marginalized group of Americans. Throughout their service, they advanced white 
America’s imperial projects. They refute the longtime myth that only white-and red-colored 
peoples inhabited the extremely diverse American West. As James Leiker argues in a recent 
anthology, New Western History needs to avoid painting the Buffalo Soldiers “either as 
villainous enforcers of white oppression or heroic subjects of injustice.” While their acts of 
resistance against white supremacy can cause one to place them in the latter category, a more 
nuanced analysis explains why they endured certain injustices, why they avenged these injustices 
by committing their own version of racially motivated atrocities, and why other Buffalo Soldiers 
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did not rebel. Just as black men neglected to emphasize the common oppression of all non-
whites, certain tribes like the Cherokee enslaved blacks and sided with the Confederacy earlier in 
the nineteenth century to better fit in white U.S. society. American race relations do not always 
take the form of the binary pitting whites on one side vs. black and other colors on the other.310   
Black men’s military service in, and civilian settlement of, the West shed light on 
Reconstruction’s non-southern history, which in turn produced a new scholarly trend that frames 
westward expansion as part of a “Greater Reconstruction.” In this telling, the death of slavery 
and the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1860s were only two of many components 
making up the Reconstruction of the American state as it tried securing federal authority and 
formulating its sectional and racial relationships on both an East-West and North-South axis 
throughout the mid-to-late nineteenth century. With the conquest of Native land and maintaining 
order taking federal priority over protecting freedpeople’s liberties by the 1870s, some African 
Americans relied on colonial service in uniform to try to realize their political and economic 
freedoms. Yet, since this service failed to persuade many white Americans to recognize these 
rights, the most frustrated among these troops used their weapons on not just the red and brown 
subjects of U.S. imperialism, but also its white designers. Despite moving West to escape 
southern racial violence, such violence followed them; whether they left or stayed put, they 
eventually clashed with white supremacy. Together, both the subjugation of indigenous 
Americans that the Buffalo Soldiers helped perpetrate and the rebellions they launched against 
hostile whites impeach the triumphalist narrative of Reconstruction.311 
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Since the 1960s and continuing to the present, the Buffalo Soldiers have acquired a 
mythical position in the national imagination, especially among African Americans. According 
to this myth, the Buffalo Soldiers were “forgotten heroes” who played a disproportionate role in 
“taming” the West and who bonded with their Indian enemies over their common oppression as 
two peoples of color. Such an image contradicts the welter of scholarship on these forces and the 
similarity in contemporary white and black views of Native “savages,” but it is potent enough to 
shape monuments, popular culture, popular history, and even some academic writing.312 Looking 
at the less glorious aspects of the troops’ careers, such as violent clashes with officers in camp 
and retributive slayings of civilians in bars and on streets, instead of fights with enemies on 
traditional battlefields, further impeaches the sanitized Buffalo Soldier myth. 
The Buffalo Soldiers’ acts of resistance illustrate how regular U.S. military service 
offered both opportunities as well as continued obstacles in the effort to complete the long 
emancipation. Once African-American soldiers detected mistreatment and injustice during their 
service, and found formal avenues of redress lacking, they rose up. Also, certain conditions that 
bred mutiny in USCT commands, such as officers’ physical abuse of the rank-and-file, continued 
to damage morale and the officer-enlisted man relationship for years.  
The first Buffalo Soldier mutiny resulted from a racial problem all too familiar to Civil 
War veterans. On April 9, 1867, at San Pedro Springs, near San Antonio, Texas, members of the 
Ninth U.S. Cavalry rebelled against brutal discipline, interpreting it as contrary to their full 
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emancipation. The mutineers responded to Lieutenant Edward M. Heyl tying up three comrades 
by the wrists for neglecting to remove nose-bags from their horses' heads and cutting, beating, 
and shooting at one who escaped. Witnesses at the court-martial reported that before the unit 
reached San Pedro Springs in April 1867, while stationed in New Orleans and San Antonio for 
two months, the lieutenant earned a reputation for vicious racism. He reportedly whipped, 
punched, struck, tied up, and stabbed victims. Alcohol often fueled his sadism. Yet, the men of 
the Ninth Cavalry initially kept their composure and exhibited high morale until the mutiny.313 
Thus, the actions that followed the most recent offense represented the last straw in a 
long-standing series of tensions. First Sergeant Harrison Bradford, a twenty-four-year-old Civil 
War veteran from Kentucky, persuaded the men of Company E to march to Lieutenant Colonel 
Merritt's quarters to complain. The force marched in an orderly column with undrawn sabres. 
When they approached Lt. Heyl's quarters, located along the way, Bradford called for them to 
draw their sabres. When the lieutenant came out and inquired into the column’s purpose, 
Bradford cited the officer’s brutal treatment of the three comrades, reminding him it was “the 
way you treated them…You do them so!” Heyl pointed his pistol at the sergeant, which 
prompted Bradford to charge with his sabre. The lieutenant opened fire, striking Bradford in the 
mouth. Several other members of the column joined this clash, including two Louisianan 
laborers named Corporal Charles Wood and Private Irving Charles. Lieutenants Seth Griffin and 
Frederick Smith arrived after hearing the shots. Coming to Heyl’s defense, Griffin fired at 
Bradford. The wounded sergeant then sliced open the lieutenant’s head from side to side with his 
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sabre, exposing Griffin's brain, a wound from which he died two days later. Company E rallied 
to help Bradford. Lt. Smith shot the sergeant twice, killing him. Irving Charles and Henry 
Johnson and a couple others swung their sabres at Smith in retaliation, wounding his arm. The 
lieutenant fired at this group too. As Charles put it, “because I was frightened and did not know 
which way to run,” he ran in multiple directions. With other officers approaching, the soldiers 
dispersed. Initially trying to reach the Louisiana border, by April 25, the starving mutineers 
eventually returned to San Pedro Springs, where they entered custody. Meanwhile, the remaining 
soldiers stayed in their ranks as the blades and bullets flew.314  
The military justice system pursued various paths to rectify the damage caused by the San 
Pedro Springs mutiny. In June, eight soldiers stood trial for mutiny. The judges distributed death 
sentences to all, which General Philip Sheridan endorsed. However, Judge Advocate General 
Joseph Holt recommended mercy for the convicted. He cited Lt. Heyl’s harsh treatment of his 
men and the command neglecting to read the articles of war, which mentioned proper redress of 
grievances. The words Holt used to describe Heyl's cruelty included "shocking,” "brutal 
tyranny," "savage treatment," "heartless," "disgraceful," and "ferocity." The statement continued, 
saying the mutineers rightfully thought their lives were in immediate danger. Due to 
contradictory testimony, Holt thought Corporal Wood’s acquittal was warranted. Private Charles 
also received the benefit of the doubt. The circumstances of the event, the judge advocate general 
contended, mitigated punishment for any offense derived from it, and since the defendants had 
already endured “anxiety and imprisonment,” they should only receive an “extremely light” 
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punishment. This persuaded Secretary of War Edwin Stanton to commute the sentences. Charles 
and Wood immediately returned to duty; the other six were released after only six months.315  
Meanwhile, Heyl only received a reprimand as discipline for his crimes. Merritt 
demanded a court-martial, but Sheridan and Grant feared that prosecuting Heyl would encourage 
greater insubordination in black units and damage the morale of their white officers. Instead, the 
two generals filled officer vacancies, which they blamed for the mutiny, and sent Heyl to another 
fort and under different superiors. Despite the lack of justice for Heyl, no subsequent evidence 
exists of him drunkenly abusing other black soldiers. He eventually won distinction for fighting 
Natives, served with the white Fourth U.S. Cavalry for fourteen years, and won a position in the 
inspector general’s office. As Charles Kenner points out, “it is an all too revealing commentary 
on the racist mores of the late nineteenth century that misbehavior as heinous as Heyl’s 
actions…would have so little impact on his subsequent career.” In another sign of the postbellum 
U.S. Army maintaining a rigid racial hierarchy based on discipline, it dismissed at least three 
officers in the Ninth Cavalry in the 1870s for fraternizing with enlisted men.316 That Heyl 
avoided punishment altogether while those who resisted his cruelty spent months in prison and 
something as minor as fraternization cost other officers their careers showcases how much work 
remained in the long emancipation process. Further, Sheridan and Grant misidentified the 
situation; it was by fostering a culture that tolerated abuse that black troops were more likely to 
mutiny. 
 
315 Proceedings of GCM, Trial of Charles Wood, OO-2488, RG 153, NARA; Trial of Irving Charles, OO-2301, 
Ibid.; Charles S. Kenner, Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry, 78-80, 326. Ironically, previously Holt 
had ensured that Henry Wirz, Andersonville’s superintendent, and Mary Surratt, mother of a John Wilks Booth 
accomplice, paid for their crimes with their lives. 
316 Charles S. Kenner, Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry, 79-82 (quote on 79); The Papers of 
Ulysses S. Grant: Volume 17: January 1-September 30, 1867, John Y. Simon, ed. (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), 434. For gambling or drinking with their enlisted men, these officers were 
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.  
248 
 
On the other hand, the military justice system was more forgiving towards this group of 
troops who endured officer abuse in mid-1867 than it was to another group in similar 
circumstances who rebelled two years prior. In 1865, Judge Advocate General William Coyl 
contended that the mutineers of the Twelfth USCHA, covered in Chapter 3, were subjected to the 
letter of military law regardless of the circumstances. By contrast, in 1867, a different judge 
advocate general recognized that barriers blocked the men’s complaint channels, necessitating a 
bending of official rules concerning the prosecution of mutiny. Though racism from commanders 
plagued African-American soldier life throughout the black freedom struggle, Holt’s handling of 
the San Pedro Springs mutiny suggested that with blacks becoming a permanent fixture of the 
postbellum U.S. Army, some whites were comprehending the ways in which this prejudice 
complicated day-to-day military life. Yet, the difference in these two cases could also stem from 
the same diversity in white racial attitudes that minimized or worsened the mutiny problem 
depending on the particular unit, personnel, location, and other factors.  
The San Pedro mutiny highlights the choices uniformed black men needed to make when 
whites abused their own. As African Americans made clear since the days of slavery, freedom 
meant avoiding physical abuse. Those who served as defense witnesses mostly denied the 
charges and specifications against their comrades. That defendants could receive remitted 
sentences and recognition of due process rights after enduring cruel abuse shows the process of 
emancipation in action despite its incomplete nature. Regardless of the disciplinary violation, 
black regulars generally supported each other against tyrannical officers.317 
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Black troops fighting to neutralize Native-American resistance to westward expansion 
continued to revolt against their own oppression into the 1870s. The Fort Stockton mutiny of 
July 1873 proved among the most prominent examples. A recent piece from anthropologist 
Nicholas Eskow accurately contends that this event “was not simply an act of defiance or 
resistance, but a symbolic assertion of fundamental rights of citizenship and personhood that 
included, but extended far beyond, the impulse for justice.” This chapter further demonstrates 
this theme by incorporating earlier analyses into the framework of the long emancipation.318 
At the time of the mutiny, 176 men from three companies—the Twenty-fifth Infantry’s F 
and K Companies and the Ninth Cavalry’s Company D—were stationed at Fort Stockton. This 
force consisted of Kentuckians and Virginians with a background in agricultural slave labor, 
northerners, and enlistees who had chosen a military career. The Ninth’s Captain Francis Dodge 
described his black soldiers’ conduct as “good” during the past spring and early summer. When 
this conduct changed, it surprised the commissioned officers and the fort’s post traders.319  
By mid-July, “trouble was brewing because of curious circumstance,” by which Dodge 
meant a backlash against a fatal case of medical neglect. The victim, Private John Taylor, was a 
Civil War veteran born in Fredericksburg, Virginia, who had enlisted in the Twenty-fifth 
Infantry in New Orleans in July 1870. On April 30, 1873, Taylor saw Post Surgeon Peter J. A. 
Cleary, who had a reputation for questioning the sincerity of patients, due to chest pain. The 
doctor gave the private medicine but denied him a medical excuse. Comrades secretly substituted 
for his guard duty. After two additional attempts at medical treatment for a “misery” in his head, 
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an angry Cleary sent him to the guard house for malingering. There, he suffered from intense 
heat, poor air circulation, and a lack of bedding. Soldiers heard Taylor thrash around and noticed 
him become “delirious.” As his condition worsened, on July 9, Clearly treated him for “affliction 
of the brain” and opium poisoning. Private Taylor died the next day. Other than an enlarged 
spleen, the doctors could only point to various mental conditions as causes of death. Due to the 
era’s scientific racism, Cleary based this conclusion on the notion that “many, if not most men of 
his race” were inherently superstitious.320 The treatment Taylor received was too little, too late. 
Accusing Dr. Cleary of murdering Pvt. Taylor, dozens of traumatized soldiers at Fort 
Stockton organized meetings to discuss a response. The men decided on writing a formal 
complaint to the adjutant general. Nearly three-quarters of the fort’s troops—129 of 180—signed 
the resulting petition. Violent language witnesses claimed to hear during one gathering brought 
this protest into mutinous territory. Though he did not attend the event, thirty-year-old Private 
Allen Crawford of North Carolina testified hearing incriminating statements from an unspecified 
location. According to Crawford, Sergeant Solomon Holloman suggested that “all the soldiers of 
the garrison should fall in and go up to Dr. Cleary's and take him and kill him, and cut his cock 
off, and tie him to the flag pole.” In this account, Jacob Lione and two or three others endorsed 
the macabre idea. Other alleged statements from the mutineers included that, “they needed no 
white officers to run the Post, and that they could do it themselves.”321  
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The majority shot down these brutal recommendations. Among them was John Thomas, 
who stated that “we can take it in a better way” through a joint-statement. Holloman agreed to 
retrieve the paper for the statement. Engaging in the peer pressure often seen in mutinies, 
Holloman reported hearing several including Jacob Lione threaten: "any man who would see his 
comrade murdered and would not sign for his rights ought to be murdered.” Sergeant Ellis 
Russell, George Ringold, and many others disagreed that any soldier should be forced to sign it. 
A committee consisting of Holloman, Ringold, Johnson, Houston Shelton, Russell, and 
Richardson collected statements regarding Cleary’s general mistreatment of troops.322  
Sergeant Russell and Private Houston Shelton assumed the task of writing and composing 
the document, which they completed the next day, July 12. A former farmer from New Bern, 
North Carolina, Russell enlisted in the Twenty-fifth Infantry in 1870 and resided in the Gulf 
Coast port town of Indianola, Texas. Russell and other attendees resolved to make their meeting 
public knowledge. In a show of their solidarity and their preference for a formal redress of their 
grievances, the soldiers’ letter began with the following: “We the undersigned enlisted men of 
this command have the honor of most respectfully calling the attention of the proper authorities 
(through the Department and Post Commander) to certain facts.” Later in the introduction, they 
described Dr. Cleary’s crime against Pvt. Taylor: “from malicious feelings of a personal nature,” 
the post surgeon “refused to give or allow him proper treatment.” The statement also demanded 
Cleary’s censure as well as a federal investigation. It revealed that over the past year, the doctor 
had committed, “abusive and harsh actions…towards the enlisted men of this post.” They added 
that, “not wishing to annoy our Superiors, we have born with it until now.” Since the Taylor 
tragedy “is of such a serious and aggravating nature…we think it worthy of the consideration of 
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the proper authorities.” On July 12, the troops met to listen to readings of the statement before 
signing it “round-robin” style to prevent anyone from disproportionate prosecution.323  
Dr. Cleary and the commissioned officers responded to the petition and to the aftermath 
of its signing. Cleary defended himself in a letter arguing that Taylor had proven to be a serial 
malingerer, making him untrustworthy. The post surgeon objected to the negligence charge, 
citing an honest misdiagnosis on his part and him repeatedly admitting Taylor to the hospital. 
While initially deeming it a justifiable response, most of the white officers began to develop 
concerns over the soldiers’ acute fury and organization in response to Taylor’s death. 
Commander of the Department of Texas, General C. C. Augur, reported that the “clannish 
and…excitable” nature of black troops put officers on perpetually high alert that “the 
whole…garrison” might revolt against them, “not as officers, but as white men.”324  
The extent to which the Fort Stockton mutineers seriously advocated violence is difficult 
to determine. Charles Kenner is correct that white officers exaggerated the threat posed by black 
men to their safety. The era’s whites often exhibited paranoia over potential racial violence. Yet, 
their fears might not have been fully unfounded. Court-martial testimony, if accurate, shows that 
at least a minority of the mutineers were angry enough to consider violence as an option. Taking 
into consideration other mutinies in which perpetrators discharged weapons, rhetorically invoked 
martial masculinity, and pressured comrades, it is perhaps surprising that the Fort Stockton 
 
323 Ibid., 21; Thomas, et. al. to AG, 12 July 1873, LR Dept. Tex., quoted in Ibid., 22-23; Ellis Russell Enlistment 
Record, Register of Enlistments in the U.S. Army, 1798-1914, National Archives Microfilm Publication M233, 
NARA, https://www.fold3.com. Dr. Clearly’s late-career decisions further demonstrated that he placed less value on 
non-white lives. In 1891, while treating a tuberculosis epidemic among Apaches in Alabama, he gave the patients 
minimal care and concluded that they merely needed to become more acclimated to recover. See Mary C. Gillett, 
The Army Medical Department 1865-1917 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1995), 82.  
324 Nicholas Eskow, “Sympathy for the Loss of a Comrade,” 23-25; Augur to Sheridan, August 5, 1873, LR, 3250 
AGO 1873, M-666, NARA (quotes); The Reminiscences of Major General Zenas R. Bliss, 1854-1876: From the 
Texas Frontier to the Civil War and Back Again, Thomas Ty Smith, Jerry Thompson, Robert Wooster, and Ben E. 
Pingenot, eds., (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2008), 5, 153. Regarding his order that soldiers “rub 
themselves with stones or” bricks, Cleary framed such guidance as sarcasm against those feigning illness. 
253 
 
episode did not escalate to bloodshed. On the other hand, the absence of one witness from the 
gathering at which he allegedly heard the most damning testimony invites skepticism. Maybe 
these witnesses sought to absolve themselves of suspicion by tapping into their officers’ worst 
fears. Regardless, the decision by African-American servicemen to advocate changes in military 
race relations by going outside the chain of command, even peacefully, fed the specter of black 
insurrection in U.S. culture and threatened officers’ absolute authority over the rank-in-file.325 
Further evidence justifying these worries accumulated at the fort. When Major M. L. 
Courtney told Peter Cook and Henry Johnson to remove their names, they refused, stating that 
they would accept the consequences and challenged the military hierarchy, elevating their own 
autonomy. While Johnson denied the value of an officers’ opinion, Cook stated that, “I prefer to 
decide the lawfulness of my acts.” Witnesses spoke of “constant talk among men of showing that 
they were not to be imposed upon.” This levelling rhetoric occupied mutinous territory.326  
Due to these circumstances, the commissioned officers met with the noncommissioned 
officers of each company to discuss how the protest movement violated Army regulations. The 
former reminded the latter of anti-mutiny provisions, as well as the prohibition of publicized and 
published discussions that judged the value of officers. If the petition signers removed their 
names, they would gain immunity from prosecution. The white officers gave them the benefit of 
the doubt regarding their knowledge of the dining hall meeting’s illegality or purpose. The 
commissioned officers assumed that numerous signees followed the lead of their corporals and 
sergeants. They added that Cleary’s diagnosis had medical corroboration and that the accusations 
of constant abuse were not previously known or were exaggerated. As Nicholas Eskow interprets 
it, “in urging people to disavow the letter they had signed,” the officers, feeling threatened at the 
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size of the protest, “were also attempting rob to this document of its legitimacy.” Many of the 
signers thought these officers were bluffing, doubting that the officers would try and execute 129 
men, hoping this solidarity would save them. However, twenty-six signees did agree to remove 
their name, often pleading ignorance of its contents and validity. A number later testified against 
their more determined comrades, from whom they felt a threat to their safety if they did not sign. 
Sergeant Holloman described the protest and threats on officers’ lives in terms of “they,” 
severing himself from the mutiny he helped orchestrate. Captain J. S. Tomkins was more 
sympathetic to the mutineers throughout, actively listening to the men and informing them of 
their activities’ unauthorized nature without asking them to remove their names. It was perhaps 
this approach that contributed to the enlisted men’s lack of defiant language made against him.327  
Captain Francis Dodge eventually restored order and began the process of formally 
punishing the mutineers. On July 18, he forwarded the letter to the assistant adjutant general, 
writing that the surgeon acted ordinarily and conclusively. Dodge bolstered the scientific racism 
theme when he asserted that “Colored troops are notorious for having ‘miseries’ in every part of 
their bodies, and if the Surgeon would excuse everyone who went to him for treatment, there 
would be very few left for duty.” Also, he added, the enlisted men failed to understand the 
situation and lacked the right to officially criticize a superior. Identifying a “unity of action” 
among the soldiers, Dodge feared the situation would become violent because he predicted that 
the petition would not be sufficient for the mutineers. Earlier black soldier mutinies fueled these 
fears of escalation, and the judge advocate expressed similar concerns because of “three cases of 
mutiny being already on record against colored troops.” After Dodge forwarded the letter, the 
fort’s commanders proceeded to arrest those who played the most active roles in the incident and 
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refused to remove their name. Next, the Department of Texas’ medical director transferred Peter 
Cleary to Fort Griffin. Twenty-one men, mostly noncommissioned officers, faced courts-martial 
between late August and early October 1873 for mutinous conduct, communication, and 
language. In their statement of final defense, the defendants revealed that “in signing the paper 
referred to in the Specifications, we were prompted solely by an earnest desire to secure what we 
believed to be our just rights.” They also informed the judges that they had refused to take their 
case to Dr. Cleary directly, instead preferring “a Complaint through the proper channel.” Further, 
they had refused to remove their signed names because it would constitute a denial of their 
charges. The statement concluded by attributing “any improper language” or misunderstanding 
of military regulations to their lack of sufficient educational opportunities.328  
After deliberating, the court made a language revision in the charges, downgrading them 
from “mutinous” to “unauthorized.” Some officers’ reports identified the event as only a protest 
that could have escalated into “a very serious mutiny” without their efforts to quell it. Chauncey 
McKeever, the Department of Texas’ assistant adjutant general, wrote that even if crafting the 
petition fell short of a mutiny, it represented “the next thing to it” because it encouraged 
violence. Though only a minority of the meeting attendees might have had bloody aims, 
McKeever added, that meant “no guarantee for the conduct of the many” regarding their 
“defiance of authority.” Of those tried, all were convicted. Twenty received prison sentences 
ranging from one to fifteen years along with a dishonorable discharge and pay forfeiture. Yet, in 
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the spring of 1874, citing a fair trial and sufficient punishment, Judge Advocate C. J. Smory of 
the Department of Texas ordered the Fort Stockton mutineers released.329 
While a fragmentary historical record often makes it difficult to reconstruct the post-
military lives of released mutineers, at least one from Fort Stockton left enough traces to show 
that he continued the struggle for the long emancipation. Ellis Russell, one of the petition’s 
drafters, moved to the rapidly developing town of Galveston, Texas. Here, he worked on cotton 
plantations and on the docks. By the 1880s, he became a prominent member of the community, 
pursuing careers as a postman, policeman, customs inspector, and insurance agent. Moreover, 
this period saw him become a protege of Norris Wright Cuney, an African-American political 
figure who helped organize, and championed higher wages for, black longshoremen. In these 
efforts, Cuney clashed with white unions. Both men shared membership in Texas’ black 
Freemason community, which participated in postbellum black political struggles and faced 
discrimination from white Masons. In a sign of black solidarity, Russell maintained a long-life 
friendship with fellow Fort Stockton mutineer George Ringold. To further show his commitment 
to the long emancipation, Russell drew on the Haitian Revolution when naming his sons, 
Toussaint L. and Louverture. After unsuccessfully pursuing justice for a victim of white cruelty 
and apathy, Russell spent his life assisting the cause of socioeconomic and political justice.330   
The Fort Stockton mutiny reminds us of the difficulty in determining what constitutes a 
mutiny. Those who did not classify this case as one could cite the lack of physical force or a 
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work stoppage. However, the extreme language white superiors and black non-mutineers cited, 
the reported intimidation of non-participants, the initial charges of mutinous actions, and the dark 
anticipations of most officers, along with the human rights for which the defendants fought, 
warrants this event’s inclusion in the narrative of black soldier mutinies during the long 
emancipation process. A key factor was the perception among officers that the enlistees were 
undermining their authority and improperly assuming such power for themselves. 
The Fort Stockton mutiny of mid-summer 1873 shares elements of earlier black soldier 
mutinies while also suggesting that these rebellions were becoming more organized. These 
Buffalo Soldiers’ use of the verb “imposed upon” to refer to the tyrannical abuse of white 
superiors matches the rhetoric of Civil War and immediate postbellum mutineers. The old 
African-American tradition of violent resistance thus consistently identified whites imposing 
their will on blacks as a main threat. Like 1860s mutineers sent to prison, the mutineers of the 
1870s only served a fraction of their original sentence, proving that a military uniform still 
afforded black men greater protection of legal rights. Yet, the peer pressure against non-
mutineers at Fort Stockton was more widespread than that of early cases in which one individual 
shamed passive responses to white officer abuse in the mid-1860s. Nearly three-quarters of a 
garrison agreed to formally, non-violently protest an injustice by circumventing their superiors 
and thereby overturning military hierarchy. This action went beyond the San Pedro mutineers’ 
march to complain to a commissioned officer. To be sure, the equal pay struggle of the Civil War 
years also united entire units or close to it, such as the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Massachusetts.  
Yet, by the time of the Fort Stockton incident, the early 1870s, African Americans were 
building on the foundations they constructed under slavery in the areas of organized self-
government. As Stephen Hahn informs us, bondspeople acted politically by operating 
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communication networks across plantations and organizing communities based on kinship, work, 
leadership, and stealthy religious behavior. The Civil War enabled freedpeople to experiment 
with self-government while congregating in contraband camps and enlisting in the USCTs. After 
the Union triumphed and the peculiar institution collapsed, blacks registered to vote, won public 
office, electorally mobilized, participated in state constitutional conventions, and orchestrated the 
passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. Moreover, they reunited families shattered from 
slave sales and formed independent churches, legal marriages, and labor unions. African-
American men who enlisted in the Buffalo Soldiers brought with them their people’s experience 
in more formal organization that Radical Reconstruction had emboldened them to undertake.331  
There are signs from the Fort Stockton mutiny that black mutineer demands were 
becoming more ambitious. Regarding the comment that the troops could run the fort without 
white officers, this case saw black soldiers pursue a greater levelling of the military’s racial 
hierarchy. No longer did black soldiers frustrated with racist abuse merely demand more just 
treatment from white officers that properly recognized their masculinity, humanity, and 
citizenship rights; now they began concluding that the only effective solution was the elimination 
of white command of black units altogether. The persistence of white abuse of black soldiers 
almost a decade after the end of the Civil War drove some to the realization that a racial 
hierarchy built within the military command structure could not be reformed, but only 
eliminated. It is perhaps no coincidence that a controversy regarding racial discrimination in 
officer commissions heated up a year after the Fort Stockton mutiny.332 Foreshadowing the 
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Spanish-American War’s “Mutinous Sixth,”333 this 1873 incident reveals that African Americans 
recognized that to more thoroughly protect their bodies from white control, they should deny 
whites the ability to command them in a rigid hierarchy. Following the Twenty-fifth’s lead, in 
December 1886, enlistees in the Twenty-fourth Infantry, stationed at Fort Elliot in North Texas, 
held a parliamentary gathering to resolve their own troubles autonomously.334 
As nineteenth-century African-American scholarship in general and black soldier 
mutinies in particular show, deprivation of personal and bodily autonomy and barriers to social 
advancement constituted some of the main grievances of the black freedom struggle. At Fort 
Stockton, soldiers thought Private Taylor and anyone else who visited Doctor Cleary suffered a 
similar injustice because they involuntarily returned to work before the completion of their 
recovery. Comparing Cleary’s medical care and Dodge’s dismissal of black knowledge over 
their own medical needs to slavery’s racial hierarchy, Nicholas Eskow described the doctor-
patient relationship at Fort Stockton as one under which “the Black man had no real authority 
over his own body, and was not competent enough even to understand his own health.”335 
The Fort Stockton mutiny exists within the broader history of medical neglect and abuse 
in the nineteenth century’s African-American units, dating back to the USCTs. In July 1864, an 
orderly sergeant in the First U.S. Colored Infantry named George W. Hatton suffered an example 
in a hospital after incurring a wound at Petersburg, to which he ascribed significance for the 
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broader cause of black freedom. For him, the “great wound” from which he agonized was a 
doctor’s decision to ban him from going home to visit his parents on a furlough, like white 
soldiers could. He reflected on the past and on the future: “Such deception as that I thought was 
crucified at the battle of Fort Wagner [July 18, 1863]; buried at Milliken’s Bend [June 7, 1863]; 
rose the third day, and descended into everlasting forgetfulness in the Appomattox River at the 
battle of Petersburg.” He asked, “when, oh! when can one of my color, and in my position, at this 
time, find a comforter? When will my people be a nation? I fear, never on the American soil; 
though we may crush this cursed rebellion.” Hatton’s prediction that the Union winning the Civil 
War was more likely than blacks enjoying a full emancipation proved prophetic.336  
To be sure, other Buffalo Soldiers praised their medical care. While it may reflect the 
relatively greater opportunities for black soldiers and/or the medical advancements of the end of 
the nineteenth century, in 1899, Sergeant Major Edward L. Baker, Jr., of the Tenth Cavalry, 
described the enlisted man’s health as “far better in service than out.” His “medicines are of the 
modern character and medical attendance comprises the very best surgical skill.” Also, Baker 
documents a welter of educational resources on Army posts, another improvement from Fort 
Stockton in the early 1870s. Further, while the Twenty-fifth Infantry’s John Taylor died from 
medical skepticism and racism, George Washington of the Tenth Cavalry, who served between 
1867 and 1875, received continuous proper treatment for asthma by doctors.337 
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A Ninth U.S. Cavalry private’s rebellion against a white noncommissioned officer in the 
next decade helps determine whether the Fort Stockton incident suggested a trend of greater 
militancy by the late nineteenth century. As Buffalo Soldiers scholar Frank Shubert introduces 
the episode: "a new generation of black soldier was emerging in the 1880s, a group of men who 
would not tolerate the bullying leadership style of men like" the sergeant discussed hereafter.338   
In August 1884, newly enlisted Private Edward Hamilton, a twenty-two-year-old miner 
from Barboursville, West Virginia, charged First Sergeant Emanuel Stance with “always pecking 
after me and using abusive language towards me, and did ill treat me in various ways.” Since the 
sergeant denied him permission to state his grievances to the commander, Hamilton concluded 
“that there was no justice, or that I had no rights that he (the 1st Sergt.) was bound to respect.” 
He felt that he lacked any other recourse. Upon enlistment and in his short period of service, the 
Army told him that he would “be treated as a man” if “I behaved myself and performed all duties 
required.” Yet, his superiors did nothing as he endured constant abuse. He proclaimed that it was 
“very hard for a man to be called a Black son-of-a-bitch, threatened with bodily injury, and you 
have your brains knocked out, and not allowed to speak.” For trying to "assert my rights," he 
received a prison sentence. Meanwhile, his abuser suffered no consequences.339  
In contrast to the Fort Stockton mutiny, this case suggests more continuity than change. 
The example of a single mutineer standing up to abuse is more in line with older forms of overt 
black resistance than the Fort Stockton incident. Given the times in which he lived and his 
response to undesirable circumstances, the mutinous cavalryman likely would have felt both the 
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promises and disappointments that the black freedom struggle faced between the mid- and late 
nineteenth century. Born at the start of the Civil War, he grew up amidst the country's move from 
slavery to Redemption. It is possible he was less patient than the black troops of the 1860s, who 
did not yet experience Reconstruction’s collapse, but his actions and language resembled 
rebellious slaves and the mutineers of the Texas Expedition and San Pedro Springs. Like 
predecessors, Private Hamilton desired recognition of his full manhood as a soldier, and when 
denied that status, he felt obligated to fight for it instead of remaining passive. To the extent that 
African-American soldiers were becoming more militant, the first generation of blacks who grew 
up after slavery knew that resisting relics of bondage such as white abuse was all the more 
important as they hoped to do what their parents could not: establish a lasting biracial 
democracy. Fortunately for Hamilton, the Army permitted him to rejoin the ranks after his 
sentence rather than face the shame and poverty that accompanied a dishonorable discharge. In 
the 1880s, black soldiers still enjoyed legal rights, just as they had not yet lost the franchise.340 
To be sure, African-American historians have demonstrated that this generation 
developed a reputation among whites for being more “uppity” than their formerly enslaved 
parents. As one Nashville-based black newspaper editor put it in 1889, “We are not the Negro 
from whom the chains of slavery fell a quarter of a century ago…We…being the equal of whites, 
should be treated as such.” Pronouncements like this motivated southern states to pass 
disenfranchisement and segregation laws and to foster lynching outbreaks. To incentivize blacks 
to recognize their proper place via carrots instead of sticks, Confederate veterans pushed for the 
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granting of pensions to former camp servants who exhibited loyalty to their masters during the 
Civil War and who replicated this role at veteran reunions.341  
However, during the same period that saw figures like Lieutenant Heyl, Surgeon Cleary, 
and Sergeant Stance inspire rebellions against their sadism, a number of white officers in the 
Buffalo Soldier regiments, defended their troops’ welfare. Colonel William R. Shafter, 
commander of the Twenty-fourth U.S. Infantry, respected and defended his men from racist 
harassment. When stage coaches denied them service, he successfully demanded a reversal in 
policy in his characteristically blunt, threatening tone, and when civilian authorities tried 
arresting one of his men for intoxication, Shafter refused to turn him over, deeming the 
attempted arrest “legal hazing.” This protection of his black troops cost him command of Fort 
Davis and likely delayed subsequent promotions.342 While abusive officers could expect revolt in 
the ranks, commanders like Shafter earned enough respect to avoid it.  
To fully understand the racial climate in which Buffalo Soldier mutinies against 
tyrannical officers operated, one should inspect violent examples of military-civilian relations in 
the West, especially Texas. Black U.S. troops found this region’s white towns to be just as 
hostile to them as those of the South. Frank Schubert accurately describes Texas as the place 
where “the unreconstructed South met the untamed West.” Historians have also wondered 
whether Texas’ reputation for disproportionately mistreating black troops derives from its status 
as not just a regional borderland within the U.S., but also an international one encompassing the 
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often politically unstable countries of northern Latin America. When one factors in the explosion 
of USCT mutinies in response to their forced relocation from Virginia to the Lone Star State to 
potentially intervene in Mexico, the transnational interpretation carries weight and also compels 
us to extend the narrative to the 1860s. Most importantly, white citizens’ racial prejudices 
clashed with black men’s expectations of equal treatment due U.S. servicemen.343 
The race riot form of Buffalo Soldier resistance became more prominent than standard 
mutinies against officers over the course of the half century after San Pedro Springs. Before 
1890, five mutinies and three race riots occurred; the post-1890 years saw four actual or planned 
race riots and one episode in which soldiers revolted against both military and civilian 
personnel.344 While officer cruelty could become an issue at any time or location in the regular 
Army’s area of operations in the West, civilian hostility in the context of Jim Crow’s rise and 
officers’ negligence in protecting their enlistees occupied the bulk of Buffalo Soldiers’ attention. 
Buffalo Soldiers’ rebellions against civilians often saw the former shoot up a business or 
section of town when whites in the targeted location previously mistreated a comrade. In the 
early Reconstruction South, the soldiers-vs.-civilians form of race riot consisted of spontaneous 
confrontations in which troops engaged in self-defense. In the late-nineteenth-century West, by 
contrast, race riots entailed an initial clash or instance of civilian harassment followed by a 
retaliatory raid from the soldiers. This second step suggested greater organization and 
coordination among rebellious enlistees who acted independent from officers. 
The frequency with which the Buffalo Soldiers conducted uprisings against civilians 
conjures the terminological issue. While these incidents fall outside of most definitions of 
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“mutiny,” vengeful acts against white officers and white communities served the same ultimate 
goal of completing the long emancipation by forcing obstacles to it to surrender through 
collective or individual acts of protest and/or violence that broke established laws. The source of 
injustice proved mostly irrelevant, since these U.S. soldiers expected respect from both the 
superiors under whom they served and the civilians for whom they served. One can see the 
clashes between white civilians and Buffalo Soldiers in late-nineteenth-century Texas as a 
continuation of Reconstruction violence as well as an accompaniment to Jim Crow-era race riots. 
These race riots have origins in the late Redemption years. In the late 1870s, members of 
the Tenth U.S. Cavalry retaliated against white civilian abuse in San Angelo, Texas. In 1877, 
Texas Rangers spotted Buffalo Soldiers drinking and dancing with local women. Angry at the 
presence of uniformed black men in a leisurely setting, the rangers pistol-whipped the troops. 
When the Tenth’s commander, Benjamin Grierson, demanded an apology from the rangers’ 
captain, the latter defended the right of his men to attack the entire Army garrison at Fort 
Concho. In response, the soldiers returned to the saloon armed and opened fire on the 
establishment, killing a bystander. At another saloon the following year, a group of white hunters 
cut off Sergeant George Goldspy’s stripes and mocked him. The sergeant returned with some 
comrades, who fired their carbines at the hunters. In the resulting firefight, one civilian and 
Private John L. Brown died, while two whites and one black soldier suffered wounds. These 
fortunate troops avoided legal punishment. In both cases, Grierson defended his men. He refused 
to apologize to the Texas Rangers’ Captain John Sparks, worked with the state adjutant general 
to fire Sparks, and denied Sparks’ replacement jurisdiction when he tried arresting Goldspy. 
While the civil judiciary indicted nine cavalrymen for murder, they avoided trial. Into the late 
nineteenth century, black soldiers felt insulted by fellow Americans who infringed on their 
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freedom to enjoy themselves on their off time and to proudly display ranks earned through merit. 
To defend their worthiness for rights under siege, they brought literal war to offenders.345 
In this particular time and place, the Tenth Cavalry rebelled against civil law and 
American society, not their military command structure. Unlike their comrades in the Ninth 
Cavalry a decade ago, these men possessed no need to mutiny against a cruel officer. Regardless 
of their target, the Army’s black resisters used the methods of martial masculinity to fight for 
greater recognition of their freedom. In contrast to these troops enjoying a commander who 
shielded them from prosecution, whenever a later generation of Buffalo Soldiers did battle with 
the non-military legions of white supremacy, they could expect certain punishment.  
The Tenth Cavalry started a trend. Buffalo Soldier raids retaliating against a comrade’s 
lynching fueled a broader effort that included vigilante revenge from black civilian bands, 
accounts of which predominated during the 1880s. In Athens, Georgia, in mid-July 1884, 
African Americans threatened to burn the town in retaliation after a police lieutenant received a 
“justifiable homicide” ruling for killing Sam Taylor when he refused to leave a sidewalk and 
resisted a beating. December 1889 saw black Georgians strike white policemen with their own 
clubs when the latter tried arresting the former for drunkenness. Black communities used armed 
self-defense for their right to peaceably assemble and engage in leisure.346   
Amidst the documented riots in which African Americans banded to protect themselves, 
rumors of widespread African-American campaigns of death, fire, and screams spread. During a 
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discussion of an 1879 incident where whites conducted a rampage against blacks who 
congregated and possessed weapons, the Waterloo Courier remarked that “such…is the dread of 
a negro-rising in the South, that the mere rumor that armed negros are assembling is enough to 
convulse whole counties with terror and fury.” An 1882 report spoke of whites in places like 
northern Alabama and Oxford, Mississippi, who “were scared almost to death…they would be 
murdered before morning.” The ways in which black insurrections tormented the white 
imagination compare with the specter of slave revolts in the antebellum era. The postbellum 
version of this specter found fuel through the greater ability of African Americans, civilian and 
military, to engage in armed self-defense during the period. It is likely that news of Buffalo 
Soldier vengeance made many white communities frightened that they would be next.347 
African-American socioeconomic and political successes in the post-slavery era further 
fueled these fears, birthing Jim Crow. The rise of a black middle class in cities making up the 
New South made whites terrified for the safety of white women intermingling with imaginary 
black rapists. Also, the maintenance of black voting blocs two decades after Redemption and the 
Populist Party’s biracial challenge to southern Democrats resurrected white fears about “Negro 
Rule.” Conservative whites responded by disenfranchising black men and segregating their 
towns, public services, and institutions. Simultaneously, a lynching epidemic took off, which 
extinguished several thousand black lives by mid-century. This occurrence disproved Booker T. 
Washington’s doctrine of blacks earning rights through economic uplift and motivated a segment 
of the black population to assume W.E.B. Du Bois’s mantle of agitation for full equality. Jim 
Crow-era mutinies and race riots shed additional light on the effectiveness of either approach to 
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civil rights. The long emancipation period taught black men that merely enlisting in the military 
was not enough to foster a widespread white commitment to full equality.348  
In the face of a new racial caste system, the Buffalo Soldiers maintained the old tradition 
of violent black resistance. If a lynch mob targeted anyone in the four Buffalo Soldier regiments, 
guilty white communities could expect swift and severe retribution. In an era during which black 
citizenship rights contracted, some African Americans believed that overt action was needed 
more than ever to finally establish racial equality in U.S. society. It was in this disturbing context 
that members of the Ninth Cavalry threatened to unleash a Haitian-style black insurrection on the 
town of Crawford, Nebraska, after one of their comrades almost became another lynching victim. 
Not all African Americans during the Jim Crow period agreed with the path chosen by 
mutineers and rioters. Black Lt. John H. Alexander took an accommodationist approach towards 
racism in the Army. To avoid any possible conflict, he merely declined invitations to dine with 
white officers. He received praise and recognition as a “manly” and “courteous” officer for 
performing his duty in this manner. For him, to challenge racism was “painful” and “fruitless.”349 
Despite the accommodationist choice of some, other African Americans emerged from 
the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars even less tolerant of white racism. While 
earlier African-American troops knew slavery firsthand, the black men growing up after 
bondage’s death had reached adulthood. This new generation had helped secure the West and 
pursued opportunities offered by the era’s industrializing, urbanizing economy. When war in the 
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Caribbean and west Pacific broke out, African Americans in general and the Buffalo Soldiers in 
particular were among the surge of recruits. During their service, these black troops earned 
thirty-six medals, including six Medals of Honor, and enjoyed laudatory attention from 
journalists and commanders. They won distinction especially for helping Teddy Roosevelt’s 
Rough Riders win battles and capturing Spanish positions under heavy fire. The white poet B. M. 
Channing captured the praise even racists gave black soldiers when he wrote a poem about the 
Tenth Cavalry: “We used to think the negro didn’t count for very much/ But we’ve got to 
reconstruct our views on color…Read the story of his courage/ The story of the Tenth at La 
Quasina!” According to this poem, black men had met all requirements for racial equality.350  
Yet, black troops returning from the conflicts of 1898-1902 found their hopes for greater 
acceptance and expanded rights as a reward for their service dashed, causing the first two 
decades of the twentieth century to be characterized by acute racial tensions that eventually 
reached a boiling point. Despite African-American sacrifices on battlefields for thirty years, 
white civilians continued to oppose the stationing of black forces in and around their 
communities. Throughout the country, episodes of racial violence increased qualitatively and 
quantitatively in the early twentieth century. Buffalo Soldiers had long waged their own war 
against racism, but the unique climate of Jim Crow and international military intervention added 
extra doses of impatience, solidarity, and assertiveness. Though a dark period in U.S. race 
relations, as Garna Christian describes it, this was also “a story of loft aspiration too long 
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delayed, of the transformation of an obsequious race into a self-confident people, and the 
righteous attempt, sometimes mistaken in its approach, to realize the American Dream.”351  
The Brownsville Affair of August 1906 reveals that as the country plunged deeper into 
the Jim Crow era, white supremacy became more pervasive in the Army. No longer the relative 
bastion of black legal rights that it had been since the Civil War, the branch began engaging in 
just as great, if not greater, acts of injustice than civilian society. That their superiors now 
assumed them to be guilty, no matter how weak the evidence, revealed that the emancipation 
process was in free fall. The Twenty-fifth U.S. Infantry regiment learned this painful lesson.  
After serving with distinction in the Cuban and Philippine conflicts, over the next couple 
years, the Twenty-fifth resumed peacetime duties at western garrisons. They initially received 
rare positive media coverage. While stationed in Nebraska for a rifle competition in the summer 
of 1904, a local paper complimented these troops as “the better class of their race,” men who 
proved themselves less prone to “disturbance and noise” than white soldiers. Following the  
closure of the Nebraska garrison, Companies B, C, and D replaced the white Twenty-sixth 
Infantry at Fort Brown in Brownsville, Texas, along the U.S.-Mexican border and Gulf Coast.352 
Despite a warm welcome in Nebraska, when the Twenty-fifth entered southeastern 
Texas, all-too-familiar mistreatment awaited it. Brownsville’s white residents sent protests to the 
War Department, which Secretary William H. Taft ignored. After arriving, soldiers received 
racial slurs and accusations of violating white womanhood. Policemen assaulted troops for 
physical contact with white women, intoxication, and verbally questioning segregation laws. As 
Sergeant Major Vance Marchbanks noted, the presence of armed blacks meant that whites could 
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not “carry out their favorite sport”—lynching—causing them to lash out at this challenge to the 
South’s racial code. On the night of August 13, nine to twenty unidentified men discharged 
several hundred bullets near the fort’s walls and towards the lit portions of the town. The ten-
minute attack killed a bartender and wounded a policeman and a book editor. Fort Brown’s 
officers immediately conducted a roll call, which found every enlisted man present.353  
Two narratives developed regarding the incident. One arose from the town, which Army 
commanders and the government endorsed; another came from the enlisted men. The white 
citizenry immediately assumed the men of the Twenty-fifth Infantry were the raiders. They cited 
the following evidence: claimed sightings, the similarity between the sounds of the shots in the 
raid and those made by the Army’s Springfield rifles, and the racial tensions leading up to the 
act. However, no witness could identify a single suspect. According to sentinel guard Private 
Joseph Howard and post scavenger Matias Tamayo, the shots came from outside their garrison. 
These two, plus Major Penrose, assumed a white mob was attacking them. Commissioned and 
noncommissioned officers confirmed that the men’s weapons had not been recently used. Yet, 
the city found cartridges on the scene, which persuaded Major Penrose of the troops’ guilt. The 
alarmed community and Texas’ senators pleaded for the government to replace the black troops 
with white ones. Steeped in conservative racial views, the press deemed the raid’s motive as 
retaliation against mistreatment and discrimination. A Roosevelt administration investigation 
refused to condemn the chronic police brutality against the black soldiers. Placing the incident in 
the context of African-American vigilance against Jim Crow, it further noted that “the colored 
soldier is much more aggressive in his attitude on the social equality question than he used to 
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be.” One Army chaplain captured a familiar theme in the history of black resistance in the U.S. 
Army, acknowledging that since “the soldiers could get no redress…they shot up the town.” 
Meanwhile, in their counter-narrative, the accused maintained their innocence their entire 
lives.354  
The experience of those allegedly involved in the Brownsville incident in the civilian and 
military criminal justice systems constituted a reversal of how the two tended to operate. Despite 
the lack of evidence, Texas Rangers arrested twelve garrison soldiers. Honoring the desire of 
white Brownsvillians, President Teddy Roosevelt ordered the suspects moved to Fort Sam 
Houston to await civil prosecution and the rest of the First Battalion to Fort Reno, Oklahoma. 
While the judge in the case described them as people with “hearts blacker than their skins,” the 
grand jury failed to indict the men following a three-week civil investigation. For a white grand 
jury in the Jim Crow era to exonerate black suspects was extraordinary, a testament to the sheer 
dearth of evidence. However, the U.S. high command was determined to punish them; the twelve 
suspects remained in Army custody. The president sent War Department Inspector General 
Ernest Garlington to the forts. If he could not persuade the men to identify guilty parties, “orders 
will be issued…discharging every man in Companies B, C, and D [First Battalion], without 
honor.” The men refused to cooperate. The inspector general observed that the men “stand 
together in a determination to resist the detection of the guilty.” The federal government thus 
weaponized these soldiers’ solidarity against them. On November 4, Roosevelt followed through 
on his dismissal threat. One hundred and sixty-seven men returned to civilian life in shame.355  
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The national response to the controversial decision highlighted the social and political 
concerns of African Americans and their white allies during the turn of the century. African 
Americans nationwide responded with outrage. The Atlanta Independent captured black 
sentiments when it proclaimed the dismissal a “flagrant violation of our constitutional rights” 
comparable to “lynch-law.” The Colored American Magazine published the following poem 
honoring the dismissed soldiers’ refusal to betray their comrades: “‘Now tell who did the 
shooting And how it all begun’/ But not one word escaped their lips/ That noble band stood 
mum/ You are discharged, every man of you, Dishonored and disgraced. Ah, but who can say 
dishonor/ When men stand by their comrades For the protection of their life.” Participants in the 
backlash reminded Roosevelt that his occupation of the White House resulted from the service of 
Spanish-American War troops of African descent. They also lambasted Secretary Taft for 
assisting white soldiers who fired on Athens, Ohio, in 1904 for non-racial motivations but 
refusing to do the same for the black troops of Brownsville in 1906. A Senate Military Affairs 
Committee demanded justification for the president punishing soldiers absent a trial. However, a 
majority of the senators agreed with the decision. Attempting to appease critics, Roosevelt 
allowed the dismissed men to appeal for reenlistment and reopened them to civil service 
employment. In early 1910, the War Department only permitted fourteen soldiers to re-enlist.356 
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The troops involved kept the memory of the incident alive. Dorsie Willis, the last 
surviving discharged soldier, remarked in 1972 on why they went silent afterward. He explained 
that “None of us said anything because we didn’t have anything to say. It was a frameup through 
and through.” The rhetoric decrying the president’s order persisted into the civil rights era.357 
Until the civil rights movement, historians generally agreed with the town’s interpretation 
of the Brownsville affair. Yet, since the early 1970s, scholarship and public opinion has 
vindicated the First Battalion. This shift in opinion led to President Richard Nixon and Congress 
agreeing to convert the discharges into honorable ones and to grant a pension to Willis. The 
latest scholarly consensus holds that the Army’s treatment of the Brownsville soldiers was 
arbitrary and a function of the country’s dominant white supremacist culture.358 
Beyond the legal injustice itself, the story of Dorsie Willis allows one to more fully 
examine the setback this discharge inflicted on blacks’ long-term struggle for the full 
implementation of their emancipation. Growing up in a sharecropper family, Willis exemplified 
how many black men used military service for their own uplift from a socioeconomic 
arrangement that mocked their free status. As all convicted mutineers, proven and unproven 
alike, learned afterward, the dishonorable discharge from the military upset their material well-
being, forcing them to perform menial jobs for the rest of their lives. While Willis eventually 
won a $25,000 settlement decades later, it was too little, too late for the former soldier, who at 
age eighty-eight continued to shine shoes in a Minneapolis barbershop. Willis reflected on the 
damage his dismissal did to him. Believing that the “world owed me an opportunity to earn a 
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living,” the discharge “kept me from improving my life.” A half century after the USCTs helped 
destroy slavery, the dream of economic independence remained elusive for African Americans 
living in a white supremacist society, whether they committed a revolt or not.359 
Regardless of their guilt level, every member in the First Battalion exhibited a 
commitment to preventing a single comrade from suffering the shame and harm of prosecution. 
Depending on what really happened that summer night, they protected the right of comrades to 
possess enough due process protections to avoid becoming a scapegoat. Such an action exposed 
how greatly the Buffalo Soldiers, at least in the Twenty-fifth, had become a united front since the 
Fort Stockton mutiny thirty years prior. The coordination this group displayed was non-mutinous 
in nature, but the determination to risk one’s own livelihood to avoid collaborating in someone 
else’s civil rights violation mirrors the disregard mutineers had for their lives. The government’s 
decision to convict them via executive, not judicial, action, illustrated the extent to which the 
emancipation process regressed at this time. That black due process rights lost enforcement in 
the Army, where black servicemen traditionally enjoyed greater legal protection than did civilian 
counterparts, mirrors the parallel reduction in black civil rights in the country, especially the 
South, generally. These trends demonstrate the influence society had on the military it birthed.360 
 
359 John D. Weaver, The Senator and the Sharecropper’s Son, xii-xvi, 212-213 (quotes). 
360 A supposed act of revenge for the mass dismissal in late 1906 presented a sequel to this narrative of racial 
violence, unclear happenings, and questionable implementation of justice. While the regiment was stationed in Fort 
Reno, Oklahoma, on the evening of December 21, 1906, someone in military clothing and a covered face attempted 
an armed robbery of post funds at the home of Captain Macklin, who had slept through the summer affair. After 
injuring Macklin, the perpetrator promptly fled. Most observers used the assailant’s military clothing and knowledge 
of post funds to claim that he was one of the Brownsville raiders. Once again, everyone was present in a subsequent 
roll call. Two brothers discovered an Army jacket floating in a nearby creek with insignia removed and containing 
five cartridges, a blood stain, and the initials E. L. K. The finding led to the arrest of Corporal Edward L. Knowles. 
Despite his presence at roll call, a court-martial ruled him guilty of attempted murder and theft, despite Macklin’s 
inability at trial to either positively recognize the defendant or establish previous association. As a member of 
Company A, Corporal Knowles was never stationed at Fort Brown. The court dishonorably discharged Knowles and 
sentenced him to fifteen years of hard labor. See Garna Christian, Black Soldiers in Jim Crow Texas, 87-91. 
276 
 
The decades-long trends of the Buffalo Soldiers mutinying against reviled officers, 
combating antagonistic white civilians, becoming ever more organized in their resistance 
methods, and serving amidst their country’s transition from Redemption to Jim Crow climaxed 
in the single most violent case of African-American soldier resistance to white supremacy: the 
Houston Riot of 1917. On the dark, rainy night of August 23 and early morning of August 24, 
members of the Twenty-fourth U.S. Infantry’s Third Battalion engaged in actions that contained 
elements of both a mutiny and a race riot, blurring the boundary between two similar types of 
rebellion that had served identical goals.361 This bloody affair can only be fully understood in the 
context of the black regulars’ entire history of conflict with white mistreatment.  
The sheer scope of brutality featured in Houston has made the event the most famous 
single rebellion in Buffalo Soldier historiography. It was not until the publication of works by 
Arthur Barbeau, Florette Henri, and Robert Haynes in the 1970s that scholarship treated the 
revolt less sensationally than the journalists who initially reported on it. According to the older 
view, the mutineers implemented a conspiracy to enact revenge that used the fear of a white mob 
as a bogus excuse. C. Calvin Smith’s recent reading of the riot’s documentation counters that the 
event constituted a spontaneous reaction to weeks of white supremacist verbal and physical 
abuse and a valid fear of racial mob violence, a view articulated by the men’s defense during 
their court-martial. Branching out temporally, Garna L. Christian’s 1995 monograph links the 
1917 Houston Riot and earlier episodes of racial violence in Texas.362  
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A fresher look at the evidence merges and revises in part the arguments of Smith and 
Christian while also stretching the event’s origins earlier, into the Buffalo Soldiers’ nineteenth-
century founding. As the current work has shown, African-American troops across several 
decades chose to rebel under circumstances that the Twenty-fourth stationed near Houston in the 
late summer of 1917 would have found familiar: after weeks or months of miseries plaguing 
troops’ lives, long-festering animosities exploded. They indeed were spontaneously responding 
to worries of white mob violence in self-defense, but the often indiscriminatory targeting of 
white citizens and stated desires to avenge a slain comrade suggest that an element of organized 
retribution existed. This is especially so considering that vengeance was a factor that repeatedly 
drove previous Buffalo Soldiers to shoot up a location that harmed a comrade. 
Examining an African-American soldier revolt during the First World War builds upon 
recent scholarship highlighting the connection long neglected in the historiography between the 
conflict and the black freedom struggle. The experience of the conflict repeated lessons from 
previous wars. In the follow up to the U.S. entry into World War I, African-American leaders 
again hoped that black military service would finally convince white America to endorse their 
emancipationist vision of a biracial democracy that recognized blacks’ manhood and worthiness 
for citizenship. Yet, the arrival of armed, proud black men demanding equality sparked yet 
another backlash from the upholders of the racial caste system. The Great Migration of rural 
black southerners to northern cities in pursuit of higher-paying industry jobs led to white 
neighbors attacking black workers and banning them from unions. Southern congressmen 
sponsored legislation that would have blocked black enlistment. While Secretary of War Newton 
D. Baker defeated this effort, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) confined most black 
troops to non-combat labor roles such as burial duty and unloading ships. Barred from fighting 
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the Kaiser, those stationed stateside instead confronted their top domestic enemy, Jim Crow. To 
prevent the certainty of racial tensions resulting from stationing black troops in the South, the 
Army’s high command decided against placing them there. However, Baker reversed this course, 
citing his philosophy that the War Department had no responsibility to settle the “race question,” 
instead advising units to use “discretion and judgement” to minimize problems. The policy’s 
failure to prevent the riot confirmed the initial fears among the high brass. Still committed to 
white supremacy, mainstream society ignored blacks’ contributions to the war effort, leading two 
scholars to label these members of the “lost generation” as the “unknown soldiers.” The dashing 
of the latest hopes for a full emancipation made black mutinies likely in Great War America.363   
The racial problems in Houston began when the unit’s six hundred forty-five men 
relocated from New Mexico on July 28, 1917, to guard an ongoing construction project at Camp 
Logan, just west of the city. The men’s superiors sent them into an area that staunchly opposed 
their mere presence, expected their subservience, and refused to assist black military police. Such 
circumstances clashed with the pride and militance black men developed while serving in the 
Army since the Civil War. Black Houstonians were fully aware of what awaited the Twenty-
fourth. This included the physician who once told the NAACP that he wondered whether he was 
leaving home for the last time every time he stepped outside, or the minister who attested to how 
“law abiding citizens feared the police in getting over the city at night more than they feared the 
highwaymen.” These black troops in particular had grown accustomed to relatively better 
treatment outside the Lone Star State, giving them heightened expectations for how American 
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society should treat them. In the month between the battalion’s move to Houston and the riot, 
numerous verbal and physical altercations broke out between black soldiers asserting their 
equality and white construction workers and policemen who resorted to the same brutal coercion 
used against black civilians who challenged the color line. A common trigger for clashes was the 
white use of the “nigger” epithet towards soldiers, who retaliated with profane outbursts.364  
The Houston Riot/Mutiny also took place in a context of upheaval in the Twenty-fourth 
Infantry’s command structure. On August 21, the Army swapped the men’s colonel of two years 
for an inexperienced major who appeared more concerned with leisurely activities than his men’s 
well-being. Incredibly, dozens of experienced officers were absent training in Iowa. C. Calvin 
Smith is correct in attributing these misguided personnel decisions as a contributing factor to the 
mutiny, a decision that clearly ignored Secretary Baker’s “discretion and judgement” order. At a 
time when African Americans were struggling to cope with Jim Crow’s injustices and using 
military service to try to improve their socio-political standing, the Twenty-fourth’s mutinous 
battalion entered an environment with a more stringent and violently-enforced racial code than 
what they had been used to, all without the stability provided by their familiar officers.365   
As this situation illustrates, the Lone Star State maintained its reputation as particularly 
hostile to African-American military personnel. Company K’s captain remarked that “Every time 
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we have been in Texas we have had trouble.” Sergeant Cecil Green and his comrades predicted a 
continuation of this trouble “in Houston from [white] mobs.” Battalion commander William 
Newman wishfully hoped to forestall violence by ordering nearly everyone to disarm. Racial 
bloodshed was on the horizon the moment the Twenty-fourth arrived in a Jim Crow city.366   
The ordeals of late summer 1917 culminated in the latest example of racially-motivated 
police brutality. At 10:30 a.m. on the day of the insurrection, two city policemen, Lee Sparks and 
R. H. Daniels, raided a craps game played by several black children and slapped and arrested a 
black woman who sheltered the kids. For interfering with these apprehensions, Officer Sparks 
beat and placed Private Alonzo Edwards into custody. Sparks stood out on the Houston police 
force as a sadist fond of violently reminding African Americans of their inferior social status.367   
That afternoon, Corporal Charles W. Baltimore, a twenty-three-year-old native 
Pennsylvanian serving on the camp’s military police force, asked the two civilian policemen on 
San Filipe for the reason they arrested his comrade. While serving as a character witness in the 
resulting court-martial, Major K. S. Snow described Corporal Baltimore as a “very good man” 
who had received a recommendation to attend a black officers’ training camp. His fateful 
incident with Jim Crow justice pulled him into a path that ended his career advancement and 
shiny reputation. In response to the corporal’s comment that “I’m on duty on this beat and when 
I return to camp I must report,” Sparks proclaimed he “don’t have to report to any nigger.” The 
officials then pistol-whipped Baltimore’s head three times before jailing him. Battalion officers 
returned the injured corporal to camp by the late afternoon. Houston police chief Brock 
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suspended Sparks, knowing that any jury would exonerate him. News of the incident soon 
reached the Third Battalion’s camp, producing false reports that the police had shot and killed 
Baltimore. According to witness recollections, in the hours leading up to the mutiny, the 
perpetrators advised “their girls” against visiting camp that night, suggesting they were plotting 
violence. Troops verbally planned to march to the city to “raise hell” and kill every white civilian 
and policeman they encountered, since “they were not going to stand for it (abuse).” After a 
month of frustration over mistreatment from white Houstonians, members of the Twenty-fourth 
had finally had enough; that Baltimore survived his own attack did not matter.368  
What began as a series of reports, rumors, and discussions quickly morphed into a 
tempest of flying metal and blood. Major Kneeland Snow, Lieutenant Charles C. Snyder, and 
Captain Haig Shekerjian attempted to diffuse the situation by banning men from leaving camp, 
assuring them that Baltimore still lived, and informing them of Sparks’ suspension. Yet, the 
situation escaped the control of the commissioned officer corps.369  
The men became visibly restless, forming crowds in the company streets. They not only 
feared another white attack, but also assumed that their commanders’ disarmament order had the 
intention of preventing them from defending themselves. In response to rumors that a civilian 
mob was approaching, various noncommissioned officers and members of the rank-and-file 
charged toward supply tents, seizing weapons and ammunition rounds at around 7:30. Sergeant 
Vidal Henry reportedly commanded the men to hurry, conserve ammunition, fill their canteens, 
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and form a battle line. Contending that “we’re tired of seeing the soldiers beaten up,” those 
arming themselves wanted to “take the law into our hands.” Members of the group asked their 
commander, “Major, what are we going to do when they beat us over the head like that?” Snow 
replied that the protocol was for them to report such abuses to him. The major testified that a 
crowd of between twenty-five and thirty on the company street excitedly threatened to shoot or 
“bore” him if he took another step forward. Snow’s orders to disarm and warnings fell on deaf 
ears. As the mutinous crowd started becoming agitated, Lt. Snyder and Captain Shekerjian issued 
orders to “take in rifles and fall in,” as well as for the placement of guards around supply tents. 
Fifty-two men of Company K complied. However, a number, including McWhorter, Burkett, 
New, T. Jackson, and Walter Johnson, refused to put their rifles down. A corporal tasked with 
guarding the supply tents notified a lieutenant that “it looked like a mutiny” was forming. The 
mutineers’ anger steadily intensified to the point that they accompanied their death threats with 
rifles pointed at their battalion commander. Feeling his life now in danger, Major Snow rushed to 
the other end of the fort to gather a suppression force. Witnesses suddenly and repeatedly heard 
the declarations “Here comes the mob!” and “Here they come” from men in all three companies, 
including Sgt. Vidal Henry, Frank Johnson, and Pvt. James Divine.370  
At this moment came the breaking point, when Company I’s Private Frank Johnson 
discharged his weapon. The rest of the mutineers opened fire in multiple directions between 8:00 
and 8:30 pm, creating a chaotic scene in which other soldiers ran for cover. The terrified 
shooters, blinded by the night and deafened by their barrage, accidently wounded several 
comrades and killed one. Next, Privates Kane, Wardlow, and Taylor declared, “Let’s go and get 
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the man than shot Corporal Baltimore.” Witnesses identified Sergeant Henry as the main 
ringleader, with the following performing secondary leading roles: Corporals Baltimore, 
Wheatley, Brown, and Moore; and Privates Pat McWhorter, Risley Young, and Frank Johnson. 
A second-generation soldier, Henry had served in the Army for thirteen years, during which he 
developed a reputation for discipline. Wheatley, Brown, and Moore stated their intention to “go 
downtown” and “shoot up the town.” Prioritizing keeping their local surroundings, rather than 
the world, safe for democracy, mutineers also shouted, “To hell with going to France. Let’s clean 
up the ___ city.” Demonstrating the legacy of Buffalo Soldier resistance to white supremacy, a 
mutineer contended that “if it had been the 9th or 10th cavalry they would be already going.” 
After shooting for between five and fifteen minutes, the hundred mutineers headed to Houston. 
Snow proceeded to warn the city of the attack.371 
The comment regarding how the Buffalo Soldiers’ cavalry wing would have responded to 
these circumstances gives us an insight into the black regulars’ inter-unit relations. While it is 
otherwise unclear from the record what reputations the cavalry regiments enjoyed in the infantry, 
the Twenty-fourth’s members likely had knowledge that the Ninth and Tenth repeatedly rebelled 
against white supremacy in earlier decades. The Houston episode served as the Twenty-fourth 
Infantry’s first revolt, while the Twenty-fifth Infantry had previously conducted two, one of 
which lacked solid evidence tying the unit to it, the Brownsville Raid. When taken together, by 
contrast, between 1867 and 1898, both cavalry units had nine mutinies or race riots under their 
belt. Perhaps in the depths of the despair these foot soldiers felt under the weight of Jim Crow, 
 
371 “Corporal Baltimore Boasted of Killing Policeman Daniels,” November 14, 1917, Ibid.; “Evidence Against 
Mutinous Negroes Shows Their Guilt,” November 15, 1917, Ibid.; “Self-Confessed Riot Participant Identified 
Many,” November 17, 1917, Ibid.; C. Calvin Smith, “The Houston Riot of 1917, Revisited,” in Buffalo Soldiers in 
the West, eds., Bruce Glasrud and Michael Searles, 204-205.  
284 
 
they concluded they needed to live up to their horse-riding comrades’ historical devotion to the 
tradition of martial manhood and black resistance in service of their race’s freedom.  
Continuing a trend dating back to the first black Army mutinies, these Buffalo Soldiers of 
1917 peer pressured the non-mutinous. Private Frank Draper later testified that as the mutineers 
departed from camp to attack Houston, each one asked him “Come on; ain’t you going?” 
Mutineers appealed to racial solidarity: “Let’s go stick by your race.” When a bugler complied 
with an order to play the “cease fire” sound, a mutineer snapped, “If you do not take that trumpet 
out of your mouth I’ll shoot it out.” Out of a desire for self-protection, Draper refused to 
surrender his rifle until being ordered a second time and Pvt. John Denty waited to report the 
formation of the mutinous group instead of immediately, as required by Army law.372  
A second, more severe storm of gunfire and bloodshed hit Houston into the early 
morning hours. Between seventy and one hundred and fifty men of the Twenty-fourth Infantry 
crossed the knee-deep Buffalo Bayou and marched on San Filipe Street across Houston’s white 
business district. Moving in military formation, the mutineers fired at white homes, individuals, 
and vehicles while sparing African Americans and whites who sheltered blacks.  
Though commanded by a corporal committed to military order, and accused by whites of 
crafting an intricate conspiracy, the men’s march through Houston contained elements of a 
rampage with random targets. This adds weight to the argument that the mutiny was solely a 
spontaneous action, but Henry’s attempts at keeping the body of troops organized and continuing 
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to recognize these men’s acutely frustrated state of mind confirms that the city assault constituted 
an act of revenge planned in the short-term. Sergeant Henry, along with Harrison Capers, issued 
orders to fire. During the carnage, numerous white civilian men, women, and children suffered 
minor and fatal wounds and a multitude of buildings, vehicles, and trees sustained bullet holes. 
Teenager Mary Winkler testified that when her family observed the invading Buffalo Soldiers 
passing next to their home, they said “There they are” and fired, blowing off her brother’s arm. 
Other statements quoted by witnesses proving vengeful desires included “Let’s show the white 
folks what we’re made of,” “Let’s get the white trash in their shacks,” and “We’re going to take 
care of this __ __ __ town tonight.” Leaving one’s lights off increased the chances that the 
soldiers would spare a house. Other civilians were shot while riding in an automobile, an 
ambulance, on horseback, or on the San Filipe Street car line. Authorities found two corpses with 
multiple bayonet wounds, as well as the slain jitney driver E. M. Jones’ nearly-severed arm. As 
the raiders marched by, a number of black civilians cheered and shook their hands.373 
Authorities launched a riot call. Eight hundred militiamen and six hundred Illinois troops 
arrived to quell the revolt. Commanding General Haden placed the city under martial law. 
Furthermore, these white soldiers excavated ammunition and weapons that the mutineers had 
buried under dirt or wood. Police forces also entered the scene.374  
The mutineers battled these counter-mutiny forces. At one point, at least a dozen troops 
intercepted a police car and disarmed its occupants. The band proceeded to verbally and 
physically assault these enforcers of Jim Crow’s sanctioned white supremacist violence. A 
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survivor from this group, C. E. Carter, discharged his shotgun at the black soldiers, giving 
Privates Pat McWhorter, T. Jackson, and Callie Glenn minor buckshot wounds. The fatal 
stabbings the soldiers inflicted on Officer Ira D. Rainey opened up his insides, while a bullet 
penetrated his heart. When Captain Mattes of the Second Illinois Field Artillery arrived on this 
scene along with Private Alpheus Jones of the coast artillery, a police officer, two corporals from 
the Fifth Texas Infantry, and a civilian named Zimmie Foreman, mutineers fired on their car, 
wounding the driver, causing it to crash into a store. The troops twice used the exclamation “Stab 
that ___!” when they identified the car’s occupants. In the resulting morbid bayonet attack, a 
witness from across the street “saw the army’s officer’s (Mattes’) head…stabbed to pieces.” 
Only Jones and Foreman survived this attack. With Officer Lee Sparks unavailable, Corporal 
Charles Baltimore used the riot to enact deadly vengeance on the other policeman involved, Rufe 
Daniels. As he boasted, “I didn’t get the man who beat me, but I got his partner.”375   
As dawn arrived on August 24 and over the next two days, the mutineers ran out of 
steam, entering civil and Army custody with no resistance and looking exhausted, dirty, and 
defeated. They likely came to the sobering realization that they would soon face unsurmountable 
government resistance. Most of those jailed possessed firearms and hundreds of rounds of 
ammunition. Captured rioters eventually went under the guard of the white Nineteenth U.S. 
Infantry before marching with the battalion back to Columbus, New Mexico. Either to escape the 
pain from wounds incurred during the revolt or to avoid the wrath of the criminal justice system, 
Sergeant Henry committed suicide. In a last act of camaraderie, he said “good-bye” to fellow 





his skull detached. The rebellion ended with fifteen dead whites, of whom four were policemen 
and two were military personnel, and dozens wounded. Meanwhile, the black raiders lost two.376  
These black troops’ frustrations with the grave harms Jim Crow inflicted drove them to 
forcibly resist. It did not matter that white policemen had merely beaten a comrade. The anger 
boiling over from previous incidents and the possibility that the current one proved worse 
brought them on such a course, as their predecessors had experienced for decades. Due to the 
removal of their respected officers, when emotions became intense, the men did not trust their 
replacements’ assurances of justice and safety. The Houston Riot illustrates the power of rumors. 
Just as white supremacists since slavery believed a black insurrection was always around the 
corner, African Americans’ subjection to chronic, severe mistreatment in the era of segregation 
and lynching made them assume any rumor of white mob violence possessed validity.  
Adding insult to injury was the wide gap between expectations and reality. The crushed 
dreams of finally enjoying greater respect for volunteering to serve their country in uniform 
exacerbated the bitterness pushing these members of the Twenty-fourth Infantry to defy their 
officers and kill police and civilians. Over a half century after slavery collapsed, African-
American soldiers still faced a racial caste system almost as hostile to black men in arms 
demanding humane treatment as the old order their grandparents overthrew.  
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The racial consciousness of the mutineers is apparent from the background of their 
ringleader. Sergeant Henry previously raised funds for the victims of the East St. Louis riots, a 
white supremacist atrocity. Disgusted with white mob violence, Henry struck back with black 
mob violence. C. Calvin Smith uses officers’ comments on Henry’s loyal, polite personality and 
poor command skills, and the ways in which the prosecution offered black witnesses immunity 
and asked leading questions, to refute the claim that Henry served as the ringleader. While Smith 
makes a logical point, black mutineers of all eras were not always preexisting troublemakers; 
when calm and collected people endure enough psychological strain, they can act 
uncharacteristically hysterical and vicious. Yet, despite the claims of white contemporaries, no 
evidence exists that Henry or any other perpetrator organized a premeditated rebellion.377  
Not just their personal experiences, but also the culture and society in which these men 
grew up, confirmed the failure of the Civil War and Reconstruction generation to secure its 
ambitious goals for a more egalitarian American republic. Coupled with an erosion of their 
socio-political status, they witnessed the progression of a cultural wave that lionized the Lost 
Cause and sectional reconciliation while forgetting the Civil War’s emancipationist legacy.378 
While preparing to serve their country in a worldwide crusade on behalf of democracy, providing 
the opportunity to reverse these horrific trends in American race relations, they found themselves 
forced to confront the top domestic enemy of their U.S. citizenship rights before they could meet 
the main foreign enemy. As warriors, they took this military campaign to a local outpost of the 
Jim Crow racial regime that directly attacked their comrades, rather than passively endure it and 
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wait to use their soldiering skills on Germans they had never met. The occasional mutilation of 
the mutineers’ targets and the targeting of every white individual they encountered spoke to an 
intense rage. With this generation of black soldiers seeing their people slide into an oppressive 
racial caste system and their white officers acquiescing to this order, it is little wonder why one 
hundred troops reacted so belligerently in Houston in 1917. The mockery Jim Crow made of 
black freedom revealed that the long emancipation process had regressed to a dangerous level. 
Paying a high price for their insurrection, the perpetrators felt the full blow of the military 
justice system. Over one hundred members of Companies I, L, and M were prosecuted in three 
courts-martial in late 1917 and early 1918. The first was the largest in U.S. Army history, with 
sixty-three men tried. Charges accused them of disobeying orders, mutiny, murder, and felonious 
assault, of which the judges convicted every defendant. According to the Army, in disobeying 
their battalion commander and in gathering weapons with which they, with premeditation and 
during a time of war, killed city policemen, the defendants “did forcibly subvert and override 
military authority…with the intent of marching upon the City of Houston, Texas, to the injury of 
the persons and property therein situated.” Survivors of the riot often testified to the courtroom in 
crutches or while displaying the bullet that pierced their bodies, providing emotion-eliciting 
signs of guilt for the defendants. During the proceedings, white witnesses tended to struggle to 
identify specific individuals when detailing their accounts, and the dark, rainy nature of the night 
cast doubts on any positive identification. Black soldiers who did not rebel gave the specific 
names of those they saw return from the city. Twenty of the jailed mutineers turned state’s 
evidence. In their plea deals, they stated that their comrades coerced them into participating in 
the revolt, either true or a means for the men to minimize their share of the responsibility. 
According to the head prosecutor, Major D. V. Sutphin, the case determined guilt based on 
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conspiracy, meaning individual words and actions implicated anyone tied to the scheme. Mutiny, 
he believed, entailed not just active involvement, but also mere presence and compliance.379  
Headed by Major Harry S. Grier, the defense focused on alibis, as well as accusing those 
who cooperated with the prosecution of cowardice. The sixteen defendants who testified under 
oath generally contended that they hid in a building, tent, or among vegetation to save their lives 
from the approaching mob. Contradictions existed between these statements and those of 
corroborating witnesses. While these discrepancies resulted from either dishonesty or the fear 
among the civilians of facing prosecution for sheltering fugitives, they deprived alibis of 
substantiation. Hurting the defendants’ cases further was the frequency with which they 
answered questions under cross-examination with “I don’t know” and “I don’t remember.” 
Regarding the claimed flights to safety, the judges notified the accused that they needed to honor 
their duty to obey orders, exhibit loyalty to their officers, willingly die if needed, and recognize 
that being under fire is an expectation of enlistment. Regarding those who turned state’s 
evidence, Company I’s Grover Burns proclaimed that “these men are doing that to save their 
lives. They would recognize anyone the investigating board tells them to.” When someone faced 
the prospect of death or years of hard labor as a consequence for mutinying, they had the choice 
to improve their livelihood in exchange for betraying comrades, which the defendants refused.380   
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The second and third courts-martial of the Houston rioters were smaller affairs. Between 
mid-December 1917 and early 1918, eighteen faced prosecution for murdering a single 
individual—the jitney driver E. M. Jones—and for deserting their posts “in a mutinous manner.” 
All had served as guards for Camp Logan’s warehouses. In the final trial, held in February 1918, 
the remaining forty mutineers were tried for the same offenses as those of the first case.381  
Confirming the acute risk that all mutineers took throughout the long emancipation era, 
ninety-one percent—one hundred ten of one hundred twenty-one—of the Twenty-fourth’s 
raiders received convictions. Twenty-nine faced death. The court sent sixty-three to prison for 
life. Only the fortunate few with shorter sentences could be sure of returning to society. On the 
morning of December 11, 1917, in a scene illuminated by bonfires and the sunrise, the Army 
carried out the first trial’s executions. The clicking, snapping, and thuds heard at the gallows 
indicated that thirteen men had paid the ultimate price for resisting white supremacy. The Army 
performed the deed secretly and swiftly after conviction, forestalling a presidential review, 
appeal, or commutation. Ironically, Corporal Baltimore lost his life in 1917, not from abusive 
police officers in the late summer, but from Army executioners on the same winter morning as 
the other doomed men. In a final demonstration of the solidarity that drove them to do literal 
battle with Jim Crow, the condemned sang hymns on their way to the gallows. Convinced that 
the conspiracy persisted because the imprisoned never stopped maintaining their innocence, 
officials rejected calls for clemency. Meanwhile, Officer Sparks was acquitted of assault.382 
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Through petitions, the NAACP pushed for sentence reductions, with mixed results. The 
documents grounded their appeals on the men’s previously clean records, the “terrific burden” 
hostile white Houstonians posed to troops, and the speedy executions, which as one put it, “had 
savored of vengeance rather than of justice…a visitation upon their color rather than upon their 
crime.” Presented with 12,000 signatures from the civil rights organization, President Wilson 
commuted ten death sentences to life in prison. 50,000 more signatures in 1921 persuaded 
Warren G. Harding to cut five life sentences to fifteen-year terms. By the 1930s, the Army 
released every mutineer still in prison. These petitions represented a partial achievement for 
African-American due process rights. Along with the socioeconomic, familial, and bodily 
autonomy envisioned since the days of slavery, the proponents of full racial equality and the 
completion of the emancipation process needed to clarify that African-American freedom 
possessed substance only when black defendants stood trial on the basis of evidence and the 
nature of the crime. However, that the freedoms needed extensive lobbying and not the sympathy 
of a white judge advocate general, as was the case in the nineteenth century, further underlines 
the poor state of the long emancipation process in the early twentieth century.383 
White Americans interpreted the Houston Riot in terms that confirmed racial stereotypes. 
Houston’s white press sympathized with the civilian casualties, describing them during the court-
martial proceedings as “the bereaved, the injured…and the terror-stricken.” Meanwhile, the 
defendants constituted a “savage band” with a “ghoulish lust” for “human blood.” According to 
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the San Antonio Light, the mutiny’s true motivation was “race hatred.” The Atlanta-based 
Presbyterian of the South pessimistically reflected on what the mutiny meant for race relations 
during the rest of the Great War: “Those who know the negro, know that he is going to give the 
government some hard problems to solve before the war is over. It is going to require a great 
deal of…hard work to make him an obedient, dependable soldier.” For conservative whites, the 
Houston Riot proved that men who lacked the capacity for soldiering constituted the vicious 
beasts that long occupied their nightmares. That November, residents of Douglas, Arizona, 
received a warning from the Twenty-fourth U.S. Infantry that they “would see that the reputation 
of the 24th was maintained” if the town’s movie theater showed Birth of a Nation. The mayor 
ordered the police to block its viewing. This threat proved fitting, since the unit rose up against a 
social order that justified its existence on the brutish black caricature depicted in the 1915 
film.384 
The African-American population sympathized with the defendants. During the trial 
proceedings, among the spectators were prominent black community members such as teachers, 
pastors, and Pullman porters. As the San Antonio Express described it, “the presence of 
these…race members seemed to shed forth a glimmer of light that…could be visibly seen on the 
faces of the accused men in the form of a smile of great appreciation.” After the Army carried 
out its punishments of the mutineers, the black press led an outcry. Writers refused to condemn 
the original offense, recommended revenge, and denounced what they saw as a miscarriage of 
justice. The NAACP-affiliated paper The Crisis painted the executed as “martyrs for the cause of 
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democracy.” Thus, like the Buffalo Soldiers, African Americans in general understood the 
Houston Riot in terms of what it revealed about the state of U.S. democracy. Both historians and 
Houstonians are still coming to grips with the legacy of this bloody tragedy.385  
African-American journalists had a case in condemning the manner in which the 
government punished the Houston rioters. A decade earlier, dishonorable discharges went to an 
entire battalion when not enough evidence existed to warrant a court-martial. That event, plus the 
execution of thirteen men in another battalion without a presidential review, demonstrated the 
great decline in the extent to which the U.S. Army honored the due process rights of its Sable 
Arm. In contrast, the eight troops sentenced to death for partaking in the also bloody San Pedro 
Springs mutiny fifty years prior all escaped execution. With the emancipation process in free fall 
in the early twentieth century, a mere accusation could lead to a black unit’s mass conviction by 
executive decision and the government was less likely to commute a death penalty. 
The mutineers emerging from the U.S. Army’s first black regulars between 
Reconstruction and the Great War occupy a central junction in the African-American freedom 
struggle. The original Buffalo Soldiers advanced the phase of the emancipation process 
following the disbanding of the USCTs and during the rebuilding of the Union; later generations 
ushered in the stage of this process tasked with countering the rise of a new racial caste system. 
These developments proved that the promises of the Civil War era were still out of reach and 
increasingly under siege for most African Americans, even as their formerly enslaved relatives 
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aged and passed away. At this point in time, mutiny and similar forms of resistance remained a 
desirable option for the least patient and most frustrated black men in uniform. Despite the U.S. 
Army’s four black regiments compiling a stellar record of service in the West and overseas, 
members endured murder and harassment from fellow countrymen seemingly incapable of 
appreciating them. When soldiers retaliated, with or without solid evidence proving they 
participated, they could not know whether they would enjoy leniency or suffer penalties devoid 
of opportunities for appeal or exoneration. The discharged men of Brownsville and the Houston 
uprising’s surviving veterans could only look forward to additional racial oppression in the 
interwar period. By the mid-twentieth century, the last generation of Buffalo Soldiers, along with 
a new wave of African-American units on land, sea, and air, took advantage of another world 
war and later, a regional conflict to launch further attempts at completing the emancipation 















The range of choices uniformed African-American men faced when deciding how to best 
advance the long emancipation process during the nineteenth century—to mutiny, riot, petition, 
testify for or against comrades, suppress a revolt, or continue doing one’s duty—set the stage for 
their twentieth-century descendants who continued to confront racism. From the American 
Revolution to the Great War, African Americans hoped that military service would finally 
persuade their white countrymen to recognize their right to bodily autonomy, family stability, 
and socioeconomic independence. When sobering realities contradicted this dream, and 
authorities ignored their plight, they viewed work stoppages and armed confrontations as their 
only remaining recourses. As African-American society organized to return the country to its 
egalitarian roots between the 1940s and 1970s, frustrated black servicemen did their part by 
tapping into the same tradition of black resistance that began under slavery and gained steam in 
civilian free labor arrangements and the armed forces. Whenever the possibility existed for 
African-American citizenship rights to expand in the midst of an armed conflict and an 
existential crisis for the republic, there was usually a corresponding increase in the number of 
munities in black units, which in turn formed part of a broader effort to realize the dream of 
racial equality. The repressive nature of American race relations during the Jim Crow era filtered 
into all branches of the armed forces, making resistance outside of the Army more common than 
ever as the country waged war against fascism and communism. While the Army’s land units 
held a monopoly on black mutinies since the Civil War, starting in World War II, the sable arms 
of both the Navy and what eventually became the Air Force launched their own mutinous waves. 
The Navy’s decision to segregate between the 1890s and 1910s marked a key 
development which led, in part, to this increase. The resulting changes in recruitment caused the 
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New Navy's black personnel to assume a subordinate status and shrink to historic lows; black 
sailors made up under five percent of the Navy during the first decade of the new century and 
just one percent by the First World War. Whenever a black petty officer from the Old Navy 
retired, a white man replaced him; new enlistees’ training confined them to mess, engine room, 
and officer service. In 1919, the Navy ceased enlisting African Americans altogether. The Navy 
reopened black recruitment in the 1930s, but only in service-related roles. This dramatic shift in 
naval race relations produced an image of the branch as a hostile place for African Americans. 
The emergence of an acute racial hierarchy in the Navy increased the likelihood of racially 
motivated mutinies by black sailors.386 
Naval segregation paralleled a broader attack on black freedom across society. White 
southerners feared that black World War I veterans stationed in the North had acquired a 
rebellious streak, and white northerners resented the job competition brought by black migrants. 
Both trends caused a spike in lynchings and other race violence. Additionally, as military 
aviation developed during the interwar period, racial barriers to skilled training prevented all but 
a few blacks from becoming military pilots. The early twentieth century thus brought the 
emancipation process to its lowest point in decades. At mid-century, a militant generation 
revolted en masse against this system to jumpstart the emancipation process.387  
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Signs of this new resistance appeared early on. In 1907, in Redondo, California, a black 
sailor named Epps defied a ban of his participation in a dance. Several white sailors attempted to 
eject him, during which they brutally beat Epps while shouting, “lynch him!” Police officers 
rescued the black sailor before the white shipmen could carry out the grisly deed. Commenting 
on the New Navy’s racial regime, the press documenting the incident commented that, “the color 
line is strictly drawn in the navy in social matters.” A decade later, the militant energies 
unleashed by the Great War inspired African-American veterans to form militias, challenge 
racist laws, and advocate for racial equality worldwide. Meanwhile, African Americans who fled 
Jim Crow via the Great Migration became more cognizant of their subordinate status in a 
democratic republic. A movement towards ever-greater militancy and collective action was 
brewing.388  
Black military historians generally agree that the Second World War constituted a 
watershed moment in race relations and civil rights. However, scholars of the mid-twentieth-
century integration of the American armed forces disagree over whether it took place during 
World War II or whether the conflict paved the way for it in later years. The numerous mutinies 
of the Second World War and the Vietnam conflict support a more nuanced interpretation that 
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like the long emancipation in general, the progress of the modern civil rights struggle within the 
military was gradual and as such, rarely advanced enough to forestall mutinies.389    
In a call back to the nineteenth century, an acute demand for manpower pushed the Navy 
and Army Air Corps to gradually lessen its racial restrictions. As the country mobilized for 
global war, every military branch began increasing its African-American representation through 
the Selective Service Act. In early 1939, President Roosevelt’s Civilian Pilot Training Program 
started recruiting African Americans, who by 1941 created the first black combat squadrons. At 
Tuskegee, Alabama, the first African-American combat aviators received training, albeit in 
segregated command structures and while barred from becoming instructors. In March 1942, 
President Franklin Roosevelt ordered Navy Secretary Frank Knox to increase black enlistment. 
By March 1943, every military branch exhausted the pool of white volunteers, prompting them 
to begin increasing their proportional share of black recruits and lessening racial restrictions. The 
war saw the first African-American sailors win officer commissions. By 1945, 5.5 percent of 
sailors had African ancestry, high by twentieth-century standards. Despite shortcomings, the 
causes of black autonomy and upward mobility continue to gain ground. When they encountered 
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hurdles to this progress, African-American servicemen, including sailors, decided on mutinous 
behavior as a last-ditch means of overcoming them.390   
World War II’s black naval mutinies resulted from what Lieutenant Dennis Nelson, the 
most successful of the Navy’s first black officers, accurately described after the war as “lack of 
advancement,” along with “intolerable social conditions and unfair treatment—conditions which 
they sought to remedy or to openly resist in one form or another.” Although Nelson thought 
Army mutinies more violent than Naval ones, a fresh look at the African-American mutinies of 
the 1940s finds more commonalities across the sable arms of both branches, a reflection of the 
greater militancy of African-American society in general by the mid-twentieth century. Further, 
igniting mutinous and riotous spirits was how northern blacks used their upbringing in a freer 
region to push change in the more oppressive South. Through mutinies, we can examine a 
reversal of the Great Migration’s South-North trajectory. Northern-born black servicemen 
stationed in the Jim Crow South during the Second World War would have felt that their own 
advancement in the long emancipation process resulting from their families’ migration was in 
danger of regression to the level of black southerners who stayed.391 
The work stoppage form of mutiny remained part of black mutineers’ repertoire during 
the Second World War. The largest and most notable example involved blacks working at the 
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Port Chicago Naval Magazine in the San Francisco Bay area, built in the aftermath of the Pearl 
Harbor attack. Here, dockworkers paused their duty to demand safer working conditions. 
Mirroring the equal pay mutinies of the Civil War, this episode eighty years later sought rights 
and used methods traditionally associated with labor activism. Further, it presents a deadly 
example of the consequences of the New Navy’s segregated system. Due to the leadership’s 
decision to limit seagoing operations to whites, African Americans made up the bulk of the 
personnel at ammunition depots and magazines. Like USCTs in the Texas Expedition and 
generations of Buffalo Soldiers, the Port Chicago base required these individuals to perform 
grueling, tedious labor quickly and around the clock in geographic isolation and without access 
to recreation, a situation which reduced morale and increased discontent. A subsequent court of 
inquiry discovered that the black stevedores and their white officers stationed at the Port Chicago 
base lacked adequate training and proper safety regulations.392  
A tragic accident prompted the mutiny, which in turn attracted national attention. On July 
17, 1944, two cargo ships loading ammunition on the decks of Port Chicago exploded, killing 
three hundred men and wounding two hundred and fifty more. Two hundred and fifty of the dead 
were African American, and blacks also made up most of the wounded. On August 9, 1944, the 
survivors refused to resume their loading duties until the service improved their safety 
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conditions, fearing a repeat of the disaster. The naval district commandant and other officials 
spent a week persuading the men to return to duty. Gradually, most of the 400 men agreed to 
resume loading, with 208 losing three months’ pay for disobeying orders. A naval court-martial 
convicted the remaining fifty holdouts, now popularly known as the “Port Chicago 50,” of 
mutiny. They received dishonorable discharges and hard labor sentences ranging from eight to 
fifteen years. However, due to the justifiable circumstances, youth, clean records, and short time 
in the service, Rear Admiral Carleton Wright issued reduced sentences for forty of them. The 
African-American press and organizations objected to the mutiny charges, arguing that the 
officers merely asked, rather than ordered, the men to load and that court-martialing the men as a 
group wrongfully implied they were all equally guilty. NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall 
tried to appeal the decision through the Navy’s judge advocate general. However, in July 1945, 
the Navy Department deemed the sentences legal and the trial fair and impartial. Under 
subsequent public pressure, the Navy decided in January 1946 to overturn the convictions and 
restore the men to active duty on probation. The Port Chicago Mutiny and smaller-scale 
incidents persuaded the Navy to end the policy of disproportionately manning magazines and 
depots with black units. Though racism sparked black mutinies, due process rights and their 
promotion by activism reduced the severity of punishment for them.393    
Race riots persisted as a theater of black military resistance to white supremacy. The 
placement of black servicemen in white southern communities during World War II led to the 
same acts of martial masculinity as perpetrated by Reconstruction occupation forces and Buffalo 
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Soldiers in retaliation against civilian racism. Thus, these latest troops demonstrated a 
willingness to violently avenge comrades whom Jim Crow’s legions had attacked. 
Throughout the conflict, the Army stationed African Americans in and around 
Tallahassee, Florida. The northerners of the 1869th Engineering Aviation Battalion noted 
grievances during their time in this corner of the Jim Crow South: “Above all we have Southern 
White Crackers as officers over us who abuse us, and treat us worse than we would treat the 
lowest of dogs." The engineers next contended that Axis prisoners of war received better 
treatment than them. Such a situation contradicted with the respect they thought they deserved as 
members of the armed forces.394  
These tensions escalated by April 1945. Two hundred fifty soldiers and airmen from Dale 
Mabry Field and Camp Gordon Johnston assaulted Tallahassee’s Frenchtown. Using colorful 
language as threats, this group warned that they planned to “paint it [Frenchtown] red” and “tear 
it apart.” The raiders plundered businesses until civil and military policemen targeted them with 
tear gas and put them into custody. Like they had done for nearly a century, black men in 
uniform became so aggravated with racist abuse that they enacted bloody revenge via 
insurrection, the same course as the most desperate and courageous slaves of early America.395   
 
394 Gary R. Mormino, “Gi Joe Meets Jim Crow: Racial Violence and Reform in World War II Florida”; 
“Mistreatment of Negro Soldiers in Dixie,” Papers of the NAACP, pt. 9, ser. B, “Discrimination in the U.S. Armed 
Forces, 1918-1955,” Armed Forces Legal Files, 1940-1950, roll 13, 613-14 (quote); Jon Evans, “The Origins of 
Tallahassee’s Racial Disturbance Plan: Segregation, Racial Tensions, and Violence during World War II,” Florida 
Historical Quarterly Vol. 79, No. 3, (2001): 346-364.   
395 Tallahassee Daily Democrat, April 2, 4, 1945; Gadsden County News, April 5, 1945; Tampa Bulletin, April 21, 
1945, https://access.newspaperarchive.com/; For a mutiny in the western corner of the Jim Crow South, see Claire 
DeLucca “Both Sides of the Barbed Wire: Lives of German Prisoners of War and African Americans in Camp 
Claiborne, Louisiana, 1944-1946,” MA thesis, University of New Orleans, 2018; Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat 
Revolt and the End of the Solid South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 31-32; Adam 
Fairclough, Race & Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 2008), 78; James Albert Burran, “Racial Violence in the South During World War II,” 215; Papers of the 
NAACP, “Discrimination in the U.S. Armed Forces, 1918-1955,” Volume 2, file folder 0360. 
304 
 
As U.S. armed forces advanced around the globe during 1940s, mutinous actions 
advanced with them. With the great mutinous wave of World War II expanding geographically, 
the Navy again experienced racial rebellions of the sort historically reserved for the Army. In the 
second half of 1944, race riots erupted between black sailors and white Marines stationed on 
Guam. On Christmas Eve, 1944, a band of the latter fired on a group of the former and drove 
them out of the island’s main town for romantically pursuing native women. Later that evening, 
a truckload of white Marines attacked the African-American camp, threatening them and 
accusing a black sailor of throwing a stone at one white Marine’s head. On Christmas day, a 
rumor spread saying that a white Marine had killed a black sailor and wounded another. On 
Christmas night, without permission, forty armed black sailors left the depot in three military 
vehicles to inflict revenge. However, the black master-at-arms reported their departure, leading 
white military policemen to intercept the vehicle and apprehend the sailors. Their court-martial 
charged them with rioting and unlawfully possessing and using U.S. property. Many 
organizations on the mainland immediately worked on the sailors’ behalf until January 1946, 
when the Navy released and cleared the remaining thirty-six men serving time. The Navy sent 
those with shorter sentences or merely suspected of involvement in the incident to other island 
bases. These incidents at Guam represent a successor to 1860s-era acts of resistance against 
white attempts to regulate the intimate lives of blacks. From slavery to the modern civil rights 
era, personal autonomy remained a central feature of African Americans’ full emancipation.396 
For the first time since the Civil War’s equal pay campaign, the peaceful and aggressive 
protests of African Americans in World War II pushed the federal government to revise racial 
policy. In April 1944, President Roosevelt selected James V. Forrestal as the new Navy 
 
396 Dennis Nelson, The Integration of the Negro into the U.S. Navy, 82-84. 
305 
 
Secretary. Previously involved in the National Urban League’s civil rights efforts, Forrestal 
spoke out in defense of African-American sailors. As he informed Admiral King, he did not 
“think that our Navy negro personnel are getting a square break. I want to do something about 
it.” In his Guide to Command of Negro Naval Personnel, Forrestal advocated for a merit-based 
system, one in which “The Navy accepts no theories of racial differences in inborn ability, but 
expects that every man wearing its uniform be trained and used in accordance with his maximum 
individual capacity determined on the basis of individual performance.” However, the postwar 
years demonstrated that this alteration merely replaced de jure segregation with its de facto 
sibling.397   
While some African-American mutinies during the Second World War built on old 
traditions of black military resistance, others foreshadowed newer traditions, including the 
modern civil rights movement’s tactics of civil disobedience against segregation laws. In April 
1945, the 477th Bombardment Group, an all-black cadet unit and component of the famed 
Tuskegee Airmen, resisted the establishment of separate officers’ clubs while training to fly B-
25s at Freeman Field, Indiana. Formed in January 1944, this command never went overseas due 
to both its late arrival in the conflict and delays resulting from its navigators and bombardiers 
needing to train in different, segregated bases. Its existence owed to the wartime decision of the 
Army Air Corps, under pressure from the NAACP and the African-American press, to welcome 
black pilots for the first time. Freeman’s base commander painted the club reorganization as the 
creation of one for trainers, the other for trainees. However, the black airmen recognized the 
underlying racial aims of the action, prompting them to demand entry into the trainer (white) 
 
397 John D. Sherwood, Black Sailor, White Navy, 9-10 (first quote); Navy Department, Guide To Command of Negro 
Naval Personnel (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1945), 
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/g/guide-command-negro-
naval-personnel-navpers-15092.html (second quote). 
306 
 
club. As James C. Warren recollected, “We decided there was only one thing left to do: go to the 
club.” Unlike rebellions that escalated into violence or up-front embraced bloodshed, this group 
decided to engage in nonviolent direct action and simply walk into the club in several waves. 
Second Lieutenant Marsden A. Thompson walked into the club first. Coleman A. Young, of the 
same rank, observed white Lieutenant J. D. Rogers shove Thompson, who replied, “Take your 
hands off me.” White superiors ultimately put 162 members of the 477th into custody for either 
mutiny or refusing to obey wartime orders (to sign a formal endorsement of the new segregation 
policy). Warren reflected on the arrest: “It didn’t bother me a damn bit…We were young, 
educated, well trained and determined.” Fortunately for the men, their action was consistent with 
Army regulations, which guaranteed all officers membership in base officer clubs, and attracted 
protests on their behalf. Everyone except Second Lieutenant Roger Terry, who was fined $150, 
won exonerations. They afterward enjoyed a leadership change from a white commander to 
Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., a distinguished combat pilot who eventually became the Air 
Force’s first African-American general.398  
Despite being ahead of its time in terms of civil rights activism, the 477th’s stand against 
segregation in the Air Corps presents holdovers from the nineteenth century’s African-American 
mutinies. First, white officers classified even the most minor acts of resistance by black 
servicemen as mutinous if their effect was to challenge a social hierarchy. Also, regardless of 
whether the “Freeman Field Mutiny” accurately falls under the term’s definition or not, it 
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stubborn attitude toward constituted authority” stifled the military career opportunities of the Freeman Field 
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historically matches the standard for a racially motivated black mutiny. Like the USCTs and 
Buffalo Soldiers, participants in this episode benefitted from a recent breakthrough in the 
emancipation process (military aviation opening up to blacks) but stood up against limits to this 
breakthrough in the hopes of advancing their rights further. Finally, despite being charged with 
crimes punishable by death, the Freeman Field mutineers earned enough sympathy from other 
whites to avoid substantial punishment.  
Consistent with long emancipation mutinies across the decades, the above revolts from 
black sailors and airmen represent examples of African-American frustrations boiling over 
because white authorities had deprived them of a formal, legal recourse to settle their grievances 
and created an environment in which numerous grievances formed and festered. In the absence 
of such avenues, mere grumbling turned into physical and verbal clashes. Only white respect for 
black men’s due process rights and safety prevented such tensions from boiling over.  
Possessing white allies paid the same sorts of dividends during World War II as it did 
throughout the long emancipation. White commanders forestalled or reduced racial tensions by 
actively solving grievances, improving training, offering recreational opportunities, and fostering 
communication between white and black personnel. This was especially the case in the Second 
Air Force, whose commander General St. Clair Streett took a hard line against discrimination. 
Additionally, African Americans stationed at British bases enjoyed better treatment, and 
therefore were less prone to ill-discipline. As an aide to General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
remarked, “To most English people…the negro soldier is just another man…a jolly good 
fellow.” Likewise, the English press praised the respectful behavior of African Americans 
stationed amongst them. While black troops in the U.K. operated under a uniform command 
structure that reduced racial tensions, those stationed in the U.S. experienced a wide array of 
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racial climates based on their particular commander’s approach to the race issue. The variables 
of geography and personality remained paramount in encouraging or precluding mutinies.399   
The great number of black military mutinies during the Second World War led to debates 
over the proper course of action African Americans should take in the face of wartime racism: 
cautious gradualism or impatient resistance. A number of black leaders proposed alternative 
strategies to mutiny or other forms of resistance to racism in the armed forces. William H. 
Hastie, a judge, NAACP member, and Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, called on 
uniformed African Americans to focus on winning the war and to leave civil rights agitation to 
civilians like himself. While opposed to segregation and a proponent of civil rights within the 
FDR administration, he contended that “experiments within the Army in the solution of social 
problems are fraught with danger to efficiency, discipline, or morale.” The numerous black 
revolts across the U.S. military during the Second World War reveals that many African 
Americans disagreed. Resistance, according to these individuals, was a necessity in every 
institution of the country if their race had any hope of realizing their full emancipation.400   
Other public African-American voices, such as NAACP business manager George S. 
Schuyler, endorsed mutiny. In an op-ed for the Pittsburgh Courier, he cheered those “who have 
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400 William H. Hastie, On Clipped Wings: The Story of Jim Crow in the Army Air Corps (New York: National 




sufficient pride and courage to rebel against mistreatment and unfairness.” He singled out the 
mutineers of Port Chicago, Camp Rousseau, and Freeman Field, arguing that their discrimination 
in the military surpassed its civilian form in severity because in the former, they could not escape 
to a freer area like the participants in the Great Migration could. Because these sailors and pilots 
were “men” lacking a “slavish craven” character, they each lack “enthusiasm for his task of 
risking his life to perpetuate a system which humiliates him and his people.” To end the low 
morale that in turn sparked mutinous behavior, Schuyler argued that only one solution existed: 
“let him serve alongside his fellow citizens. Promote him according to his merits, and treat him 
as a hero.” Overall, “we must treat them (black soldiers and sailors) not as Negroes, but as 
Americans.” Only if whites finally agreed to stop blocking the culmination of the long 
emancipation process would the Army and Navy avoid black uprisings, which would in turn 
strengthen their fighting capacity through higher morale. The entire country would reap rewards 
from racial equality. African-American military mutinies had become so central to the long 
emancipation process and the long civil rights struggle that they had crossed over into the 
broader debate waging since W.E.B. Du Bois’ pro-resistance Niagara Movement first 
condemned Booker T. Washington’s Atlanta Compromise calling for accommodation.401  
For a moment, it appeared that the emancipation process would finally be completed in 
the American armed forces following the conflict against European fascism and Japanese 
imperialism. In a groundbreaking action, in 1948, President Harry Truman issued Executive 
Order 9981, which established “equality of treatment and opportunity” for all military personnel 
regardless of race. Lieutenant Dennis Nelson reflected that the recent series of pro-integration 
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naval directives “brought the nation closer to realizing its ideals” by removing racial barriers. 
Historians tend to interpret the Truman desegregation order as the culmination of the military 
sphere of the civil rights struggle or as part of a gradual process from the 1940s to 1960s. They 
point out that Army and Marine units successfully implemented Truman’s order on Korean War 
battlefields to boost efficiency, while the Air Force immediately embraced integration after it 
became an independent branch.402 
However, as recent scholars like John Darrell Sherwood and Natalie Kimbrough have 
revealed, a de facto version of segregation stubbornly persisted in the U.S. military into the 
1970s, especially in the Navy. The problem was multifaceted: African Americans consistently 
viewed the Navy as a prejudiced institution, discouraging them from joining in any role; white 
naval leaders had a weak commitment to recruiting blacks; poor test scores reduced the pool of 
prospective black officers under the Navy’s merit-based recruiting; and the perception among 
blacks across the branches that the justice system stood against them. After World War II, the 
number of black naval officers dropped from a wartime high of sixty to only three, while their 
overall percentage fell to three percent, with most black sailors returning to service roles. Despite 
the once strong African-American presence in the nineteenth-century maritime world, one vice 
admiral asserted that blacks were “not a seafaring people.” As Admiral Elmo Zumwalt put it as 
late as 1976, “as far as breaking down racial barriers was concerned, the Navy was marching in 
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the rear rank of the military services.” With the long emancipation process further along than 
ever but still incomplete, one more outbreak of black mutinies approached.403 
The Vietnam War, with the civil rights and black power movements serving as a 
backdrop, created the conditions for this outbreak. As higher-skilled whites flooded into the 
Navy and Air Force to avoid ground combat in Southeast Asia, the Army and Marines drafted 
disproportionately high numbers of working-class African Americans. The resulting high 
casualty rate for poor blacks in Vietnam enraged activists already demanding resolutions to 
poverty and police brutality in black communities. In the early 1970s, the Navy, to promote 
equal opportunity, relaxed recruitment standards following President Nixon’s scaling back of the 
draft. This new policy brought in an influx of African Americans with minimal education. 
Though promised socioeconomic advancement away from the violent, drug-infested, 
impoverished communities emerging in postwar American cities, this naval underclass did not 
receive the training and education needed to rise above servile labor. Since white naval 
management clung to institutional racism, the likelihood of racially-motivated black revolts 
remained high.404  
Early in the Vietnam conflict, U.S. ground forces primarily rebelled against racist 
superiors. Within the fragging epidemic among soldiers and Marines fighting in Vietnamese 
jungles were black enlistees who murdered white officers for dismissing grievances and 
frowning upon black organization. This trend increased in 1968 after Martin Luther King’s 
assassination and Black Panther Party calls for black troops to “start killing the racist 
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pigs…giving you orders.” These acts highlight how black men still felt that the Army constituted 
a wing of a white society that viewed their lives expendable. While ground forces were more 
integrated than those at sea, the process did not finish until after the Vietnam War.405  
In the latter years of the conflict, naval sites became the centers of black rebellion. A 
massive wave of sit-down strikes and riots hit hundreds of vessels and bases between 1972 and 
1974, including the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk. While stationed off the coast of North 
Vietnam and conducting airstrikes in mid-October 1972, this ship’s black crew rose up. They had 
endured a longer tour than scheduled and the most sorties of any aircraft carrier during a single 
Vietnam War deployment, which fatigued the men. To worsen the situation, whites held the 
ship’s most prestigious positions while blacks toiled as messmen, and segregated living quarters 
perpetuated racial othering and alienation. The black section housed men from urban ghettos 
well-versed in a culture that gave them, as African-American Commander Benjamin Cloud later 
testified, “no real sense of loyalty to any organization other than their black brothers.” Showing 
the influence of the black power movement, the black crewmen believed that “every deprivation 
of opportunity or privilege that the black man has had…can easily …be laid at the door of blame 
of the white man.” On October 12, petty squabbles in the mess hall over incorrect food orders 
and sailors accidentally stepping on comrades’ feet escalated to black sailors indiscriminately 
beating whites and issuing threats of “kill, kill, kill the motherfucker” against officers. Cloud 
finally restored order by making the black power salute and begging a crowd of 150 mutineers to 
adopt Martin Luther King’s peaceful approach to oppression, arguing that violence will only lead 
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to death. At least sixty sailors suffered injuries. Once the Kitty Hawk finished its tour, nineteen 
out of twenty-nine men were convicted for their participation. Punishments included pay 
forfeitures, rank reductions, and imprisonment; ringleader Airman Apprentice Terry Avinger, of 
Philadelphia’s black section, won release for lack of a speedy trial. Rather than the structural 
barriers to black sailors’ upward mobility, senior naval officials and congresspeople later blamed 
the Kitty Hawk mutiny on “thugs” and the early 1970s reforms, which they argued encouraged 
ill-discipline and radicalism. Going forward, however, the Navy focused on raising performance 
standards, coupled with affirmative action and the full integration of ships. By the turn of the 
twenty-first century, this shift bore fruit; the Navy has not just become more diverse, but its 
image among African Americans has become positive.406 
Despite the achievements of the African-American freedom struggle in the mid-twentieth 
century, black sailor mutinies, once rare and small in the nineteenth century, expanded, 
becoming larger and more frequent. This resulted from issues that once exclusively plagued the 
Army: a persistent gap in the expectations about, and reality of, military service; barriers to 
resolving grievances; and the perception of racial oppression from commanders. Yet, a 
difference exists between earlier mutinies and those of Vietnam. Commander Cloud convinced a 
riotous mob to stand down by reminding his men of the counterproductive nature of martial 
masculinity. Perhaps civil rights’ activists’ success with nonviolent resistance, coupled with the 
failure of black power’s call for armed self-defense, ended the reign of Frederick Douglass’ 
archetypal slave who was willing to spill white blood. 
During the two centuries in which African-American servicemen conducted mutinies and 
race riots, a few lessons present themselves. Their actions proved counterproductive for blacks 
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because they ignited white fears of black savagery and invited further retaliation. While fighting 
designated enemies on the battlefield could and did prove black men’s worthiness for citizenship 
rights, fighting one’s officers or civilians, no matter how abusive, did not prove to whites this 
same worthiness. However, when human beings feel victimized by injustice, some inevitably 
desire the most destructive and costly methods of pursuing justice, especially when they feel they 
have nothing left to lose. Additionally, whites made the specter of black insurrection a self-
fulfilling prophecy by continuing to oppress African Americans generation after generation. 
Whenever a branch commissioned racist individuals as officers and rarely adequately punished 
those who abused their authority, the U.S. armed forces fostered an environment fertile for 
mutinies from those victimized by such policies and actions. A cycle of ignorance and hatred, 
which provoked frustration and vengeance, became ingrained in Army and Navy culture. 
Regardless of how or whether they shaped race relations in the military or society at large, 
rebellion in the ranks characterized the military experience of thousands of African-American 
warriors from the early republic to late-civil rights era. Though comprising a small portion of 
their military careers, the numerous aspects of the mutineer experience became strongly 
imprinted on their memories: the intense sentiments and painful ordeals that provoked mutinous 
conduct, the thrill of participating in the action, the sobering reflections while sitting for weeks 
or months in custody, and the range of emotions—nerves, devastation, and embarrassment—
while being tried before their peers and superiors. 
The phenomenon of black military mutinies forces Americans to come to terms with one 
of the most difficult aspects of their past, and the tradition of black resistance that encouraged 
such mutinies continues to influence U.S. society and politics into the early twenty-first century. 
The history of American race relations can be seen as a continuous dance of “two steps forward, 
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one step back,” or vice-versa. In the current era, African Americans and their white allies 
continue to express frustration over the United States’ inability or unwillingness to fully purge 
itself of the fragments of slavery a century and a half after its destruction. Since the civil rights 
struggles of the mid-twentieth century, Americans have become more fully conscious of all 
forms of prejudice and have made unprecedented efforts in righting historical wrongs, from 
promoting greater upward mobility and educational opportunities to ensuring universal adult 
suffrage and increasing the proportion of people of holding political offices. However, African 
Americans remain disproportionately impoverished, under-represented in electoral politics, 
victimized by racial violence, and imprisoned.407 Therefore, the U.S. has yet to implement the 
full racial equality envisioned by slaves and freedpeople. While racially-motivated mutinies that 
once plagued the armed forces have become a distant memory, African Americans maintain their 
tradition of resistance to white supremacy, building on the mutinous actions of their ancestors, 
along with the non-violent lessons taught during the civil rights movement. Because African 
Americans continue to feel that the country has failed to live up to its egalitarian ideals, over the 
last decade, they have formed groups such as Black Lives Matter to bring attention to police 
brutality, clashed with white supremacists at places like Charlottesville, demanded steps to create 
a more equitable socioeconomic system, and joined fringe black separatist groups.  
Regardless of the utility of their methods, the USCTs, Buffalo Soldiers, airmen, and 
sailors who rebelled against racial oppression understood that the key to winning one’s freedom 
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was to continuously fight for it, avoiding complacency. Victories in human rights causes often 
prove fragile, hollow, and prone to reversal. As such, the black resisters of the long emancipation 
era acted vigilantly to acquire, preserve, and regain their rights. When the Navy changed its 
status from the most racially progressive branch to the most regressive on racial matters, black 
sailors’ likelihood of mutinying shifted from being rare to frequent. Whenever their 
compensation or physical treatment fell far short of expectations, black Army personnel from the 
1860s to 1960s rose up to demand a fairer military experience. Regardless of a social justice 
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